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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral dissertation weighs in on Olivier Roy’s and Stuart Croft’s diverging positions on Islamist 
radicalisation. To Roy and those aligned with his arguments, the phenomenon in question is a 
worrisome matter and should be treated accordingly. Conversely, as per Stuart Croft and those in line 
with his theories, fear over Islamist radicalisation is socially and culturally constructed to securitise 
Muslims and advance specific agendas. Applied to the Italian scenario, which position is ultimately 
right? Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a myth, or is it Rome’s worst nightmare? In a keen effort to 
contribute to the existing discussion, we completed one of the largest quantitative and qualitative 
analyses in the field exploring Italian Muslims’ views on religiously framed violence. Providing our 
definition of “Islamist radicalisation”, we determined the presence of an “Islamist outlook” through 
data from hundreds of questionnaires and interviews/focus groups. Though it is no nightmare, our 
findings show Italy cannot deem itself immune to prospects of Islamist radicalisation either, for Roy’s 
argument fits the Italian scenario best. As such, we tested a large number of models linking support for 
violence with various predictor parameters stemming from the most accredited theories on the drivers 
of radicalisation. No statistically significant support was found for theories proposing discrimination, 
economic disparity, outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression of Muslim, or any standard 
sociological variable, including gender and being a convert to Islam, as predictors. Similarly, neither 
“traumatic experiences” nor rational choice theory was supported by the data. By contrast, the most 
significant predictor variables relating to support for violence were taking offense against offenders of 
Islam and the endorsement of an Islamic, theocratic form of government (ideology). Social difficulties 
were fairly significant. Geography, “networks”, frustration, and uncertainty as for the wish to belong 
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A Machiavellian combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare, propaganda via the Internet 
and social media, and terrorism,1 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) still incarnates a major 
threat to international security. In spite of increased Western military action in the region spearheaded 
by U.S. President Donald Trump, the Caliphate still occupies portions of Syria and Iraq. Despite the 
fall of Mosul and the subsequent contraction of its area of control, ISIS has carried out or has claimed 
responsibility for attacks in major European cities such as Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Berlin, London, 
and Barcelona. Yet, what perhaps astonishes most Western audiences and governments is the fact that 
Muslim citizens residing in Europe have executed every single ISIS-related attack on European soil 
since 2015.2 And if the Caliphate succeeded in galvanising and mobilising European Jihadist terrorists, 
the group was arguably even more successful in luring Western Muslims to the Middle East. 
Estimations from various agencies refer to more than 7,700 Western foreign fighters responding to 
ISIS’s call to arms,3 4,000 of them from Europe,4 with France, Germany, the UK, and Belgium leading 
the chart. Around 1,200 combatants have departed from France, over 900 from Germany5, 850 from the 
U.K,6 and 450 from Belgium.7  
Home of the multiculturalist approach par excellence, Britain has not been spared from ISIS’s 
European terror-spree. Since March 2017, Britain has suffered 5 attacks allegedly linked to the Islamic 
State. More than that, fellow British Muslims or individuals living in the UK have been responsible for 
these attacks. Khalid Masood, a Muslim convert born in Kent, drove a car into pedestrians and then 
fatally stabbed an unarmed police officer in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster on March 22nd 
2017.8 Exactly two months later, 22 year-old British Muslim Salman Ramadan Abedi from Manchester 
                                                        
1 Cronin, Audrey. (2015). “Isis Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat”. 
Foreign Affairs. Vo. 94, no. 2. (March/April Issue), pp. 97-98.    
2 Please see Table 1 on page 48.   
3 Ranstorp, Magnus. (2017). In Vidino, Lorenzo et al. (2017). Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in 
the West. ISPI, Milan; ICCT, The Hague; The George Washington University Program on Extremism, Washington. 
Forward.  
4 Neumann, Peter. (2015). Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000. ICSR, Department of War Studies. 
King’s College London.   
5 Heinke, Daniel. (2017). “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; The Updated Data and Its Implications”. CTC 
Sentinel 10: 3. 
6 (2017). “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985 accessed on 25 April 2017.    
7 Van Ostayen, Pieter. (2016). “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks”. CTC Sentinel 9:6. 
8 Dodd, Vikram et al. (2017). “Police unravel multiple aliases of Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/23/westminster-attack-police-arrest-seven-people-in-raids-at-six-addresses 
accessed on 29 August 2017. 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detonated a homemade bomb at the Manchester Arena during a music concert.9 Likewise, besides a 
British citizen named Khuram Shazad Butt, authorities confirmed that the other two perpetrators of the 
London Bridge attacks had been living in the UK right until the date of the attack on June 3rd.10 Lastly, 
as already mentioned, Britain has been a steady reservoir of Jihadist foreign fighters. As a matter of 
fact, Britain counts more British Muslims fighting for ISIS than for the UK Army reserve.11 Among 
these 850 individuals was the group’s notorious executioner Mohammed Emwazi, a.k.a. “Jihadi John”, 
the then 28 year-old Westminster University graduate from West London.12  
But could the emblematic image of the British graduate dressed in black clenching a knife be 
just the tip of the iceberg of a much deeper issue concerning Islamist radicalisation in Europe? After all, 
calls for Sharia-patrolled areas in Germany,13 the refusal by a number of French Muslims to observe a 
minute of silence in honour of Charlie Hebdo’s victims,14 and more than 30 ISIS-related attacks in the 
Old Continent since 201515 do seem to pose a question of Islamist radicalisation. In other words, are 
Europe’s Muslim citizens undergoing a process of radicalisation? And if so, is Islamist radicalisation to 
be deemed a serious threat to European security, especially when potentially linked to Jihadist 
terrorism?  
Unsurprisingly, such topics are the fulcrum of two diverging academic positions. The first one 
contends Islamist radicalisation is a major issue, as it sees its potential connection to acts of political 
violence and terrorism. Following the 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London Jihadist attacks, Lorenzo 
Vidino claimed Europe clearly had a problem with radicalisation.16 More than a decade later, most of 
mainstream European academic experts still “think [Islamist radicalisation] is an urgent problem”,                                                         
9 Evans, Martin et al. (2017). “Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-bomber-salman-abedi/ accessed on 29 
August 2017. 
10 Knapton, Sarah et all. (2017). “Khruam Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: Everything we know about 
the London Bridge terrorists”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/05/ringleader-london-bridge-
terror-attack-named-khuram-butt/ accessed on 29 August 2017. 
11 McTague, Tom. (2014). “More Brits signing up to fight with Jihadist militants in Iraq and Syria than for the UK Army 
Reserve”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2659237/More-Brits-signing-fight-jihadist-militants-
Iraq-Syria-UK-Army-Reserve.html accessed on 28 June 2017.  
12 Freeman, Colin. (2015). “Ladbroke Grove connection- the wealthy West London district that bred Jihadi John”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11438534/Ladbroke-Grove-connection-the-wealthy-
west-London-district-that-bred-Jihadi-John.html accessed on 29 August 2017. 
13 (2014). “Locals concerned as ‘Sharia police’ patrol streets of German city”. Deutsche Welle. 
http://www.dw.com/en/locals-concerned-as-sharia-police-patrol-streets-of-german-city/a-17904887 accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
14 Sengupta, Kim. (2015). “Charlie Hebdo cover: We are not Charlie”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-cover-we-are-not-charlie-say-the-dissenting-voices-
angered-further-by-french-solidarity-9976166.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
15 Please see Table 1 on page 48.  
16 Vidino, Lorenzo (2009). “Europe’s New Security Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly. 32: pp. 61–75. 
  13 
contends Alex Schmid. 17 Even Olivier Roy, one of the most accredited voices in question, 
acknowledges that “Islamist radicalisation definitely exists and, without being alarmist, we have to 
admit it’s a serious matter”18 (Appendix 1).   
Others pundits beg to differ from such assumptions and debunk the supposed correlation 
between radicalisation and terrorism. According to Stuart Croft from Warwick University, not only is 
fear of Islamist radicalisation exaggerated, but is also socially constructed to securitise Islam and 
reaffirm British cultural superiority.19 By doing so, holds British scholar Tahir Abbas, mainstream 
society has been able to refrain from dealing with those controversial issues entangled in the tortuous 
relation between Europe and its Muslim citizens, namely denied rights and inequality for Muslims.20 
Ergo, in light of such a debate, the question that comes to mind is quite natural: who is right? Is 
Islamist radicalisation a perturbing, pressing matter in today’s Europe, as Roy says? Or is the very 
concept of radicalisation inflated and even constructed to securitise an entire group of people and not 
having to come to terms with the inability to provide equality for all, as Croft argues? 
While the whole study is committed to such inquiries, the latter does not actually feature a 
comparative analysis of multiple European countries. This is because Europe is not a monolithic entity 
and, although shared commonalities surely exist, European countries all differ from one another. As 
such, we believe that a forensic discussion that goes beyond the level of Europe and focuses on the 
nation states is a crucial starting point. And within the European context, we believe Italy provides an 
interesting case study in which to replay the discussion stemming from Roy’s and Croft’s observations.  
 
The Choice of Roy and Croft 
As we will discuss in the next chapters, the very notion of radicalisation is source of 
considerable confusion. In reality, “Radicalisation” is a relative and debated concept, which is often 
politicised and poorly understood. Aware of this, we deem Roy and Croft to be among the best experts 
our study can use to recreate the kind of fair, academic discussion we aspire to. Arguably the most 
renowned European pundit on political Islam, we chose Roy because he inserts religious 
fundamentalism within the European context –which is the milieu where this research operates. 
Pioneering works such as Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah featured in Chapter II 
                                                        
17 Schmid, Alex. (2015). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 3 June.  
18 Roy, Olivier. (2015). Interviewed by Michele Groppi, 18 June. Appendix 1.  
19 Croft, Stuart. (2012). Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
20 Abbas, Tahir. (2011). Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience. London: Routledge.   
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enable us to contemplate the journey and trajectory of political Islam within our societies.21 They make 
us ponder over the mechanisms and the sociological factors that cause malaise among many European 
Muslims, ranging from personal grievances to the interplay between globalisation, traditional culture, 
and identity crisis. As such, Roy allows us to reflect upon those dynamics and vulnerabilities that could 
be exacerbated and exploited by fundamentalist narratives. And as societies attempt to balance and 
internalise new facets of multiculturalism, Roy’s works let us appreciate the potential risks for Europe 
should the latter fail to cope with Islamist radicalisation. 
Yet, we also elected Roy because he is not alarmist or hostile to Muslims. While he 
acknowledges the seriousness of the matter, Roy entices no social divisiveness or securitisation of 
Muslim citizens. During an interview with the author, the French sociologist clearly stated that, “we 
don’t have to be alarmist. Yes, there is an issue with radicalisation, but there is no need for panic. If we 
do, then we do what the terrorists want” (Appendix 1). More than that, Roy is even critical of policies 
and behaviours that highlight individual differences within society. Rather, he believes Europe should 
tackle radicalisation by stressing nationality over religion and by creating communal feelings of 
belonging.22 Considering the type of controversy surrounding the notion of radicalisation, Roy’s 
attitude is vital for our approach to the study of Islamist radicalisation -for it reinforces our attempt to 
address such a sensitive subject through rational, constructive terms devoid of any alarmism or 
prejudice against Islam or Muslims.   
On the other end, we opted for Croft for two reasons. To begin with, not only does he question 
the relationship between Islam and radicalisation and Islam and terrorism; he goes even further by 
challenging the very established concept of security. As illustrated in Chapter II, Croft introduces us to 
ontological concepts of “Self” and “Other” that are socially, culturally, and politically constructed and 
accepted by mainstream society. Remarkable works such as Securitizing Islam allow us to ponder over 
the mechanisms through which British (and European) Muslims have become securitised within a 
constructed “Self” vs. “Other” dichotomy. To Croft, the whole matter is not about radicalisation and 
terrorism. Rather, it is about defending British (and Western) culture, which feels threatened and 
defines itself in juxtaposition to a Muslim “Radical Other.”23 As a result, not only do Croft’s works 
show that fear of radicalisation could be exploited and socially crafted to advance specific agendas; 
                                                        
21 Roy, Olivier. (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 
22 Roy, Olivier. (2007). “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. In Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael 
Emerson (eds), European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
pp. 55-6. 
23 Croft, Stuart. (2012). Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  15 
they also push us, especially those coming from counter-terrorism backgrounds, to critically examine 
the type of established discourse on radicalisation we have been taught. 
Nevertheless, Croft does not deny that there might be an issue with radicalisation and terrorism. 
On the contrary, he once wrote that none of his analysis “is to deny that there is a ‘real threat’; that 
there are real people, in real places, planning to kill others, supposedly in the name of Islam. That is not, 
and cannot be, in dispute.”24 Though critical of the whole narrative on security, Croft does not discredit 
violence and does not belittle apprehension over it. But he does invite us to carefully examine how our 
societies deal with the phenomenon in question. In doing so, not only does Croft encourage us to live 
up to the kind of democratic principles we have been preached; he also warns us that the continuing 
securitisation of European Muslims could backfire and, actually, increase chances of radicalisation.25 In 
reality, as Roy does in his conclusions, Croft too shows moderation.   
 And in the end, this type of cogitative moderation is exactly why we think Roy and Croft are a 
solid duo. While their positions and pieces of evidence are divergent, their final goal is the same: the 
search for a better society where all citizens feel part of it. Given the degree of animosity surrounding 
the discourse of radicalisation, by using Roy and Croft can we truly approach and appreciate the 
complexity of the phenomenon we are trying to explore. We can delve deep into issues of Islamist 
radicalisation and terrorism without intending any alarmism or securitisation of fellow Muslim citizens. 
At the same time, we can question and challenge the security discourse we have been taught without 
minimising the need for security. In other words, thanks to Roy and Croft, we can aim for the 
construction of a balanced, academic discussion that wishes for a better, more secure, and equal society.     
 
The Choice of Italy: Is the Country an “Exceptional” Case? 
Certainly, one could claim that Roy’s and Croft’s observations would better explore cases of 
nations that really do have serious issues with Jihadist terrorism and radicalisation. Nonetheless, as one 
might wonder why we did not choose Belgium or France, we think the Italian case study should still be 
examined for two main reasons. And these both rotate around the idea of Italy’s supposed 
“exceptionalism” in relation to Islamist radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism. As such, it could be 
argued that Italy is an exceptional case because, in contrast to Britain, Belgium, France or Germany, 
the country has so far not been torn by Jihadist attacks. Hence, according to this reasoning, what is 
                                                        
24 Croft, Stuart. (2012). Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. p. 255. 
25 Croft, Stuart. (2012). Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. p. 256. 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different in Italy? Is there is anything special about the Italian scenario that prevents radicalisation and 
terrorism? What shields Italy? 
Naturally, multiple attempts have been made to answer such a riddle. As Vidino reminds, 
terrorists have used Italy as a logistical platform in the recent past.26 Now, the country is still the main 
link between Europe and the North African and Balkan Jihadist routes.27 Were Italy to be stricken, 
terrorist groups would suffer themselves from the loss of an ideal pathway to the gates of continental 
Europe. To the then Minister of Internal Affairs Angelino Alfano, instead, the reason is to be found in 
the use of preventive tools such as monitoring and expulsions at the embryonic stages of investigation 
that allowed authorities to hamper terrorism.28 Journalist Lucia Annunziata has linked Italy’s marginal 
involvement in the anti-ISIS coalition and the lack of Muslim-inhabited ghettoes to the absence of 
terrorism.29 And to Arturo Varvelli from Milanese think tank ISPI, the answer is fairly straightforward: 
compared to other European realities, Italy counts fewer Muslims and, thus, less violent Islamists.30  
By contrast, it could be argued that, although Italy might seem an exceptional case, in reality, it 
is not. Anis Amri, the Berlin truck driver attacker, radicalised during his transition in Italy and was shot 
dead by police officers in Milan after fleeing Germany.31 Youssef Zaghba, the third perpetrator of the 
London Bridge attacks, was born and raised in Bologna.32 Coupled with reports of decennial Jihadist 
activity including thwarted plots, these cases may once again show Italy does not differ considerably 
from other European nations. Or, if anything, this type of evidence could suggest that the alleged 
Italian “exceptionalism” is diminishing.33 Perhaps it is no surprise that the 2016 Secret Services’ 
Report on national security deemed attacks by lone-wolves linked to ISIS considerably likely.34 To                                                         
26 Vidino, Lorenzo. (2014). Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of radicalization [Italian]. 
ISPI, Milan. 
27 Vidino, Lorenzo. (2017). In Rosini, Gianni. “Terrorism, Vidino: Italy is not a logistical base: but Lombardy, Emilia-
Romagna, and Veneto are Jihadist centres”. [Italian] Il Fatto Quotidiano. 
https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/06/07/terrorismo-vidino-litalia-non-e-base-logistica-ma-lombardia-emilia-romagna-e-
veneto-centri-del-jihadismo/3640721/ accessed on 10 June 2017.  
28 Alfano, Angelino. (2016). In Custodero, Alberto. “Alfano: ‘Prevention steady, Italy is a safe country’” [Italian]. La 
Repubblica. http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/08/15/news/terrorismo_alfano_prevenzione_ok_paese_sicuro-
146021579/ accessed on 10 June 2017. 
29 Annunziata, Lucia. (2016). “5 doubts as to why Italy is safe (but maybe not by much)” [Italian]. Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.it/lucia-annunziata/sicurezza-italia-terrorismo_b_11072118.html accessed on 10 June 2017. 
30 Varvelli, Arturo. (2016). In Giudici, Cristina. “Why is Italy still immune to terrorism?” [Italian]. Il Foglio. 
http://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2016/07/15/news/perche-litalia-e-ancora-immune-dal-terrore-98420/ accessed on 10 June 2017. 
31 (2016). “Anis Amri killed in Milan” [Italian]. Il Sole 24 Ore. http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2016-12-23/spara-
ad-agente-milanese-e-grida-allah-akbar-ucciso-polizia-102426.shtml?uuid=ADHVlRJC accessed on 25 April 2017.  
32 Tonacci, Fabio. (2017). “London attack, third terrorist identified: Italian-Moroccan Youssef Zaghba” [Italian]. La 
Repubblica. http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/06/06/news/londra_attentato-167383564/ accessed on 10 June 2017. 
33 Groppi, Michele. “The Growing Jihadi Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is Rapidly Diminishing”. 
34 (2017). Relazione sulla politica dell’informazione della sicurezza. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Sistema di 
informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica. Rome, Italy.  
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professor Lombardi, such likelihood would be “only a matter of time,”35 which, according to professor 
Orsini pondering over ISIS’s loss of ground in the Middle East, could even materialise in 2018.36  
Regardless of the correct interpretation of the situation, both approaches necessitate a 
comprehensive analysis of the Italian Muslim community. If one agrees with the idea of an Italian 
“exceptionalism”, then exploring the degree by which Islamist views accepting violence are shared by 
Italian Muslims is warranted. By this logic, would most Italian Muslims reject violence in the name of 
their religion and, if so, could it be that fear over Islamist radicalisation is truly exaggerated? Instead, if 
one maintains that Italy is not substantially different from other countries or that its special condition is 
changing, it is still worth assessing the potential penetration of Islamist ideas within the country’s 
Muslim community. Accordingly, would Italian Muslims be increasingly accepting violence in the 
name of their religion and, if so, could this represent a major challenge? All in all, no matter how one 
looks at the Italian milieu, we believe that Italy should still be a case worth investigating.  
 
The Aim of the Study  
Having elucidated the philosophical case for Roy, Croft, and Italy, the exact same question as 
before comes to be: who is right? Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a worrisome matter, especially when 
potentially linked to acts of terrorism, as Roy contends? Or is Islamist radicalisation socially 
constructed to securitise Islam, permit discrimination, and justify international policies, as Croft 
believes? Is indeed Islamist radicalisation in Italy a myth, or is it one of the country’s worst 
nightmares? 
As the two positions both feature valid points, our objective is to empirically explore and 
analyse Italian Muslims’ attitudes on religiously framed violence in order to attest which argument best 
fits the Italian case study. Given the provided evidence, could it be possible that Islamist radicalisation 
in Italy is really no pressing issue but “spurs” of radicalisation still emerge? Could we hypothesised 
that both Roy’s and Croft’s theories are ultimately inaccurate in the sense that one cannot generalise, 




35 Lombardi, Marco. (2016). “Why is Italy still immune to terrorism?” 
36 For more information, please see professor Orsini’s interview for an Italian political talk show: Orsini, Alessandro (2016). 
“Orsini: Possible attacks in Italy in 2018” [Italian]. Onmibus, La7 TV, 6 January. http://www.la7.it/omnibus/video/orsini-
possibili-attentati-in-italia-nel-2018-07-01-2016-171296 accessed on 10 June 2017.  
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Major Clarifications 
Before addressing the matter in question, there are several essential clarifications to be made. 
To start with, we are aware that our approach might have affected the outcome of the study. Since the 
beginning, we decided to solely focus on people’s attitudes and opinions. As such, we recognise that 
we have failed to appreciate certain categories. As we asked for people’s views on violence in the name 
of Islam, we have taken for granted the concepts of “religion”, “being Muslim in Italy”, and “violence” 
–with the latter conceived within the Italian milieu devoid of narratives of “resistance” and 
“oppression”, for instance. Further, we know that there are major schools of Islamic jurisprudence that 
differ from one another. We realise that individuals internalise religion and sacred tenets differently. 
And we agree with Frédéric Volpi’s claims that Western academia has generally scrutinised “Islamism” 
through Western lenses that depended on the various disciplines pundits pertained to;37 ergo, we 
recognise that our approach and conceptualisation of “Islamism” might have been shaped by the 
discipline we come from, that is, security studies. Aware of such shortcomings, we still decided to 
choose Italy, contextualise and define the term “Islamist” to fit our analysis, and solely focus on Italian 
Muslims’ opinions. Cognizant of biases and limitations, we just wanted to see if participants living in 
Italy would eventually support violence in the name of God and, if that were the case, which drivers 
were significant for their decisions. 
In doing so, we acknowledge that the controversial nature of the subject and our academic 
background might have also impacted the investigation. As we entered the Italian Muslim community, 
we must admit that most individuals who were asked to participate in the study eventually did not. 
There were several reasons for this. They were afraid to voice their opinions on such heated topics. 
They did not trust a non-Muslim researcher who came from a counter-terrorism background. And they 
preferred talking about racism, Islamophobia, and discrimination rather than Islamist radicalisation and 
Jihadist terrorism. Although we introduced ourselves with the sincere intention to grant Italian Muslims 
a voice, touching upon every aspect of their experience in Italy, most potential participants still 
refrained from taking part to the project. And those who did participate, self-selected themselves; this 
might have impacted results too, as the opinions we have scrutinised came from a small percentage of 
those who accepted the premise of the study and might not reflect what most Italian Muslims really 
think –though we firmly state that the study’s sample is nonetheless fairly representative of the overall 
Islamic community.  
                                                        
37 Volpi, Frédéric. (2010). Political Islam Observed. London: Hurst & Co. (Publishers). Introduction.  
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In light of this, while numbers are our study’s main contribution, we are not absolutist in 
relation to our empirical findings. Although we take pride in the kind of objective, scientific analysis 
our research is based upon, we are fully aware of the many challenges, limitations, and choices that 
might have affected the results. Being the best we could do given our resources and capabilities, we 
definitely deem our numbers true, but only within the contours of the study, its sample, its 
methodology, and its restrictions. As scientific as they are, numbers should not be approached in 
dogmatic terms; rather, we feel they allow us to “scratch the surface” of what we are trying to explore. 
In simpler terms, numbers make our project not the final destination but the starting point towards more 
solid and objective investigations on radicalisation. 
That clarified, although the study touches upon notions of Islamist radicalisation, this is no 
witch-hunt. In line with the rationale behind our choice of Roy and Croft, not only does this research 
refrain from assuming or fostering negative generalisations about Islam, Muslims, and Muslims in 
Europe; it also rests on the premise that holding “radical” views is not an issue per se, for the latter are 
not automatic precursors of violence. In truth, radicalisation and terrorism, for the most part, have 
nothing to do with each other. As Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko explain, not every terrorist 
is a radical and, more importantly, most radicals never become terrorists.38 As renowned expert Brian 
Jenkins has asserted during a correspondence with the author: 
Radical populations may be large. Terrorist numbers are tiny…In most western societies, radical 
views are themselves not illegal. It is only when a person plots or engages in violence or 
provides material support (the operative word here is “material”) to violent groups that it 
becomes a legitimate concern of law enforcement.39  
 
Along the same lines, the framing of the very idea of “ Islamist radicalisation” is crafted to 
avoid or limit any prejudice or bias. Equally to our choice of Roy and Croft, we opted for Robert 
Satloff’s and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definitions because they come, respectively, from the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the CISAC Centre at Stanford University – two 
institutions that have often approached issues of radicalisation and terrorism in critical and moderate 
terms. Hence, as illustrated in Chapter III, we used Robert Satloff’s definition of “radical Islamist” to 
clarify what constitutes radical Islamist views and how they may be related to violence.40 Likewise, we                                                         
38 McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2011). Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford: 
University Press, p.5. 
39 Jenkins, Brian. (2017). Email correspondence with Michele Groppi, 8 March. 
40 Robert Satloff is the Executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For more information about his 
take on theoretical frameworks regarding Islamism, please see Satloff, Robert. (2016). “Words Matter in the Fight Against 
Islamism”. The American Interest. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/01/words-matter-in-the-fight-against-
islamism/ accessed on 25 April 2017. 
  20 
utilised Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definition of “radicalisation” to ascertain its manifestation.41 This is 
particularly significant because it allows us to place Islamist views within “radical” contours that, 
though they may or may not justify violence, are not naturally linked to actual acts of violence. Simply 
put, Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definition enables the study to search for Islamist views justifying violence in 
the name of Islam without directly associating them to terrorism. 
Lastly, in order to identify signs or manifestations of Islamist radicalisation, we sought the 
assistance of the three most prominent leaders of the Italian Muslim community. Again, we are aware 
that this choice might have affected the whole take on the study too. As the Islamic community 
struggles at finding an entente with the Italian State -which would grant Islam in Italy official 
recognition and benefits- Imams might already have preconceived, established agendas. That is, in an 
effort to normalise and engage with authorities, Imams might already conceptualise and reject violence 
for the sake of being accepted. Aware of this, we still sought and obtained help from the head of the 
Union of the Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII) Imam Ezzedin Elzir,42 COREIS’s vice president 
Imam Yaha Pallavicini,43 and secretary of the Italian Islamic Confederation (CII) Massimo 
Cozzolino.44 Having assessed their potential preconceived take on violence, the established discourse 
on radicalisation, and Islam’s status in Italy, we agreed with the three leaders that the best way to 
analyse potential instances of radicalisation was to scrutinise respondents’ opinions about the following 
topics: justification of violence in defence of Islam, duty to punish offenders of the Islamic faith, and 
support for Al Qaeda and ISIS.  
 
A Brief Note on Methodology 
Bearing such clarifications and suggestions in mind, we explored Italian Muslims’ views on the 
above-mentioned matters to examine the Roy vs. Croft discussion. Although we will explain every 
aspect of our methodology in Chapter V, the analysis featured 440 questionnaires and data from 200 
subjects participating in interviews and focus groups executed in 15 Italian cities including Milan, 
Rome, Turin, Naples, and Florence. In order to compare results with mainstream society, 440 Italian 
non-Muslims were also surveyed. In spite of several methodological considerations and restrictions                                                         
41 Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja is the Director of the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence Academy and associate 
professor at the Department of Political Science at Stanford University; Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. (2010). “Violent 
Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33: pp. 797–814. 
42 Union of the Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII). 105, Via Masaccio, 50132, Florence & 17, Via Tor de’ Schiavi, 
00172, Rome. 
43 Islamic Religious Community (COREIS). 9, Via Meda, 20136, Milan. 
44 Italian Islamic Confederation (CII). 156, Via Ferrarese, 40128, Bologna.  
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encountered throughout the process –which will be addressed in the methodology section-, such 
empirical data allowed us to assess the presence of what we labelled a potential “Islamist outlook”.  
This was composed of those attitudes justifying violence framed in Islamist terms. That is, we 
included the answers in the questionnaires and interviews/focus groups that agreed with the right to use 
violence in defence of Islam, the duty to punish its offenders, and the support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. 
Our objective has in fact been to search, quantify, and study these answers indicative of a potential 
“Islamist outlook” with the intent to test our hypothesis –about “spurs” of radicalisation- and contribute 
to the overall discussion on radicalisation.   
 
The Contribution of the Study 
We think that this study constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of 
radicalisation for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the investigation features one of the largest 
quantitative analyses about theories of Islamist radicalisation at macro level. In truth, Rachel Gillum 
and Ruud Koopmans have investigated religious fundamentalist views by both Muslims and Christians 
in the U.S. and the Old Continent.45 The Pew Center has explored Muslims’ views about terrorism and 
mutual perception between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe.46 A number of polls conducted in the 
UK, France, and Germany have surveyed local Muslims’ views regarding ISIS or Jihadist terrorism.47 
And a study by three conjoint institutions, ISPI, ICCT, and George Washington University, has offered 
a greatly valuable assessment of Islamist radicalisation through the study of Jihadist attacks in the West 
from 2014 to 2017.48 
Nevertheless, no study so far has been assembled to statistically test assumed casual models of 
Islamist radicalisation at the macro level. Hence, not only does the project in question address the Roy 
vs. Croft discussion, but it also replicates it in a new case study –namely Italy. Being one the first ones 
of its kind, the study also sheds light upon the academic debate on theories of radicalisation, verifying, 
if radicalisation is indeed occurring, which drivers from the abundant literature review can be best 
associated to support for violence justified in Islamist terms.  
                                                        
45Gillum, Rachel. (2013). “There is no difference in religious fundamentalism between American Muslims and Christians”. 
The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/16/no-difference-in-religious-
fundamentalism-between-american-muslims-and-christians/ accessed on 27 June 2017; Koopmans, Ruud (2015). “Religious 
Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 33-57. 
46 Lipka, Michael (2017). Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world. Pew Research Center, 
Washington DC.  
47 These are all featured in both Charter I and II. 
48 Vidino, Lorenzo et al. Fear Thy Neighbor.   
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More generally, this investigation could also contribute to the very own discipline of 
radicalisation studies. According to professor Alex Schmid, this field of research is in desperate need of 
a reconceptualization of the very concept of “studying radicalisation”, which has often been 
inconclusive and risks evanescing. To the Dutch expert, the notion of “Radicalisation” remains useful 
in explaining the potential transition to terrorism, as long as it is detached from violence, is applied to 
larger groups of individuals, and is studied at the macro level.49 Hence, the study in question follows 
professor Schmid’s directions, for it clearly separates “Radicalisation” and violence and conducts 
quantitative analyses at macro level. 
Further, the project’s findings could also be valuable to Italian policymakers and institutions. 
The study could indeed enhance the debate on Islamist radicalisation, especially given the lack of 
substantial academic pieces on the matter in question. Surely, there have been copious amounts of 
journalistic articles about Jihadist-related activity in Italy,50 as well as few but interesting studies 
elucidating the Jihadist-inspired threats and certain prospects of radicalisation and home-grown 
terrorism in the country.51 Indubitably the most distinguished Italian expert in this field, Lorenzo 
Vidino has provided, in fact, an essential, brilliant picture of the whole Jihadist movement in Italy, 
focusing on its history, mechanisms, germinal case-studies of home-grown terrorists, and future 
implications tackling home-grown terrorism.52 
Likewise, an EU report has explored European (and hence Italian) security perceptions,53 briefly 
touching upon the general issue of terrorism, while a few Italian investigations surveyed Italian 
Muslims’ perspectives on integration and social status in the country.54 Similarly, the Leone Moressa 
survey from July 2015 has provided remarkable insights as to how Italian Muslims feel about ISIS and 
matters of Islamist terrorism. Still, no study up-to-date in Italy has solely attempted to explore Italian 
Muslims’ views accepting violence, test casual models of Islamist radicalisation, and then compare 
results to the ones obtained by Italian non-Muslims. 
This research could also further the discussion on issues of integration and coexistence. 
Although Muslim presence in Italy is significantly inferior when compared to other European countries                                                         
49 Schimd, Alex. (2013). “The End of Radicalisation?”. ICCT, The Hague. Schmid’s argument about the 
reconceptualization of the very concept of “Radicalisation” is fully elucidated in Chapter II. 
50 Dozens of them are the bulk of the evidence of Michele Groppi’s report on Jihadist-related activity in Italy since 2001.   
51 Bjorkman, Carl. (2011). “Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in Italy”. In Magnus Ranstorp, Understanding Violent Radicalisation. 
Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2013). “The Evolution of Jihadism in 
Italy: Rise and Homegrown Radicals”. CTC Sentinel, 6:11.   
52 Vidino, Lorenzo. Home-grown Jihadism in Italy; Italian Ministry of Justice. (2012). The radicalization of Islamic 
Terrorism. Elements for a study of the proselytism phenomenon in jail. [Italian]. Quaderni ISSP. Number 9.  
53 European Commission. (2011). Special Eurobarometer 371. Internal Security.  
54 (2011). “G2: A Proud Generation”. [Italian]. Genemaghrebina Association.  
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-as most Muslims are first-generation immigrants mainly from North Africa- the country is estimated to 
experience the fourth largest increase in its Muslim population in Europe. Only behind their 
counterparts in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, Italian Muslims will grow by 102% in the next 20 
years.55 Besides, only in 2016, 171,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy from Libya56 and more than 
250,000 more are expected to arrive in 2017.57 Such prospects, though, inevitably pose questions of 
security, integration, and social cohesion. Undermined by fear over increased Jihadist-related activities 
and ISIS’ credible threats to Italy, potential failed processes of integration, accommodation, and 
acceptance of new multitudes of Muslim citizens could destabilise both Italy and the very European 
Union. Thus, given Italy is destined to host increasing amounts of Muslims in the near future, 
understanding the potential dynamics of radicalisation affecting one of the prime gates to Europe 
becomes worthwhile. 
In this process, our project could be used as a starting point to create bridges between Italy and 
its Muslim citizens. The similar surveys aimed at both Italian Muslims and non-Muslims highlight 
commonalities and divergences between the two groups. Interested in its implications, the study has 
drawn the attention of three Italian Ministries, Muslim and non-Muslim organisations, and a number of 
politicians, ambassadors, and public figures. Hopefully, its findings will allow these policy makers to 
increase chances for understanding and dialogue –especially considering the already much politicised 
debate on radicalisation, terrorism, and integration of Muslims and Islam in Italian society.   
 
The Structure of the Study 
In a keen attempt to contribute to the existing field of knowledge, we have opted for an 
unorthodox structure, which features the literature survey and the methodology section in different 
chapters, instead of subsuming them in the introduction. This unconventional scheme is mainly due to 
our desire to present a considerably complex debate on radicalisation in the most possible balanced, 
coherent, and exhaustive manner. As it will be largely explicated, radicalisation is, in Marc Sedgwick’s 
terms, a considerable source of confusion, for its understanding is subjective, relative, and shaped by 
                                                        
55 (2011). The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Pew Research Center. Washington DC.  
56 Kingsley, Patrick. (2016). “2016 Sets New Record For Asylum Seeker Reaching Italy By Boat,” The Guardian 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/2016-sets-new-record-for-asylum-seekers-reaching-italy-by-boat accessed 
on 25 April 2017. 
57 Cartaldo, Claudio. (2017). “Dossier on arrivals by boat: in 2017 more than 250 thousand migrants”. [Italian] ll Giornale. 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/dossier-riservato-sugli-sbarchi-nel-2017-oltre-250mila-1375348.html accessed on 
25 April 2017.   
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political agendas and zeitgeists.58 And this sort of confusion inevitably characterises the three 
convoluted, consequential debates around which the study gravitates: the Italian debate on 
radicalisation, the international academic debate on radicalisation and its discussed relation to terrorism, 
and the debate on causes of radicalisation. 
But as we illustrate these three academic discussions, our aim is not to champion one theory 
over the other. Our intention is not to pick sides. On the contrary, as we present evidence that 
corroborates certain theories, we eventually introduce other facts that challenge the very same beliefs. 
Although this might seem curious, this is our voice when dealing with radicalisation. And it goes hand 
in hand with our choice of Roy and Croft: radicalisation is complex and, before tackling the potential 
issues of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, we want to consider and reflect upon every possible argument 
and counter-argument that could help us construct our statistical analysis and make sense of our 
numbers. 
This is the reason why we take on three convoluted discussions in a row. In order to appreciate 
the complexity of the Italian debate, one needs to ponder over Roy’s and Croft’s juxtaposing positions. 
And in order to appreciate the two pundits’ thoughts, one needs to reflect upon the uncertainty 
surrounding radicalisation’s meaning and causes. Though particularly extended, intricate, and filled 
with apparent contradictions, this last discussion on causes and theories of radicalisation is essential to 
understand the selection of those predictive, independent variables that are directly extrapolated from 
the literature survey and inserted into the quantitative analysis. As explained in the methodology, such 
variables are the tools that will allow us to determine which drivers of radicalisation could best fit the 
Italian case, if that is the case.  
That asserted, Chapter I delves into the Italian debate on Islamist radicalisation. Chapter II 
juxtaposes the diverging positions held by Roy and Croft on Islamist radicalisation and its discussed 
relation to terrorism. Chapter III is dedicated to the study’s conceptual frameworks and definitions, 
including its accepted meaning of “Islamist Radicalisation”. Chapter IV features the literature review 
about radicalisation, discussing its theories in depth. Chapter V presents the study’s methodology, 
displaying restrictions and challenges, the sample’s composition, its variables, and statistical methods. 
In a keen attempt to assess which position (Roy’s or Croft’s) better fits the Italian case study, Chapter 
VI illustrates empirical quantitative and qualitative findings from Muslim respondents –which are also 
compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. Based on the gathered evidence, Chapter VII delves into  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the statistical analysis testing causal models of Islamist radicalisation. Drawing on results from such 
tests, Chapter VIII features the study’s discussion, while chapter IX presents the investigation’s 































CHAPTER I: THE DEBATE ON ISLAMIST RADICALISATION IN ITALY 
 
Islamist Radicalisation in Italy: Exaggerating an Alleged Threat  
Historically relatively immune to Jihadist terrorism, Italy has begun to grow worried over the 
prospects Jihadist terrorist attacks on its soil. Whilst Islamist radicalisation has only recently turned 
into a matter of public interest, those aligned with Croft’s positions agree with the theory that fear of 
radicalisation is exaggerated. Their logic is mostly constructed on the questionable amount of empirical 
evidence that links Italy to Islamist radicalisation and the unlikelihood of acts of Jihadist terrorism. 
To begin with, radical visions of Islam seem to gain little traction in Italy. As opposed to other 
European countries, Italy has never seen hordes of Muslim citizens holding signs advocating for the 
establishment of Sharia law or stating, “behead those who insult Islam.”59 Certainly, many have taken 
part to public demonstrations, but nothing comparable to something as debatable as “al-Quds Day” in 
London and other cities.60 Italian Muslims have never formed unofficial patrol units to impose Sharia 
law inside their communities like their counterparts did in Germany.61 Aside from one isolated case,62 
Jihad has never been glorified in rap songs, unlike in France.63 Even as for more cultural-related issues 
not linked to radicalisation or violence, the questions of the headscarf or the selling of prohibited goods 
such as pork and alcohol have not commonly been source of controversy.64 
Bust most importantly, many Muslims residing in Italy have firmly condemned violence in the 
name of Allah in multiple occasions. Vice president of the Islamic Religious Community (COREIS),65 
Imam Sergio Yaha Pallavicini, has once asserted that: 
Just like Mafiosi are criminals, so are these self-defined Muslim [terrorists], even if they say 
they are acting in the name of the Prophet…Hamas, for example, is not Islam, but a movement                                                         
59 Bowcott, Owen. (2006). “Arrest extremist marchers, police told”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/feb/06/raceandreligion.muhammadcartoons accessed on 28 June 2017. 
60 Pfeffer, Anshel. (2012). “Iran’s specter looms large over London’s annual ‘Quds Day’ march”. Haaretz. 
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/2.431/iran-s-specter-looms-large-over-london-s-annual-quds-day-march-1.459264 accessed 
on 28 June 2017. 
61 “Locals concerned as ‘Sharia police’ patrol streets of German city”. Deutsche Welle.  
62 The reference is to Anas el Abboubi, a Moroccan citizen who grew up near Brescia whose dream was to become a 
famous rapper. Initially, Anas’s music reflected his desire to combine his Italian and Muslim identities, but he then switched 
to more violent tunes inciting to Jihad as he was undergoing a radicalisation process. He eventually left for Syria to join 
ISIS, where he still believed to be. Groppi, Michele. (2015). “Portrait of the Lombard Jihadist”. [Italian]. In “Who Fears the 
Caliph?”. Limes, Italian Magazine of Geopolitics. No. 3 (March issue). pp. 191-200. 
63 Payne, Ed. Carroll, Jason. (2015). “The terrorist recruiting crossroads: Where Jihad meets rap”. CNN. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/13/us/jihadi-rap/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
64 Carter, Claire. (2013). “M&S apology over Muslim staff policy”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/10534294/MandS-apology-over-Muslim-staff-
policy.html accessed on 25 April 2017. 
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that legitimises the use of violence to redeem a territory. Confusing these movements with 
Islam is like confusing Mafia with Italians.66 
 
Following grave incidents of Jihadist terrorism, numerous Muslim leaders have utterly chastised the 
perpetrators of those massacres, labelling them betrayers of Islam. For example, in the days after the 
tragic Charlie Hebdo events in Paris, Asfa Mahmoud, the head of Milan’s House of Muslim Culture, 
unambiguously specified that, “violence is against the message of the Prophet.”67 Reinforcing his point, 
Mohamed Ben Mohamed from Rome’s Centocelle Mosque categorically condemned the terrorists, for 
“those have nothing to do with Islam. Even if our community has been offended, the answer cannot be 
violence.”68 Actually, “violence can never be justified”, Segrate’s Imam Ali Abu Shwaima’s once 
made crystal clear.69 Bearing this in mind, Davide Piccardo has sturdily proclaimed that, “whoever 
does something like this [killing of the French journalists] is not a Muslim.”70 
Embracing Piccardo’s point, groups of outraged Italian Muslim citizens have filled the streets to 
express their rejection of terrorism in the name of Islam.71 Such spirals of condemnation were reflected 
in the July 2015 Leone Moressa Foundation’s survey, when 9 out of 10 Muslim interviewees expressed 
their rejection of ISIS.72 Hence, not only was religious violence deemed despicable, but was also 
perceived as detrimental to the very Muslim community, for “we are the first victims of ISIS and Al-
Qaeda”, maintained Benaissa Bounegab from Milan’s House of Muslim Culture.73 This is because, to 
many Muslims, radical visions of Islam can never truthfully incarnate their faith, as, according to 
Hazma Roberto Piccardo, “There is only a moderate Islam.”74 For that reason, in the words of Egyptian 
Imam Hazzan Zeinah from Rome's Great Mosque, the type of Islam preached in Italian mosques 
naturally urges believers to, “follow these noble teachings in our daily lives, where each act of violence                                                         
66 Yaha Pallavicini, Sergio. (2015). In Pelliccetti, Riccardo. “Here’s what is preached at the mosque: ‘Allah, count them and 
exterminate them all’”. [Italian]. Il Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/i-leader-dialoganti-condannano-
terrorismo-nei-luoghi-culto-1082268.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
67 Mahmoud, Asfa. (2015) In Bonessa, Michelangelo. “Those Italian Muslims between cheering and ambiguity”. [Italian] Il 
Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/quei-musulmani-italiani-esultanza-e-ambiguit-1081156.html accessed on 
28 June 2017. 
68 Ben Mohammed, Mohammed. (2015). In Castellani, Daniele et al. “At the mosque people don’t cry for Charlie Hebdo”. 
[Italian]. L’Espresso. http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2015/01/15/news/in-moschea-non-si-piange-per-charlie-hebdo-
1.195285 accessed on 28 June 2017. 
69 Shwaima, Ali Abu. (2015). In “At the mosque people don’t cry”. 
70 Piccardo, Davide. (2015). In “Those Italian Muslims”. 
71 (2015). “The Islamic communities: ‘We demonstrate for peace’”. [Italian] La Stampa. 
http://www.lastampa.it/2015/01/09/edizioni/vercelli/le-comunit-islamiche-manifestiamo-per-la-pace-
f4QLGHB6kFNIuy1ar3xXSN/pagina.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
72 In Polchi, Vladimiro. (2015). “The Caliphate and jihadists are just terrorism”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 29 June, p. 14.  
73 Bounegab, Benaissa. (2015). In “At the mosque people don’t cry”.”. 
74 Piccardo, Hazma Roberto. (2008) In Lorenzetto, Stefano. “Piccardo: ‘There’s only a moderate Islam’”. [Italian]. 
Panorama. http://archivio.panorama.it/archivio/Piccardo-C-e-solo-un-islam-moderato accessed on 28 June 2017. 
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is condemnable per se. The message of Islam is a message of peace, concord, solidarity, and social 
cohesion. Islam is a religion striving for mercy, love, and not violence.”75      
Such instances are validated by the Jihadists’ seeming disregard of Italy. Ideally, the country 
has always epitomised an appealing target to them. After WWII, Rome has consistently been a steady 
ally of Washington, as it still has three major American military bases on its soil. Italy supported U.S. 
President George W. Bush’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and even now Italian forces are 
stationed in both countries. Italy hosts Vatican City, the historical home of Christendom and, 
conversely, a sworn enemy to Jihadists around the globe. To such regard, during his mandate, Pope 
Ratzinger irritated many Muslims for his remarks linking violence and Islam.76 Grave tension in Libya, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan followed Lega Nord member Roberto Calderoli’s disrespectful showing of the 
controversial Danish cartoon of Muhammad on national television.77 Lastly, as terrorism historian 
Domenico Guzzo believes, Italy’s perpetual open wounds from more than two decades of left and 
right-wing terrorism make the nation potentially sensitive to the prospects of Islamist terrorism –as 
people would be forced to re-experience feelings that are still vivid in the country’s memory and not 
totally processed or overcome.78 
Yet, when asked about the likelihood of an Al-Qaeda-type of attack on Italy in the wake on 9/11, 
Imam Bouriq Buochta from Turin showed no hesitation. “It just will not happen”, reassured the 
Muslim cleric, “[because] here [Osama] bin Laden has no outposts and all Imams in Italy come from 
the moderate school. And even in case of war, Turin would not be involved, I am sure of that. Here we 
feel safe, as Turin must feel safe in relation to us.”79 Although his assertions would be largely 
disproven and he himself would be expelled in 2005 for “matters of public order,”80 ironically, 
Buochta’s predictions about Al-Qaeda’s alleged intentions to strike Italy have, so far, turned out to be 
accurate. Osama bin Laden has threatened Italy less than other Western countries, as the “Eternal City” 
                                                        
75 Zeinah, Hazzan. (2015). In Lodoli, Marco. “Mosque, fear, and prayers”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
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did not appear to be on Al-Qaeda’s top hit-list as much as other European capitals. Accordingly, the 
majority of thwarted Jihadist plots discovered by Italian authorities prior to 2009 did not feature Italy as 
the main target.81 
Terrorists were indeed more likely to be linked to the global Jihadist movement, coordinating 
plots aimed at foreign targets. Besides, large numbers of incarcerated presumed Jihadist terrorists have 
been eventually released or acquitted of all charges for “lack of evidence.”82As of today, Italy has yet 
to witness one single major Jihadist terrorist attack. And even in spite of ISIS’s ascent, 70,8% of 
Muslim interviewees still thought the risk of Jihadist terrorist attacks occurring in Italy was “really 
low”, according to the Moressa Foundation’s survey.83 So, not only did Italian Muslims not appear to 
hold radicalised views, but the evidence also seemed to discredit potential links between Islamist 
radicalisation and terrorism.  
Actually, it has been argued that the symbiotic relation between Islamist radicalisation and 
terrorism could well be artificially created. Several actors, including a number of Italian academics,84 
have identified the nation’s media as a crucial tool in the establishment of public anxiety over Islam 
and its supposedly close association to terrorism. “Look at my hands, they are the same as yours. I 
work all day long. I have a family. And I have to read in the newspapers that my religion kills. It’s 
false”, once thundered a believer from Rome’s Centocelle Mosque when asked to comment on how the 
Italian media shaped perceptions of Muslims and Islam.85 To Catania’s Imam Kheit Abdelhafid, certain 
politicians would actually exploit the media to create fear and “spew venom and insult our religion.”86 
Such a process, complained leaders Davide Piccardo, Hareth Amar, and Souheir Katkhouda, was 
actually nothing more than a blatant attempt to foster feelings of discrimination and Islamophobia.87 
This was mainly due to discredit Islam on one hand, while avoiding addressing the question of denied 
rights on the other -especially when it came to the building of mosques88 and the treatment of 
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immigrants.89 Scandalised by three specific RAI TV shows, the three leaders wrote to the Italian 
channel’s Chair, Roberto Fico, exhorting him to: 
Take action […] to re-establish that balance and respect, which should be a defining mark of 
RAI, so that the good name of Muslim citizens can be protected…Vita in Diretta, Porta a Porta, 
and Virus have all talked about Muslims but with any Muslims, not granting the presence of 
Muslim representatives on the shows, acting in a biased, prejudiced, and inept fashion…and 
promoting an image according to which, in each case, Muslims citizens in this country would be 
potential purveyors of violence, [implying that in Italy] Muslim presence should be deemed as a 
source of danger for Italians’ security.90         
 
Echoing an equal degree of dissent towards media deception of Muslims, labelled a sort of 
“psychological terrorism”, regional supervisor Sharif Lorenzini even wrote the then President of the 
Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano. In his open letter, Lorenzini urged the President to, “defend the 
Islamic Community to eradicate every form of social tension against Islam and Muslims, whom, fed up 
at this situation, will sooner or later decide to demonstrate in the streets in their thousands.”91 
To experts such as Stefano Allievi and Mostafa el Ayoubi, the media’s construction of the 
concept of Islamophobia has actually concealed preoccupations over Italy’s identity loss at the hands of 
Islam. Equally to Stuart Croft’s assertion on Britain featured in the next chapter, fear of Islam and the 
ensuing Islamisation of Italy has facilitated the establishment of the Islam-terrorism axis, creating a 
suspicious Muslim “other”. Hence, to el Ayoubi, it is not about Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, 
but, rather, it is about defending the Italian identity vis-à-vis Islam.92 And while Italy has not perchance 
been ready yet to internalise facets of modern multiculturalism, including the encounter with other 
forms of religious confessions, the “entrepreneurs of fear” have exploited public worry over Islam to 
obtain votes, claimed Allievi.93 According to the Padua University professor, especially in Northern 
Italy, thriving on the need to defend the country’s identity, certain politicians have amplified security 
threats not with the intent to come to terms with Italy’s tortuous relation with its growing Muslim 
population; rather, by “surfing the wave of fear” fostered by the media, these politicians have 
intentionally accrued confrontation between mainstream society and Muslim minorities because, to 
Allievi, unstable circumstances grant more votes.         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If according to Allievi and Piccardo, “it’s unacceptable that the media […] ignites feelings of 
Islamophobia,”94 the mystification or, worse, the creation of ad hoc Jihadist plots would be even more 
despicable, contended Carlo Corbucci.95 Defence attorney of 80% of the individuals charged with 
Jihadist terrorism accusations in Italy, Corbucci wrote a 1750-page book entitled Islamic Terrorism: 
Falsity and Mystification. Corbucci’s main argument is that the Jihadist threat has been created through 
“dialectic and military frauds”. To the Roman lawyer, fear of Islamist radicalisation created by the 
media was responsible for the twisting of the legal system to justify sentences against presumed 
terrorists, whom were believed to be guilty a priori.  
More than that, Corbucci claimed that at least three controversial alleged Jihadist plots had 
actually been orchestrated, veiled, and attributed to innocent Muslims by third parties, most likely the 
Italian Secret Services. In Anzio in 2002 and in Rovigo and Naples in 2003, Italian authorities raided 
various Muslim immigrants’ apartments, confiscating large amounts of explosives, fake documents, 
contacts, and supplementary Jihadist material. Every subject’s denial of all accusations could not avoid, 
however, their subsequent incarceration on charges of terrorism. In the end, the three Egyptian citizens 
from Anzio were released for lack of evidence linking them to the establishment of any subversive 
organisation -two of them were even reimbursed a total of 280,000 euros.96 Likewise, the supposed 
Jihadist terrorists in Rovigo were rapidly freed after five days for lack of evidence.97 Lastly, when 
asked to elucidate the acquittal in Naples of the 28 Pakistani presumed terrorists, judge for the 
preliminary investigations Ettore Favara admitted that, “the gathered evidence could not help but 
reconsider the grave accusations faced by the subjects in question.”98 Despite the complete absence of 
proof and the ensuing, relatively rapid acquittal of all presumed terrorists, to Corbucci, the system still 
fell victim to the exaggerated level of fear over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. This, according to 
the lawyer, was artificially constructed to ultimately justify the government’s support of the U.S-led 
war on terror and convince the public that intervention was necessary.99     
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Agreeing with the theory that fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is overstated, Salameh 
Ashour, Sapienza University professor and president of the Palestinian Community in Rome, once 
vehemently summarised the whole matter as follows: 
If this phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation were true, Italian prisons would be swamped with 
Muslim terrorists. On the contrary, vast amounts of those arrested on charges of terrorism were, 
in fact, eventually released and up-to-date there hasn’t been one single big Jihadist attack in 
Italy. What this discourse on radicalisation fails to address is, instead, the matter of all those 
denied rights to Muslims, both in Italy and abroad, like the recognition of Palestine. This is the 
real question.100  
 
In light of all the provided evidence, can it be argued that fear of Islamist radicalisation in Italy to be 
actually exaggerated? Is the latter socially constructed to foster feelings of Islamophobia, defend Italian 
identity, permit discrimination of Muslims, and justify international policies? Could Stuart Croft’s 
theory of securitisation of Islam be ultimately right?  
 
Islamist Radicalisation in Italy: A Likely Worrisome Issue 
Unlike professor Ashour et al, the pundits presented in this section do see Islamist radicalisation 
in Italy as a potentially pressing issue. Being more in tune with Roy’s position, their logic is mainly 
based on the evidence connecting Italy to Islamist radicalisation and the chances of terrorism, which is 
by no means tenuous. Academics of the calibre of Lorenzo Vidino and Marco Lombardi believe 
Islamist radicalisation affects Italy too101 and apprehension over it is warranted for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, a number of Italian Muslims do seem to share radical visions of Islam. 
According to a 516-page report from March 2015 by the Military Centre for Strategic Studies 
(CEMISS), multiple Koranic schools have taught their young students not to befriend Christians or 
Jews, as they are destined to hell.102 5 out of the 6 main Shia organisations have fostered grave feelings 
of anti-Semitism. Hazma Piccardo’s copy of the Quran, the most widespread in the country, displays 
excerpts filled with hateful remarks towards Jews, the West, and the Catholic Church. Preacher Adel 
Smith ridiculed the crucifix on national television and contemptuously defined Western society as 
“satanic, lesbo-feminist-gay.”103 And Wagdi Ghoneim, a controversial guest speaker linked to the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood invited by UCOII, stated that whoever does not convert to Islam will 
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turn into a cat or a mouse, whereas women are to be beaten because, like sheep, they need a 
shepherd.104  
Perhaps more alarmingly, a variety of Muslims have sustained violence in the name of Allah. 
While many leaders have fiercely condemned terrorism, others have glorified or even incited acts of 
Jihad.105 For instance, Imam Amar Sahoune from Naples’s Piazza Largo al Mercato Mosque has 
praised Osama bin Laden in a number of sermons, while Imam Abdellah Labdidi from Fermo’s El 
Rahma Mosque declared massacring Westerners was legitimate. Along the same lines, two Imams 
from Bologna’s Al-nur Mosque have commended Palestinian suicide operations against Israel, as 
martyrs that “died for a just cause and are in heaven now, in Allah’s glory”, given that “in Israel there 
are no civilians and not even the children are innocent.”106 
In fact, San Donà di Piave’s Imam Raoudi Abdelbar has prayed Allah to “exterminate all the 
Jews [to] make happy all the Muslims in the world.”107 Mostapha El Korchi, Ponte Felciano’s Imam, 
has instead promoted violence against Italians, inviting members of his congregation to “hit Italian 
children on the head until blood comes out.”108 Likewise, on the eve of Italy’s entrance in the U.S.-led 
war on Iraq, Carmagnola’s Imam Abdul Qadir Fadallah Mamour warned that if Italians continued to 
support the war, Italy would become a land of battle as “Bin Laden will continue to strike Italian 
soldiers, [for] all Italians are at risk.”109 More recently, preacher Robert “Musa” Cerantonio posted on 
Facebook a picture of himself holding an ISIS’s flag in Saint Peter Square, commenting, “The black 
Tawhid flag waves in front of the Vatican…Allah willing, we will destroy the Vatican as the head of its 
people.”110 
Facts listed in the March 2015 report provide further evidence about multifaceted decennial 
Jihadist activity on Italian soil.111 To begin with, Jihadist sympathisers have financially backed 
international terrorism through multiple expedients, such as donations (“zakat”), cover companies, or 
unlawful businesses.112 Cremona’s Mosque has used donations to support an Ansar al-Islam training 
camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, for instance. Through meals and the selling of books and Halal products the  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Milanese Islamic Centre of Viale Jenner has immensely supported the Jihadist cause. Similarly, a cover 
company named Servizio Lavoro has financed Chechen terrorists by transferring millions of Liras to 
London and Dubai. Viale Jenner and the Via Quaranta Mosque have even counterfeited documents, 
including 70 fake passports retrieved by American troops in Iraq. The members of the Buccinasco 
terrorist cell sold drugs and stole cars to endow their activities. And in 2010 Eurostrust dismantled an 
international network based in Milan believed to finance Jihadist terrorist groups through drug 
trafficking and illegal immigration.  
Jihadists have also exploited Italy to acquire weaponry.113 In the ‘90s, the Camorra Clan 
provided wannabe fighters with used arms on their way to the Balkans. In 2005 and 2006 Italian 
officials disrupted a Camorra-based network that provided members of the Algerian Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) with logistical assistance and weapons between the cities of Milan, Rome, Naples, 
Algiers, and Marseilles. In 2012, Neapolitan harbour officials seized 5 containers allegedly transporting 
construction material; in reality, these were shipping missiles to Hamas through Egypt. Likewise, two 
ships containing weapons directed to Libya and Iran were seized in Genoa in 2003 and 2009 –the one 
on the way to the Persian Gulf was transporting forbidden nuclear technology. In 2010, Italian police 
dismantled a network between Italy and Iran on allegations of international terrorism. In that occasion, 
officers confiscated large amounts of tracer bullets, highly flammable mixtures of chemical, firebombs, 
one helicopter, numerous parachutes, and 120 military wetsuits.      
As some of these cases show, Italy has also been a crossroad for terrorists.114 Particularly in 
cities like Milan, Bologna, Cremona and Naples, a number of mosques and Imams –including the 
notorious cases of Abu Imad and Abu Omar- have been connected to the Algerian GIA, the Salafist 
Group for the Predication and Combat, Ansar-al Islam, Jamatt-Islamiyya, and, of course, Al-Qaeda. In 
detail, Viale Jenner hosted Ramzi Youseff, one of the 1993 Twin Tower attackers, while member 
Abdelhalim Hafed Remadna was the head of a sleeping cell linked to Abu Jaffa, at the time one of Al-
Qaeda’s top-3 officials. Renowned for his personal connection to 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and 
for his central role behind Al-Qaeda’s 2004 Madrid attacks, “Mohammed the Egyptian” often 
transitioned through Milan. Finally, “Hazma the Libyan”, to wit Osama bin Laden’s emissary, used to 
live in Milan, but travelled extensively across northern Italy and Europe to establish Al-Qaeda’s 
European network.  
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Besides funds, weapons, and links, Italy has been a steady reservoir of martyrs and foreign 
fighters destined to theatres of Jihad.115 During the Balkan conflict in the ‘90s, numerous fighters left 
northern Italy to join their Bosnian brethren under the leadership of Anwaar Shaaba, at the time Viale 
Jenner Imam and commander of the Mujahedeen foreign brigade. Then, following the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq, more than 30 martyrs recruited by 12 main Imams left from the Belpaese, mainly from 
the area between Milan and Cremona. Among them, the most famous have been Abu Hafs from 
Cremona and Abu Farid Al Masri from Milan. On December 9th, 2003, Hafs attacked the Iraqi 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, killing 30 and wounding 660 people. Months later, instead, Al Masri 
detonated himself at the Canal Hotel in Bagdad, killing a UN special representative and 22 people. 
Lastly, more than a dozen captured Jihadists detained or transitioned through the U.S. Guantanamo 
prison came from Italy.    
Although Italy has yet to experience one single large-scale Jihadist attack, the nation has 
actually been a fairly appealing target.116 Since 2001, there have been 27 cases of a Jihadist-related 
nature, among which 20 thwarted plots, 6 carried out and unsuccessful attacks (featuring no casualties) 
and 1 carried out and partially successful attack –the one by Mohammed Game at the Santa Barbara 
Carabinieri base in Milan in 2009, in which the very attacker and a guard reported injuries, but no 
casualties were registered. Jihadist plots envisioned attacks on several targets, including public areas 
(restaurants, cafes, shopping malls), critical infrastructure (Milan’s tube, railway stations, harbours), 
diplomatic and military institutions (U.S. embassy and military bases), and symbolic sites (churches, 
synagogues, monuments). Among these, the most spectacular plans visualised the bombing of Milan’s 
cathedral, the chemical attack on the U.S. embassy in Rome,117 the crushing of a ship filled with 
explosives in Naples’s harbour, and an attack on Vatican City in 2010 and 2016.118 
Originally, the perpetrators were mostly young males from North Africa, who were somehow 
linked to the global Jihadist movement and mainly gravitated around the mosque network. Conversely, 
recent years have beheld the emergence of lone-wolves and home-grown terrorists typically detached 
from the mosque network or international terrorist groups. Unlike their predecessors, modern terrorists  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are often self-radicalised through the Internet and social media –as it was for Mohammed Jarmoune 
and Anas el Abboubi, whom used the virtual space as a means for radicalisation, linkage, and planning 
of attacks. All in all, since 2001, more than 200 individuals have been arrested on charges of terrorism, 
featuring more than 100 sentences, including dozens of expulsions.119      
Last but not least, ISIS’s lure, direct threats, and ideological and physical infiltrations have 
reaffirmed Italy’s relevance on the Jihadist chessboard. To start with, Italy has supplied the Caliphate 
with fighters who departed for the Syrian and Iraqi front. Though considerably inferior in size 
compared to other European counterparts, 110 combatants from Italy have in fact joined the 
Caliphate,120 including 10 Italian converts.121 Among these were Genoese Giuliano Delnevo, the first 
convert to die in Syria, and Maria Giulia Sergio.122 One of the few female Italian converts joining the 
Caliphate, Maria’s animosity towards her own home country has particularly shaken public opinion. In 
her numerous messages to her family, the then 28-year old wife of an Albanian Jihadist, has urged her 
family to leave for Syria, live strictly by Sharia law, and wage Jihad on the infidels in Italy.123 
Even though Maria and the majority of Italian combatants are still believed to be in the Middle East –
where a number are also presumed deceased and incarcerated-, at least 17 of them have allegedly 
returned to Italy, declared Italian authorities.124   
Whilst ISIS has mostly sought to recruit foreign fighters, Italy has been object of direct threats 
by the very Caliphate. In truth, the group has menaced Italy more than any other terrorist 
organisation.125 This is due to its symbolic role as the home of Christendom and its appeal in relation to 
a prophetic vision by the Prophet Mohammad foreseeing an Islamic conquest of Rome near the end-of-
time.126 In September 2014, after the United States launched air strikes in Syria, the then ISIS’s  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spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani stated in an audiotape: “With Allah’s permission, we will 
conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the 
Exalted. This is His promise to us.”127 
In the same vein, in February 2015 ISIS released a video of the beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts 
on a Libyan beach. One of the fighters warned on camera, “We are here, south of Rome. Soon we will 
conquer Rome with God’s will.” Such warnings were indeed designed to pressure Italy not to deepen 
its involvement in Libya, as Italy has so far only been involved in logistical support to recognized anti-
ISIS forces.128 Again in 2015, a video featuring executions and beheadings was specially subtitled in 
Italian and stated, “You have declared war on me with the misbelieving alliance…the more you will 
fight, the more you will suffer.”129 One of the most explicit threats was made in April 2016 when an 
English speaking fighter featured in a video showing footage of previous attacks stated, “If it was Paris 
yesterday, and today Brussels, only Allah knows where it will be tomorrow. Maybe it will be in 
London or Berlin or Rome.”130 
Lastly, Italy has experienced ideological and physical infiltrations by the Islamic State. The 
cases of two of ISIS’s affiliated Imams sheds light upon the Caliphate’s realisation that Italy is a 
potential fertile land to promote Jihadist agendas. As already mentioned, Musa Cerantonio, the pro-
ISIS Australian Imam of Italian origin subsequently arrested in the Philippines on charges of terrorism, 
preached in Brescia and Bergamo in August 2012.131 Likewise, Bilal Bosnic travelled across the Italian 
peninsula to explicitly recruit fighters, preaching in Pordenone, Cremona, and Bergamo in July 2011.132 
During and after his journey, Bosnic facilitated the radicalisation process of two Balkan fighters who 
joined ISIS in 2013.133 Unsurprisingly, not only did the Bosnian Imam confirm the presence of Italian 
                                                        
127 (2014). IS Spokesman Rallies Fighters Against U.S.-Led Coalition, Threatens Enemy and Calls Individual Muslims to 
Launch Attacks. SITE Intelligence Group. 
128 Grignetti, Francesco. (2016). “U.S. Raid in Libya, Italy offers support but won’t send its army”. [Italian]. Il Secolo XIX, 
http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/mondo/2016/08/02/ASVoHCkD-italia_sostegno_militari.shtml  accessed on 25 April 2017. 
129 Stabile, Giordano. (2015). “New threats to Italy in a new ISIS’s video”. [Italian]. La Stampa, 
http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/14/esteri/nuove-minacce-allitalia-in-un-video-dellisis-
s2c8mYqTa6OIVpEP4aLCdI/pagina.html accessed on 25 April 2017. 
130 (2016). “Islamic State hints at attacks in London, Berlin and Rome,” Reuters.  
131 Di Landro, Armando. (2015). “The Italian-Australian Jihadist Imam. Sermons in Bergamo and Brescia too”. [Italian]. Il 
Corriere della Sera http://bergamo.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_gennaio_20/musa-cerantonio-bergamo-brescia-moschee-
1f9d5874-a090-11e4-b571-55218c79aee3.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017. 
132 Groppi, Michele. Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. p. 105. 
133 (2016). “The journey of the Jihadists from Veneto to ISIS’s training camps”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della Sera 
http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/notizie/cronaca/2016/28-marzo-2016/viaggio-jihadisti-veneto-campo-
addestramento-dell-isis-240231397695.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017.  
  38 
fighters joining ISIS in a 2014 interview; he also corroborated the Caliphate’s interest in Italy to recruit 
new members.134  
Understanding Italy’s potential, ISIS has made extensive use of the Internet to propagandise its 
message in Italian,135 galvanise minds, and entice acts of terrorism. As confirmed by the Mossad, Italy 
would count 162 ISIS’s affiliates on its soil,136 including the Tunisian and the Pakistani citizens 
arrested in Brescia in July 2015. Planning attacks on a U.S. military base and other symbolic Italian 
sites, the two for months showed their support for ISIS online. Apparently integrated and 
communicating in Italian to each other, they underwent a process of self-radicalisation by downloading 
Jihadist material, culminating in threats such as, “We are in your streets. We are everywhere. We are 
choosing the targets, waiting for the X hour.”137 In truth, the organisation has propagandised its 
conquest of the Vatican and would allegedly plan Pope Francis’s assassination, warned the Mossad and 
the CIA.138 Likewise, on April 8th 2016 Abderrahim Moutaharrik, a former kickboxing champion living 
in Lecco, was provided an order by an Islamic State sheikh to strike Italy.139 As authorities 
demonstrated he was planning to target the Vatican,140 Moutaharrik was arrested in April 2016 and was 
sentenced to 6 years in prison in February 2017.141  
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Finally, capitalising on the seemingly unstoppable migration flow, ISIS has allegedly attempted 
to infiltrate Italy with terrorists disguised as refugees.142 Only in 2016, 171,000 irregular migrants 
arrived in Italy from Libya.143 Disguised as a refugee was Ben Nasr Mehdi, a Tunisian explosive expert 
previously linked to Al Qaeda,144 who had been incarcerated after being convicted of terrorism 
offences in Italy and deported to Tunisia. In November 2015 Mehdi attempted to re-enter Italy with 
fake credentials seeking political asylum, but was discovered and deported back to Tunisia.145 Italian 
security services suspect Mehdi is a key figure for facilitating jihadists’ journeys towards Syria and 
Iraq.146 
There is also concern that irregular migrants arriving in Italy might be vulnerable to the 
message of radical proselytisers inside Italy, because of unmet expectations and unstable circumstances 
within rescue centres. A case in point was Anis Amri, who carried out the 2016 Berlin truck attack. 
Amri was radicalized in prison in Sicily after arriving there as a young asylum seeker and being jailed 
for starting a fire at his refugee shelter.147 Aware that prisons can serve as venues for radicalisation, as 
the Amri case shows,148 Italian authorities are currently monitoring 400 detainees presumed at risk of 
radicalisation.149 All in all, if one takes into account ISIS’s alleged attack on the Italian Consulate in 
Cario,150 and its presumed involvement in the kidnapping of four Italian technicians in Libya,151 little  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161777930/ accessed on 25 April 2017.   
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http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_luglio_20/libia-farnesina-quattro-italiani-rapiti-mellitah-101937da-2eaa-11e5-820a-
d82a668b1363.shtml accessed on 12 June 2017.    
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doubts remain as for the group’s concrete bellicose intentions. According to former Minister of Internal 
Affairs, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Angelino Alfano, the threat stemming from ISIS can be 
“compared only to Al-Qaeda’s 9/11.”152 153 
In light of the displayed evidence, Alessandro Orsini, head of the Centre for the Study of 
Terrorism at Roma Tor Vergata, agrees that, “the problem with radicalisation that leads to terrorism 
exists in Italy too. Empirical evidence shows so.”154 Echoing his colleague’s point, Cattolica University 
professor Marco Lombardi believes that, “The process of [Islamist] radicalisation is a grave issue that 
must be tackled in every European country. Numbers, even if in Italy these are low in relation to 
terrorism, cannot underestimate the question.” 155 As the most authoritative academic voice on the 
subject, Lorenzo Vidino explains: 
Italy is now affected too, though in minor ways, by dynamics of radicalisation that are similar to 
the ones experienced by other European countries for more than a decade; [there is a] limited 
presence of structured terrorist groups, but [an increase in] processes of auto-radicalisation; the 
majority of the radicalised subjects [are] to be found among second-generation [Muslims] and 
converts; [there is an] increasing amount of women; [a] limited role of the mosque and the 
cruciality of Internet and social media.156   
 
Given these facts, can one state that Islamist radicalisation in Italy is a pressing, critical issue requiring 
maximum attention? Could its potential in relation to the prospects of terrorism as whole represent a 
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CHAPTER II: THE DEBATE ON RADICALISATION 
 
Islamist Radicalisation and its Potential, Discussed Relation to Terrorism: Two Juxtaposing Positions 
As shown in the last chapter, the issue of Islamist radicalisation and its controversial, potential 
relation to acts of terrorism has recently gained considerable attention in Italy. But the Italian case is 
just one facet of a much larger academic debate between two diverging positions that disagree on how 
they perceive the very issue of Islamist radicalisation and its supposed relation to Jihadist-inspired 
terrorism.157 
 
Roy’s Take on the Challenge of Islamist Radicalisation   
As already stated, to renowned French sociologist Olivier Roy, radicalisation exists and can 
potentially cover a crucial role in relation to acts of terrorism, including home-grown terrorism. This is 
not to say that Roy or whoever agrees with his position envisions all those undergoing a radicalisation 
process or merely holding radical ideas ultimately turn to terrorism;158 rather, especially as for home-
grown terrorism, Roy and alike deem radicalisation as a potential key element in explaining the root 
causes of such forms of violence. 
According to Roy, Islamist radicalisation is, first and foremost, a matter of identity searching in 
the context of a globalised world. In his famous book Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, 
the French scholar argues radical visions of Islam are a response to the loss of traditional Islamic 
cultures undermined by globalisation.159 As recalled in his previous work, The Failure of Political 
Islam, not only has globalisation eroded Islamic traditional values, but Islamist groups, except in Iran’s 
case, have also failed in seizing political power.160 In parallel, globalisation has facilitated the de-
territorialisation of the Ummah, the community of Muslims’ believers, as many migrated to the West. 
Once in Europe though, large numbers of young, second-generation Muslims often experience a sort of 
identity crisis, which juxtaposes their traditional values of Islam with secular Western culture.  
Such a vacuum creates, as Roy elaborates, a lost generation that can fall prey to fundamentalist 
views. Marking a clear-cut separation from the parents’ traditional religious values, radical theories of                                                         
157 The adherence of scholars and pundits to these two positions is by no means mutually exclusive. That is, some adherents 
may not necessarily and entirely fit into one argument or the other, but, nonetheless, for the sake of analysis, they provide 
valuable insights that can be used by the position they are more in tune with.  
158 Schmid, Alex. “The end of radicalisation?”; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. (2011). Friction. How 
Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford: University Press. 
159 Roy, Olivier. (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. 
160 Many of the points Roy makes are expanded from his 1994 piece The Failure of Political Islam: Roy, Olivier. (1994). 
The Failure of Political Islam. London: IBI Tauris. 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Islam are “both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalisation that has made them what 
they are.”161 “Al Qaeda and consorts”, writes Roy, “offer a narrative of revolt and violence that appeals 
to an unmoored youth and gives a religious and political dimension to youth revolt.”162 In fact, through 
the acquisition of purist forms of Islam, born-again Muslims are able to create an imaginary, universal, 
and almighty Ummah. This imagined community goes beyond any sort of physical or national 
boundary, reclaiming Islam’s past grandeur and role as a major antagonistic force against the West. As 
the French scholar clearly summarises: 
Radicalized young people, who rely heavily on an imagined Muslim politics (the Ummah of 
earlier times) are deliberately at odds with the Islam of their parents…They invent an Islam 
which opposes itself to the West…They are moved to action by the displays of violence in the 
media of Western culture. They embody a generational rupture…and they are not involved with 
the local religious community and the neighbourhood mosques. These young people practice 
self-radicalization on the Internet, searching for a global jihad. They are not interested in the 
tangible concerns of the Muslim world, such as Palestine. In short, they are not seeking the 
Islamization of the society in which they live but the realization of their sick fantasy of 
heroism.163  
 
Such a mixture of uncertainty and fantasies of glory are also found in other works by Marc Sageman 
and Farhad Khosrokhavar. According to Sageman,164 hordes of young European Muslims, outraged by 
Western foreign policy and frustrated by Western societies’ inability to meet their expectations, could 
undergo a bottom-up process of self-radicalisation.165 Struggling to establish their own identity vis-à-
vis Europe’s national myths based on degrees of “Britishness”, “Frenchness”, “Germannes”, these 
young Muslims could form a “new generation of terrorists consist[ing] of home-grown wannabes –self-
recruited, without leadership, and globally connected through the Internet. They are young people 
seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging to their lives.”166 
                                                        
161 Roy, Olivier. (2007). “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. In Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael 
Emerson (eds), European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. pp. 
55-6. 
162 Roy, Olivier. “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. pp. 55-6. 
163 Roy, Olivier. (2015). “There Are More French Muslims Working For French Security Than For Al Qaeda”. The 
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-roy/paris-attack-muslim-cliches_b_6445582.html accessed on 12 
June 2017. 
164 Sageman cannot entirely be placed under Roy’s umbrella, as in 2013 he even came to challenge the very notion that 
radicalisation can be linked terrorism. Yet, his work is still relevant to Roy’s position. For more information about 
Sageman’s 2013 declaration regarding radicalisation, please see Hasan, Mehdi. (2013). “Woolwich Attack: Overreacting to 
Extremism ‘Could Bring Back Al Qaeda’ Ex CIA Officer Warns”. The Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/27/sageman-interview_n_3342206.html, accessed on 01 August 2017. 
165 Sageman, Marc. (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
166 Sageman, Marc. (2008). “The Next Generation of Terror”. Foreign Policy. Issue 165. March/April Issue. p. 37. 
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 Similarly, Khosrokhavar’s works with multiple Islamist detainees in France enlighten how the 
search for identity can trigger radicalisation leading to terrorism. Based on his numerous interviews, the 
French sociologist explains how economic hardship, perceived racism, and rejection by Western 
society can provoke feelings of humiliation. Yet, humiliation is not perceived as a personal condition, 
but as a common state of the global Ummah, which, either while in prison167 or in the aftermath of 
precipitating events such as the Bosnian War or the invasion of Iraq (“archetypal event”), facilitates the 
creation of an imaginary “Neo Ummah”. As Khosrokhavar articulates:  
Radicalisation is, in summary, related to the Neo Ummah, mainly characterized by its being 
‘wounded’, ‘manhandled’, repressed, humiliated, and acted upon contemptuously…[Yet this is 
also] jubilant through its new achievements [that is, luring the West] into traps and quagmires 
[as young Muslims] build up their new identity by fighting against a mighty enemy who 
becomes a ‘lame duck’ [and is defeated] because the Islamic youth is not only more valiant, but 
more intelligent…by cheating the enemy.168   
 
If such a “locus for revenge” pushes young Muslims to create an imaginary society, then the main 
question becomes the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims in Europe, argues Gilles Kepel in The 
War for Muslim Minds.169 According to this renowned French expert, Europe is indeed in the midst of a 
battle for the hearts and minds of second and their-generation European Muslims. Largely 
disenfranchised and deluded by Western societies’ inability to satisfy their expectations, these young, 
angry Muslims170 struggle for the right of “self definition”, which is stuck between Islamic and 
European identities, eventually falling prey to radical visions of Islam.171 Begotten by such 
mechanisms of radicalisation, Kepel believes that home-grown terrorist attacks like Madrid have 
“established Europe as the new front line for terrorist attacks…[and] as the primary battlefield on 
which the future of global Islam will be decided.”172 
Unsurprisingly, Kepel warns that, “The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds in 
the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of [Muslim] believers 
on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of 
the West.”173 Kepel concedes that, if European societies succeed in integrating young, disaffected 
Muslims and steer them towards prosperity, the new generation in question might become the Islamic                                                         
167 Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2015). “The Mill of Muslim Radicalism in France”. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/the-mill-of-muslim-radicalism-in-france.html?_r=0 accessed on 12 June 2017. 
168 Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2013). “Radicalization through religion”. University of Michigan. pp. 1-8. 
169 Kepel, Gilles. (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
170 Leiken, Robert. (2005). "Europe's Angry Muslims," Foreign Affairs. 84:4. (July/August). 
171 Kepel, Gilles. The War for Muslim Minds. Ch. 7. 
172 Kepel, Gilles. The War for Muslim Minds. p. 241. 
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vanguard of the next decade, initiating and inspiring virtuous cycles of modernity and democracy even 
in their countries of origin. Regrettably, were this outcome not to materialise itself, the risk for Europe 
is: 
[To] become a place where Islamists and Salafists will manipulate significant numbers of 
Muslims…to help advance their aim of creating strongholds of uncompromising Islamist 
identity capable of sustaining political campaigns (as over the hijab) or creating jihadi cells 
capable of inflicting attacks on the scale of Madrid.174   
 
Afraid that the radicalisation of such young, angry Muslims could eventually pave the way for waves 
of European mujahedeen, Robert Leiken argues not only does Islamist radicalisation represent a serious 
threat to Europe, but also to the entire Western world.175 
Yet, if Roy agrees on the seriousness of the issue of Islamic radicalisation, the French scholar 
still preaches cautious approaches in countering radicalisation. Roy urges not to give in to the whole 
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory, for such an Islamist “neo-fundamentalism” is not 
only a reaction but also a product of the West. Being part of the West, “Muslims end up thinking in 
Western ways [and] tend to express their identities through these Western models,”176 which are also 
found in purist forms of Catholicism and Protestantism. The reason why, according to Roy, many 
governments fail to properly address this Islamist neo-fundamentalism is because they lack the 
understanding of the actual context Islam is inserted in the West, where the Muslim faith is de-
territorialised, Westernised, and projected to a global vision of an imaginary “Ummah.”177 
Therefore, Roy proposes a precise course of action in relation to the state of Islam in Europe. To 
begin with, Europe should stop referring to the “Muslim community”, but acknowledge that Muslims 
form an utterly divided and heterogeneous population.178 Secondly, society should stress the 
disconnection between religion and culture.179 Islamist terrorists, and even more so converts who 
joined al-Qaeda, demonstrate to have nothing in common with traditional Islamic values, as they are no 
more the bearers of a traditional culture. 
This should be followed by the push for a Western Islam, which does not mean interfering with 
ideology or necessarily championing a liberal Islam. Rather, this Westernised version of Islam should 
be based on the voluntary choice to belong to the Muslim faith, avoiding considering Muslim anyone                                                         
174 Kepel, Gilles. (2004). In “The War for Muslim minds: an interview with Gilles Kepel”. Open Democracy. 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-5-57-2216.jsp, accessed on 24 June 2017.  
175 Leiken, Robert. “Europe’s Angry Muslims”.  
176 Roy, Olivier. Globalized Islam. p. 201. 
177 Roy, Olivier. Globalized Islam. pp. 1-58, 303. 
178 Roy, Olivier. “There Are More French Muslims Working For”. 
179 Roy, Olivier. “Islamic Terrorist Radicalization in Europe”. pp. 55-6. 
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with a Muslim background. Westernised Islam should then be treated and recognised by the same laws 
and principles that deal with other religions, as society should stress citizenship above any other form 
of communal affiliation. By doing so will Europe meet the aspirations of many Muslims, that is, the 
recognition of Islam as a Western religion and Muslims as full citizens, “while discouraging the 
creation of small communities, ghettos, and minority status. This would also isolate the terrorists and 
prevent them from building a political constituency.”180      
In addition to Roy, other eminent scholars have dedicated their efforts to the study of Islamist 
radicalisation and its potential role in leading to acts of terrorism. This, though, is mainly due to the 
fact that, as Schmid has asserted, except for rare cases, most of mainstream European academic experts 
do think Islamist radicalisation exists and is a serious issue that needs to be studied.181 Unsurprisingly, 
the period following the Madrid and the London bombings and other home-grown-related incidents has 
been marked by a mushrooming literature regarding radicalisation –most of which will, in fact, be 
taken into analysis in this study’s literature survey. Experts of the calibre Rik Coolsaet, Magnus 
Ranstorp, Lorenzo Vidino, Petter Nesser, Peter Neumann, and also U.S. scholars Bruce Hoffman and 
Brian Jenkins, are only few of the names of those academics who have dedicated their energies to the 
studying of radicalisation as a crucial, possible trigger factor for political violence.182 
Also, a number of leading centres and think tanks throughout the West have engaged in major 
projects to research the issue of radicalisation, among which RAND in Santa Monica, CA, the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, the Real Istituto Elcano in Madrid, 
the International Counter-Terrorism Institute (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, the international Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation based at King’s College London (ICSR), and the International Centre for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in the Hague. All of the abovementioned studies feature a wide array of 
topics dealing with radicalisation and terrorism –including home-grown terrorism-, ranging from 
                                                        
180 Ibid. 
181 Please see note on page 13.    
182 Bergen, Peter, Hoffman, Bruce. (2010). Assessing the Terrorist Threat. Bipartisan Policy Center; Jenkins, Brian. (2010). 
Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001. Santa 
Monica, CA, RAND Corporation; Schimd, Alex. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A 
Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. ICCT Research Paper; Coolsaet, Rik. (2011). (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the 
Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences, 2nd edition. Farnham: Ashgate; Magnus Ranstorp. (2010). 
“Understanding Violent Radicalisation”, In Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: 
Routledge; Vidino, Lorenzo. (2009). “Europe’s New Security Dilemma”. The Washington Quarterly. 32:4. pp. 61-75; Petter 
Nesser. (2010). “Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe: Exploring motivational aspects of recruitment and radicalisation”, 
in Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation. pp. 108-09; Neumann Peter. (2008). ‘Introduction’, in 
P.R. Neumann, J. Stoil, & D. Esfandiary (Eds.), Perspectives on radicalisation and political violence: papers from the first 
International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence. ICSR, London. p. 4; Donatella Della Porta & Gary 
LaFree. (2012). “Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation”. IJCV, Vol. 6, No. 1. p. 4. 
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definitions, theories, mechanisms, implications, policy decision making etc. Nonetheless, the universal 
common denominator is the relevance of radicalisation as a possible crucial tool for violence to occur.  
In general, such academic interest in Islamist radicalisation might be reinforced by certain 
European Muslims’ acceptance of violent rhetoric or religiously framed violence. Although most 
French and European Muslims have fiercely condemned terrorism, a number of French Muslim 
students still refused to observe a minute of silence to honour Charlie Hebdo’s victims.183 Shorty after, 
a primary school teacher decided to leave his school in Lille due to his pupils’ anti-Semitic attitudes,184 
while a Muslim girl-gang attacked a 21 year-old woman for wearing a bikini swimsuit in a public park 
in France.185 In the wake of the controversial Danish cartoons about the Prophet Mohammad, numerous 
outraged Muslim protesters filled British streets holding signs saying, “behead those who insult Islam” 
and “death to democracy.”186 Similar slogans have also been registered at a number of al-Quds protests 
in London and Paris, inciting anti-Israeli and anti-Western sentiments.187 In Germany, a number of 
Muslims established Sharia-patrolled units to ensure the respect of Sharia Law close to Dusseldorf.188 
And, all in all, there have been numerous Muslim clerics promoting violent visions of Islam across the 
continent.189  
Still, what perchance motivates most of Roy’s proponents is the factual evidence that seems to 
potentially link radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism in Europe. As shown in Table 1, we have counted 
58 Jihadist-related attacks in Europe since 9/11. One again, we must clarify that creating the following 
list was no easy task. As there can be uncertainty as to what constitutes a “terrorist act”, we know that 
our selection of Jihadist attacks might be incomplete, relative or even inaccurate –for some cases are 
still being investigated or circumstances continue to remain unclear. As such, we inserted attacks 
whose links to terrorism were proven or whose motivation was allegedly driven by Jihadist ideology. In 
this respect, we included a number of attacks where perpetrators have shouted “Allah Ahkbar” before                                                         
183 Sengupta, Kim. “Charlie Hebdo cover: We are not Charlie”.  
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promoting-Islamism.html accessed on 12 June 2017.  
185 Calderwood, Imogen. (2015). “French women furious after ‘Muslim girl-gang’ attacks ‘immoral’ sunbather”. The Daily 
Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3175959/Girl-gang-attacks-immoral-sunbather-wearing-bikini-French-park-
sparking-JeSuisCharlie-style-social-media-campaign.html accessed on 12 June 2017.  
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their acts. Certainly, shouting “Allah Ahkbar” is not and cannot be associated to terrorism. Also, at 
least in a number of circumstances, we know that perpetrators might have nothing to do with violent 
visions of Islam. We are also aware that a number of them suffered from mental issues and that religion 
was not even an important part of their lives. Yet again, with a degree of vagueness, we still decided to 
take into account perpetrators’ self-proclaimed and alleged religious motivations. 
Considering such clarifications, 40 of our selected 58 attacks (69%) have taken place in the last 
two years. Home of the largest Muslim community in Western Europe with almost 5 million 
Muslims,190 France has witnessed the highest number of attacks (23/58, 40% of the total). The UK has 
been the second most preferred target, featuring 13 incidents. In this chart, Germany ranks third (7/58), 
followed by Belgium (6/58), Spain and Sweden (2/58 each). Denmark, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Italy, 
and Finland have registered 1 incident so far. Overall, there have been 675 victims and more than 4,300 
injuries. Although France has suffered the highest amount of casualties, Spain has experienced the 
deadliest attack on the European soil, counting 191 fatalities and 1,800 injuries following a series of 
train bombings in Madrid in 2004.  
Until 2012, aggressors were mainly linked to terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, and 
Hezbollah, from which they were recruited, trained, and, probably at times, even directed. Starting in 
2014, coinciding with the rise of the Islamic State, almost every incident has even been directly 
connected to ISIS. Out of all the attacks allegedly linked to the Caliphate (more than 30), at least 22 
have been carried out by lone-wolves allegedly self-radicalised through ISIS’s propaganda. The group 
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Table 1. List of Jihadist-related attacks in the European Union and the UK since 2001. 
Date and location of Attack # of Victims (including the 
attackers) 
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39) 06/08/2016, Charleroi Machete 










40) 04/09/2016, Osny Prison Melee 
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51) 19/06/2017, Champs-Elysées 











52) 20/06/2017, Brussels Central 
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*This includes official, proven affiliation to terrorist groups; alleged, believed affiliations that are still investigated; 
unofficial affiliations given the fact that a number of perpetrators had no direct link with terrorist organisations, but claimed 
to be inspired by them and terrorist organisations claimed responsibility for the attack.  
**This is meant at the time of the attack, if the perpetrator carried out operations alone or in group –for follow-up 
investigations have often proved several lone actors had culprits or where somehow assisted by third actors.  
 
All in all, perpetrators either held citizenship of the country they attacked or had been living 
there or in other European countries for a number of years/months. The last two years have seen the 
emergence of foreign nationals, including asylum-seeking refugees, as the perpetrators of terrorist 
attacks –just like in Germany, Sweden, and Finland.191 Lone actors have carried out 76% of the total 
attacks (44/58). Aggressions have featured suicide operations, hostage kidnapping, and targeted 
assassinations; have made use of bombings, stabbings, gunfights, and hijacking of cars and trucks to 
drive into crowds of people; have targeted soldiers, law enforcement officers, politicians, professionals, 
and innocent civilians; have been executed in public areas (like stations, airports, factories, workplaces, 
boulevards) or even at peoples’ home doorsteps.  
 Besides the above-mentioned attacks, Europe also counts dozens of Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked 
thwarted plots. Among the most spectacular were the 2006-foiled plans to explode 10 trans-Atlantic 
                                                        
191 For more information about the Wurzburg attack, please see: Oltermann, Philip. (2016). “Germany’s first attack by 
radicalised asylum seeker alarms officials”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/germany-train-
attack-could-prompt-rethink-of-counter-terrorism-policy accessed on 15 June 2017; for more information about the 
Ansbach attack, please see: Weaver, Matthew. (2016). “Ansach bombing: attacker pledged allegiance to Isis, says official- 
as it happened”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/25/ansbach-explosion-german-town-
deliberate-blast-latest accessed on 15 June 2017; for more information about the Stockholm attack, please see: Anderson, 
Christina. (2017). “Stockholm Suspect Was Denied Asylum and Told to Leave in ‘16”. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/world/europe/sweden-truck-attack.html?_r=0 accessed on 15 June 2017; for more 
information about the Turku attack, please see Slawson, Nicola. (2017). “Finland knife attacker ‘targeted women’”. The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/19/finland-police-believe-turku-knife-attack-was-terrorism 
accessed on 29 August 2017. 
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airplanes carrying passengers to North America from the UK,192 and the 2014 alleged plans to detonate 
five British passenger planes bound for major European destinations in a “Christmas spectacular.”193 In 
2010 authorities thwarted a plot envisioning Mumbai-style commando attacks in cities in Germany, 
France, and Britain.194 In 2014, Jihadist terrorists wanted to attack the Eiffel Tower, the Louvre 
Museum, and nuclear plant in France.195 In 2015 a terrorist cell based in Sardinia had previously 
intended to attack Vatican City.196 In the same year, ISIS members were accused of plotting attacks 
against Munich train stations on New Year's Eve.197 In 2016 French authorities arrested three ISIS-
affiliated women after their attempted car bombing at the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.198 
Preoccupation over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is also given by the potential return of 
those European foreign fighters who have joined the Islamic State. According to a 2015 study by the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), almost 4,000 foreign fighters left from 
Europe to join Isis in the Middle East.199 The largest European countries, France, Germany, and Britain, 
have also provided the largest numbers of fighters. For instance, France has provided ISIS with 1,200 
fighters, Germany 900,200 Belgium 450,201 and the UK 850.202 But in relation to the country’s 
population size, the most affected countries are Belgium (more than 40 per capita), Denmark (100-150, 
27 per capita) and Sweden (150-180, 19 per capita). Given such numbers, European authorities have 
been growing preoccupied over the possible return of belligerent Jihadists that could mount attacks in 
their homelands, as it was the case for the Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting and the Saint-Quentin-
                                                        
192 (2006). “Police: Plot to blow up aircraft foiled”. CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/10/uk.terror/ 
accessed on 12 June 2017. 
193 Macintyre, Donal. (2014). “Exclusive: Al Qaeda plot to blow up 5 passengers planes in Christmas ‘spectacular’”. Daily 
Express. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/541725/REVEALED-Al-Qaeda-plot-to-blow-up-5-European-passenger-jets-in-
Christmas-spectacular accessed on 12 July 2017. 
194 Norton-Taylor, Richard. (2010). “‘Mumbai-style’ terror attack on UK, France, Germany foiled”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled accessed on 12 June 2017.  
195 Samuel, Henry. (2014). “Islamist plot to blow up Eiffel Tower, Louvre, and nuclear power plant foiled, say French 
police”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10956636/Islamist-plot-to-blow-up-
Eiffel-Tower-Louvre-and-nuclear-power-plant-foiled-say-French-police.html accessed on 12 June 2017.   
196 Custodero, Alberto. “Blitz against al-Qaeda in Italy”. 
197 Millward, David. (2016). “Munich terror alert: Two railway stations ‘evacuated’ as German police warn of threat by 
Islamic State suicide bombers”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12077040/Munich-terror-alert-train-stations-evacuated.html 
accessed on 15 June 2017. 
198 Chrisafi, Angelique. (2016). “Cell of French women guided by ISIS behind failed Notre Dame attack”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/09/cell-of-french-women-radicalised-by-isis-behind-failed-notre-dame-attack 
accessed on 15 June 2017. 
199 Neumann, Peter. Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000. 
200 Heinke, Daniel. (2017). “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; The Updated Data and Its Implications”. CTC 
Sentinel 10: 3. 
201 Van Ostayen, Pieter. (2016). “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks”. CTC Sentinel 9:6. 
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Fallavier attack. In fact, in both instances in Belgium and France, attackers had previously travelled to 
Syria and Iraq to join ISIS, had spent large periods of time in the region, and eventually brought the 
war home.203      
In light of the provided evidence, it is no surprise, then, that several institutional and political 
figures have also expressed their concern over the potential bond between Islamist radicalisation and 
the chance of terrorist attacks. Following the 07/07 London bombings, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, 
then head of the MI5, warned an increasing number of individuals were “moving from passive 
sympathy toward active terrorism through being radicalised and indoctrinated by friends, families, in 
organised training events here [in the UK] and overseas, by images on television, through chat rooms 
and Web sites on the Internet.”204 At the time of such statement, Dame Manningham-Buller referred to 
nearly 30 AQ-inspired plots planned by British foot soldiers to cause casualties and endanger Britain’s 
economy, reinforcing the then PM Tony Blair’s beliefs that the threat from Islamist home-grown 
terrorism would last a generation.205 Perhaps even more alarmingly, following the Woolwich attack – 
the murder of British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby by two Jihadist terrorists- the then UK Home 
Secretary Theresa May warned that thousands of people were potentially at risk of being radicalised 
and “[the UK government] need[s] to see if there are additional steps we should be taking to prevent 
radicalisation.”206 
Distress over the threat of home-grown terrorism has instigated several other reports from the 
UK207 and elsewhere, specifically designed to prevent radicalisation.208 Keenly attempting to shed light 
upon the relation between radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, the EU also birthed numerous                                                         
203 (2014). “Brussels Jewish Museum killing: Suspect ‘admitted attack’”. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
27654505 accessed on 13 July 2017; Dearden, Lizzie. (2015). “‘Isis’ French factory attack”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/grenoble-isis-beheading-live-updates-french-factory-attack-
10347351.html accessed on 13 July 2017. 
204 Manningham-Buller, Eliza. (2006). In Cowell, Alan. “Blair Says Homegrown Terrorism Is Generation-Long Struggle”. 
The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/world/europe/11britain.html?_r=0, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
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206 May, Theresa. (2013). In “Woolwich murder probe: ‘Thousands’ at risk of radicalisation, says Theresa May”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22671619, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
207 Numerous were the reports and investigations in the UK, among which: House of Commons [1087]. (2006). Report of 
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005; HM Government [CM 8092]. (2011). Prevent Strategy; 
Christmann, Kris. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. (2012). Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent 
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208 Pretch Tomas. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. Danish Ministry of Justice; United 
Nations, co-Chairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism. (2008). First Report of the Working 
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important studies and reports to better understand and tackle the issue of Islamist radicalisation.209 Yet, 
in spite of considerable efforts, ten years after the Madrid bombings, the then British PM David 
Cameron had argued radicalisation and Islamist extremism were still a main issue,210 while in the wake 
of the events of Charlie Hebdo, the then French PM Manuel Valls conveyed that France “is at war 
against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking 
fraternity, freedom, and solidarity.”211 Echoing such sentiments, EU counter-terrorism coordinator 
Gilles De Kerchove admitted that: 
The terror threat is still present in Europe [although] we now have franchises of Al Qaeda 
everywhere in the world. We have seen some lone wolves –people acting by themselves with no 
link to Al Qaeda core. And we have recently seen a rise of Europeans going to Syria –going 
there to fight. And that raises a specific security challenge.212 
 
In regard to European mujahedeen entering the Syrian civil conflict, former PMs Tony Blair213 and 
David Cameron,214 along with French,215 Dutch and German authorities,216 have shown serious worries 
over the risk of return of European fighters to their home countries. According to Cressida Dick, the 
Metropolitan Police’s assistant commissioner and head of specialist operations at the time, Britain  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could feel long-term consequences of the Syrian conflict, as young British Muslims who have travelled 
there to fight might commit violence when they return.217 Furthermore, as former head of counter-
terrorism at MI6 Richard Barrett has declared, up to 300 people have already come back to the UK 
from Syria, but intelligence services have faced an impossible task in trying to track them. Bearing this 
in mind, Barrett then added: 
If you imagine what it would cost to really look at 300 people in depth, clearly it would be 
completely impossible to do that, probably impossible even at a third of that number…With this 
whole business in Syria, although there is no linear projection from foreign fighters to domestic 
terrorists, it’s inevitable that a number will fall into this category.218  
 
In conclusion, those who agree with Roy consider Islamist radicalisation as a key, potential element in 
leading to acts of terrorism, and particularly home-grown terrorism. In this screenplay, the actors are 
often disenfranchised and detached young Western Muslims who embrace hard-line visions of Islam. 
Through these, young Muslims might experience a process of radicalisation triggering, in rare instances, 
violence. In the end, for most proponents of Roy’s theories, if Jihadist terrorism, including home-grown 
attacks, is a worrisome issue, then Islamist radicalisation is one of main issues to tackle.  
 
Croft’s Construction of the Islamist Radicalisation Threat  
Juxtaposing Roy’s supporters are those in line with Stuart Croft. To him, not only is fear of 
Islamist radicalisation exaggerated, but the very concept of radicalisation and its presumed association 
with terrorism is also flawed. In his distinguished book Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for 
Security, Croft holds the idea that “Britishness” has come to be constructed in contradistinction to a 
new Islamist terrorist “Other”, in order to reinforce the sense of British identity, perceived to be under 
challenge. By applying ontological notions to the domain of security studies –that is, by focusing on the 
individual “Self” rather than the State-, Croft argues individual values and behaviours are inter-
subjectively constructed, creating sets of identities, which are supposed to interact with one another 
either congruously or discordantly. 
In terms of security, those identities that collide with the dominant one suffer a process of 
“insecuritization”, by which the dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should  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Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-for-many-years-says-
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Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-for-many-years-says-
cressida-dick, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
  56 
be designated, as those who are to be controlled, objectified, and feared –in other words, securitized. 
Such a process is justified by the need of a society to find antagonist forces in order to reinforce and 
reaffirm its sense of identity.219 Therefore, societies need to construct a biographical narrative of 
continuity, rotate around networks that can be trusted, and act in accordance to “self-integrity”. That is, 
societies learn to be aware of what is acceptable and appropriate at all times and struggle against those 
“unsecure” parts of mainstream society that collide with the dominant identity.220 
That affirmed, Croft employs such ontological notions to describe the status of British Muslims since 
9/11: 
The contribution of ‘Britishness’ [meant to boost] the ontological security of some has 
necessitated the ontological insecuritization of others, specifically those known as ‘British 
Muslims’. That is, dominant notions of Britishness have been inter-subjectively understood and 
have become means of insecuritizing those categorized as ‘British Muslims.’221 
 
In detail, two pivotal events like 9/11 and the 07/07 attacks heralded the dichotomous construction of a 
new British “Self”222 juxtaposed with a Muslim “Other”, later personified in “British Muslims”. As 
opposed to being considered as a constituent part of Britain, British Muslims have been portrayed as a 
separate identity by those “trust structures” from the political, religious, and media realms. According 
to some, not only did the media construct, shape, and aggravate the actual entity of the idea of 
radicalisation,223 but it also contributed to the marginalisation of British Muslims, linking Islamist 
radicalisation to terrorism.224 Therefore, conceived as living in a particular special and temporal space, 
alongside Britain, the mainstream Muslim community, and its youth in particular,225 became, 
eventually, a subject of fear and suspicion.226 This can be explained, indeed, by the need of society to 
provide social solidity vis-à-vis perceived existential threats to the dominant identity. In fact, although 
“Britishness” is in part defined by what it is against –here constructed as “Islamic terrorism”, Croft 
argues:   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Security Policy. Issue 32, Vol. 2. pp. 219-235. 
222 Croft, Stuart. Securitizing Islam. Ch. 3 and 4.  
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The fear of ‘British Muslims’ creating terrorist attacks against the self is not the key element, in 
all but a handful of cases. Rather, it is the sense that the ‘British Muslim’ other will be 
successful in its ‘confrontation’ with the ‘British identity’, thus depriving the self of key identity 
resources.227 
 
In spite of the imaging of an enormous and unprecedented threat posed by Islamist terrorism,228 Croft 
holds the crucial underlying factor is not terrorism per se, but the dominant British identity’s dread of 
the Islamisation of the country.229 Such timorousness, in the end, justifies the process of 
“insecuritization” of the constructed idea of “British Muslims”, which results in their control and final 
securitization. By applying this angle to matters of Islamist radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, 
Croft shows the core issue lies at the very base of the debate. Islamist radicalisation and terrorism 
remain pressing issues, but undue worries over their symbiotic relation have been exaggerated to 
successfully construct a certain vision of Muslims, which eventually led to the securitization of Islam 
and the whole Islamic community. Put poorly, it is not about Islamist radicalisation causing terrorism, 
but, rather, it is about the struggle for identity and how Islam in the UK is being securitized under the 
banner of security to boost the idea of “Britishness”.  
 Croft’s theory about the securitization of Islam is welcomed among other experts. Harvard 
University professor Jocelyne Cesari’s work can be regarded as a sort of antechamber to Croft’s oeuvre. 
Three years prior to Croft’s Securitizing Islam, Cesari illustrated how the securitization of Islam in 
Europe, in response to the perceived threat coming from Islamist terrorism, was not merely a speech act, 
but a true policy-making process affecting the making of immigration laws, multicultural policies, and 
security policies.230 Yet, unlike Luca Mavelli’s theory about the need to defend a secular religious 
subjectivity from Islam,231 Cesari’s underlying reason for the justification of the securitization of Islam 
springs from the actual European unwillingness to come to terms with its presence in Europe: 
 
Islam is still seen as a dangerous and alien religion. Coming to terms with Islam would mean 
for Europeans to acknowledge their own restrictive conception of religion vis-à-vis civil society 
and citizenship. This would require a paradigm shift that Europe does not yet seem ready to 
accept.232 
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This rejection and fear to accept Islam as a cardinal entity in European societies is a product of the so-
called Islamophobia phenomenon. According to Tahir Abbas, particularly disseminated by the media 
after 9/11, erroneous political and cultural misinterpretations of Islam created a symbiotic relation 
between radicalisation and Islam and violence and Islam233, inciting feelings of fear towards Islam.234 
Accordingly, such daunted sentiments aim to hide envy for a few Muslims’ success in society. They 
turn a blind eye to larger questions of contested foreign policy,235 issues of Muslim integration, and 
social, economical, and cultural alienation featured in imperfect multicultural societies.236 And they 
normalise and justify the process of the securitization of Islam. To Andrew Hoskins and Ben 
O’Loughlin, the very concept of radicalisation is nothing but a myth created by the media.237 
As per Cesari, whilst empirical evidence shows most Muslims are willing to make 
accommodations in their practices to fit into Western society, “the process of securitization, [which] 
involves actors who propose that Islam is an existential threat to European political and secular 
norms…justifies extraordinary measures against it [Islam and the Muslim community].”238 Practically 
speaking, such exceptional measures translate into the hardening of the discourse on Muslim 
immigration, the needs of the Islamic community, and a number of anti-terrorism policies. Equally to 
Tahir’s analysis, Ceseari’s sums up her main point as such: 
The European state views Muslim groups as a threat to its survival and takes measures to 
reassure citizens that it will not allow the incubation of terrorism. However, the politicisation of 
religion essentially impoverishes and threatens its survival, leading devout Muslims to feel 
resentful of the interference of non-religious actors. Thus, the measures intended to prevent 
radicalisation actually engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious 
conservatism to fundamentalism. This is the process of securitization.239 
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Therefore, in regard to Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, not only is the theory linking the latter two 
inflated –being the product of muddled conventional wisdom240 and Islamophobic feelings that 
spawned myths of radicalisation and the securitization of Islam241; also, its unquestioned support is 
counterproductive and dangerous, as these sentiments of Islamophobia could backfire and push, de 
facto, Muslims towards radicalisation –resulting in the alienation of entire communities regardless of 
their invaluable partnership and support in governments’ counter-terrorist efforts.242  
 This could be an ironic outcome, especially given that facts show radicalisation is not 
widespread among Muslims. The Gallup survey on the global Muslim population by John L. Esposito 
and Galia Mogahed -the most comprehensive study of its kind, representing 90% of its population- 
demonstrates that Muslims are not as radicalised as expected. Muslims and Americans -and Westerners 
as a whole- are not intrinsically different when it comes to what matters most in life. Findings illustrate 
the two share the same desires and aspirations for a better tomorrow. When asked to describe their 
dreams for the future, the majority of Muslims would not mention fighting in a “Jihad”, but, rather, 
finding a better job.243 
Along these lines, research by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris shows basic cultural values of 
Muslim migrants evolve to conform to the predominant culture of the European society in which they 
live, as Islam is neither an exclusive identity nor a marching order.244 Although they proudly maintain 
their religious credo, most European Muslims happily combine their national and religious identities- 
as demonstrated by Muslims’ increasing role in society, the mushrooming of multicultural 
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organizations promoting dialogue, and the rise of interfaith marriages between Christians and Muslims, 
especially in Britain.245 
More importantly, most Muslims have fiercely condemned violence and terrorism. As 
illustrated in the Gallup survey, Muslims and Americans are equally likely to reject attacks on civilians, 
for they are morally unjustifiable. In reality, those who condone acts of terrorism are a minority and are 
no more likely to be religious than the rest of the population, argue Esposito and Mogahed.246 
Accordingly, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, hordes of outraged French Muslims have 
demonstrated at Champs-Elysees, all over France,247 and in other parts of Europe against Islamist 
terrorism and ISIS, through the slogan, “Not in my name.”248 Analogously, multiple British Muslim 
leaders have come together in an online video to openly condemn Jihadist violence and the 
Caliphate.249 One of them, a prominent cleric named Tahir ul-Qadri, has even launched an anti-ISIS 
“counter-terrorism curriculum” in London to be taught both in Muslim institutions and British schools. 
Ul-Qadri’s intention is to: 
Make clear that all activities carried out by Is or any other terroristic or extremistic organisation 
either in the name of God or religion or establishing any kind of Islamic state by acts of 
violence…are totally in violation of the Quran and Islam. The children who are going to Isis 
and fighting over there and leaving the comforts of their own British society, they are going to 
hell.250 
 
Such outcries against radical visions and violent acts in the name of Islam by European Muslims 
challenge claims of their religion’s incompatibility with Western values.251 As British polls from 2012 
show, in spite of many difficulties, 83% of British Muslims are proud to be Muslim citizens, 77% of  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them strongly identify with Britain, 86.4% feel they belong in Britain, and 82% want to live in diverse 
and mixed neighbourhoods.252 In France there are more Muslims in the army, the police, and the 
gendarmes than in the al-Qaeda network, as the case of Ahmed Merabet demonstrates.253 As a Muslim 
police officer killed while defending Charlie Hebdo’s offices, Merabet’s heroic actions were revered by 
all of France, because, in his brother's words: 
My brother was Muslim and was killed by two terrorists, two false Muslims. Islam is a religion 
of peace and love. As far as my brother’s death is concerned, it was a waste. He was proud of 
the name Ahmed Merabet, proud to represent the police, and of defending the values of the 
Republic: liberty, equality, fraternity.254 
 
These examples demonstrate that, “Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible”, uniting 
people against violent extremism, had endorsed the then PM David Cameron in 2011.255  
Even regardless of European Muslims being less radicalised than assumed, empirical evidence 
also seems to debunk the link between Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. First of all, high numbers 
of Muslims condemning terrorism can simply explain why there are not as many Islamist terrorist 
attacks as imagined, contends University of North Carolina professor Charles Kurzman. “If there are 
more than a billion Muslims in the world, many of whom supposedly hate the West and desire 
martyrdom”, Kurzman asks, “why don’t we see terrorist attacks everywhere, every day?”256 Then, 
Kurzman calculates that global Islamist terrorists have succeeded in recruiting fewer than 1 in 15,000 
Muslims over the past 25 years, and fewer than 1 in 100,000 since 2001. This results into 1 in 100,000 
Muslims being a terrorist, which still leaves approximately 15,000 terrorists from a global population 
of around 1.5 billion Muslims.257 Although Islamist terrorism should be taken as a serious peril, such a 
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threat should not be overblown because, “as it turns out, there just aren’t that many Muslims 
determined to kill us.”258 
 This appears to be the case in the United States. Out of more than 300 American deaths from 
political violence and mass shootings since 9/11, until 2013 only 33 have come at the hands of Muslim-
Americans, asserted a report.259 During that period, instead, 180,000 Americans were murdered for 
reasons unrelated to terrorism.260 And between 1970 and 2011, non-Muslims were responsible for more 
than 90% of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Overall, 32% of the perpetrator groups were motivated by 
ethno-nationalist/separatist agendas, 28% by single issues, such as animal rights or opposition to war, 
11% by right-wing extremists, 22% by left-wing extremists, and, finally, 7% by religious beliefs.261 
Within this, out of a total of 2,400 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 1970, Muslims carried out only 60 
attacks, amounting to 2.5% of all terrorist incidents.262 Such findings confirm Marquette University 
professor Risa Brooks’ assertion that the threat posed by Islamist radicalisation and home-grown 
terrorism in the United States has been greatly exaggerated.263 264 In her own words:  
My conclusion should be generally reassuring to Americans: Muslim home-grown terrorism does 
not at present appear to constitute a serious threat to their welfare. Nor is there a significant 
analytical or evidentiary basis for anticipating that it will become one in the near future. It does 
not appear that Muslim Americans are increasingly motivated or capable of engaging in terrorist 
attacks against their fellow citizens and residents.265 
 
Brooks concludes her analysis by warning about the risk from officials’ overstatements of the threat 
posed by radicalised Muslim Americans. To her, mischaracterizing this threat, in turn, is potentially 
costly and counterproductive for the security of the United States and the welfare of its citizens –in 
terms of economic spending, public resilience to terrorism, and alienation of the Muslim community.266  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Similarly to their American counterparts, European reports too seem to challenge the alleged 
link between Islamist radicalisation and home-grown terrorism. In 2013, the Europol TE-SAT reported 
that, out of 219 terrorist attacks occurring in 2012, more than 70% were related to separatist terrorism 
(France and Spain registered the highest rates). By contrast, Jihadist terrorists had carried out 6 attacks 
on EU soil (compared to none in 2011), killing 8 people.267 
Although Jihadist attacks and related offenses have sharply increased since then, the 2016 TE-
SAT report confirmed once again that, “As in previous years, the attacks specifically classified as 
separatist terrorism accounted for the largest proportion”, with the UK, France, and Britain leading the 
chart.268 Conversely, acts of violence against Muslims, their properties, or their worship places by non-
Muslims have been on the rise both in Europe269 270 and the United States -according to a FBI report, 
2015 registered 257 incidents related to hate crimes against American Muslims, marking a 67% 
increase compared to the previous year.271 In light of this, columnist Gary Younge conveys that, 
“Muslims are nowhere near the greatest terrorist threat…That doesn’t mean there isn’t a 
problem…But…put bluntly, if you have to assume anything when a bomb goes off in Europe, think 
region, not religion.”272 
Finally, even anxiety over hostile Jihadists returning to Europe from Syria and Iraq might be 
overstated for a number of reasons. Firstly, studies of returning fighters fail to conclude that 
participation in foreign conflict increases involvement in terrorist activity on domestic soil.273 For 
instance, a 2014 project by Jeanine van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker analyses cases of foreign fighters 
returning from Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia. In spite of tentative evidence, the Dutch researchers 
present 8 possible pathways returning fighters can undertake, which not all necessarily entail violence. 
The study concludes that, “although there is reason for concern with regard to (potential) high numbers 
of returning Western foreign fighters from Syria, only having an eye for the worst-case scenario is a too 
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narrow focus to look at this multifaceted phenomenon.”274 
Secondly, group and ideological fragmentation might limit chances of combat. Of all the 
European Jihadists entering Syria, writes Christoph Reuter, “only a fraction see battle [while] far more 
are building bases in the region.”275 Third, those who travelled abroad for Jihad might actually be less 
likely to focus on terrorist operations against the West, for they would detract attention from the more 
global brand of Jihad fighters propound, maintains Richard McNeil.276 Finally, as Peter McKay 
endorses, “the percentage of UK Muslims volunteering for Jihadism abroad is tiny. So is support for 
them in the Muslim community. The youngsters who volunteer are the exception, not the rule.”277 
Last but not least, several epistemological ruminations of very term of radicalisation question 
the claims made by Roy’s adherents. As Mark Sedgwick endorses, the concept of radicalisation is per 
se a source of considerable confusion.278 To being with, as several scholars opine, confusion arises as 
to whom should be labelled “radical”.279 Further, the absence of a shared, universal definition of 
radicalisation is problematic, as it paves the way for subjective policies, as the Anglo-Saxon and the 
European approaches utterly demonstrate.280 
Secondly, the concept of radicalisation is strictly connected to historical contexts and zeitgeists. 
Throughout history, those designed as “radicals” have gained both positive and negative connotations 
depending on their ultimate purpose and on their antagonist forces.281 Thirdly, the idea of radicalisation 
is also shaped by societies’ different contexts (security, integration, and foreign policy), which are 
based on different agendas. Given that each agenda, however, uses the term “radical” to mean 
something different, the inevitable collision between these adds confusion to the concept of  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radicalisation -as an agenda’s definition of “radical” is unlikely to meet the other agendas’ criteria to be 
defined as such.282 Finally, just like governments struggle in their attempts to fully comprehend 
radicalisation, audiences too understand the concept in question subjectively. Although media outlets 
reach large audiences, studies show the public differs from official and media discourses on 
radicalisation, as individuals internalise the meaning of radicalisation according to their own lines of 
thought. This disjuncture creates a variegated, but more confusing mosaic of ideas of radicalisation.283  
All in all, once again, when it comes to the relation between Islamist radicalisation and 
terrorism, such epistemological considerations prove the problem lies at the base of the debate. This is 
because the very concept of radicalisation cannot help being intrinsically confusing. Put plainly, 
confusion arises as for what radicalisation is, who is to be defined as “radical”, how the term is shaped 
by time and different contexts/agenda, and how the public perceives it. In other words, the concept of 
radicalisation is relative and subjective. 
Proving this point is the type of controversy surrounding the question of whether British 
Muslim organisations should receive governmental funds to counter radical views. As announced in the 
wake of the 07/07 bombings by Ruth Kelly, the then secretary for Communities and Local Government 
for the Labour Party, the agenda’s conscious aim was to develop a sort of “British version of Islam”, 
devoid of anti-Western sentiments and projected towards Muslims’ integration.284 Hence, this “prevent” 
strategy commenced by the Labour Party and then continued by the Coalition government allowed 
several Muslim organisations to acquire taxpayers’ money. Yet, as often reported by The Telegraph, in 
some cases, governmental funds ended up financing groups that actually promoted radical tenets of 
Islam or even displayed ties with radical and/or terrorist groups (the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, 
for instance).285 In light of such evidence, the then Home Secretary Theresa May was even forced to 
admit that “hundreds of thousands of pounds” were wasted in the name of prevention.286 
Nevertheless, governmental response was mixed, for organisations like the Muslim Council of                                                         
282 Sedgwick, Marc. “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion”.  
283 O’Loughlin, Ben, Boudeau, Carole, Hoskins, Andrew, Holloway, Royal. (2011). “Distancing the extraordinary: 
Audience understandings of discourses of ‘radicalization’”. Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies. 25:2. pp. 
153-164.  
284 Jones, Stephen. (2013). “New Labour and the Re-making of British Islam”. Religions. Vol. 4, pp. 550-566.  
285 Gilligan, Andrew. (2009). “Islamists who want to destroy the state get £100,000 funding”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6427369/Islamists-who-want-to-destroy-the-state-get-100000-funding.html 
accessed on 15 May 2017; Turner, Camilla. (2014). “Government donation to Muslim Charity Forum denounced as 
‘madness’”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11114599/Government-donation-to-Muslim-
Charities-Forum-denounced-as-madness.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
286 May, Theresa. (2011). “Islamist hatemongers funded by the taxpayer with money earmarked for schools”. The Daily 
Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2000492/Theresa-May-admits-63m-terror-fighting-fund-GIVEN-extremist-
groups.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
  66 
Britain and the Muslim Charity Forum were stripped of their funds,287 while others considered as 
radical were not.288 In spite of harsh criticism and controversial proof of their radical nature, 
associations, groups, and schools have still continued to benefit from governmental funds. For example, 
the then PM David Cameron once criticised the Labour Government’s financing of the Shakhsiyah 
Foundation for its “extremist links”; but his administration eventually granted state funds to a number 
of Muslim schools that the very act PM had already condemned for promoting anti-British 
sentiments.289 Not only does this sort of inconsistency show that the Labour and the Coalition 
governments interpreted the notion of radicalisation differently; it also demonstrates that even within 
the same administration uncertainty may arise as to what being radical actually means.  
In order to avoid or decrease similar controversial cases caused by different interpretations of 
the notion of radicalisation, John Horgan argues for the need to focus on terrorist behaviour and 
terrorism. The study of radicalisation, endorses the scholar, “may ultimately prove unnecessary.”290 
Peter Neumann,291 instead, opts for a more holistic approach to the study of radicalisation, equally 
emphasizing both extremist beliefs and behaviours to elucidate as much as possible radicalisation’s 
labyrinthian nature.292 Finally, Sedgwick recommends abandoning the use of radicalisation as an 
absolute concept, recognising at the same time its relativity and moulding by different contexts and 
agendas.293 
In summary, those more in line with Croft294 disagree on the urgency surrounding the concept 
of Islamist radicalisation and its discussed correlation to terrorism. To them, radicalisation and the fear 
of Jihadist-inspired home-grown terrorism have been constructed to mask deeper issues such as identity 
struggle (as in the British case), socio-economic alienation and marginalisation, securitization of Islam, 
and feelings of Islamophobia fabricated by the media and institutional figures. Further, empirical  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evidence shows Muslims hold less radical views than feared, Jihadist home-grown terrorist attacks are 
minimal when compared to other types of terrorism, and predictions of violence following Jihadists’ 
return from Syria and Iraq seem less unlikely than envisioned. Lastly, some experts contend the main 
issue lies at the base of the debate, as the meaning of radicalisation is in itself problematic, relative, and 
misused. 
In the end, for those under Croft’s umbrella, radicalisation and terrorism remain considerable 
threats, but are, nonetheless, mythicized, overstated and exaggerated. In truth, the real matters are 
Europe’s new racism, feelings of Islamophobia, controversial politicians, and “securocrats.”295 As 
Reem Salahi vehemently puts it, the public should “stop parroting the misguided construct of 
homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalization as the problem, when the real problem is xenophobia 
couched in politically correct terms.”296 
 As illustrated in Chapter I, the points raised by Roy and Croft are source of heated discussion in 
Italy as well. As academics, politicians, and institutional figures choose their side, the study aims to 
discover which argument is ultimately right. Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy an urgent matter that 
ought to become one of the country’s worst nightmares, especially if potentially linked to terrorism? Or 
is fear of radicalisation exaggerated and socially constructed to justify unjust policies against Italian 
Muslims? Before attempting to understand which of the two positions best fits the Italian case, it is 
paramount to delve into the literature survey about radicalisation. Ergo, the following chapter is 
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CHAPTER III: THE STUDY’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Defining “Islamist radicalisation” is an indubitably strenuous task. This happens because 
uncertainty surrounds the two elements of the equation, namely “Islamist” and “Radicalisation”. What 
does being an “Islamist” actually mean? What constitutes “Radicalisation”? How do “Islamist” and 
“Radicalisation” interact with each other? When can one spot instances of “Islamist radicalisation”? 
Before addressing the discussion on theories and causal models, the following section presents the 
debate on definitions and provides ground for the crafting of its operational definition of “Islamist 
radicalisation”.  
 
Conceptual Framing and Definitions of “Islamist” in the Literature 
As already mentioned in the Introduction,297 we recognise that we have taken for granted certain 
categories. For instance, as we asked for people’s opinions about violence in the name of Islam, we 
have taken for granted the concepts of “religion”, “being an Italian Muslim” or “being an Italian 
Muslim talking about violence in Islam”. Likewise, we are aware that there are major schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence that differ from one another. We also know that individuals internalise religion 
and sacred tenets differently. Most importantly, we know that we could have dedicated more emphasis 
to the conceptualisation of “Islamism”, “Wahabism”, “Salafism”, and to major theorists like Ibn 
Taymiyya, Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Qubt, and Ruhollah Khomenini - none of them mentioned in this 
research. 
Keeping this in mind, we still thought that an exhaustive discussion on the conceptualisation 
and on the journey of “Islamism” was not as pivotal for the sake of our study, which only focuses on 
what people think and why they might think that way. Although we did contextualise “Islamism” 
within the Italian milieu and we briefly touched upon the evolution of the concept in question, we 
mostly dedicated our efforts to define how we could identify “Islamist” manifestations. As such, this 
section features those definitions and academic ruminations that eventually allowed us to locate 
“Islamist” within our theoretical framework.  
That clarified, the term “Islamist” stems from the word “Islamism”. As shown in the works by 
Martin Kramer and Mehdi Mozaffari, the term has changed its meaning and connotations multiple 
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times throughout history.298 Originally, “Islamism” had appeared in the 17th century in France and until 
WWI it has been used as a synonymous of Islam or belonging to the Islamic faith. The term acquired 
more political connotations following the 1979 Iranian revolution to stress the entrance of religious 
affairs into the political order. After being replaced by “political Islam”, “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
“radical Islam”, the term regained traction in the wake of 9/11 mainly to refer to revolutionary Muslim 
militants.  
Since then, conceptualising “Islamism” continues to be a considerably challenging task. To 
begin with, as William Shepard et al note, in the post 9/11 era the term “has often acquired a quasi-
criminal connotation close to that of political extremism, religious sectarianism, or bigotry, [whose] 
goals are often perceived merely as a series of violations of human rights and the rights of women.”299 
The academic domain has struggled at conceptualising “Islamism” too. Frédéric Volpi argues that this 
is due to the inability of Western academia to address the concept critically. Despite a blossoming 
literature, Volpi claims that scholars often read Islam through the lenses of the “dominant” Western 
narrative, which ultimately offers different strands of analysis that solely depend on specific disciplines 
and research goals.300 This kind of approach makes “Islamism” relative and subject to one’s field of 
study -as pundits from post-colonial studies, international studies, sociology of religion, 
democratisation studies, multicultural studies, security studies, and globalisation studies might present 
different perspectives based on what they are exploring.301 
Such biased takes on “Islamism” might not allow Western scholars to fully appreciate the type 
of dynamic, transnational transformation Muslim politics are experiencing recounted by Peter 
Mandaville.302 More than that, the common usage of “Islamism” adds uncertainty and takes for granted 
the complexity and multifaceted nature of practices and interpretations of Islam, notes Elizabeth 
Nugent. For instance, pondering over the term “Islamist”, Nungent writes: 
Islamists can range from those that advocate for quietism, effecting gradual political change 
through internal individual reform, to political parties advocating for societal reform through 
social welfare and electoral contestation, to revolutionary militants that seek to overthrow 
illegitimate states and implement revolutionary change. Islamists range from those who root 
justifications of their political behaviour in personal and literalist interpretation of the textual  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tradition, to those who rely on interpretations derived from independent reasoning and decision-
making with a firm basis in established schools of Islamic legal theory.303 
 
Subsuming the above-mentioned categories under a unique “Islamist” umbrella increases confusion as 
to what and whom should be considered “Islamist”, warns Nugent.304 
To Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar, this “sloppy language” disregards complexities and contexts 
and ends up alienating Muslims.305 Thus, it is no surprise that the Council on American-Islamic 
relations once complained that the word “Islamist” had become shorthand for “Muslims we don’t 
like;”306 that “Islamism” has become of the most contested terms in scholarly literature, as Emin 
Poljarevic underlines;307 and that due to its misused, relative, and politicised nature, a number of 
American scholars have even argued for the abandoning of “Islamism”, labelled ineffective.308 
 Notwithstanding the kind of uncertainty and criticism around the concept of “Islamism”, 
multiple attempts have been made to define the term. In doing so, major emphasis has mostly been 
allocated on the centrality of Islam within personal and public spheres. Back in 1932, Hasan al-Turabi 
used “Islamiyyun” to indicate, “political Muslims for whom Islam is the solution, Islam is religion and 
government and Islam is the Constitution and the Law.”309 Decades later, William Shepard used the 
term “Islamic Totalism” to describe “the tendency to view Islam not merely as a ‘religion’ in the 
narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with 
guidance for political, economic, and social behaviour.” Switching to the term “Islamism”, Berman 
Sheri defines it as “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life.”310 
And Poljarevic observes that, “Islamists are those who believe that Islam has an important role to play 
in organizing a Muslim-majority society and who seek to implement this belief.”311 
Other definitions point to Sharia Law as a valuable tool to establish an Islamic order. Olivier  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Roy indicates “Islamism” as “the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that aims to re-
create a full Islamic society, not simply by imposing shari’a [Islamic law], but by establishing first an 
Islamic state through political action.”312 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon refer to “Islamism” as “a 
religious ideology that insists on the application of shari’ah law by the state.”313 Likewise, Peter 
Mandaville defines it as “forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment 
of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and 
legal system derive directly from the shari’ah.”314 
As “Islamism” often entails political participation, Efraim Karsh believes Islamists are truly 
“political activists and ideologues” renewing the quest for “Allah’s Empire.”315 Akin to socialism and 
liberalism, “Islamism is a discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order,” writes 
Salman Sayyid.316 To him, “Islamism can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-
blooded attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles.”317 
Other scholars add emphasis on how certain Islamists wish to achieve these societal/political 
goals through the use of violence. To Mozaffari, “Islamism” is “a religious ideology with a holistic 
interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means.”318 And to Robert 
Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Islamism seeks the 
imposition on entire societies of a certain form of Muslim religious rule, together with the destruction 
of everything that Islamists believe is antithetical to their understanding of the proper practice of 
Islam.”319  
 
The Study’s Conceptual Framework and Definition of “Islamist” 
Taking these definitions into account, the study’s main distinctive trait of “Islamism” and, thus, 
“Islamist” is not to be sought in the milieu in which Islamists may operate (electoral, militant, or 
personal). It pertains not to the heterogeneous nature of the actors, such as quietists, militants, political 
activists, etc. It is not to be searched in the content of the ideology, which may be based on the 
centrality of Islam in personal and/or public life. It is not majorly focused on the end goal many 
Islamists may aspire to, namely the establishment of an Islamic order under Sharia Law. Rather, it  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ponders over the role of violence as a tool to achieve one’s goals. According to Satloff, “One can 
reasonably differentiate between those who employ violence and those who merely endorse, advocate, 
or sympathize with those who employ violence—calling the former violent Islamists and the 
latter radical or extremist Islamists.”320 
Ergo, keenly avoiding any prejudiced generalisation or misuse of the term, the study’s 
conceptualisation of “Islamist” encompasses the main contributions the literature has so far offered. 
That is, it acknowledges the different nature of the actors that might be considered “Islamist”, ranging 
from quietist followers to revolutionary militants who may operate in different milieus. It recognises 
that Sharia and the establishment of an Islamic form of government or rule are desirable, but not all 
Islamists aim or apply their energies for them. But, for the sake of analysis, the most emphasis is 
attributed to the justification of violence in religious terms. 
Applying Satloff’s description of “Radical Islamist” to the above-mentioned definitions, the 
study provides the following definition of “Islamist”: 
A person, whose religious affiliation is self-proclaimed, who adopts literalist visions of Islam 
and who, while centring (or not) such overarching interpretations within private and/or public, 
social and political spheres, advocating (or not) for the establishment of an Islamic legal and 
societal order, justifies or accepts violence framed in religious terms.  
 
Though not mutually exclusive, this definition enables to respect the variegated nature of “Islamists”, 
the spheres in which they may operate, and their end goals. But most importantly, it draws the line 
between purist, orthodox religious interpretations, and the acceptance of violence as a tool for change. 
In simple terms, a person adopting literal visions of Islam and advocating for the establishment of 
Sharia may be considered orthodox or purist, but not “Islamist”. In this logic, an individual becomes an 
“Islamist” only when violence is justified religiously independently from his/her degree of religiosity 
and personal/universal aspirations –as one might even refrain from centring religion within his/her 
private/public sphere or advocate for an Islamic order, but still accepts violence framed in religious 
terms.  
     
Conceptual Framing and Definitions of “Radicalisation” in the Literature 
Equally to “Islamism”, defining the term “Radicalisation” is an essentially arduous exercise. 




mean root and rooted.321 However, the meaning “going to the origin, essential” dates from 1651.322 
Centuries later, in relation to societal contours, Carole Douglas sees “Radical” as “going back to the 
root of things,”323 while John Belchem as “returning to the first principles.”324 With regard to more 
contemporary politics, Daniel Schönpflug links such aspirations to “go back to the roots” to the concept 
of fundamental change in society through the use of extraordinary means.325 This notion of sweeping 
change is also developed by Joyce Irwin who refers to reform outside or against the established 
institutions, against the system.326    
As illustrated in the previous chapter, “Radicalisation”, especially when applied to sweeping 
social change, is an utterly relative concept. This is due to the fact that “Radical”, based on notions of 
“going back to roots”, is a relative idea. In time, its sense has in fact changed according to historical, 
political, and social contexts. Interestingly, Andrew Silke notices that terrorists have not always been 
deemed “Radical”, for there was no mention of IRA members being radicalised at the time.327 In turn, 
advocates of republicanism against royalism in the 19th century were considered “Radical.”328 In the 
1960’s, hippies and those who countered the established status quo were too regarded as such.329 Even 
feminism was initially considered a radical movement, for it championed freedom from oppressive 
male supremacy.330 And in present-day Texas, purist Christian preachers and right-wing activists have 
labelled gay advocates radical extremists.331 
Starting in 2004, “Radicalisation” has gained more pejorative nuances being linked to terrorism. 
This was mainly due to the desire to understand the reasons and processes by which Western Muslims 
would engage in acts of home-grown terrorism.332 Since then, multiple efforts have been made to 
search for an exhaustive definition. In more general terms, Rem Korteweg et al define “Radicalisation”  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as “the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can 
result in a threat to the democratic structures and institutions.”333 Fairly similarly, Lidewidje Ongering 
sees it as the “process of personal development whereby an individual adopts even more extreme 
political or political-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals 
justifies extreme methods.”334 
Other pundits stress the use of revolutionary means and violence as attributes of the very idea of 
“Radicalisation”. To Peter Waldmann, “a person with radical goals questions the status quo of the 
socio-political order with a view to replacing it with another –either a revolutionary or an extremely 
reactionary one.”335 Thomas Olesen defines “Radicalisation” as “the process through which individuals 
and organisations adopt violent strategies –or threaten to do so- in order to achieve political goals.”336 
Peter Neumann describes it as “the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to 
approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims.”337 For Alex Wilner 
and Claire Dubouloz, “Radicalisation” is “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme 
political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and in which the attainment of particular goals 
justifies the use of indiscriminate violence.”338 
The abundant amount of academic and institutional339 definitions of “Radicalisation” has been 
unable to avoid criticism, however. First, equating it to the notion of “Terrorism”, there is no shared 
definition of “Radicalisation”. As a group of Australian pundits admits, “about the only thing 
radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a process.”340 As a result, the term continues to 
be relative, poorly understood, ill-defined, and a source of considerable confusion.341 Second, 
definitions have failed to provide policymakers with clear-cut approaches to prevent and counter 
radicalisation. Given the emphasis on “individual” and “personal” in most of the above-definitions,  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much academic research has been devoted to attempts to link personal circumstances to causes of 
terrorism. But such attempts have been mostly unsuccessful. Though individual biographies certainly 
matter, the extensive focus on personal variables has produced “false positives”, notes Schmid.342 That 
is, what enticed certain individuals to radicalise and turn to violence did not apply to others with similar 
characteristics. 
The inability to develop profiles or predictive models based on personal circumstances has 
brought the very study of radicalisation into doubt. Even two of the most renowned experts in terrorism 
studies, namely John Horgan and Marc Sageman, have come to challenge conventional wisdom linking 
root causes of terrorism to radicalisation of young Muslim individuals. Following the Boston Marathon 
bombings, Horgan stated that, “The idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest 
myth alive today in terrorism research.”343 Echoing his colleague’s remarks, Marc Sageman has 
suggested that, “the notion that there is any serious process called ‘radicalisation’ or indoctrination, is 
really a mistake.”344  
 
The Study’s Reconceptualization of “Radicalisation” 
Against this background, the study rests on professor Schmid’s assumption that the concept of 
“Radicalisation” can enjoy a second life amid conceptual renovation.345 The Dutch scholar believes that 
a much larger theoretical framework is needed to diminish confusion and over reliance on individual 
factors to elucidate complex processes of radicalisation. Schmid maintains that “Radicalisation” can 
remain useful and indispensable if it is seen as affecting conflict parties on both sides in a 
confrontation; accepts that radical opinions do not necessarily lead to political violence or terrorism; is 
applied not only to individuals and small groups but also to larger groups; is studied not only at the 
micro, but also at the meso and macro-levels; is detached from radicalism, while being more linked to 
the process of growing commitment to, and engagement with, violent extremism.346   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This last point is particularly significant. To Schmid, within the Western European zeitgeists, 
there is a substantial difference between “Radicals” and “Extremists”: 
While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extremists are never 
democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity. They are also positively in favour of the 
use of force to obtain and maintain political power, although they might be vague about this in 
their public pronouncements, especially when they are still in position of weakness. Extremists 
tend to have inflexible ‘close minds’, adhering to a simplified mono-causal interpretation of the 
world where you are either with or against them…Radicals, on the other hand, have historically 
tended to be more open to rationally and pragmatic compromise, without abandoning their 
search for getting to the root of a problem. Radicalism is redeemable –radical militants can be 
brought back into the mainstream, extremist militants, however, much less so.347 
 
As Schmid infers, the real issue is not the adoption of radical ideas per se, but the transition into 
“Extremism”, which is by nature more inclined to accept violence. 
In light of this, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen’s distinction between “Cognitive Radicalisation” and 
“Violent Radicalisation” fits Schmid’s logic perfectly. She explains that “Cognitive Radicalisation” is 
“a growing readiness to support and pursue far-reaching changes in society that conflict with or pose a 
direct threat to the existing order”, while “violent radicalisation [is] a process in which radical ideas are 
accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts.” 348 That 
is, cognitive radicalisation is the process through which an individual adopts ideas that are at odds with 
those of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social order, and seeks to replace it with 
a new structure based on a completely different belief system. Violent radicalization, instead, occurs 
when an individual takes the additional step of employing violence to further the views derived from 
cognitive radicalisation. 
Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definition utterly suits the study’s conceptual framing of the idea of 
“Radicalisation”. Crafted in this way, it unambiguously clarifies that radicalisation does not 
automatically result in violence. Also, defined so, “Violent Radicalisation” is linked to notions of 
“Extremism”, or, in Schmid’s terms, to the acquisition of extreme views that either justify or trigger 
acts of violence in response to a state of close-mindedness that leaves no room for tolerance.  
 
The Study’s Definition of “Islamist Radicalisation” 
Having defined and reconceptualised the terms “Islamist” and “Radicalisation” singularly, the 
study seeks to propose a more exhaustive definition of “Islamist radicalisation”. Connecting it to                                                         
347 Schimd, Alex. Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation. p. 10.  
348 Daalgard-Nielsen, Anja. (2010). “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”. 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vo. 33, Issue 9. pp. 797-814. 
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Islam/Islamism, Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi describe “Radicalisation” as “the process of 
progressively adopting more radical beliefs and ideas of Islam.”349 Analogously, Sam Mullins sees 
“Radicalisation” as “the process of coming to adopt militant Islamist ideology.”350 In the context of 
Jihadism in Denmark, in Michael Taarnby Jensen, “Radicalisation is understood as a process in which 
people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimisation of political violence.”351 
Inspired by Satloff’s and Dalgaard-Nielsen’s definitions of “Islamist” and “Radicalisation”, and 
resting on the assumption that both terms are relative and are being crafted within the current Western, 
European zeitgeists, the study defines “Islamist radicalisation” as:     
The process by which a Muslim individual or a group of Muslim individuals residing in Europe, 
whose religious affiliation is self-proclaimed, adopts purist visions of Islam or Islamic tenets, 
which, while centring (or not) such overarching interpretations within private and/or public 
spheres, advocating (or not) for the establishment of an Islamic legal and societal order, may or 
may not turn into justification for violence and/or active engagement in actual acts of violence 
framed in religious terms to subvert the democratic system or achieve particular political goals.  
 
Although the above definition is not mutually exclusive, it can be noteworthy for a number of reasons. 
First, it acknowledges that radicalisation is a process. Second, it inserts Islamist radicalisation into the 
European, Western context, recognising this process might differ substantially in other parts of the 
world –though it does not claim the West to be a monolithic entity. Third, it respects the different 
nature of the actors (quietists vs. activists), milieus (private sphere vs. public sphere), and end-goals 
(advocating or not for an Islamic order). Fourth, it allows for the fact that radicalisation does not 
always result in violence, but can also remain latent. 
Fifth, it links “Radicalisation” not to purist, literalist views of Islam, but to extremist views that 
are more likely to accept and/or engage in violence in response to a state of close-mindedness that 
leaves no room for tolerance. By this reasoning, Islamist views become so only if they accept violence 
and Islamist radicalisation only occurs when individuals accept and/or participate in violence that is 
justified in religious terms. In other words, purist views that might conflict with the existing order are 
not the main issue per se. Violence is the principal threshold, which is independent from one’s degree 
of religiosity or societal aspirations -as one could even be a non-religious person who does not 
advocate for an Islamic order but still accepts and/or engages in violence framed in religious ways.  
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That asserted, the study’s definition covers three intersecting groups of actors, which are similar 
to Lorenzo Vidino’s and James Brandon’s three subgroups of Islamist militants:352 “religious purists”, 
“non-violent Islamist extremists”, and “violent Islamist extremists”. Here, “religious purists” are those 
individuals who internalise purist visions of Islam that may or may not pervade their private/public 
sphere and that may or may not advocate for an Islamic order. “Religious purists”, who might be 
considered orthodox, may or may not conflict with the existing order, but never endorse violence. 
“Non-violent Islamist extremists”, who may or may not be “religious purists”, accept violence in 
religious ways but do not engage in any violent act. “Violent Islamist extremists”, who also may or 
may not be “religious purists”, justify and actually engage in violence framed in Islamist terms. 
Given these three categories, the study searches for “non-violent Islamist extremists,”353 for 
their justification of violence framed in religious concepts is indicative of instances of Islamist 
radicalisation. Still, as specified in the Introduction, this is no witch-hunt. Even if one person supports 
violence, his/her involvement in it is by no means automatic. As Clark McCauley and Sophia 
Moskalenko explain, not every terrorist is a radical and, more importantly, most radicals never become 
terrorists.354 In Jenkins’s terms,355 the real issue is only when one makes the transition into operational 
support and/or actual acts of violence. Hence, the study’s intention is not to criminalise, stigmatise, and 
marginalise those who might accept violence in religious terms. Rather, if such instances of Islamist 
radicalisation are spotted, the research aspires to explore those drivers that may lead to the endorsement 










352 Vidino, Lorenzo. Brandon, James. (2012). Countering Radicalization in Europe. ICSR, London. p. 10.  
353 As explained in the methodology section, the study’s field research was conducted in the “legal domain” and, thus, the 
author assumes the subjects participating in questionnaires and interviews/focus groups were not directly engaged in any 
terrorist activity at the time the research was executed.  
354 McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. p. 5. 
355 Please see Note on page 19 in the Introduction.  
  79 
CHAPTER IV: THE DEBATE ON THEORIES OF RADICALISATION 
 
Since its entrance in the field, “Radicalisation” has been widely applied to elucidate root causes 
of terrorism. In addition to theoretical models explaining how radical views can turn into violence and 
terrorism summarised in Appendix 2, there have been many attempts to understand why certain 
individuals radicalise and embrace violence. Wishing so, various governmental institutions have 
offered sets of root causes of radicalisation.356 A number of experts have instead focused on terrorists’ 
and extremists’ biographies with the intent to establish common profiles. Edwin Bakker scrutinised and 
found provisional similarities among terrorists’ lives and backgrounds,357 as did Thomas 
Hegghammer.358 Similarly, Tomas Precht discussed commonalities regarding recurrent causes and 
characteristics of European Jihadists’ radicalisation process.359 And Peter Nesser even proposed a 
Jihadist personality-type model based on profiles of Jihadist terrorists in Europe.360   
Even though some tentative similarities were indeed found between studies,361 other 
investigations admit that establishing terrorists’ profile is a nearly impossible quest.362 As Magnus 
Ranstorp et al, put it, each potential triggering factor –stemming from economic, social, political, 
cultural, psychological, religious, and personal conditions-, is instrumental but not sufficient to solely 
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explain every single instance of radicalisation.363 To Precht, this is due to the fact that the very process 
of radicalisation is a strictly personal matter.364 Its causes are “unclear and can even be unknown to the 
radicalising person”, observe Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker.365 What seems to be clearer, Ranstorp 
et al hold, is that radicalisation occurs as an intersection between an individual’s personal 
circumstances – resulting from his/her psychological, social, economic, political, cultural, and religious 
dimensions-, and the current zeitgeist.366 As such, radicalisation, conclude Velhius and Bakker, is really 
the product of a combination of all the above-mentioned factors that is unique for every person.367   
This given, our research does not advance additional theoretical causal models that would 
overflow an already abundant literature on the matter. Rather, the following section presents the main 
theories that are linked to Islamist radicalisation. These are essential to understand the choice of the 
predictive variables the quantitative analysis is built upon. Thus, we borrow models and theories from 
terrorism studies and apply them to the concept of “Islamist Radicalisation”. In doing so, however, we 
assume no automatic relation between radicalisation and terrorism. We explore theories that can only 
(or mostly) be applied to the European/Western context, for Islamist radicalisation occurring in 
different societal milieus in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere might feature different explanations 
and dynamics.368 And throughout the whole analysis we steadily differentiate between instances of 
Islamist radicalisation –here intended as the justification of violence framed in religious terms- and 
cases of Islamist radicalisation leading to terrorism.  
That asserted, this research utilises Martha Crenshaw’s scheme on causes of terrorism, as well 
as root cause models of violent radicalisation by Veldhuis, Daniela Pisoiu,369 and the Youth Justice 
Board for England and Wales.370 Drawing on the mentioned studies, the following section divides 
causes of radicalisation into grievances, rational factors, structural factors, and facilitating factors. 
Although cases from outside the Islamist domain (IRA and Red Brigade, for instance) and instances of 
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As the concept of “Radicalisation” grew increasingly attached to explain root causes of 
terrorism in the post 9/11 era, grievances have been often utilised to explain motivations behind acts of 
terrorism. Grievances have been generally conceptualised as a response to a sense of suffering, 
deficiency, and “lacking” individuals may experience at social, political, and psychological levels.   
 
1. Social Level 
Within society’s social contours, economic disparity and discrimination are the grievances 
typically used to address Islamist radicalisation. Two valuable tools the literature offers to understand 
why individuals radicalise and, at times, turn to violence are found in the relative deprivation theory 
and the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The first theory mainly deals with economic disparities 
causing terrorism. It is based on Ted Gurr’s belief that rebellions come to be when people cannot bear 
the undeserved misery of their lot, perceived unjust when compared to others’ better status quo.371 In 
Islamist terms, relative deprivation theory is important to grasp the sense of victimisation experienced 
by Muslims nationally and worldwide, which allows for Islamist narratives claiming Islam and the 
Islamic world to be under attack.372 Linked to the above-mentioned theories, the second valuable tool is 
John Davies’ belief that resentment and violence are always responses to frustration.373 
As there have indeed been Jihadist terrorists driven by feelings of financial inequality,374 
economic disparity is also to blame for radicalising hundreds of European Muslims, holds Tahir 
Abbas.375 Although disparity is not embedded in the system, official reports show Muslims generally 
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constitute the lower-income class in various European countries.376 First-generation immigrants often 
struggle to obtain citizenship and regular working Visas, frequently falling prey to unemployment. 
Unskilled workers are more likely to find occupation, but salaries tend to be low and conditions 
unstable. 
In addition to perceived economic inequality at the work place, Muslim communities feel 
underrepresented and cannot always voice their malaise.377 Within second, third, fourth generations, 
socio-economic advancement has also been slow, scarred by “generational reproduction of acute 
unemployment, poor housing, and declining health.”378 In turn, thousands of European Muslims reside 
in lower-income neighbourhoods outside various city centres, which are often torn apart by crime, 
decaying infrastructure, drug abuse, and tension with police.  
It is exactly in these vulnerable outskirts, symbol of the kind of economic disparity affecting 
European Muslims, that radicalisation preys on alienated, poor youngsters, claims Abbas.379 A study 
for the European Union recounts how “enduring unemployment is creating the conditions for youth 
disaffection, with recognition that environmental and familial pressures place many young people at 
risk from varying forms of radicalism and criminality.”380 In this scenario, gangs and gang-related 
culture, the report conveys, can play an instrumental role in the acquisition of extremist views. Drawing 
on this, a study by ISPI highlights how terrorist organisations, namely ISIS, exploit gang-torn, 
impoverished areas to radicalise young Muslims. Turning, in rare cases, into “Jihadist hotbeds”, the 
report shows how Muslim enclaves in several European cities “are breeding ground for Islamic 
radicalism and may pose a threat to Western security.”381   
As for Britain, Abbas believes young British Muslims are particularly more vulnerable to 
radicalisation when they are poor, discriminated, and northern.382 Even though pockets of poverty are 
found in East London affecting the Bangladeshi community, Abbas asserts that conditions for Muslims 
in northern Britain are direr: 
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The problems of widening economic and social inequalities also have implications for wider 
issues of alienation, disenfranchisement, isolation, and dislocation that impact on how young 
men, Muslims and non-Muslims, might become vulnerable to the forces of political radicalism, 
and sometimes where the hate towards the “other” turns to acute forms of violence.383 
Besides other extra-continental realities,384  
 
France is another example of how harsh economic circumstances can fuel Islamist radicalisation. 
A study by one of France’s leading think tanks, Institut Montaigne, has analysed living conditions in 
several suburbs (banlieues) around Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and other cities. Similarly to Daniela 
Pisoiu’s study on “sub-cultures,”385 the investigation described the outskirts in question as “separate 
Islamic societies” parallel to France, which are affected by “isolation”, “wasteland[s] of the de-
industrialisation”, “radical rejection of France” and “Islamic values of community closure.”386 
Although the 2005, 2007, and 2010 riots have been considered more “popular” than Islamist 
uprisings,387 “the rise of radical Islam is largely concentrated in the most sensitive French suburbs”, 
writes Eric Denece, founder of the French Centre for Intelligence Research.388 “Over the past three 
decades” the founder maintains, “France let its inner cities become real powder kegs. In lawless areas, 
the fundamentalism has used the failure of the state because it thrives wherever there is frustration.”389 
Given that, in 2005 Denece estimated approximately 500,000 French Muslims to adhere to hard-line 
visions of Islam, warning the country about an “explosion in the suburbs.”390  
Discrimination and racism can also be significant drivers of radicalisation at the social level. 
Adding to historical and religious misconceptions about Muslims and Islam embedded in Western 
cultures,391 crossroad events have accrued mutual resentment and mistrust. Episodes such as the  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“Satanic Verses”, the Danish cartoons over the Prophet Mohammad, the controversial question of the 
veil in France, and the rise anti-Islam groups across Europe have often widened the gap between 
Muslims and mainstream society.392 Precipitating events such as 9/11 and acts of home-grown 
terrorism have, in turn, exacerbated feelings of Islamophobia and discrimination towards Muslims. 
Although its meaning and perception remain unclear, Islamophobia indubitably affects both the UK 
and Europe, contends Christopher Allen.393  
As there have been cases of violence, crime, and Jihadist terrorism fuelled by perceived 
discrimination,394 discriminatory attitudes can also foster radicalisation within wider Muslim 
communities. According to Abbas, drawing on notions of securitisation successfully constructed by the 
media and the political discourse, Islamophobic-related discrimination has seriously hindered the 
integration of large segments of the British Muslim community.395 Missed integration, exacerbated by 
citizenship deprivation of suspected subjects,396 has augmented chances for radicalisation.397 Personal 
interviews with members of Islamist groups in Britain by Quintan Wiktorowitz show extremist 
movements have capitalised on widespread feelings of frustration and alienation ignited by 
discrimination and racism.398 Furthermore, according to a 2015 poll, 4 in 10 British Muslims agree that 
discriminatory actions by police and MI5 are contributing to the radicalisation process of young 
Muslims.399 And in Germany, where studies report Muslims feeling discriminated against,400 the lack 
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of governmental measures countering Islamophobic attitudes has been blamed for triggering 
radicalisation amongst Turkish citizens.401 
In neighbouring France, racism and discrimination have much to do with Islamist radicalisation 
as well. Spokeswoman for the Collective Against Islamophobia, Elsa Ray contends that in France “a lot 
of young Muslim people feel hopeless nowadays [as] they are discriminated against on a daily basis, at 
work, at school.”402 Echoing her colleague’s words, former French Ministry of Justice Rachida Dati 
invites France not to “close [its] eyes forever. There is Islamophobia. There is enormous inequality. 
There is unequal treatment of different population.”403  
If “doors are closed when you are an Arab,”404 natural feelings of resentment pave the way to 
radicalisation, holds Radwan Masmoudi. As director of the Washington-based Center of the Study of 
Islam and Democracy, Masmoudi understands that young French Muslim “get fed up with their life and 
they don’t see any hope for improvement…they are like a ticking bomb.”405 Hence, as Olivier Roy 
explains, in French banlieues, the attraction of radical Islam becomes a “youth movement…[because] 
to some of them, radical Islam is a way to find a second life.”406 British author Andrew Hussey 
contends the situation in France is so tense, that the rise of radical Islam as a response to racism could 
turn the country into the major set of a future global war, featuring even a French Intifada.407  
 
2. Political Level 
Politically speaking, worldwide oppression of fellow Muslims and Western foreign policy are 
the two most accredited factors provoking outrage. In terrorism studies, nearly every scholar mentions 
the duo as instrumental elements in motivating terrorism. Specifying that profiles are almost impossible 
to establish, Marc Sageman still notes that anger at Western intervention in the Islamic world is a 
distinctive trademark of virtually every Jihadist.408 This happens because, as Yousufzai Khouwaga and  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Franziska Emmerling claim, Western foreign policy “lies at the root of modern day Islamist 
terrorism.”409 Ibrahim el-Houdaiby writes that hostility “is not a rejection of Western values. Rather, it 
is foreign policies that cause hostility, [as] 81% of politically radicalised Muslims describe the U.S. as 
‘aggressive.’”410 In light of this, former president of the U.S. Barack Obama and current Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn both acknowledge the centrality of Western foreign policy in triggering Islamist 
radicalisation and terrorism.411   
In depth, as Korteweg et al illustrate, Islamists deem the West guilty of Muslims’ dire 
conditions. Adding to old resentment sprung from past colonialist domination of Muslim lands,412 
indignation stems from Western military intervention in the Islamic world; its support for dictatorial 
and corrupted regimes in the Middle East; its backing and double-standard attitude towards Israel; its 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which are conceived as deliberate aggressions on Islam masked 
under the “War on Terror” banner.413  
A number of theories and beliefs can expound such kind of hostility towards the West. For 
example, John Dollard’s oppression theory argues that oppression provokes political violence.414 This 
happens particularly when governments mistreat particular groups of people, robbing them of their 
identity, dignity, security, and freedom, adds Martha Crenshaw.415 Mark Juergensmeyer’s humiliation-
revenge theory contends humiliation evocates feelings of revenge and, ultimately, violence.416Jerald 
Post’s cultural identity theory prioritises the identity of a particular cultural group over the 
individual.417 
Leonard Weinberg’s national cultural theory maintains that some cultures, societies, and 
countries are more collectivist than others and, ergo, are more likely to experience acts of terrorism  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than individualist realities.418 Likewise, Gahad Hamed’s theory of collective belonging maintains that 
family bonds, friendships, and feelings of collective belonging are defining traits of Arab and Muslim 
societies. This is mostly due to the fact that “the Arab culture places a high emphasis on the importance 
of family which ensures that a person who is raised in the Arab culture understands where their loyalty 
lies and their goal is to grow into a member of the family that makes them proud.”419 
The sense of collectivist loyalty is noticeable in Muslim’s pronounced identification with their 
faith. This, according to a 2006 Pew poll, is the most important defining trait for Muslims around the 
world. To them, their religious affiliation is more important than nationality. As such, it is perhaps no 
surprise that support for fellow oppressed Muslims from the Palestinian Territories averaged 70% 
among European Muslims and 74% among Muslims worldwide.420 
The above-mentioned theories can surely account for the myriad of terrorists blaming their 
actions on oppression of Muslims and Western foreign policy.421 In a similar way, such theories also 
elucidate cases of Islamist radicalisation driven by the political grievances in question. According to 
Tufyal Choudhury, the answer is to be searched in the strength of a shared Islamic identity that allows 
for empathy and support of oppressed brethren.422 Reactions by a number of British and French 
Muslims to the bellicose events of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may prove Choudhury’s point. As a 
response to Palestinian casualties at the hands of Israel in 2012, hordes of Muslims protested in London 
chanting “Allahu Akbar” (“God is the Greatest”) while burning Israeli flags.423 In the same year, during 
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the Jerusalem Day held in Britain’s capital in solidarity with the Palestinians, protesters displayed signs 
that stated, “We’re all Hezbollah” and “Israel is the disease, we’re the cure.”424 
Two years later, following the Jewish State’s military operations in the Gaza Strip against 
Hamas, thousands of French Muslims marched through several cities to condemn Israeli violence. On 
that occasion, protestors purposely defied a ban imposed after marches on two Parisian synagogues 
occurred the previous weekend, resulting in scuffles with the police. Again in Paris, a number of 
demonstrators climbed on top of a building and burned an Israeli flag, for “we must show that, as 
Muslims, we’re all united”, a protestor declared.425 
Back in Britain, outrage at Western foreign policy also fuelled instances of Islamist behaviour 
justifying violence. Couching their frustration at the U.S. and the UK in religious terms, during the 
2011 9/11-memorial event in London, a group of about 100 Muslims, including members of Muslims 
Against Crusades, burned American flags in front of the U.S. embassy. As one demonstrator shouted, 
“You [America] will always face suffering, you will always face humiliation, unless you withdraw 
your troops from Muslim lands”, others held signs saying, “Islam will dominate the world.”426 
Similarly, following Osama bin Laden’s death, dozens of Al-Qaeda’s sympathisers marched in front of 
the U.S. embassy once again, staged a mock funeral for the organisation’s deceased leader, burned U.S. 
flags, and featured signs stating, “Jihad to defend the Muslims”, from “Western injustice in Iraq, 
Afghanistan.”427 
One year later, during an anti-American rally in London, Islamists held banners that proclaimed, 
“The followers of Mohammad will conquer America”, while black Jihadist flags waved in the 
background. Other signs stated that “Muslims will destroy the crusaders”, as, according to the speech 
by preacher Anjem Choudary, Sharia law is destined to take over the entire world, including the UK.428  
And the very same Imam, in a 2013 BBC show, refused to condemn the murder of drummer Lee Rigby 
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by two Jihadist terrorists, describing the action as a response to unjust British and Western foreign 
policies.429  
 
3. Psychological Level 
Psychological factors have been recently gaining traction within the political discourse 
following terrorist attacks by allegedly mentally unstable subjects. In the wake of the Leytonstone knife 
attack,430 the Nice truck attack,431 and the Ansbach bombing,432 authorities have reported all 
perpetrators responsible for these attacks to have a history of mental illness resulting from 
psychological disorders. Yet, with most of the academia having discarded psychopathological, 
narcissist, and paranoid theories, the following section scrutinises the two psychological factors 
ordinarily associated with radicalisation: negative/traumatic personal experiences and identity crisis. 
This first theory is based on the idea that negative personal experiences and traumatic events 
can cause violence. Applied to radicalisation, such a belief can explain why certain individuals and, in 
rare instances, even entire cultures radicalise in the aftermath of negative occurrences and traumas.433 
As Quintan Wiktorowicz’s study illustrates, adverse experiences and traumatic events might create 
cognitive openings, undermining and questioning individual core believes. This process initiates the 
search for a new, better identity, where overarching Islamist ideas offer a sense of meaning, belonging, 
and opportunity for redemption and success.434 
                                                        
429 (2013). “Preacher refuses to ‘abhor’ attack”. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-22650053/anjem-choudary-refuses-
to-abhor-woolwich-attack accessed on 22 June 2017. 
430 Dodd, Vikram, Addley, Esther. (2016). “Leytonstone knife attack: man convicted of attempted murder”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/08/leytonstone-knife-attack-man-convicted-of-attempted accessed on 23 
June 2017. 
431 Boyle, Danny et al. (2016). “Nice terror attack: Police vans blocking promenade withdrawn hours before”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-blocking-promenade-withdrawn-
hour/ accessed on 23 June 2017.  
432 Weaver, Matthew, Farrer Martin. (2016). “Ansbach bombing: attacker pledged allegiance to Isis, says official”. The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/25/ansbach-explosion-german-town-deliberate-blast-latest 
accessed on 23 June 2017. 
433 For more information on the theory of cultural trauma, please see: Jeffrey, Alexander et al. (2004). Cultural Trauma and 
Collective Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press; for more information about cultural traumas stemming from 
forced migration affecting entire cultures, colonialism in Egypt, and harsh living situation in the Gaza Strip, please see: 
Sagramoso, Domitilla. (2010). “Islam and ethno-nationalism in the north-western Caucasus”. In Yemelianova, Galina. 
Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. Oxon: Routledge. p. 136; Asik, Ozan, Mehmet. Erdemir, Ayakan. (2010). 
“Westernization as Cultural Trauma”. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies. Vo. 9, no. 25. pp. 111-132; Heyer, 
Julia. (2014). “The Spoils of War: Violence in Gaza Leads to Youth Radicalization”. Der Spiegel. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-in-gaza-strip-leads-to-radicalization-of-palestinian-youth-a-985510.html 
accessed on 23 June 2017.   
434 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. Radical Islam Rising. Ch. 2. 
  90 
As personal negative or traumatic experiences have been instrumental catalysts for a number of 
terrorists,435 they have been source of Islamist radicalisation as well. Aside from the role prisons cover, 
which will be later analysed, death of friends or family member is believed to be a stimulus to 
radicalisation. Wiktortrowicz’s investigations with members of the Islamist group al-Muhajiroun in 
Britain indicate that 31.7% of the interviewees began to think more deeply about Islam following the 
death of a family member. Disregarding the fact that 3% of the interviewees’ religious seeking 
commenced after near-death experiences, distress from the death of relatives eventually facilitated the 
acquisition of Islamist ideas culminating in al-Muhajiroun memberships.436  
In addition to familial losses, traumas linked to migration might also offer chances for 
radicalisation. Various studies show that, compared to the overall population, refugees and asylum 
seekers are more likely to suffer from pre437 and post-migratory traumas, including Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder438 and depression.439 Distressed by living conditions in overcrowded accommodation 
centres and by the tortuous nature of the asylum-seeking process, refugees embody appealing targets. 
ISIS’s attempt to radicalise and recruit migrant newcomers in Italy440 and Germany441 proves this point. 
Actually, fearing other asylum-seekers emulating Riaz Khan Ahmadzai,442 Mohammad Daleel,443 and 
Anis Amri,444 German authorities are “very concerned that Islamists in Germany are trying, under the 
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cover of humanitarian assistance, to exploit the situation of the refugees for their own ends and to 
proselytize and recruit among asylum-seekers.”445 
Besides personal negative experiences, identity crisis is a major psychological factor explaining 
both terrorism446 and manifestations of Islamist radicalisation. According to Gilles Kepel, Farhad 
Khosrokhavar, and Olivier Roy, radicalisation occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity 
in a perceived hostile and confusing world, namely French society.447 As second and third-generations 
become Westernised to the extent they no longer feel part of their parents’ culture, they end up crashing 
against society’s unwillingness to incorporate them. Stuck between traditional cultures and Western, 
liberal, globalised societies, this type of identity crisis renders Islamist visions alluring, for they satisfy 
an inner quest for meaning, dignity, and belonging. Providing a valid alternative to traditional Islamic 
values, Islamist views grant alienated Muslims a noble cause to advocate for -that is, the heroic defence 
of Islam and oppressed Muslims-, transitioning, in their eyes, from rejects to honourable individuals. 
Like France, Germany too finds itself handling issues relating to an identity crisis among its 
Muslim citizens. Baffled between traditional Islamic values and Germany, which brands Islam as an 
incompatible entity,448 numerous Muslims are coming to embrace Islamist visions that further separate 
them from mainstream society. As a matter of fact, according a 2012 poll, 48% of German Muslims 
would reject German majority culture. More than that, among the 14 to 32-year-olds that were 
surveyed, “there exists a subgroup of religious extremists who hold anti-Western views and are 
reportedly prepared to use violence.”449 
Britain is another example of how certain Muslim citizens end trapped between their Islamic 
tradition and Western values. For Imtiaz Shams, issues of identity crisis are inevitable when British 
Muslims are confronted by a society that feels suspicious towards them and that questions their 
beliefs.450 And in this scenario, explains Ed Husain narrating his journey towards the joining of Islamist 
group Hiz ub-Tahrir, Islamist views represent a solution to the search for identity:  
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My generation of young British Muslims was torn between two cultures. The mainstream 
British lifestyle of dating, pre-marital sex, living together, and dissolution of partnerships with 
comparatively little fuss was not something that appealed to us. Simultaneously, the customs of 
our parents’ generation—arranged marriages with cousins—were equally abhorred…Cut off 
from Britain, isolated from the Eastern culture of our parents, Islamism provided us with a 
purpose and a place in life. More importantly, we felt as though we were the pioneers, at the 
cutting edge of this new global development of confronting the West in its own back yard.451 
 
This newly found persona, continues Husein, made him proud, for “everywhere we [members of the 
organisation] went, we were the brothers to be respected. It was intoxicating.”452  
Catherine Raymond’s interviews with members of Sharia4UK are another illustration of how 
identity crisis can entice Islamist radicalisation.453 Before becoming more interested in his religion, one 
of Raymond’s interviewees said: “The path I was following was not the right path, I always had this 
feeling that there was something wrong…I’ve got purpose now.”454 Similarly, according to another 
member who spoke about his Muslim friends, “At home they’d be pious, and then when they’d go to 
school, or college, or university they’d become someone else…change their names…change their 
attitudes…it is an identity crisis.”455 
 
Rational Factors 
In contrast to social, political, and psychological grievances, an alternative explanation for root 
causes of radicalisation is not to be searched in feelings of suffering, deficiency, or lacking that an 
individual may experience. Rather, the individual is perceived as a rational actor embarking on a 
benefit-cost analysis, pushed by self-interest and self-betterment. In terrorism studies, as Martha 
Crenshaw elaborates, the rational choice theory entails that terrorist actions derive from conscious, 
calculated decisions. As such, terrorism is rationally adopted as the optimum strategy to accomplish 
socio-political goals.456 Within this context, mobilisation depends not on the existence of grievances, 
but, as Alan Krueger contends, on the availability of material and symbolic incentives and resources in 
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the political system.457 These ruminations conflict with claims that terrorist acts are altruistic in 
nature,458 as they are really driven by mankind’s classical sense of egoism459 that materialises into 
action only if personal incentives are achievable.460   
Applied to radicalisation, Daniela Pisoiu argues Islamist radicalisation is nothing but the 
product of a rational occupational choice.461 Through the analysis of numerous Islamists’ trials, court 
material, and interviews in Austria, France, and Germany,462 Pisoiu claims individuals rationally 
engage in decision-making processes and choose to become Islamists over other occupations. This 
decision is built on the subjects’ evaluation of three occupational categories Pisoiu names “Standing”, 
“Recognition”, and “Reward”. In detail, “Standing” applies to what an individual values most in 
society in terms of prestige. “Recognition” pertains to the perceived approval and support of particular 
actions by the social surrounding, based on a commonly shared apprehension of what is acceptable. 
“Reward” refers to the idea of being successful for making a highly noble and compensated 
difference.463 
Pisoiu states that the evaluation of these three categories is no different than what regular people 
do when they choose their occupation. What differentiates Islamists is their interpretation of the 
categories in question.464 To Islamists, “Standing” means courage, altruism, and heroism. “Recognition” 
signifies religious approval within their constituencies, including peers, family, and the larger masses. 
“Reward” equals to advocating for a noble cause in defence of Islam and in pursuit of eternal life. For 
some, “Reward” also means material gain, whether in form of money, lucrative businesses, or various 
preferential treatments. 
These “radical” interpretative frameworks are learned and constantly legitimised and reinforced 
through the establishing of increasingly exclusivist and absolutist environments. As a result, such 
frameworks rationally convince individuals that, when compared to other occupations, espousing the 
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Islamist cause entails more benefits than costs.465 By this logic, chances of electing other careers are 
nullified, for they are deemed less efficient than direct, first-hand action. According to Pisoiu, this is 
why Islamists reach to the conclusion that there is no feasible solution other than taking action and 
embrace the Islamist occupation.466  
As numerous are the cases of terrorists467 and Jihadist organisations468 applying rational 
decision-making processes, the calculated choice to join Islamist groups may suit Pisoiu’s theory of 
Islamist radicalisation. In Britain, Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK have often 
drawn negative attention due to their anti-Western tone and desire for Sharia law. Particularly in the 
wake of official bans or public altercations, it could be argued that, for Muslims living and working in 
Britain, joining or gravitating around the groups in question could be problematic. Yet, if one applies 
Pisoiu’s notions of “Standing”, “Recognition” and “Reward” and agrees with purist interpretations and 
the implementation of Sharia, joining Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK may be still logical and desirable. 
This could explain why, in spite of potential controversy, between 3,000 and 4,000 British Muslims, 
most of them students, decided to become members of Hizb ut-Tahrir,469 and why contentious preacher 
Anjem Choudary boasts hundreds of followers.470 
Material incentives may also prove Pisoiu’s point. Given the harsh economic and social 
conditions affecting many European Muslims, the opportunity to benefit from various sorts of concrete 
aid471 may offer chances for Islamist radicalisation. The famous Islamic centre of Viale Jenner in Milan 
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perfectly fits this reasoning. In addition to providing halal meals, language courses, and even academic 
school programmes in lieu of Italian public schools, the centre is also renowned for having provided 
immigrants with fake Visas. But for those who supported the Islamist cause, counterfeited work Visas 
would cost 700 euros, instead of the 2,500euros regular price.472 Obviously, such examples cannot 
minimally relate to the kind of social services Hamas, Hezbollah, and IRA have provided in their 
jurisdictions.473 Nevertheless, they still create rational incentives to join Islamist milieus in return for 
spiritual and material rewards.  
What perchance supports Pisoiu’s theory the most may be represented by British Muslim 
women’s rational decision to join ISIS. Interestingly, the choice to embark on journeys to the Middle 
East might be far more logical for women than men, argues Julia Brewer.474 First of all, joining ISIS as 
Jihadi brides satisfies women’s noble desire to serve Allah and His warriors. As Nabeelah Jaffer 
explains, women tend to imagine the Caliphate as “a world in which there is little poverty and 
inequality, governed with perfect fairness under clear-cut, divine laws that work to the advantage of 
all.”475 As Katherine Brown puts it, by joining the Islamic State, these women think they will become 
“perfect people”, to whom ISIS is saying, “You can have this perfect world –you just need to try a little 
bit harder.”476 
Kalsoom Bashir, co-director of Inspire, believes ISIS represents an alternative to the remarkably 
controlled lives experienced by many Muslim women back at home.477 Dominated by their fathers and 
husbands, without a voice, and unable to experience many of those freedoms British culture grants, 
Muslim women sometimes take their chances and leave -as it was the case of the three sisters from 
Bradford who left their respective husbands and fled to Syria with their children.478 To women like 
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them, Syria is not a war-zone but a “way out” that provides them with another opportunity to start a 
new life.       
Furthermore, as associate fellow at Chatham House, Hassan Hassan claims, ISIS empowers 
women, especially in relation to their family members. To this regard, Hassan writes that: 
If a woman is found violating the Isis dress code, her husband or father would be punished, not 
her. In tribal societies, women are also traditionally not allowed to share inheritance, but Isis has 
reversed that if the case is reported. Women have used such practices and rulings to report their 
husbands to Isis members and even win a divorce.479 
 
Not widely reported in the media, these practices might eventually convince Muslim women they can 
be better protected and respected under the Caliphate rather than in their Western societies. 
Finally, a series of economic and practical advantages might attract female recruits. As “Umm 
Umar” implies during her Twitter conversation with Nabeelah Jaffer, life under ISIS can be normal, for 
“U can come here and study btw. Study fiqh [Islamic legal interpretations], hadeeth [sayings of the 
Prophet], medicine, etc.…u can [also] do hisbah [join the religious police], but if ur married ur husband 
will want u to stay at home lol…lots of ajar [reward for good deeds].”480 Speaking of which, if women 
are married to a shaheed, a martyr who died in battle, the Caliphate provides for them. “U dnt hav 2 
pay 4 ANYTHING if u r wife of a shaheed,” writes “Umm Zahra”.481 But all women, the girl reassured, 
are looked after, for “U will still get money each month.”482 
Surely, as not each and every one of the 500 Western women483 -including 60 from Britain-484 
joining ISIS did so after carefully calculating costs and benefits. Yet, it is likely that many of those who 
have reached the Caliphate had indeed been briefed about the mentioned incentives, providing rational 
grounds for leaving everything behind, holds Hassan Hassan.485       
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Structural Factors 
 Structural factors do not explain radicalisation through grievances or processes of logical 
decision-making. Rather, emphasis is allocated on the structure and the mechanisms of particular 
elements, namely social groups and ideology. That is, what is relevant now is how Islamist groups and 
Islamist ideology function and ignite, at times, processes of radicalisation.  
 
1. Social Group and Personal Bonds 
 In terrorism studies, the relationship between social group dynamics/personal bonds and 
terrorism has been widely explored.486 Group dynamics might play a crucial role in triggering terrorism 
because collective identity subsumes individual identity, argue Jerrold Post et al.487 Bearing this in 
mind, Wiktorowicz and Sageman draw their analyses on those psychological theories that explain 
terrorism as a product of group psychology within idiosyncratic subcultures that coalesce in reaction to 
circumstances they perceive as intolerable.488 To the two scholars, grievances are essential, but not 
sufficient to instigate the radicalisation process, as they necessitate particular groups of people and 
personal bonds. Bluntly put, Wiktorowicz’s and Sageman’s contention is that radicalisation is really 
about who you know and how you interact with that person or group. 
As such, Wiktorowicz focuses on the relation between social movement theory -more precisely 
with one of its sub-branches called framing theory-, and radicalisation. Social movement theory deals 
with the production and dissemination of meaning and how individuals come to conceptualise 
themselves as a collectivity, based on the social group they decide to be a part of.489 In this picture, a 
frame is an individual’s worldview, consisting on values and beliefs; being a complex entity, an 
individual matures several frames, which enter competition to establish themselves as the authoritative 
interpretation of social reality. The success of a social movement, thus, depends on its ability to align 
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its frame to the one of the person who joins the group.490 There, the individual comes to fully identify 
with the social movement identity, and at that stage, according to Wiktorowicz, radicalisation takes 
place. 
Like Wiktorowicz, Sageman equally recognises the importance of group dynamics and 
networks in triggering radicalisation. Based on his studies of dozens of Islamist terrorists, for Sageman, 
radicalisation stems from the interplay, not linear or sequential order though, of four factors: the 
individual sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims in the world; 
the personal interpretation of such moral outrage by the individual within the context of a larger war 
against Islam; the individual’s potential resonance between one’s sense of moral outrage and one’s own 
experience, embodied by personal stories of discrimination and inequality within the frame of Western 
societies; finally, the mobilisation through networks which function as “echo chambers”, where a 
“spontaneous bunch of guys” makes the transition from rhetoric to violence, that is, where 
radicalisation takes place.491 
Unlike Wiktorowicz, Sageman majorly stresses the impact of personal bonds and networks 
made of like-minded people, most likely displaying already existing connections to each other, as a 
crucial element for radicalisation to occur.492 In a post 9/11 counter-terrorist era, where top-down 
recruitment is less feasible, aspiring militants are connected not so much by formal organisational ties, 
but rather by shared ideology and the Internet. In Sageman’s terms, radicalisation is a bottom-up 
process, which is possible through the coming together of virtual, already connected, global networks. 
Similar to Donatella della Porta’s analysis of Red Brigade members,493 in most all the cases identified, 
Sageman claims that people who joined a militant cell already knew someone affiliated with it.494 
Corroborated by Rogelio Alonso’s and Jamie Barrett’s studies of Jihadist terrorists,495 Sageman asserts 
strong emotional bonds formed through informal kinships or close friendships do, in fact, play a central 
role in individuals’ shift towards radical political violence. 
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Applied to Islamist radicalisation, Wiktorowicz’s and Sageman’s ideas find confirmation in the 
cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Shari4UK. Besides cases in Central Asia,496 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s group 
involvement was also instrumental in triggering the radicalisation of a number of British Muslims. 
Michael Whine explains that, particularly active on British campuses497 like Imperial College and 
Queen Mary College, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s has radicalised students and professionals through conferences, 
poster hangings, and face-to-face interaction.498 Once a Hizb ut-Tahrir’s member and recruiter, Ed 
Husain recounts how he used to distribute leaflets across British campuses (i.e. “The only meeting 
place for a Muslim and a Jew is on the battlefield”) with the specific intent to radicalise and recruit 
students.499 As he recalls in a 2007 CNN interview: 
It was here [East London] that I and extremist organisations in the mid 1990s, and even now, 
found it easy to recruit, because people in these parts of Britain don’t have a clear identity as to 
who they are, whether they are Asian, whether they’re Muslim, whether they’re British. We 
claimed India, for example, was Muslim land to be conquered again by the Army of a coming 
Caliph. That was the sort of rhetoric we were putting out and nobody questioned us.500 
 
Thriving on issues of identity crisis Hizb ut-Tahrir members have often managed to promote Islamist 
views, which eventually increased religious animosity at Tower Hamlets and Newham College. Such 
intense propaganda culminated in the recruitment of 3,000-4,000 British Muslims, recounted Husain to 
the London-based Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat.501 
In a similar fashion, Sharia4UK also shows group dynamics can induce Islamist radicalisation. 
Led by controversial preacher Anjem Choudary, Sharia4UK, which was banned in 2010, has exploited 
different platforms and methods to increase its outreach capabilities within British society. As shown in 
Catherine Raymond’s study, aside from extensive use of the Internet, the organisation has championed 
public initiatives meant to foster radicalisation and recruitment. The targets, Choudary reveals, were 
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urban areas displaying “a lot of problems with the youth, prostitution, drugs, alcohol [where we] really 
tap into that and present the Islam as an alternative.”502 
Prior to the 2010 ban, Sharia4UK often engaged in road shows around London on a weekly 
basis, where members held banners, distributed leaflets, sold DVDs, and engaged in face-to-face 
interaction. As Choudary interacted with contacts at universities such as the London School of 
Economics, the University of Leeds, and Trinity College in Dublin, student groups presumably 
affiliated to Sharia4UK also staged low-profile events on and off campus. This type of determined and 
efficacious group participation resulted in the support hundreds of British Muslims. 
Likewise, personal bonds can too be pivotal elements for the acquisition or reinforcement of 
Islamist ideas. Though his journey towards radicalisation had already begun, Ed Husain’s initial 
interaction with other likeminded individuals he came to identify as “brothers” plunged him deeper into 
extremism.503 Comparably, as Claire Stevens writes, her grandson’s radicalisation followed his 
befriending of Muslim students in college. After a few months when Muslim friends would pile up in 
his bedroom, the previously atheist boy, “Under the informal tutelage of his new friends…eagerly took 
on the attitudes of his Muslim ‘brothers’ in place of his former personality.”504 These attitudes, 
however, consisted in “hate-filled bile against homosexuals, women, Jews, anyone in fact who wasn’t a 
Muslim man.”505   
 
2. Ideology 
 Indubitably, radicalisation is detached from any particular type of religion. Still, studying the 
beliefs shared by Islamists and Jihadists might in turn be a useful tool in elucidating the reasons why 
certain individuals radicalise. Surely, this is not to advance any link between Islam and radicalisation or 
Islam and terrorism. Nor are we arguing Islamist ideology and Islamist actors to be monolithic entities. 
As specified in Chapter III, Islamists differ in literalist interpretations and end goals. Here, the type of 
Islamist ideology that accepts violence framed in religious terms is the one analysed to shed light upon 
the narratives built to foster radicalisation. 
Two theories could help address the impact of Islamist ideology. First, Robert Lifton’s 
absolutist theory refers to the adoption of dogmatic, non-negotiable, and non-debatable ideology that 
                                                        
502 Choudary, Anjem. (2010). In “Al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK”. p. 15. 
503 Husain, Ed. “Interview: Ed Husain, author of the Islamist”. 
504 Stevens, Claire. (2014). “I was a liberal atheist. And then my stepson found radical Islam”. The Spectator. 
http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9329742/my-boy-the-radical-muslim/ accessed on 21 June 2017. 
505 Ibid. 
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justifies terrorism in order to achieve its goal of creating a pure world.506 Second, Albert Bandura’s 
social learning theory pertains to the learning from a young age of aggressive behaviour through 
observation and imitation.507 In relation to terrorism, a variant of this theory has been invoked to 
explain violence as a product of witnessing acts of violence, glorification of terrorism, and teaching of 
martyrdom.508  
 Given these theories, when exposed to literalist interpretations, individuals might adopt 
absolutist attitudes that intimately bind them to the newly acquired tenets. As illustrated in Korteweg et 
al,509 dogmas are internalised through the teachings by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, 
Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Yusuf ‘Azzam, Osama Bin Laden,510 Anwar al-Awliki, and Musab Al-Suri. As 
there can only be one true God, these types of Islamists see that the world is in a perpetual state of war 
between “Dar al-Islam” (House of Islam), and “Dar al-Harb” (House of war). Inhabited by infidels, the 
latter must either convert to their righteous vision of Islam and abide by Sharia Law or be confronted 
through Jihad.511 In case of Western and/or Zionist aggression of Muslim lands, Jihad becomes a 
mandatory duty for every true Muslim. Killing of civilians and attacks on foreign countries are justified 
if the victims support governments guilty of oppressing Muslims.512  
 Aside from specific doctrines, external and internal factors might facilitate the rise of this 
particular kind of ideology. The first element is embedded in the relation between Islam, the West, and 
globalisation. To Salman Sayyid, Islamism, which is one interpretation of Islam, acts in function of the 
erosion of the West and the loss of its hegemony. In this picture, as the West is unable to halt its de-
centralisation, Islamists operate to end the “Age of the West”. Benefiting from globalisation, Islamism 
is destined to become the major force antagonising Western decaying supremacy and the 
Westernisation of the international system.513  
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507 Bandura. Albert. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. New York: Prentice Hall. 
508 Crenshaw, Martha. (1992). “How terrorist think”. In Howard, L. Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses. New York: 
Praeger. 
509 Korteweg et al. “ Background contributing factors to terrorism”. pp. 21-49. 
510 For further information regarding sources of radical Islamic tenets, please see Korteweg et al. “ Background contributing 
factors to terrorism”. 
511 “Jihad” is a highly disputed concept. Here it is intended as the use of violence against the infidels. For more information 
about the multiple meanings and interpretations of the very concept of Jihad, please see: Ali, Shaheen, Rehman, Javaid. 
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Benjamin Barber sees Islamism more in relation to the dynamics of globalisation than in 
relation to the West. For Barber, globalisation creates a collision between forces of Islamic tribalism, 
reactionary fundamentalism, integration of modernism, and aggressive economic and cultural 
globalism (the “McWorld” system). By this logic, Islamist visions are a response to perceived sense of 
destabilisation of traditional Islamic tribal societies and Islamic religious identity, deemed under siege 
in modern globalised contexts. Unlike Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations”, Barber considers 
this struggle “as a dialectic expression of tensions built in a single global civilization.”514 
Along similar lines, Roy thinks that globalisation changes the way many Muslims perceive their 
faith. Not in mere juxtaposition to Barber’s “McWorld”, European Muslims approach Islam as 
individuals interacting with and within a globalised world. As the process of de-territorialisation 
disconnects religion from a particular territory or culture, globalisation and the Diaspora of the Muslim 
community favour the creation of a new, transnational, often virtual Ummah. In this frame, Islamist 
narratives might become appealing to young Muslims, for they aspire to be part of a global, strong, and 
noble community.515 
As Korteweg et al note,516 another factor allowing for the rise of Islamism is the lack of 
powerful counter-narratives. Although Muslim communities at large have decisively condemned 
Islamist terrorism, the alleged absence of powerful counter-narratives hinders moderate voices, while 
somehow empowering extremist ones. Finally, though the role of the mosque and Imams is somehow 
becoming less relevant within second, third generations,517 Imams or spiritual leaders can, at times, 
cover highly instrumental roles in shaping individuals’ radicalisation processes.518 
As multiple terrorists have justified their actions in Islamist terms,519 two examples from 
Belgium and Britain could best illustrate how particular religious interpretations can trigger Islamist  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radicalisation. Head of the disputed organisation Sharia4Belgium, Fouad Belkacem, alias Abu Imran, 
once explained that his quest for the establishment of Sharia law in Belgium was motivated by the 
religious duty to reject democracy and follow Allah’s teachings: 
Sharia is Islam, to be clear. There is no difference between Islam and Sharia…Democracy is the 
opposite of Islam and Sharia. We believe that Allah is the legislator, Allah makes the laws, He’s 
the One who tells us what’s allowed and what’s forbidden…It’s really funny when I hear 
someone saying ‘I was speaking to a democratic Muslim’. It’s the same thing as saying ‘I was 
speaking to a Christian Jew or a Jewish Muslim’ or something like that. It’s impossible…and 
the Muslim that says he’s against Sharia is not a Muslim, it’s impossible.520 
 
Commenting on prospects of Muslims being the majority in cities like Antwerp in the next 30 years, 
Imran predicted that, “The victory of Allah is very near, so I think the West needs to prepare itself for a 
wave of Sharia and Islam.”521  
Resonating his fellow Belgian’s remarks is also British-born preacher Anjem Choudary. Head 
of banned groups such as al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK, Choudary has justified his intensions to 
overthrow democracy in Britain by arguing that, “Islam is superior. And will not be surpassed. So I 
believe that the law of God is much superior to man-made law…the messenger Mohammad, he said 
‘Fight them with your wealth, with your body, with your tongue.’ So, I’m engaged here, if you like, in 
a verbal Jihad.”522 Though the leader maintained both al-Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK were non-violent 
political parties, Choudary has nonetheless couched his support for physical Jihad in religious terms: 
You can’t say that Islam is a religion of peace, because Islam does not mean peace. It means 
submission. So the Muslim is the one who submits. There is a place for violence in Islam. There 
is a place for Jihad in Islam…The Koran is full of, you know, Jihad [which is] the most talked 
about duty in the Koran other than ‘tawhid’- belief. Nothing else is mentioned more than the 
topic of fighting.523 
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In conformity to such assertions, Choudary has never condemned the murder of British soldier Lee 
Rigby by two Jihadist terrorists, not to mention the attacks on the Parisian magazine Charlie Hebdo. 
Defending Islam, even through force, is justifiable for the British preacher because Islam “is more than 
just a religion. It is not just a spiritual belief. It is, in fact, an ideology which you believe in and you 
struggle for and you are willing even to die for, because you believe in that: that is your whole life.”524   
 
Conversion and Gender Theories 
Combining grievances, rational, and structural factors, conversion and gender theories have 
recently gained much attention. This is mainly due to the fact that Western converts to Islam are 
overrepresented in acts of terrorism.525 Likewise, reports on European foreign fighters travelling to 
ISIS-occupied territory suggest that 17% of them are women.526 And recent events, such as the 
Westminster attack by a British convert527 and the three French Muslim women’s foiled plot to strike 
Notre Dame,528 reinforce the need to keep exploring conversion and gender theories.    
 
1. Conversion Theories 
As already stated, Western and European converts to Islam have earned much consideration in 
recent years. As Sam Mullins’s research demonstrates, despite their minor presence within European 
Muslim communities, converts are overrepresented in terrorist attacks.529 In spite of a series of 
methodological and conceptual ruminations, Bart Schuurman et al corroborate Mullins’s findings, 
agreeing that converts are overrepresented both in home-grown terrorism and foreign fighting.530  
Disparate are the explanations for converts’ radicalisation. Milena Uhlmann argues converts are 
more likely to radicalise because they lack knowledge of Islam.531 Inspired by John Lofland’s and 
Rodney Stark’s categorisation of “total converts,”532 Daniel Benjamin refers to “converts’ zeal”, 
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namely the desire to demonstrate commitment to the new faith.533 Marion Van San observes Dutch and 
Belgian youngsters with problematic backgrounds acquiring knowledge of Islam online being easily 
manipulated.534 Stressing the role of identity and belonging, Monika Bartoszewicz believes that 
individuals who are at odds with both their identity and the society they belonged to before embracing 
Islam are more inclined to radicalisation.535 
Comparing converts and non-converts in the U.S. and the UK, Mullins describes their 
radicalisation as a combination of mental issues/personal circumstances and group/structural factors 
such as socioeconomic deprivation and the role of social media.536 Emmanuel Karagiannis concludes 
that four mechanisms are responsible for the radicalisation of European Jihadi converts: personal 
victimisation resulting from abuses and/or discrimination; “the slippery-slope”, meaning the joining of 
radical groups with influential members and preachers; “the power of love”, as in being radicalised by 
partners and relatives; and political grievances affecting the domestic/international scene.537  
 In addition to renowned Jihadist converts such as the Westminster attacker,538 the above 
explanations unravel why other European converts sympathise with religious violence. Former Italian 
communist and proud supporter of Hezbollah, Ammar De Martino has envisioned the destruction of 
Israel, inviting all Muslims in the world to fight oppression in “any possible way.”539 Barbara Aisha 
Farina, a convert from Milan, became notorious for her pro-Osama bin Laden remarks on the wake of 
9/11, her editorial of two magazines glorifying martyrdom, and her blogs meant to disseminate Jihadist 
ideology in Italy.540 
A Former boxer from Neu-Ulm, Pierre Vogel has become one of the most famous Islamist 
voices in Germany. Calling himself Abu Hamza, the name of a warrior from the time of Prophet 
Mohammad, he has exhibited a “HAM-ZA 911” license plate, a clear reference to Hamza and 9/11.541 
Reportedly against violence, Vogel has been investigated for contacts with suspected Jihadists, tried to                                                         
533 Benjamin, Daniel. (2007). The Converts’ Zeal: Why Are So Many Jihadists Converts to Islam? Brookings Institute, 
Washington DC.   
534 Van San, Marion. “Lost Souls Searching For Answers? Belgian and Dutch Converts Joining the Islamic State”. 
Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 9, no. 5. pp. 47-56. 
535 Bartoszewicz, Monika. (2012). “Controversies and Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of European Converts to 
Islam”. Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 7, no. 3. pp. 17-29. 
536 Mullins, Sam. “Re-examining the involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism”. 
537 Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”. 
538 For a plentiful list and elucidation of cases of Jihadist converts, please see: Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “European Converts 
to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”. 
539 Ammar, De Martino Luigi. (2006). In Groppi, Michele. Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. p. 102. 
540 Vidino, Lorenzo. Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of radicalization. pp. 49-52. 
541 Bartsch, Matthias et al. (2012). “The Dangerous Success of Radical Young Clerics”. Der Spiegel. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-growing-following-in-germany-the-dangerous-success-of-radical-young-
clerics-a-816642-2.html accessed on 24 June 2017. 
  106 
hold public funeral prayers for Osama bin Laden,542 and his sermons are believed to contribute to the 
radicalisation of Muslim youth, say German authorities.543  
 
2. Gender Theories  
 To other pundits, terrorism and Islamist radicalisation can be approached through gender. As for 
men, focus should not be allocated on grievances and rational and structural factors, but, rather, on the 
individual’s sense of manhood. Studies by Louise Archer544 and Choudhury Tufyal545 illustrate that 
masculinity, intended as the central, often dominant, role of the man within the familial system, is a 
defining trait in most Islamic cultures. Given its relevance, failed social advancement due to any given 
factor might imperil one’s manhood.  
In this picture, masculinity theory can be a valuable asset in explaining radicalisation. Running 
an empirical study of Pakistani masculinities, Maleeha Aslam explains that socially trivialised men are 
more likely to be frustrated. And as such, they more incline to accept violence to regain masculine 
efficacy.546 Michael Kimmel’s analysis on the Taliban reinforces Aslam’s point.547 Convinced that 
society depends on them, Muslim men feel emasculated by their inability to fully cope with American 
interference and attempts of Westernisation. In this context, the Taliban’s discourse offers men a 
chance to reclaim their manhood from emasculating policies of globalisation. Similarly, Katherine 
Brown claims that counter-terrorist policies might foster the securitisation of British Muslims, stripping 
men (and women too) of their rights and dignity as equal members of society.548 And these, in turn, 
might endorse Islamist ideas made of warped utopian politics that offer solutions to perfused feelings 
of malaise, including one’s damaged sense of masculinity.549  
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Besides terrorists feeling emasculated or in search for manhood,550 certain male Islamists also 
accept violence in gendered terms. During the course of a focus group in Reggio Emilia with the author, 
a sub-group of 5 individuals expressed their sympathy for those defending oppressed brethren. One of 
the 5 subjects, a North African worker in his thirties, made the point that it was a man’s duty to defend 
his ground. “As a man, you must defend your own home and your own brothers. If you cannot, other 
men will come protect you. That’s what they do, it’s their job as good Muslim men,”551 declared the 
worker. Analogously, after claiming that Islam allows for self-defence, a Tunisian citizen in Palermo 
concluded his comment by asking, “If they attack your family and you do nothing, what kind of man 
are you?”552    
When it comes to women, a specific gendered approach may elucidate the motifs enticing them 
to embrace Islamist viewpoints. Here, radicalisation becomes a function of women’s relation with 
mainstream society and with their community/familial system. In Britain, for instance, the Muslim 
Women’s Network UK claims Islamic women to be one of the most deprived groups in the country.553 
Muslim women display the highest unemployment rates, the poorest health, and the lowest educational 
attainment. And they face multiple discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, and dress code. 
Being more recognisable than men, women are in fact the main targets of Islamophobic attacks.554 
Regardless, instead of tackling the mentioned social issues, the British government only expects 
women to counter radicalisation, complain Muslim Women’s Network UK.555 Yet, women’s 
involvement is solely due to the assumption that women are more “peaceful” than men. Based on 
notions of femininity that see women as “moderate” subjects who can prevent radicalisation, this kind 
of prejudice is emblematic, Brown holds.556 To her, such a concept truly reinforces the stereotype that 
                                                        
550 Kimmel refers to the case of Mohammed Atta and his father’s constant undermining of his manhood for not succeeding 
in becoming a doctor. In fact, the mastermind of the 9/11 hijackings would have turned to terrorism as a response to his 
failed attempt to satisfy his father and the subsequent shame bestowed upon his family: Kimmel, Michael. “Gender, Class, 
and Terrorism”; The other example is the one by ISIS’s commander Abu Bilel who reasserts his manhood by proudly 
stating that Jihadi bribes fantasise him being a warrior of Allah: (2015). “Skyping with the enemy: I went undercover as a 
Jihadi girlfriend”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/french-journalist-poses-muslim-convert-
isis-anna-erelle accessed on 25 June 2017. 
551 Interview no. 58, Q7, Appendix 5. 
552 Interview no. 68, Q6, Appendix 5. 
553 Muslim Women’s Network UK (MWNUK). (2010) “Memorandum: Written Evidence Submitted to the House of 
Commons, Select Committee Report 2010 on Preventing Violent Extremism PVE20”. 
554 Vidal, Ava. (2014). “Islamophobia: ‘people call us terrorist, grab our veil, want us dead’”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/10804880/Islamophobia-People-grab-our-veils-call-us-terrorists-and-
want-us-dead-What-its-really-like-to-be-a-Muslim-woman-in-Britain.html accessed on 26 June 2017. 
555 MWNUK. (2010). Memorandum. Muslim Women’s Network UK. 
556 Brown, Katherine. (2012). “Gender and Anti-Radicalisation: women and emerging counter-terrorism measures”. In 
Satterthwaite, Margaret, Huckerby, Jayne (Eds). Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism: a human rights 
  108 
women cannot be effective role actors, for they misread reality and need guidance. This would explain 
why preventive programmes are not engaging Muslim women as much as they should. And when they 
do, women are mainly functioning in the policy sphere as “mothers” and not as “citizens”. 
Instead of overcoming cultural barriers and truly feel part of society, Muslim women are 
expected to use “motherly” skills to spy on their families. As a result, the dominant narrative intrinsic 
to the political discourse on radicalisation does not empower British Islamic women. Rather, it hinders 
their interaction, public involvement (even within mosques557), and sense of trust in the government, 
concludes Brown.558 Feeling ignored and detached from society, Muslim women’s constructed 
vulnerability inevitably offers chances to organisations such as ISIS to feed on discontent.     
Regrettably, women’s status is not less problematic within their communities/familial systems. 
As co-director of Inspire559 Sarah Khan observes, British Muslim women often suffer from “barriers 
within families, barriers within communities, and lack of ‘outside agencies’ that can help.”560 Living 
remarkably controlled lives, certain women conflict with the patriarchal structures of their 
communities.561 Adding to cultural gaps with their parents, women can too find themselves stuck 
between traditional cultures and British values promoting emancipation. 
Similar to traumatic events such as being raped,562 failure to follow/respect traditional values 
often results in tension and dishonour bestowed upon a woman’s family. Fearing various kinds of 
repercussion at the hands of husbands, fathers, and relatives, Muslim women can feel voiceless. Even 
at university, due to their parents’ worry caused by the securitisation of Muslims in Britain, Islamic 
women are discouraged to engage in several forms of activism and student life.563 Unable to interact 
with reliable religious authorities within their communities, women struggle at finding external 
assistance too, falling prey to depression and alienation. 
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Considering both their relation with mainstream society and with their communities/families, 
Islamist ideas offer women a chance to restore their position/status, whichever and wherever it may be. 
Aside from female terrorists and suicide bombers,564 cases of British Muslim women accepting Islamist 
views and joining ISIS prove this point. As a study of British Muslim men and women finds a 
correlation between depression and support for Islamist violence,565 women’s radicalisation can be seen 
in response to their vulnerable condition. As Edwin Bakker and Seran de Leede contend, their 
departure is a rebellion against mainstream society and their communities that disregarded them.566 To 
Hassan, ISIS embodies the chance for a new life where women are granted the care and respect they 
seek,567 while fulfilling their utopian aspiration of life under the Caliphate, assert Carolyn Hoyle et 
al.568 
For instance, tweeting with British girls who left for Syria, Jaffer notes that Islamist ideas 
satisfy material needs, desire for independence, and much-aspired feelings of sisterhood.569 Moreover, 
Jaffer reports that Islamist views often solve issues of identity crisis experienced in Britain. A girl of 
Libyan origin who previously lived and studied in the UK named “Umm Kulthum” found in Islamist 
views an answer to the antidepressants she took as a lonely girl in England. “Umm Umar” also 
described herself as being desperately lonely and alienated while in Britain, for she felt unable to 
combine her identity with society. But joining ISIS gave her that much needed sense of meaning and 
“rush” she was longing for: “Man I hated the UK so much…the sickest [best] thing I’ve ever done in 
my life is to cross that Turkish border…it’s time for action. Your Eeman [faith] will get sooo high 
during the border crossing. Big adrenaline rush.”570       
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 In addition to grievances, rational factors, structural elements, and conversion and gender 
theories, facilitating factors are those that cannot singlehandedly cause radicalisation, but are still worth 
mentioning as incubators of radicalisation. These elements, namely the Internet, international crises, 
prisons, Diasporas, and various social centres, can sometimes foster, reinforce, and boost an 
individual’s radicalisation process or radicalisation leading to terrorism.  
 
The Internet 
The Internet and the new social media are indubitably crucial tools for radicalisation. According 
to Ines Van Behr et al, the Internet features numerous advantages. 571 First, it creates more opportunities 
to acquire Islamist visions. Its high-speed, unlimited 24/7 reach, anonymity, and rhetorical tolerance, 
which would not be permitted in the real world, allows for like-minded people. Establishing 
connections and networks, these are able to share all sorts of information, including propagandist 
material, practical knowledge, and footage/imagery. Second, the Internet acts as an amplifying echo 
chamber, where Islamist views are constantly reinforced through the interaction with a virtual global 
community. Third, the Internet arguably facilitates the creation of illegal, underground groups that 
would be considerably more arduous to establish in real life.  
 Finally, the almost universal access to the Internet accrues the reach of Islamist ideas. 
According to The Economist, in 2012 more than a third of the people living in the Middle East had 
access to the Internet. In the same year the United Arab Emirates featured the world’s highest rate of 
smartphone penetration (61%). In Egypt, that rate stood at 26%, not much below Germany’s 29%.572 In 
Europe, rates of Internet usage stood at 75% and 89% in the UK.573 
In this picture, as endorsed in Bart Barendregt’s study, the Islamification of technology allows 
Muslim youngsters to explore Islamist interpretations “to distance themselves from older, traditional 
practices while also challenging Western models.”574 Certainly, it is nearly impossible to calculate how 
many Muslims have internalised Islamist concepts through and because of the Internet. But as virtually 
every terrorist has recurred to the Internet at some point,575 it is plausible to assume that social media 
and the web have and still facilitate the spread of Islamist radicalisation on a global level.   
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International Crises 
Strictly linked to the political domain, major international crises might spark radicalisation. 
Wars and military confrontations affecting Muslims often reinforce widespread beliefs Islam and 
Muslims are under Western/Zionist attack.576 In addition to inspiring or motivating terrorists,577 crises 
like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might pave the way for outbursts of Islamist sentiments. During the 
2014 pro-Palestinian demonstrations following confrontation in the Gaza Strip, a number of anti-
Semitic tones were indeed crafted in Islamist terms. At a Central London march, protesters confronted 
a Jewish woman with her two young children telling them to, “Burn in hell.”578 And In North London, 
a rabbi was reportedly verbally assaulted by a number of youths who shouted “Free Palestine, F*** the 
Zionists, F*** the Jews” and “Allahu Akhbar.”579 
In the course of rallies throughout Britain and London, protestors have showed placards 
evoking Nazi persecution of Jewish people by declaring, “Hitler, you were right!”580 Although 
Muslims were not the sole perpetrators, an organisation called the Community Security Trust reported 
that anti-Semitic incidents increased by 500% in the UK since the beginning of the 2014 Gaza War.581 
And, allegedly, Israeli aggression on the Palestinian people was also responsible for stirring Muslims-
led riots in the suburbs of Paris.582   
 
Prisons 
As studies show Islam to be the fastest growing religion among convicts in Europe and North 
America, Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt tag prisons as fertile foundations for radicalisation.583 Based 
on al-Qaeda’s penetration of American jails, a U.S. 2006 policy report even warned that prison 
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radicalisation posed a “threat of unknown magnitude to the security of the [United States].”584 In an 
attempt to explore the relationship between prisons and radicalisation, an ICSR study run in 15 
countries recognises that “prisons matter”. Jails’ overcrowding, chaotic and unsafe conditions, and acts 
of discrimination against Muslim convicts might indeed favour Islamist narratives.585 
Following his work with British Muslim convicts, Gabriele Marranci explains that convicts’ 
defence of a “self” that cannot be subjugated by man-made laws facilitates the acquisition of Islamist 
views derived from a “Prison Islam.”586. As Humberto Trujillo et al add, the feeling of being 
collectively marginalised can render inmates vulnerable to prospects of radicalisation, enticing sorts of 
identity seeking among prisoners.587 As prisoners tend to adopt the attitudes and actions of influential 
“others”, Islamist convicts and Imam carry out active proselytism.  
Not only have prisons facilitated a number of terrorists’ radicalisation process.588 Jails are also 
responsible for creating Islamist inmates, especially in Britain. England and Wales, for instance, count 
almost 12,000 incarcerated Muslim convicts, 100 of them jailed on terrorism charges. Pondering over 
these numbers, former head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office Chris Phillips has once 
warned that, in British prisons, “what we have is a growing haystack of extremists where we still have 
to find the single needle that’s going to go off and do something really nasty.”589 Echoing Phillips’ 
point after spending time in more than 40 jails in the UK, former convict John Shelly admits that: 
Over the last few years there’s been a real sort of noticeable change of people becoming 
radicalised and getting themselves involved in violent situations -and being coerced into doing 
that by some of what you might call the more prominent Muslims that are inside for various 
offences…Extremism…it’s grown and grown by the day, and [guards] found themselves in a 
situation where they can’t separate anyone because wherever they separate them to, they’re just 
mixing them with other people who have the same view and same sort of message.590  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Diasporas 
Intended as those societal contexts composed of ethnic groups forming their communities in 
foreign countries,591 Diasporas are believed to enable processes of radicalisation.592 At times, Diasporas 
conceal grievances resulting from the dichotomous interaction between indigenous and minority 
cultures. Although cases devoid of conflict exist, Diasporas generally include low-income immigrants 
in contrast with societies resenting their presence, as many European Muslims feel.  
Exacerbated by social/economic inequality, individuals within Diasporas might fall prey to 
issues of identity crisis stuck between traditional and indigenous cultures. Drawing on such 
assumptions, the largest Muslim communities in the Diaspora in Western Europe –featuring the 
Algerian community in France, the Turkish in Germany, the Moroccan in Italy, and the Pakistani in 
Britain- have all witnessed the emergence of Islamist visions and, at times, of Jihadist terrorists.593 
 
Other Social Centres 
Besides prisons, different social settings like schools, clubs, workplaces or sport centres can too 
contribute to Islamist radicalisation. Deemed places of interaction and exchange of ideas, such venues 
represent appealing targets to Islamists. As several terrorists have been radicalised in schools, 
universities, and gyms,594 there have been various attempts to exploit these places to foster Islamist 
views. In fact, members of al-Muhajiroun are known for infiltrating gyms in the past.595 Members of al-
Ghurabaa –another organisation linked to al-Muhajiroun- have also entered community centres and 
gyms.596 
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Satisfying what Michael Whine describes as a preference for recruiting the elites,597 members of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir have penetrated university campuses in the UK. And so did al-Muhajiroun and 
Sharia4UK associates.598 Likewise, certain Muslim teachers have exploited public schools to spread 
aggressive Islamist visions. Best known as the “Operation Trojan Horse”, the plan discovered in 2014 
envisioned the imposition of academic curricula with the intent to Islamise several schools in 
Birmingham.599 As former counter-terror chief Peter Clarke reported on the Birmingham scandal: 
I have established that there is a group of associated individuals in positions of influence in 
schools and governing bodies who have, over quite a considerable time, looked to introduce 
what could be described as an aggressive Islamist agenda into some schools, very few schools, 
in Birmingham…There is a group of people of like mind, who are well known to each other, 
who have been working together for a number of years - and they have deliberately sought to 
bring those practices into the schools.600 
 
These views referred to by Mr Clarke were then considered “grossly intolerant”, as they included 
explicit homophobia, disparagement of strands of Islam, highly offensive comments about British 
service personnel, and recurrent anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli sentiments. Even though 
the dynamics of the mentioned case in Birmingham and other British institutes remain unclear, it is 
believed that schools and other social centres could also function as incubators of radicalisation.  
 
Critique of Theories of Islamist Radicalisation 
In terrorism studies, Maxwell Taylor and John Horgan note that most theories on root causes of 
terrorism fall short vis-à-vis the specificity argument.601 To them, “whilst many people experience 
circumstances that might be correlated with induction into a terrorist lifestyle, relatively few people 
actually become violent terrorists.”602 Borrowing Taylor’s and Horgan’s specificity argument, no 
theory on Islamist radicalisation can singlehandedly explain the fact that what enticed certain 
individuals to radicalise did not apply to others with similar characteristics. Nor can such theories 
explain the fact that those aspects that were crucial in certain Islamists’ journeys were minimal or 
totally absent in other Islamist biographies. 
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As such, grievances cannot expound why millions of Muslims experiencing equal or similar 
conditions do not justify violence framed in Islamist terms. As already seen, most European Muslims 
are economically deprived, claim denied social rights, and are victims of racism and discrimination. 
Most of them feel outrage at Western foreign policy oppressing fellow Muslims. Some suffer from 
personal traumatic experiences and many from issues of identity crisis. 
Were grievances the sole responsible for radicalisation, Europe would count millions of its 
Muslim citizens espousing violent Islamist views. By contrast, not only are Islamists justifying 
violence a documented minority,603 but do not fit into the alleged theories either. As one of the most 
outspoken British Islamist voices, Anjem Choudary did not suffer from economic deprivation. To 
prove this, an American journalist even asked the then leader of Sharia4UK if he did not see any 
discrepancies between his anti-Western message and his wealthy, “comfortable” life in the UK.604  
Likewise, Ed Husain did not suffer from economic deprivation, discrimination or racism. Aside 
from isolated intolerant events, he was beloved by his schoolteachers. His family even made friends 
with the nuns from the neighbourhood and used to help out at the church’s annual jumble sale.605 In 
truth, a study of 600 Muslim men and women living in the UK reveals Islamists are not generally poor 
and discriminated. Rather, they are more likely to be born in Britain, rich, and depressed.606 
But even so, traumatic experiences and identity crisis cannot singlehandedly explicate Islamist 
radicalisation. Not every loss of relatives or conflict with mainstream society leads Muslims to endorse 
violence in the name of Islam. Besides, a number of Muslim teenage girls fleeing to Syria came from 
stable, integrated backgrounds. They were not depressed, alienated, or, at least apparently, stuck 
between cultures. Amira Abase, for example, was a straight-A student who was also athletic, good-
looking, respected, and well liked by all. She counted many non-Muslim friends, enjoyed Western TV 
series, listened to chart pop music, talked about dating boys, loved her I-Phone, and even wanted to 
have a lip piercing. To her, recalled a friend, her faith was important, but she perfectly combined it with 
her British lifestyle.607   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And if outrage at Western foreign policy/oppression of Muslims is believed to fuel 
radicalisation the most, one cannot account for the emergence of anti-Western Islamist ideas in 
countries like Sweden. The Nordic nation displays no colonialist history in the Middle East and its 
military presence in the region is almost null.608 Stockholm is regarded as one of the most outspoken 
critics of Israel609 and has heavily invested into the integration of immigrants and refugees. Yet, the 
country is home to Islamist groups, is an “exporter of Jihad”, and has been stricken by Jihadist 
terrorism.610  
When it comes to conversion theories, not all converts radicalise. In the interviews with the 
author, Italian converts to Islam often underlined their inner peace Islam provided them, their quest for 
brotherhood, and their subsequent rejection of anything justifying violence in the name of Allah.611 
Likewise, not all men who do not succeed in life turn to radical ideas. Some men, as Imtiaz Shams 
explains, move on, find other balances or even lose faith.612 Besides, a few who arguably had fulfilling 
occupations in academic and financial institutions still radicalised and even engaged in Jihad.613 In 
spite of securitisation, discrimination, identity crisis, and their tortuous relation with society and their 
familial system, certain women find ways to balance their Islamic and Western identities without 
recurring to Islamist views to fill the void.614  
As for the other featured theories, there are various critical considerations to be made. 
In regard to rational factors, three are two main pieces of criticism. First, rational choice theories fail to 
address the “free-riding problem”, according to which people to let others endanger their social status 
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612 Shams, Imtiaz. In Anthony, Andrew. (2015). “Losing their religion: The hidden crisis of faith among Britain’s young 
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and, in case of success, they too will benefit from collectively acquired good.615 If one assumes that 
individuals are self-interested actors, joining Hizb ut-Tahrir or sympathise banned groups like al-
Muhajiroun and Sharia4UK in today’s unstable societal context may be hazardous. In reality, rational 
choice theories do not grasp the role emotions play, which can elucidate decisions to embark on 
“irrational” radical journeys, holds Jeff Victoroff.616 This would explain the fact that, for instance, out 
of more than 3 million British Muslims, only a few thousands joined Hizb ut-Tahrir and Sharia4UK.617 
Second, Pisoiu’s notion that individuals rationally choose the Islamist occupation falls short 
when it comes to drop-outs. Basing their decision on the radical framework Pisoiu presents, individuals 
should never abandon Islamist paths and groups. Actually, if they agree that there is no higher 
aspiration in life other than becoming an Islamist, the decision to quit seems irrational. But some still 
abandon their Islamist journey, and the case of Ed Husain is perhaps one of the best examples. In spite 
of his commitment to his Islamist cause, after the death of a Christian student on campus he realised the 
very ideas he was preaching were also responsible for the student’s murder. Emotionally struck, not 
only did Husain rationally decide to abandon Hizb ut-Tahrir, but he also gradually relinquished his 
views to become one of the most outspoken British Muslims against Islamist extremism.618   
In spite of their unquestioned relevance, group dynamics and personal bonds may too fail to 
untangle the whole Islamist puzzle. This is because not every person who comes to contact with the 
group’s members eventually becomes radicalised. Sharia4UK has distributed thousands of leaflets, 
while its members interacted with dozens of potentially vulnerable targets.619 Yet, only a portion of 
those who decided to continue the conversation and then followed through ultimately became Islamists. 
What network theories seem to disregard is the initial, pivotal role individual motivations and 
circumstances cover. Especially in Sageman’s bottom-up process of radicalisation, a lack of such 
individual presumptions would indeed seriously hinder Islamist groups’ ability to connect and attract 
recruits. 
As for the impact of ideology, two main observations should be raised. First, ideology alone is 
incapable of elucidating dilemmas as to why millions of Muslims who learn or are exposed to violent 
interpretations of their faith and grow up in certain contexts that may glorify martyrdom do not 
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radicalise.620 Were radicalisation only a matter of ideology, the world would be overflown with 
Islamists. Conversely, evidence shows Islamists supporting violence are a minority, as numerous 
schools or interpretations of Islam preach and yearn for peace and dialogue with other religions while 
condemning violence in the name of Allah. 
 In regard to facilitating factors, not all those exposed to online Islamist material end up 
accepting violence. In spite of their worrisome diffusion, online communities have mainly remained 
daunting but virtual armies.621 Preserving anonymity, online users usually tend to display more extreme 
views online than they normally would in real life.622 Besides, as Tim Stevens and Peter Neumann hold, 
despite its numerous benefits, the Internet alone cannot replace human, face-to-face interaction 
providing ideological reinforcement, practical training, and operational knowledge.623 As Sageman puts 
it, remaining an instrumental platform for Islamist discourse, “[for] the type of allegiance that the jihad 
demands, there is no evidence that the internet is persuasive enough by itself.”624 
Even though international conflicts might spark tension, they still do not automatically entice 
Islamist radicalisation. On the contrary, international turmoil might also enhance people’s search for 
justice and peace. Noticing imbalance in Muslims’ reactions in relation to Israeli oppression of 
Palestinians and ISIS’s atrocities, Taj Hargei urged fellow Muslims to show the same level of 
emotional condemnation for the Caliphate as they do for Israel.625 Further, the Muslim Council of 
Britain joined British Jewish organisations in a united call for a ceasefire and a condemnation of 
civilian casualties on both sides. Echoing such cries for peace, Muslim and Jewish believers came 
together to publicly announce their rejection of violence by the launching of a campaign named 
“Muslims and Jews refuse to be enemies.”626 
Even if prisons are indisputable incubators of radicalisation, they do not automatically trigger 
Islamist ideas. The British prison system, for instance, counts approximately 12,000 Muslim inmates. 
A study by Marc Hamm suggests that, while in prison, some convicts convert to other religions, others 
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abandon every form of religious practice, and many do not even radicalise.627 Although British (and 
Western) prisons continue to be at risk of Islamist radicalisation, it is unrealistic to think that each and 
every one of the 12,000 Muslim prisoners in the UK is destined to undergo through an Islamist process. 
Most of the time, this needs no jail, for Islamists such as Ed Husain have never had a criminal record.  
Moreover, not everyone who is part of the Muslim Diaspora becomes an Islamist. If this were 
the case, Britain would count thousands of Pakistani Islamists, France hordes of Algerian sympathisers 
of Jihad, Germany a myriad of Turkish Islamists, and so on. On the contrary, most Islamists from those 
countries are not born in the Diaspora, as most of them are British and French citizens.   
Likewise, not every Muslim student exposed to violent visions becomes an Islamist. If this were 
true, Britain and other European countries would count thousands of Islamist students within their 
educational system. By contrast, campuses and schools host Muslims organisations dedicated to 
interreligious and cultural dialogue. They have also shut down a number of events considered 
dangerous, as it was the case for Westminster University following the revealing of Jihadi John’s true 
identity.628 Lastly, not all Islamists have necessarily recurred to youth groups and sports clubs or gyms 
to acquire extreme visions.  
 
Assessment of the Literature Survey 
As specified at the beginning of this section, there is no factor which can singlehandedly 
explain Islamist radicalisation. Such a phenomenon is highly personal and occurs as a combination of 
individual and environmental circumstances in specific contexts. Ergo, this chapter has presented the 
debate surrounding theories on radicalisation not to champion one theory over the other. As already 
stated in the Introduction, our intention is not to pick sides. On the contrary, as we have presented 
evidence that corroborates certain theories, we have eventually introduced other facts that challenged 
the very same beliefs. Although this might seem curious, this is our voice when dealing with 
radicalisation. And, again, it goes back to our initial choice of Roy and Croft: radicalisation is a 
complex phenomenon and, before tackling potential issues of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, we want 
to consider and reflect upon every possible argument and counter-argument stemming from the 
literature survey and the evidence provided. 
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As we are about to delve into the empirical core of the study, which theory is ultimately right? 
Is Islamist radicalisation in Italy a pressing matter or is it a myth? If radicalisation is indeed happening, 
which theories from the literature survey validate Roy’s point? And if radicalisation is not occurring, 
what are the reasons that confirm Croft’s claims? Before addressing such queries, the following 
sections will feature the study’s methodology, which is essential to understand how we constructed our 




























CHAPTER V: THE STUDY’S METHODOLOGY 
 
Having set the academic discourse on Islamist radicalisation, conceptual frameworks/definitions, 
and theories of radicalisation, this section features the study’s methodology. This includes: an overview 
of the Italian Muslim community; the study’s restrictions and challenges; its population sample; the 
outline of its variables; the statistical methods used to empirically test causal models of Islamist 
radicalisation. 
 
Overview of the Italian Muslim Community 
Significantly inferior compared to other European countries, the Muslim presence in Italy 
amounts to 1,650,000 individuals, equalling to 3% of the Italian population.629 In spite of newly 
established second-generations, Muslims in Italy are mostly first-generation immigrants mainly 
employed in the primary sector, import-export, construction, and food industry. 
From a religious standpoint, the overwhelming majority of Muslims residing in Italy are Sunnis, 
while only 2% are estimated to be Shia followers. Between 10,000 and 70,000 Italian citizens are 
believed to have converted to Islam. In Italy, Muslims can count on more than 20 social organisations, 
hundreds of worship places and Islamic centres, and four officially recognised mosques: the al-Rahman 
mosque in Segrate, the Great Mosque in Rome, and the ones in Ravenna and Colli di Val d’Elsa.630  
From a demographic perspective, as shown in Table 2 and Graphs 1 and 2, although 43% of 
Muslims in Italy come from North Africa, the largest national group is from Albania. Albanians 










629 Groppi, Michele. Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. p. 17. 
630 Ibid. pp. 7-9. 
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Table 2. Italian Muslims’ top-ten countries of origin and growth rate since 2011.  
Country of 
citizenship (in 
base al 1/1/14) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
(%increase/decrease 
compared to 2011) 
1) Albania 482,627 450,908 464,962 495,709 (+ 3%) 
2) Morocco 452,424 408,667 426,791 454,773 (+0.05%) 
3) Bangladesh 82,451 81,683 92,695 111,223 (+35%) 
4) Tunisia 106,291 82,997 88,291 97,317 (-8%) 
5) Egypt 90,365 66,932 76,691 96,008 (+6%) 
6) Senegal 80,989 73,702 80,325 90,863 (+12%) 
7) Pakistan 75,720 71,031 80,658 90,615 (+20%) 
8)Algeria 25,935 20,725 21,801 23,095 (-11%) 
9) Turkey 19,068 16,354 17,711 19,951 (+5%) 
10) Iran 7,444 5,962 7,273 8,995 (+21%) 
Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.  
 



















Graph 2. Italian Muslims’ geographical area of origin. 
 
Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.  
 
The second largest national group is composed of almost 450,000 Moroccan citizens (29% of Muslim 
community), followed by individuals from Bangladesh, which has experienced a 35% growth rate since 
2011 (7.2% of the total). Tunisian, Egyptian, Senegalese and Pakistani citizens range from 97,000 to 
90,000 citizens, respectively taking fourth (6.3%), fifth (6.2%), sixth (5.9%), and seventh (5.8%) place 
in the chart. Considerably inferior in number, Algerian, Turkish and Iranian citizens seal the top-ten 
chart, forming with all the other unmentioned Muslim countries the remaining 7.6% of the Italian 
Muslim community. 
 As shown in Graph 3, males (the red columns) always outnumber their female counterparts (the 
blue columns) in every national group. For instance, the largest gaps between men and women are 
registered in the cases of Bangladesh (70% vs. 30%) and Senegal (73% vs. 27%) –though other groups 


















Graph 3. Male/female ratio in relation to country of origin.  
 
 
Graph 4. Male/female ratio in relation to interregional demographic concentration. 
 
Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.  
 
Such ratios are reflected on the Muslims’ geographical concentration on the Italian soil, as Graph 4 
illustrates, where Muslim males are always more numerous than Muslim females in every part of the 
country. 
Overall, as Graph 5 indicates, the overwhelming majority of Muslims reside in Northern Italy, 
as 39% and 27% of them live, respectively, in the North West and the North East. By contrast, only 















21% of Italian Muslims reside in the centre of the country, while 13% live in the south –combining the 
islands and the mainland. 
 
Graph 5. Italian Muslims’ interregional geographical concentration. 
 
Source: Groppi, Michele. (2015). Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community. Centro Militare Studi Strategici. CEMISS.  
   
Chart 6. Italian Muslims’ regional geographical concentration. 
 

















As for Italian regions, showing that Muslim males outnumber their female counterparts in every region, 
Graph 6 reveals that Lombardy registers the highest concentration of Muslim citizens. In truth, 
Lombardy hosts 409,351 Muslims, which amounts to 26.5% of the overall Muslim population in Italy. 
Following Lombardy are Emilia-Romagna, home to 207,114 Muslims (13.4%), Veneto (139,539, 9%), 
Piedmont (137,467, 9%), Tuscany (8%), and Lazio (9%). Lastly, Marche (3.4%), Sicily (3.4%), Liguria 
(3.2%), and Campania (2.7%) end the regional top-ten chart. 
 At the provincial level, the provinces tallying the largest amounts of Muslim inhabitants are the 
ones in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. As Table 3 illustrates, in the first ten positions, four are the 
provinces from Lombardy (Milan, Brescia, Bergamo, Varese) three from Emilia-Romagna (Bologna, 
Modena, Reggio Emilia), and one from Lazio (Rome), Piedmont (Turin), and Tuscany (Florence). 
Milan is the province that hosts the largest quantity of Muslims (118,342), followed by Rome (89,748) 
and Brescia (73,204). Padua, Venice, and Genoa take, respectively place 17th, 18th, and 20th, while, 
surprisingly, Naples and Palermo, two major southern cities, only take 31st and 46th position. 
 
Table 3. Italian Muslims’ geographical concentration at the provincial level. 
Province Total Male Female 
1) Milan 118,342 74,819 43,523 
2) Rome 89,748 61,503 28,245 
3) Brescia 73,204 41,042 32,162 
4) Bergamo 58,365 33,638 24,727 
5) Turin 53,007 29,467 23,540 
6) Bologna 43,106 24,533 18,573 
7) Modena 39,606 21,877 17,729 
8) Varese 34,784 19,966 14,818 
9) Florence 33,510 18,528 14,982 
10) Reggio Emilia 29,399 16,665 12,734 
17) Padua 23,541 13,084 10,457 
18) Venice 23,355 13,433 9,922 
20) Genoa 20,565 12,051 8,514 
31) Naples 16,290 12,091 4,199 
46) Palermo 10,218 6,619 3,599 







The Study’s Restrictions and Challenges 
There have been various restrictions/challenges before and throughout the course of the analysis. 
From a sociological standpoint, the major limitation has been the self-selection bias.631 Being 
completely voluntary, the study has included only those subjects who wished to participate in the 
questionnaires or interviews/focus group sessions. Having an interest/desire to voice their opinion, 
there might be a chance that such answers could have steered the study’s outcome in a certain direction 
and may not be fully reflective of the overall Muslim population. 
Likewise, the heated nature of the project might have hampered participation and reliability. 
Starting in spring 2016, the study’s field research was conducted in the wake of ISIS’s terror spree in 
Europe. As COREIS, UCOII, and CII initially distributed questionnaires through mailing lists and 
newsletters, we estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 Muslims had the opportunity to participate. But 
in spite of anonymity, individuals were reluctant to share their opinions about religious violence, al 
Qaeda, and ISIS. This forced us to abandon online surveying, and we then started gathering physical 
evidence at mosques, Islamic centres, and public places. And even then, recruiting potential 
participants has not been an easy task. 
In the end, 440 subjects accepted to partake in the questionnaires and 200 took part in 
interviews and focus groups. In this frame, we acknowledge that sensitive questions in today’s 
European charged context might have deterred potential participants, while possibly shaping the 
attitudes of those who did participate. Hence, we wonder if a larger sample, devoid of likely fears of 
voicing opinions in the current, tense zeitgeist, could have altered the study’s results. 
More generally, we are also aware that written questionnaires are not able to assure the veracity 
of the provided answers.632 Nor are we able to know if subjects, particularly the ones filling the 
questionnaires, have taken a serious effort to understand questions with the intent to provide accurate 
responses.633 Further, the potential impact of some of the study’s queries has prevented the actual 
measurement of a number of variables -as will be explained later. For instance, the variable “Networks” 
did not assess possible, concrete contacts or personal bonds with Islamist third actors, as the risk of 
non-response rate to the question was exceptionally high. Consequently we decided to measure the 
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Surveys”. Growth and Change. Vo. 22, issue 1. pp. 10-20.  
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Current Psychology. Vo. 9, issue 1. pp. 46-55. 
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perception one person has about contacts with third parties.634 And finally, our inability to conduct 
investigations within the Italian prison system or specific mosques,635 along with linguistic and cultural 
barriers, logistical restraints,636 and risky situations,637 did not allow us to gain the wider picture we 
originally aimed for.      
     
The Study’s Sample638 
After weighing the mentioned restrictions, we decided that the study’s sample would consist of 
440 questionnaires and 200 subjects taking part in interviews/focus groups. In social sciences, 
quantitative samples range from 30 to thousands of observations. Such studies generally accept a 5% 
margin of error with a 95% confidence interval.639 According to Herbert Weisberg’s and Bruce 
Bowen’s Table of maximum sampling error, if one is eager to accept an error level of 5%, then the 
sample should count 400 observations.640 Being greater than 400, we can affirm that the study’s sample 
size is ample enough to provide statistically significant results. As for the qualitative part of the 
research, we determined the threshold of 200 through classic notions of saturation.641 That is, we 
stopped sampling relevant cases when data from interviews/focus group offered no new theoretical 
insight or, in other words, when information would consistently repeat itself. 
 That asserted, the quantitative analysis is based on a questionnaire featuring 68 
questions/statements, which were translated into Italian, Arabic, and French. A very similar                                                         
634 If we had asked, “Are you in contact with any Islamists and/or Jihadists?” we would have obtained a truthful 
measurement of the variable “Netoworks”. But being the risk of non-response rate exceptionally high, we preferred to see if 
people agreed or disagreed with the statement that “Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a cause 
worthy”.  
635 The Italian Ministry of Justice had prevented the author from extending the project to the prison system in light of a 
number of safety and logistical considerations. Likewise, the author has been unable to conduct research in a number of 
mosques and Islamic centres that rejected any kind of involvement a priori. 
636 For instance, in two occasions, focus group sessions hosted more individuals than normally expected (30 instead of 20). 
Yet, due to lack of communication/misunderstanding, the milieus’ geographic location, and participants’ expectations, the 
author was still forced to carry out the sessions.   
637 In two particular circumstances, the author was verbally and nearly physically assaulted.  
638 The information about the composition of the non-Muslim sample is provided in Appendix 3. 
639 In statistics, “Margin of error” measures the maximum amount by which the sample results are expected to differ from 
those of the actual population. In other words, it measures the likelihood that the results reflect the views of the sample 
population. Given that quantitative studies target samples of individuals and not entire populations, a certain amount of error 
is bound to occur because not everyone from the population, in this case almost 2 million Muslims, is analysed. Thus, most 
studies use the 5% threshold, meaning that any result is subject to a 5% error of either +5% or -5%. By “Confidence 
Interval” we mean the likelihood the people who took part to the study are representative of the overall population. In this 
case, as in most quantitative studies, if we were to repeat the same analysis over and over, we would expect the same results 
95% of the time.   
640 Weisberg, Herbert, Bowen, Bruce. (1977). An Introduction to Survey Research and Data Analysis. San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman. p. 41. 
641 Bryman, Alan. In Baker, Sarah, Edwards Rosalind (Eds.). (2012). How many qualitative interviews is enough? National 
Centre for Research Methods Review Paper. Southampton: ESRC National Centre for Research Methods. p. 18. 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questionnaire was also distributed to 440 Italian non-Muslim citizens in order to compare answers. 
Both available in Appendix 3, questionnaires aimed at Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were 
administered in 15 Italian cities. These have been selected according to Muslim demographics and 
Jihadist history. These were: Milan, Rome, Brescia, Bergamo, Turin, Bologna, Modena, Reggio-Emilia, 
Padua, Venice, Genoa, Naples, and Palermo. In addition to a few dozen online surveys, the vast 
majority of written questionnaires have been delivered at mosques, Islamic centres, markets, train/bus 
stations, and individual businesses and activities (Kebab shops, barbers, Halal butcheries, etc.). 
Specifying that the Muslim target population has not been preselected in any way, the sample 
includes 303 males and 133 females. At the time of the field research, including only definite 
answers,642 263 respondents were 16 to 30 years old, 155 between 30 and 60, and 17 over 60. 117 
individuals were Italian citizens, while 116 were born in Italy, and 254 had been living in the country 
for more than 5 years. 209 respondents came from Africa, in particular, Morocco (96/440), Tunisia 
(39/440), and Egypt (29/440). As for the rest, 64 subjects came from Asia and 34 from Europe. As for 
residency, 108 respondents lived in the northeast of Italy, 195 in the northwest, 81 in the centre, and 54 
in the south. Milan counted the highest amount of respondents (68/440), followed by Rome (50/440), 
Turin (42/440), Florence (31/440), Naples (30/440), Venice (27/440), and Brescia (24/440). 
In relation to occupation, 188 individuals were employed, 59 were business owners, 119 were 
students, 36 were unemployed, and 30 were engaged in other kinds of activities. 212 individuals earned 
less than 1,000 Euros a month, 133 between 1,000 and 2,000, and 16 more than 2,000. 249 were single, 
168 married, and 30 divorced. 159 respondents had children while 272 did not. 232 had a high school 
diploma, 113 a university degree, and 88 had neither one or the other. 286 stated they always go to 
mosque, 99 said they only take part in religious ceremonies on holidays, and 34 declared they are not 
very observant. As for religious affiliation, 365 respondents were Sunni, 21 Shia, 39 Sunni converts, 
and 1 convert was Shia. In light of its composition, we can affirm that the study’s sample is fairly 
representative of Italy’s Muslim population.  
In regard to the qualitative analysis, 97 subjects participated in interviews, while 103 took part 
in focus groups. Subjects from the interviews were randomly approached. By contrast, aside more 
informal gatherings,643 focus groups sessions were facilitated by a number of community leaders. Yet, 
                                                        
642 That is, excluding, only in this part, those subjects who answered, “I do not know” or “Decline to state”.  
643 In a number of instances, focus group sessions were not planned, for the author introduced himself to groups of people 
gathered outsides of mosques and public places. If groups counted more than 3 people, they automatically became informal 
focus groups.  
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individuals involved in focus groups were almost never singularly selected, as Imams and assistants 
extended invitations to their entire communities. 
Both interviews/focus groups featured direct, face-to-face interaction in Italian, English, and 
French. Unlike the questionnaires, questions were open-ended and varied in nature depending on the 
interviewees. Interviews and focus group sessions were administered in the same cities and milieus the 
questionnaires were handed, but did not feature the same participants. The vast majority of participants 
were males from North Africa, but women, converts, members from second generations, and subjects 
from other national groups were also included.          
 
The Quantitative Study’s Variables 
 As already stated, the quantitative analysis is entirely based on a written questionnaire that was 
carefully crafted with the help of the three most prominent Italian Muslim leaders.644 The questionnaire 
is divided into four parts. The first one includes standard sociological variables such as age, gender, 
economic status, educational attainment, occupation, nationality etc. (questions 1-14). The second part 
proposes a number of statements meant to reflect Muslims’ conditions in Italy (questions 15-37). The 
third part features statements on Islamist radicalisation, Jihadist terrorism, and issues of integration and 
coexistence (questions 38-59). The last section displays the participants’ predictions about future 
attitudes and scenarios (questions 60-68).      
Most questions were intended to assess the respondents’ views on different issues and were 
phrased as precise statements from which each respondent could choose one of the following answers: 
1) strongly agree, 2) slightly agree, 3) slightly disagree, 4) strongly disagree, 5) do not know, 6) decline 
to state. In the quantitative part of the study only the definite responses (the first 4) were taken into 
account. To such regard, probably due to self-selection bias, non-response rate – answering “Do not 
know” or “Decline to state”- was never an issue,645 for it averaged to 5-6%.   
The quantitative analysis had two main objectives: determine the existence of a possible 
“Islamist outlook” and elucidate its drivers. By “Islamist outlook” we refer to the respondents’ views 
on violence framed in Islamist terms. These visions have been scrutinised through the respondents’ 
agreement or disagreement with four statements crafted with the three Muslim leaders: 1) justification 
                                                        
644 Please see page 20 in the Introduction.  
645 As previous research has shown, sensitive questions can push subjects to hide “socially unacceptable” views by 
answering “No opinion”, “I do not know”, or “Decline to state”. Luckily, the study’s most sensitive questions did not suffer 
from high non-response rate. For more information on the matter of non-response rate, please see: Tourangeau, Roger. 
(2007). “Sensitive Questions in Surveys”. Psychological Bulletin. Vo. 133, no. 5. pp. 859-883. 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of violence in defence of Islam; 2) duty to punish whoever offends Islam and its sacred tenets; 3) 
support for Al-Qaeda; 4) support for ISIS. These are the study’s “Response variables” which are 
potentially reflective of an “Islamist outlook”. That stated, as for justification of violence in defence of 
Islam, we selected statement #42: “Violence in defence of Islam can also be justified”. As for duty to 
punish offenders, we chose statement #43: “Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be 
punished”. By support for Al-Qaeda, we meant statement #44: “Al Qaeda and other groups are the only 
ones that can fight Zionist and American imperialism”. Lastly, by support for ISIS, we meant statement 
#45: “ISIS’s struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate”. 
The formulation of two of the mentioned statements needs further explanation. The variable 
about the duty to punish offenders of Islam is deliberately vague in its implication of punishment. As 
discussed with Imam Yaha Pallavicini, had we intentionally included physical force,646 we would have 
obtained large non-response rates due to the charged impact of the Charlie Hebdo attack on the subjects’ 
perceptions. Referring to punishment instead of violence, we were still able to include in the responses 
both those entailing physical punishment and those envisioning non-violent tools (legal action). 
Pallavicini et al also advised us to use more neutral tones about Al Qaeda.647 Had we specifically 
addressed the legitimacy of the group as we did for ISIS,648 many would have not answered, feared the 
Imams. This is due to the fact that, in cities like Milan, Al Qaeda counted on established networks. By 
proposing a more neutral statement,649 were we still able to gain a sense one’s possible support for Al 
Qaeda. To the Imams, in fact, whoever believes that Al Qaeda and alike are the only ones that can fight 
Zionist and American imperialism is still more likely to sympathise with the group.  
The other variables originated from the theories described in the literature review. As Table 4 
shows, such “Predictive variables” can be classified (with a degree of vagueness) as “Grievances”, 
“Psychological factors” “Rational factors”, and “Structural factors”. “Conversion/Gender theories” are 
included in a wider group we named “Standard sociological variables”, which also included age, 
nationality, occupation, educational attainment etc.650 Within “Grievances”, we used statement #18 to 
indicate economic disparity: “As a Muslim, I struggle at finding a good occupation”. As for social                                                         
646 Originally we intended to craft the statement as: “Whoever insults Islam and its sacred tenets should be physically 
punished or killed”. 
647 Originally we intended to craft the statement similar to the one we used for ISIS: “Al Qaeda’s struggle against Zionist 
and American imperialism is legitimate”. 
648 This was possible because the Imams believed we would have encountered less ambiguity in relation to the Caliphate, 
which is believed to enjoy little support within Italy’s Muslim community. 
649 A person can agree with the notion that Al Qaeda and alike are the only ones that have the capabilities to fight Zionist 
and American imperialism without actually supporting such groups. 
650 We refrained from including “Facilitating factors” such as the Internet, prisons, Diasporas, international crises, and social 
centres as they can be deemed more as incubators of radicalisation. 
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difficulties, we used statement #16: “As a Muslim, I have a difficult time blending in at school or at 
work”. In regard to discrimination and racism, we used statement #15: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel 
discriminated against”. As for outrage at Western foreign policy, we used statement #28: “Western 
foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and has been unjust and frustrating”. We selected statement 
#29 to indicate perceived oppression of Muslims: “Muslims in the world are often oppressed”.    
 
Table 4. List of Predictive (Independent) Variables Used in the Study. 
INDEPENDENT (PREDICTIVE) VARIABLES     Grievances • Economic disparity • Social difficulties 
• Discrimination/racism 
• Outrage regarding Western foreign policy 
• Perceived oppression of Muslims 
• Frustration 
Variables from the literature on radicalisation (aside 
from conversion and gender theories) 
Psychological factors 
• Traumatic personal experience 
• Identity crisis  
   Rational factors 
• Rational spiritual and material benefits   Structural factors 














• Years of permanent residency in Italy 
• City of residence 
• Social status 
• Number of children 
• Economic status 
• Educational attainment 
• Occupation 
• Political orientation 




Within “Psychological factors”, we used statement #32 to indicate traumatic/negative personal 
experiences: “In the past, there have been hard experiences that brought me closer to God”. By 
“Identity crisis”, we meant statement #31: “In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace 
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Italian culture or if I wanted to be out of it”. As for “Rational factors”, we chose statement #40: “A 
person decides to get physically involved in a cause due to personal interests, which can be both 
material and mental/spiritual”. As anticipated in the study’s restrictions, this statement is not able to 
measure one’s actual material/spiritual incentives to support/engage in Islamist activities. Rather, this 
statement assesses one’s perception of such factors, which may or may not be deemed relevant to the 
person in question. 
Within “Structural factors”, we opted for statement #39 to indicate social groups/personal bonds 
(which we labelled “Networks”): “Members of a group and friends are the ones who really make a 
cause worthy”. Equally to “Rational factors”, this statement is not able to measure one’s actual 
contacts/bonds with Islamist third actors, but, rather, only one’s perception and relevance about them. 
As for “Conversion”, we used question #14 to indicate if one was a Shia or a Sunni convert. Likewise, 
as for “Gender”, we selected question # 2 to determine one’s gender. 
Lastly, as for “Ideology”, we all concurred it would be best to include something that most 
purists would agree on, that is, their preference, in the Middle East, for Sharia law. So, we chose 
statement #46: “In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one”. Yet, we 
mean no automatic juxtaposition between democratic and Islamic theocratic systems, for it can be 
argued both Islam and Sharia Law have a democratic essence.651 Still, following the insights by Imam 
Pallavicini, we still decided to craft the statement in this way for specific reasons. First, the Imam 
feared that a statement solely based on people’s attitudes on Sharia law would have resulted in high 
non-response rates. Thus, we decided to set the scenery in the Middle East while giving Italian 
Muslims a means of comparison of what they are accustomed to, that is, Western democracy. But again, 
this is not to juxtapose democracy and Sharia, or democracy and Islam; rather, by providing a more 
neutral ground (i.e. the “Middle East”) and a means of comparison (“democracy”), we intended to 
explore Italian Muslim’s overall views on theocratic forms of government.        
 
Statistical Methods 
After assessing the Roy vs. Croft debate, we used statistical methods to explore the possible 
“Islamist outlook” –a detailed explanation of statistical terminology, concepts, and tests can be found in 
Appendix 4. Yet, our aim to explore possible drivers was not to determine causal relations between                                                         
651 For more information about Islam and democracy being highly compatible, please see Voll, John, Esposito, John. (1993). 
“”Islam’s Democratic Essence”. Middle East Quarterly. Vo. 1, no.3. pp. 3-11; for more information about the theocratic 
Iranian system featuring bits of democracy, please see Bruno, Greg. (2008). “Religion and Politics in Iran”. Council on 
Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-and-politics-iran accessed on 17 July 2017.  
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variables, for statistics, as a matter of principle, are unable to establish causality. Hence, in an effort to 
study our potential “Islamist outlook”, we tested 25 predictive variables652 to assess their potential 
impact on our “Response variables” – that is, supporting violence in defence of God, the duty to punish 
offenders of Islam, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. 
As presented in Appendix 6, we first tested every single predictor with the four “Response 
variables”, measuring the degree of independence (0.05 significance p-value). For the most significant 
predictors we then looked at single parameter analyses, where we measured the odds that religiously 
framed violence could be justified based on the single predictor (i.e. the probability that, within the 
contours of this study, individuals who felt discriminated against also justified punishing offenders of 
Islam). Finally, as shown in Appendix 6, we selected the most significant predictors and inserted them 
into logistic regression models to assess which one of them, when all grouped together, emerged as the 
most significant one. 
 
Interview/Focus Groups Questions  
 Qualitative data was not subsumed in the quantitative analysis. Though we did quantify results 
in the qualitative section, data from the 200 interviewees were mainly used to enhance and elucidate 
trends and attitudes stemming from the questionnaire. Unlike the previous methods employed, 
interviews and focus groups displayed a more flexible structure. Questions were open-ended and had 
the goal to facilitate and positively stimulate the interviewees’ participation.      
Interviews/focus group sessions were mainly divided into two parts. In the first one, the author 
addressed the situation of Muslims in Italy. He touched upon perceptions of discrimination, racism, 
social equality, portrayal of Islam, and frustration asking questions such as: “What are your views 
regarding Italy? Is there discrimination or racism?”; “Is it hard to find a good house, a good job, and a 
mosque, place of worship, being Muslim?; “What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in 
Italy, especially in the media?”; Have you ever felt frustration due to your personal situation in Italy?” 
In the second part, the author asked the participants what they themselves thought about potential 
issues of Islamist radicalisation, delving deep into their perception of violence in the name of God. 
Hence, the author asked queries such as: “Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam?”;                                                         
652 In reality, we tested every variable that we carved out of the questionnaires, such as, for instance “Sense of Mistrust”, 
“Difficulty in finding an appropriate worship place” or “Perception of a media war against Islam”. Yet, for the sake of 
analysis and due to their final non-significance in the regression models, we decided to include only those variables that are 
mostly linked to the literature survey or that could incorporate the variables in question –“Discrimination”, “Social 
difficulties” and “Economic disparity”, for example, can include difficulty in finding a worship place and the feeling there is 
a media war against Islam. 
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“What are your views regarding violence in the name of God?”; “What about if someone offends Islam 





























CHAPTER VI: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ROY VS. CROFT  
 
Roy vs. Croft: Who’s Right in Italy? 
Having expounded the Italian debate on Islamist radicalisation, conceptual frameworks and 
definitions, theories of radicalisation, and methodological aspects, we are now able to address the 
discussion between Roy’s and Croft’s positions. Devoid of any kind of alarmism or unfair 
generalisation, proponents of Roy contend Islamist radicalisation is a serious issue for today’s Europe 
and must be addressed as such. By contrast, those who agree with Croft maintain Islamist radicalisation 
is socially and culturally created by the media and other agencies to securitise the Muslim community 
and advance certain agendas. 
Once again, the question is quite natural: who is right? Which position can best fit the Italian 
scenario? Based on their argumentations and evidence, we envisioned neither Roy nor Croft to be 
ultimately right. Though it is probably no nightmare, our hypothesis was that Islamist radicalisation 
could not be deemed a myth either, as “spurs of radicalisation” might still emerge. Was our assumption 
accurate? In order to verify so, we searched for what we called an “Islamist outlook”. Based on the 
definition of “Islamist radicalisation” we provided,653 this “Islamist outlook” includes the respondents’ 
justification of violence framed in Islamist terms. Presenting and comparing the results on religiously 
framed violence by Muslim and non-Muslims participants, the following section allows us to assess 
which position was more accurate.   
 
Islamist radicalisation in the Respondents’ Eyes 
 Our first goal was to understand how Islamist radicalisation is generally perceived in Italy. 
Within the sample extrapolated from Italian society, Islamist radicalisation is indeed perceived as a real 
issue affecting both Islam and the Islamic community in Italy. In fact, 69% of non-Muslim respondents 
(304/440) stated there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam. 19.5% (86/440) declared there is an issue 
but it is exaggerated by the media. Only 2.5% (11/440) said there is no issue of radicalisation in Islam, 
while 8% (35/440) did not know, and 1% (4/440) did not answer. Likewise, 44% (193/440) claimed 
there is an issue of radicalisation within Italian Muslim communities. 23% (103/440) affirmed there is 
but it is exaggerated. 9.5% (42/440) said there is no such an issue in Italy, 22.5% (99/440) had no 
opinion, and 1% (3/440) refused to answer.  
                                                        
653 Please see page 77 in Chapter III.   
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Unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, when we asked Muslim respondents if they thought 
radicalisation exists and is an issue, their response was more ambivalent. As shown in Graph 7, 20% of 
them (86 out of 440) affirmed there is an issue of radicalisation within their religion. 44% (194/440) 
contended such a question does exist, but it is minimal and exaggerated by the media. 26% (115/440) 
maintained Islam has no issue of radicalisation. 5% (23/440) did not know and 5% (22/440) did not 
answer. Similarly, as Graph 8 illustrates, respondents were more likely to disagree with the claim that 
Italian Muslim communities suffer from internal issues of radicalisation. Indeed, 43% (189/440) of the 
respondents believed radicalisation is not a problem in Italy. 10% (46/440) begged to differ and 
maintained there is an issue of radicalisation, while 30% (132/440) contended there is a problem, but it 
is minimal and exaggerated by the media. 11% (49/440) had no opinion and 5% (21/440) did not reply 
(1% of the data was missing).  
 




















Graph 8. Charts on Muslim respondents’ perception of radicalisation within the Italian Muslim 
communities. 
 
Ergo, when comparing Muslim and non-Muslim samples, the difference in the perception on the 
issue of Islamist radicalisation appears evident. As shown in Graph 9, among all those agreeing there is 
an issue of radicalisation in Islam, 304 were non-Muslims and 86 Muslims (circa 4/1 ratio). 86 non-
Muslim subjects claimed such an issue exists but is exaggerated by the media, while Muslim 
respondents arguing the same were 194 (more than twice as many). Among those who held Islam has 
no issue of radicalisation, there were 11 non-Muslims and 115 Muslims (more than 10 times as many). 
That is, non-Muslim respondents were significantly more likely to affirm there is an issue of 
radicalisation in Islam. Muslim participants were instead tremendously more prone to deny the matter 



















Graph 9. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent’s views on the perception of Islamist 
radicalisation in Islam. 
 
 
Graph 10. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent’s views on the perception of Islamist 
radicalisation inside Italian Islamic communities. 
 
 
 A fairly similar scenario repeated itself regarding Islamist radicalisation inside Italian Muslim 


























within local communities, 193 were non-Muslims and 46 Muslims (more than 4/1 ratio). 103 non-
Muslim and 132 Muslim respondents claimed such an issue affects local Islamic communities too, but 
it is inflated. Among those who maintained local communities have no issue of radicalisation, there 
were 42 non-Muslims and 189 Muslims (5 times as many). Similarly to the previous query, non-
Muslim respondents were considerably more likely to claim Italian Islamic communities do have an 
issue of radicalisation. Muslim participants were instead substantially more inclined to state such an 
issue does not affect their communities, while they were barely more inclined to affirm radicalisation is 
inflated.     
In light of this, why were Muslim respondents divided or more ambivalent when asked about 
radicalisation? How did interpretations of the matter in question differ from person to person? Among 
those agreeing radicalisation exists and is an issue, scriptural ignorance and manipulation of Islam were 
the two main factors motivating their answers. From north to south, recurrent answers included phrases 
such as: “Radicalisation exists and is a big problem because people who don’t know Islam read the 
Quran, take some parts out of context, and use them for their own needs;”654 “Radicalisation has 
become a problem because people who know nothing of Islam, who have not studied it, take some 
figurative notions and take them too far, but these people are not real Muslims, for they do not 
represent us;”655 “Radicalisation is huge and our communities have to do something.”656 
Others agreeing with this idea have also clarified that Islamist radicalisation is minimal and/or 
exaggerated by the media. As one student in a focus group session in Bergamo stated:  
You don’t have to believe everything they tell you or make you read. You probably know that 
Muslims are killed by these [Islamist] terrorists for the most part and, on top of it, if you look at 
who commits the most acts of terrorism, Muslim perpetrators are the great minority. This 
[radicalisation] problem exists but it’s minimal. In fact, if you think that we are more than a 
billion and a half in world and there are only a few thousands who are now in Syria, you do the 
math, but it’s a very small percentage of the whole Muslim population in the world.657 
 
Likewise, an Italian-born Muslim student from Naples declared that, though radicalisation exists, pro-
violence Islamists are “really a minority and fear towards them is exaggerated, even created by the 
media to securitise our community and keep us under control.”658  
                                                        
654 Interview no. 2, Q7, Appendix 5. 
655 Interview no. 12, Q5, Appendix 5. 
656 Interview no. 26, Q5, Appendix 5. 
657 Interview no. 23, Q5, Appendix 5. 
658 Interview no. 16, Q5, Appendix 5. 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Conversely, those who denied Islam and Muslim communities in Italy have an issue of 
radicalisation stressed the peaceful nature of their religion being hijacked by individuals who cannot be 
deemed true Muslims. As a Bangladeshi street vendor in Naples articulated, “I don’t think there is [an 
issue of radicalisation in Islam]. Islam is perfect, it teaches you how to love, how to behave, how to be 
peaceful at all times; then if you hurt someone in the name of God, I am not sure if He will ever forgive 
you.”659 Indeed, from north to south, respondents who vehemently rejected allegations of Islam and 
Italy having an issue of radicalisation clarified that, “Islam means peace and has nothing to do with 
being radical”660 and, “If you are a radical, you are not a Muslim because the Quran and the Prophet 
teach us to respect everyone.”661 A focus group in Reggio Emilia explained why Islam does not have a 
problem of radicalisation in a similar fashion:  
All of those who are radical are not real Muslims. They don’t know what Islam actually is. 
What does “Allah Ahkbar” mean? Anyone can say it, even you could, and are you a Muslim? 
It’s not enough to cry that aloud in a public place, you don’t become Muslim, you’re not a 
Muslim just for that. You have to live Islam and follow the teachings of the Prophet, which are 
all about peace. So, ask yourself: can these people be Muslim? No, they cannot.662  
 
Along the same lines, Italian Muslim communities should not be considered at risk, because, 
“Unfortunately there are many extremists… but not in Italy”, reassured a Moroccan young woman in 
Milan.663 “Here in Italy”, continued an Egyptian baker, “Imams teach us to love the country and its 
inhabitants. We have to earn our spot in society, and maybe one day Milan could have too, like London, 
a Muslim mayor who serves all citizens. So, you see, there is just no room for radicalism and 
extremism here; we would be the first victims.”664 
In sum, when it comes to the perception of radicalisation in Islam and inside Italian Muslim 
communities, unlike non-Muslims, Muslim respondents mostly agreed with the assumption that there is 
an issue of radicalisation in Islam, though it is minimal and exaggerated by the media. Yet, they 
slightly denied that there is an equal question in Italy. These presumptions are not too surprising, 
perhaps, as 82% of the survey’s respondents –as will be later illustrated- believed there is a media war 
to discredit Islam, but 81% of them stated they still love Italy and its culture and want to be part of 
Italian society. Could the respondents’ perception be a sign that Croft’s argument is ultimately right? 
                                                         
659 Interview no. 48, Q5, Appendix 5. 
660 Interview no. 55, Q5, Appendix 5. 
661 Interview no. 61, Q6, Appendix 5. 
662 Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5. 
663 Interview no. 46, Q5, Appendix 5. 
664 Interview no. 42, Q5, Appendix 5. 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The Search for an “Islamist outlook”: Violence in the Name of God 
 In an effort to verify if Muslim respondents’ assumptions could prove Croft’s argument right 
over Roy’s, we looked for attitudes justifying violence in Islamist terms. In our quest for a possible 
“Islamist outlook”, we searched for what we defined as “non-violent Islamist extremists” –at least to 
the best of our knowledge, operating within legal domains, we assumed everyone participating in the 
study not to be actively engaged in any violent activity. That asserted, within the sample extrapolated 
from Italian mainstream society, 5.2% (23/440) non-Muslims strongly supported violence in defence of 
faith, 3.9% (17/440) slightly endorsed it, 11.1% (49/440) slightly opposed it, 75% (330/440) strongly 
rejected it, 3.6% (16/440) did not have an opinion, and 1.1% (5/440) refused to answer. Within the non-
Muslim sample, 86% (379/440) of respondents rejected violence in the name of religion, while force 
was endorsed 9% (40/440) of the times.   
As for the Muslim sample, although the majority of respondents in the questionnaire did not 
justify violence in defence of Islam, a considerable minority did. According to Graph 10, those who 
strongly or slightly approved of defending Islam violently amounted to 24% (respectively 52 and 53 
out of 440 respondents), which, counting only definite answers –excluding participants who had no 
opinion or refused to answer-, turned to 26% (105/408). As for the rest of the sample, 45% of the 
respondents (198/440) strongly disagreed with violence justified in defence of Islam, 24% (105/440) 























Graph 10. Charts on the Muslim respondents’ take on violence in defence of Islam. 
 
 
Understandably, rates for support of religiously framed violence were higher in the 
questionnaires than in interviews/focus groups. Taken individuals might be more cautious during face-
to-face interactions, only 32 subjects out of 200 (in 16 cases out of 71 in which interviews and focus 
groups were conducted), or 15.5%, supported religiously motivated violence. The overwhelming 
justification for such beliefs was rooted in the respondents’ conviction that Islam allows force as long 
as it is executed in self-defence and/or defence of other Muslims. “The only thing that Islam allows is 
self-defence, that is, if you are attacked, then you can react, but that’s it. Violence, offensive violence, 
can never be justified”, explained three North Africans in Bologna.665 As a Gambian artisan from 
Verona declared, “Only if there is a good reason God can allow [violence], like say you have to defend 
yourself.”666 
To other respondents, the concept of self-defence applied also to other Muslims being 
oppressed. As an Egyptian owner of a Kebab place in Milan argued, “Islam and violence cannot go in 
the same sentence, unless you are talking about non-Muslims oppressing Muslims,”667 because, “It’s                                                         
665 Interview no. 60, Q7, Appendix 5. 
666 Interview no. 39, Q6, Appendix 5. 
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natural when a person is oppressed to rebel and do whatever he can to end the suffering, even by 
fighting”, clarified two Pakistani shopkeepers.668 In fact, to a Bangladeshi immigrant in Rome, “The 
only case in which violence is justifiable is in the face of oppression. Let’s say someone kills or attacks 
your family or your Muslim brethren, you then can kill or attack your enemy’s family, for the Quran 
allows you to do so.”669 In this case, “If there is a good cause, like defending oppressed brothers,”670 
not only is defensive Jihad allowable but even mandatory. Remarks from respondents in Naples, Genoa, 
and Milan included examples such as: “If one brother is attacked and cries for help, then I have to help 
him, because I have to be a good Muslim”; “If a brother is in danger or under the yoke of the oppressor, 
it is a religious duty to go and help him”; “If there is oppression you are compelled to take action to 
defend your Muslim brothers.”671 That stated, though supporters of violence were drastically 
outnumbered in both the quantitative and the qualitative analysis by proponents of the “Peaceful nature 
of Islam [which] leaves no room for violence, at any time, especially in the name of God,”672 a 
significant minority in the study’s sample justified the use of force in defence of their religion.    
 
The Duty to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Its Prophet 
Equally to other realities, Italian mainstream society has witnessed the emergence in recent 
years of charged debates juxtaposing respect for religious icons and freedom of speech. As such, non-
Muslim respondents were asked to voice their thoughts on the duty to punish whoever offends the 
sacredness of a religion and its symbols. Within this sample, 7.3% of respondents (32/440) strongly 
accepted the punishment of offenders, 8.2% (36/440) slightly endorsed it, 18.2% (80/440) slightly 
opposed it, 59.3% (261/440) strongly rejected it, 4.8% (21/440) had no opinion, and 2.3% (10/440) 
declined to state. In total, 15.5% (68/440) of the sample justified the punishment of religious offenders, 
while 77.5% (341/440) disagreed with such a stance.   
Analogously, Muslim respondents were asked to share thoughts on the duty to punish whoever 
offends Islam and its Prophet. Similarly to the justification of violence in defence of Islam, a significant 
minority also supported the duty to punish offenders. As Graph 11 shows, out of 440 respondents, 69 
(16%) strongly agreed with punishing whoever insults Islam and its prophet, while 62 (14%) slightly 
agreed with such a stance. In total, 30% of the sample (131/440) justified the duty to punish offenders 
                                                        
668 Interview no. 10, Q6, Appendix 5. 
669 Interview no. 1, Q6, Appendix 5. 
670 Interview no. 22, Q6, Appendix 5. 
671 Respectively, Interview no. 10, Q6; Interview no. 20, Q7; Interview no. 47, Q7, Appendix 5. 
672 Interview no. 67, Q8, Appendix 5. 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of Islam, amounting to 33% (131/392) if only definite answers were counted. As for the rest of the 
survey, 15% (67/440) slightly rejected the idea of punishing offenders of Islam, 44% (194/440) 
strongly opposed it, 5% (23/440) did not know, and 6% (25/440) declined to state. 
 
Graph 11. Charts on Muslim respondents’ take on the duty to punish offenders of Islam. 
 
 As already specified in the methodology section, this particular statement on the duty to punish 
whoever insults Islam and its prophet did not necessarily infer any use of violent means. Yet, it was 
still inserted in the analysis for its charged nature. Needless to say, the sensitivity of the issue in 
question transpired considerably during the interviews and focus groups. Though the vast majority 
rejected the idea of punishing religious offenders, certain respondents rejected violence but showed 
sympathy as to why others would react violently if their prophet were insulted. For instance, a Tunisian 
student from Bologna explained that offending Islam and Mohammed “[Is] a huge provocation that 
should not be done. Yet, even if I think killing or hurting someone is wrong, I think we are doomed to 
wars of religion, because people don’t understand how hurtful insulting Mohammed is.”673 A group of 
fellow Tunisians in Brescia elucidated the delicacy of the issue as follows: 
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You can insult me, my wife, my children, and all of the people who are here [in front of you]. It 
would hurt, but it wouldn’t hurt as much as if you offended our Prophet, because all of our lives, 
compared to Him, are worth nothing, and so, when someone insults Mohammed it hurts us real 
bad inside of our souls, because He’s more sacred than our lives.674 
 
In light of this, 47 people out of 200 (circa 25%) claimed that whoever insults Islam and its sacred 
tenets should be punished. However, 23 of these believed offenders of their faith should certainly be 
punished, but only through legal means. A Palestinian activist living in Rome warned that offenders of 
Islam “should be sued immediately,”675 because, as a group of respondents in Lombardy explained: 
Mohammed cannot be touched, as He’s sacred for us. We are for freedom of speech, but your 
freedom ends when someone else’s starts. We respect all of the prophets, including Abraham, 
Moses, Jesus, and even the Virgin Mary, because, if you do not, you cannot be a real Muslim. 
So, given that we respect this, why shouldn’t people respect our Prophet and our sacred truth? 
[Hence] we can take legal action.676 
 
All these respondents clearly and openly repudiated violence in favour of legal action. Turkish workers 
in Modena conceded that, “No one should be punished physically, but legally,”677 for “Even if you 
insult the Prophet, I cannot kill you, I will sue you, but God forbid I use violence in His name, and 
whoever does so is not a Muslim”, affirmed two waiters in Milan.678  
By contrast, the other 24 subjects who would punish offenders of Islam either directly or 
indirectly justified violent means. Comments from those who patently endorsed actual force featured 
examples such as: “[A] person should definitely be punished, even physically if he doesn’t stop and 
repent”; “It’s definitely right to punish someone who offends the Prophet, maybe even physically, 
especially if this person keeps doing that”; “I cannot kill you, but I do understand if someone punches 
you because you cannot touch the Prophet.”679 As a Turkish family man from Modena put it: 
Killing someone is out of the question. But at the same time, just like in your family you have to 
discipline your children and punish them if they persevere in their mistakes, you have to do the 
same here. If you decide to write offensive caricatures [about Mohammad] and I tell you that 
insults me once, twice, three times, four times, etc., then maybe, if I slap you, you stop.680 
 
The rest of the respondents who indirectly supported violent means inferred the foolishness of insulting 
Islam and its prophet given the existence of short-tempered, unbalanced individuals. In other words, to                                                         
674 Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5. 
675 Interview no. 5, Q7, Appendix 5. 
676 Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5. 
677 Interview no. 37, Q8, Appendix 5. 
678 Interview no. 28, Q3, Appendix 5. 
679 Respectively, Interview no71, Q7; Interview no. 3, Q7; Interview no. 65, Q7, Appendix 5. 
680 Interview no. 37, Q8, Appendix 5. 
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these respondents, offenders are to blame themselves if they end up being attacked. Their most 
common remarks included phrases such as: “If you decide to insult Mohammad, it’s your risk, you 
should not do that”; “There are lots of crazy people out there, if you decide to provoke them, it’s your 
own risk, because you know by now how bad insulting the Prophet is”; “It’s wrong to kill people, but I 
understand that if you insult Mohammed and there are some crazy people out there…it’s your risk…If 
there are some hotheads and you insult the Prophet, it’s your fault.”681 
In general, most respondents greatly rejected the duty to punish offenders of Islam and its 
prophet based on a myriad of religious and civic values gravitating around respect, patience, and the 
peaceful nature of Islam, including the very teachings of Mohammad. Nevertheless, a significant 
minority begged to differ, for, whether physically or legally, if one offends Mohammad, “This person 
has to be punished harshly”, judged a Moroccan mother from Varese.682       
 
Views on Al Qaeda and ISIS 
Considering public apprehension over such groups within Italian mainstream society, non-
Muslims respondents were asked to share their views on Al Qaeda and ISIS. Within this sample, as for 
Al Qaeda, 3.6% of non-Muslim respondents (16/440) strongly endorsed its struggle, 3% (13/440) 
slightly agreed with it, 8.6% (38/440) slightly opposed it, 68% (299/440) strongly rejected it, 12% 
(53/440) had no opinion, and 4.8% (21/440) refused to answer. As for ISIS, instead, 5% of non-Muslim 
participants (22/440) strongly endorsed ISIS, 2.7% (12/440) slightly approved of it, 8.6% (38/440) 
slightly rejected it, 76.6% (337/440) strongly opposed it, 4.1% (18/440) had no opinion, and 3% 
(13/440) declined to state. Overall, support for Al Qaeda and ISIS amounted, respectively, to 7% 
(29/440) and 8% (34/440), while the groups were opposed 77% and 85% of the times (337/440 and 
375/440).     
Within the Muslim sample, as clearly described in Graphs 12, out of 440 respondents, 25 
strongly endorsed Al Qaeda’s struggle and 19 somewhat supported it. In total, 10% (44/440) of the 
surveyed subjects supported Al Qaeda, which became 12% counting only definite answers (44/380). As 
for the rest of the survey, 10% (47/440) slightly disagree with Al Qaeda’s struggle, 66% (289/440) 
strongly opposed it, 6% (28/440) had no opinion, and 7% (32/440) refused to answer.   
 
                                                        
681 Respectively, Interview no. 10, Q7; Interview no. 57, Q7; Interview no. 32, Q8, Appendix 5. 
682 Interview no. 29, Q8, Appendix 5. 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Graph 12. Charts on Muslim respondents’ take on Al Qaeda’s struggle.
 
 
When it comes to ISIS, Graph 13 illustrates that, out of 440 surveyed subjects, 32 strongly 
agreed with the legitimacy of the group’s struggle, and 25 slightly approved of it. Overall, 13% 
(57/440) of respondents in the survey endorsed ISIS, which amounted to 15% (57/392) if only definite 
answers were taken into account. As for the rest of the questionnaire, 10% (42/440) somewhat 
disagreed with ISIS’s actions, 67% strongly opposed them (293/440), 3% (15/440) expressed no 
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Graph 13. Charts on Muslim respondents’ take on ISIS’s struggle. 
 
Such results were noticeably greater in the survey than in the interviews and focus groups. 
Given Al Qaeda and ISIS related-terrorist activities in Europe, this might have been a quite predictable 
outcome, arguably, for we did not expect many individuals to openly voice their support for the groups 
in question. Unsurprisingly, only 7 people out of 200 (3.5%) patently showed their sympathy or 
appreciation for the two terrorist organisations. To all of them, the reason behind their support was 
mainly tied to the lack of governmental intervention to protect oppressed Muslims, and the subsequent 
religious duty to fight oppression. As a group of North African interviewees in Emilia-Romagna 
reflected upon: 
Think you are a Syrian citizen. Who is going to protect you? Assad? Putin? The West? No, only 
other true Muslims who are obliged to come protect you if you are in danger. If there is violence, 
if people are dying and the West does nothing, what is left for the Syrians? If other people do 
not take action, there’s only death. And at this point, it’s really a religious duty for every true 
Muslim to defend oppressed and persecuted brothers.683 
 
Bearing this in mind, a Senegalese vendor in Naples thundered against Bashir Assad and the West, 
pronouncing Al Qaeda and ISIS to be “[…] the only defenders of oppressed people in Syria and the  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Middle East,”684 from “[…] the Syrian and the Western regimes [who] butcher [them] daily”, reiterated 
a Somali worker in Florence.685 “If it weren’t for them”, continued the man, “there would be much 
more blood in the area.”686 
All in all, it is paramount to specify that the overwhelming majority of the study’s respondents 
strongly rejected Al Qaeda and ISIS. Especially in the qualitative part of the research, respondents were 
almost unanimous in their stance when asked about the terrorist organisations in question. They harshly 
condemned Al Qaeda, ISIS, and religiously motivated violence fiercely, for these organisations, to 
them, are “made of infidels [and are] shameful to Muslims everywhere,” 687 for “they do not represent 
any kind of Islam or Muslims by any means.”688 However, not only did a fair minority support Al 
Qaeda’s and ISIS’s armed struggle, but also justified it in religious terms, framing it within the 
mandatory duty to protect fellow oppressed Muslims.        
 
Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents’ Comparison on Religiously Framed Violence  
When comparing the questionnaires by non-Muslim and Muslim respondents, it is evident the 
two groups share a different take on the justification of religiously framed violence. In sum, 9% of non-
Muslim respondents (40/440) agreed with force in defence of faith, 15.5% (68/440) endorsed the 
punishment of religious offenders, and 7% (29/440) and 8% (34/440) supported Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s 
struggles. In turn, within the Muslim sample, 24% of respondents (105/440) agreed with violence in 
defence of faith, 30% (131/440) accepted the punishment of offenders of Islam, 10% (44/440) 
supported Al Qaeda’s struggle, and 13% (57/440) viewed ISIS’s struggle as legitimate. As shown in 









684 Interview no. 8, Q8, Appendix 5. 
685 Interview no. 71, Q8, Appendix 5. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Interview no. 7, Q9, Appendix 5. 
688 Interview no. 21, Q9, Appendix 5. 
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Graph 14. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent’s views on religiously framed violence. 
 
 
faith, 40 were non-Muslims and 105 were Muslims (almost 3 times as many). Along the same lines, 
non-Muslim respondents agreeing with punishing those who insult a religion’s sacred tenets were 68, 
while Muslim participants claiming the same were 131 (almost twice as many). Lastly, Al Qaeda 
counted 29 non-Muslim supporters and 44 Muslim proponents (1.5 times as many), while ISIS 34 non-
Muslim supporters and 57 Muslim advocates (1.7 times as many). In all the mentioned instances, in 
regard to support for religiously motivated violence, Muslim respondents noticeably outnumbered their 
non-Muslim counterparts.  
 
Roy More Than Croft  
Before we started our field research, we expected both Roy’s and Croft’s arguments to be 
somewhat inaccurate in describing the Italian scenario. We disagreed with Croft’s claim that 
radicalisation is socially constructed, as we expected to identify manifestations of Islamist 
radicalisation. At the same time, we predicted such instances to be minimal, unlike, perhaps, the French 
case, where prospects of Islamist radicalisation might even fuel an “explosion in the suburbs”, 
contended Eric Denece.689 Hence, we did not assume Islamist radicalisation to be a pressing, urgent 
                                                        

















issue, for we pictured the vast majority of Muslim respondents to fiercely reject violence framed in 
religious terms. 
The empirical evidence we produced seems to challenge our initial hypothesis, however. 
Surprisingly, we did not register mere “spurs” of radicalisation. Rather, we came across a significant 
minority of respondents who actually endorsed violence framed in Islamist terms, ranging from 10% to 
30% of the total sample. Simply put, our observed “Islamist outlook” was ultimately greater than 
expected. These findings are fairly consistent with what Italian officials have observed. In the words of 
Domenico Messina from the Italian Postal Police: “Your results are fairly consistent with our findings. 
As we monitor the Web on a daily basis, we can say that up to 30% of the online community supports 
violent interpretations of Islam.”690 
The three Imams’ reactions691 to the quantitative results also challenge our initial hypothesis. In 
fact, the three clerics have all unanimously shared their concern about the quantity of individuals from 
the sample supporting violence framed in religious terms. Pallavicini defined the findings as “bone-
chilling.”692 “To me”, continued the Imam, “when I completed the questionnaire myself, when it came 
to the statements about violence in Islam, the answer was quite simple and unquestionable. But, 
apparently, I was wrong.”693 Cozzolino, who converted to Islam years ago, labelled the results “really, 
really worrying, for they should not be minimised.”694 Imam Elzir expressed even more disappointment 
and worry about the “Islamist outlook”: 
This research is very important to us to see how we are doing inside our communities. And 
when you say that almost 30% of the people would punish whoever offends Islam or would 
justify violence in the name of Allah, while between 10% and 15% support Al Qaeda and ISIS, 
it’s way too many people. I thought we would find like a 5% rate or so, but even 5% would still 
be too much. The fact there are these people who espouse violence in the name of Islam is 
unacceptable. It goes against everything we teach everyday.695   
   
In light of official data from the Police, and in light of three Imam’s comments, we can affirm 
that the debate on Islamist radicalisation in Italy steers more towards Roy’s position. Not only do the 
study’s results disprove our hypothesis of finding mere “spurs” of radicalisation; they also seem to 
contradict, at least partially, Muslim respondents’ perception of radicalisation in Italy. Overall, most of                                                         
690 Domenico Messina, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017, Appendix 1. 
691 These were secretary general of the Italian Islamic Confederation (CII) Massimo Abdallah Cozzolino, head of the Union 
of the Italian Islamic Communities (UCOII) Ezzedin Elzir, and vice president of COREIS Yayha Pallavicini. 
692 Pallavicini, Yaha, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
695 Elzir, Ezzedin, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
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them claimed there is no issue of radicalisation within the Italian Muslim community, and those who 
did, claimed such a problem to be minimal and exaggerated by the media. Inflated or not by media 
outlets, our numeric findings show Islamist radicalisation in Italy cannot be considered a marginal 
phenomenon. And even though the results may be inferior to other continental realities, they are 
certainly closer to Roy’s belief that Islamist radicalisation is a matter worthy of attention –especially if 
one accounts for those restrictions and challenges expounded in the methodology section. 
In the end, we can state that, in Italy, Islamist radicalisation is no myth, nor is it socially 
constructed as Croft maintains, for the analysis would have registered null or almost null rates of 
support for religiously justified violence. Though it can hardly be argued Islamist radicalisation is 
Italy’s worst nightmare, the study showed the country cannot deem itself immune to Islamist processes 























CHAPTER VII: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ASSUMED CAUSAL MODELS OF 
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION 
 
Drivers of Islamist Radicalisation in the Respondents’ Eyes 
 If Roy’s theories best fit the Italian case and the country cannot reckon itself impervious to 
prospects of Islamist radicalisation, exploring the drivers behind Islamist views becomes pivotal. But 
before delving into the statistical analysis, it is worth exploring what respondents themselves think the 
drivers of Islamist radicalisation are. Hence, we asked those Muslim and non-Muslim respondents who 
agreed that an issue of radicalisation exists to rank its first three causes. According to non-Muslim 
participants, “Economic social harshness” was the main driver of Islamist radicalisation, allocating it in 
the first three causes 16% of the times. Right behind was “Exploitation of Islam for political purposes”, 
which was selected 15% of the times. “Identity crisis” and “Lack of a strong internal debate inside 


































between 8% and 3% of the times.696 
As for Muslim respondents, Graph 15 indicates they identified “Exploitation of Islam for 
political purposes” as the most influential factor in triggering Islamist radicalisation. On average, this 
voice was allocated 13% of the times in the first three causes. The second most nominated driver was 
“The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS” (chosen 12% of the times). The third most chosen                                                         
696 These were, in descending order: “Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world”, “Past and present 
Western foreign policy and the history of the Crusades”, “The call to arms for every true Muslim”, “The importance of 
personal bonds and the group”, “Denied rights/frustration”, “Western racism”, “The Israeli-Palestinian question”, “Search 
for adventure and sense of nobility”, “Traumatic personal experiences”, “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, 











factor was “Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam” (selected 11% of the times). “Traumatic 
personal experiences” was elected 9.4% of the times. Every other proposed cause ranged between 8% 
and 2% of the times.697 
Muslims’ top-four selected drivers of Islamist radicalisation were also the most mentioned 
elements during the interviews and focus groups. Those who alluded to the “Exploitation of Islam for 
political purposes” based their claim on scriptural ignorance, misinterpretation, or deliberate hijacking 
of the complex, but yet peaceful nature of Islam for political goals. As an Italian convert from Rome 
phrased it, extremists “[…] use such tenets [of Islam] to obtain power or other political purposes,”698 
for, “They misinterpret what is written in the Quran and use it for political reasons”, repeated Turkish 
citizens in Emilia-Romagna.699 
Likewise, a Moroccan female graduate student from Padua confirmed that, “Yes, of course, 
there are people who use the name of God to hurt other people… but I think terrorism is nothing but 
military tactics that misuses or twists a certain ideology for political purposes, in the end.”700 The 
reason behind this is that, according to other two Italian-born Muslim university students from Modena 
and Naples, “People read just a few lines, know nothing of the complexity of the Quran, and use only 
parts of it for political purposes”, or, worse, “[…] take parts of the Quran out of context and use them 
to pursue their political, unholy interests.”701 As fully summarised by an Algerian shopkeeper in 
southern Italy, those who justify violence in the name of Allah: 
[…] Don’t understand anything about Islam, they only use it for political purposes. In the end, 
it’s all a game of politics, international politics, featuring global interests. All the players in the 
game have political purposes and, some of them, Muslims and non-Muslims too, use Islam and 
wrongfully self-proclaimed Islamic groups to obtain precise political goals in the Middle East 
and elsewhere.702  
 
Conversely, respondents who indicated “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS” as 
a major driver of radicalisation founded their beliefs on the individual’s desire to obtain goods granted 
for being extremist. Interviews and focus groups revealed three particular benefits to be believed to 
cause radicalisation. The most cited one was financial compensation. When a female student in Reggio                                                         
697 These were, in descending order: “Economic and social harshness”, “Identity crisis”, “Oppression by authoritative 
governments in the Arab world”, “Denied rights/frustration”, “Western racism”, “Past and present Western foreign policy 
and the history of the Crusades”, “The importance of personal bonds and the group”, “The Israeli-Palestinian question”, 
“Search for adventure and sense of nobility”, “The call to arms for every true Muslim”. 
698 Interview no. 25, Q5, Appendix 5. 
699 Interview no. 37, Q5, Appendix 5. 
700 Interview no. 64, Q5, Appendix 5. 
701 Respectively, Interview no. 62, Q6; Interview no. 16, Q5, Appendix 5. 
702 Interview no. 12, Q6, Appendix 5. 
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Calabria was asked as to why people radicalise, she replied, “It’s very simple, for it is the oldest reason 
in the world: money.”703 Like her, respondents from all parts of Italy blatantly pointed to, “Money and 
lust for power”; “Definitely money and power”; “Money, business, and various opportunities”; “It’s 
just people who want money.”704 Such greedy attitudes are enabled by the fact that extremists and 
people who join terrorist groups are really “[…] mercenaries only driven by money,”705 for, “People 
who go fight for ISIS…have nothing going on in their own lives and are just lured by the money”, 
affirmed respondents in Rome and Modena.706 As an Egyptian/Italian grocer from the Capital 
exhaustively recapitulated, “I think it’s actually more about the money, those people don’t care about 
Islam or the state of the Islamic world, they have nothing to do, and what they truly care about is the 
money, that’s it.”707 
The second most alluded benefit was the improvement of the individual’s social status. In 
addition to “Money”, respondents referred to fame and romantic/sexual triumph. As a group of 
Senegalese merchants in Naples explained, “[radicals] just want money and to become famous. They 
were poor, had nothing before and, when groups like ISIS offer them something to improve their 
everyday situation, they take it with no regard to God or any other religion for that matter.”708 Most 
Islamist extremists strive to “feel great and important people,”709 for they “[…] think they can have 
women because they feel cool”, continued the West African sellers.710 Even more, if they become 
famous, extremists “[can] get women, steal, and do things that are utterly forbidden in Islam”, argued 
other Senegalese vendors.711 In sum, according to a southern Moroccan shopkeeper, drivers of 
radicalisation would be nothing but, “The only two things people like and that are motivated by: money 
and women.”712  
The third most cited advantage concerned the individual’s spiritual nature. Besides material 
goods such as “Money” and “Women”, respondents also included transcendent rewards to be collected 
in the afterlife. As such, an unemployed woman from Varese elucidated the fact that: 
[Extremists] see some advantages in choosing this path. The first one is money...Also, if you 
don’t know anything about Islam and you meet with people who are bad [who] tell you that if                                                         
703 Interview no. 54, Q6, Appendix 5. 
704 Respectively, Interview no. 32, Q6; Interview no. 21, Q6; Interview no. 7, Q6; Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5. 
705 Interview no. 22, Q5, Appendix 5. 
706 Interview no. 37, Q6, Appendix 5. 
707 Interview no. 4, Q6, Appendix 5. 
708 Interview no. 7, Q6, Appendix 5. 
709 Interview no. 41, Q6, Appendix 5. 
710 Interview no. 7, Q6, Appendix 5. 
711 Interview no. 7, Q9, Appendix 5. 
712 Interview no. 19, Q6, Appendix 5. 
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you kill yourself you’re going to Heaven, you can, at times, be brainwashed, and then you think 
God will reward you.713 
 
Another relevant element believed to cause Islamist radicalisation that emerged in the 
qualitative analysis was “Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam”. This stance was mainly based 
on the respondents’ sense of doctrinal ignorance within certain segments of the Muslim community, 
coupled with the paucity of inner debate peculiarly on the issue of religiously framed violence. From 
north to south, interviewees linked the acceptance of violent means in defence of Islam to lack of 
religious knowledge, because extremists “[…] just don’t know what the real Islam is all about. If they 
knew, they would never become radical”, maintained an Egyptian/Italian student in Milan.714 
Similarly, a Pakistani Shia and a Jordanian Sunni both affirmed violent Islamist ideas are the 
product of a “Complete lack of religious knowledge, along with bad leaders”, for “[extremists] got it all 
wrong because they go against the pure Islam.”715 This scriptural unawareness or misinterpretation is 
then exacerbated by the absence of a much-needed discussion on violence in the name of God. As such, 
an Albanian engineer from Milan pictured the “Lack of heated debate on the interpretation of Islam and 
the role violence plays in it” to be the major factor in triggering radicalisation.716 Along the same lines, 
a group in Bergamo argued that, “The fact that [Islamist extremists] don’t know Islam is crucial, 
because a person who studies, goes to the mosque and such, cannot be brainwashed. The fact is that we 
don’t talk as much as we should about these things.”717 Analogously, two Italian-born Muslim 
university students summarised the matter as follows: “[The cause of radicalisation is] Lack of 
religious knowledge, because people read, [but] know nothing of the complexity of the Quran”… “I 
don’t think it’s because of money, poverty, and denied rights as many Muslims are saying. It’s because 
people don’t know their own religion, hence, it’s an internal problem that we have to face and come to 
terms with.”718 
Lastly, those respondents that identified “Traumatic personal experiences” as major tools in 
triggering radicalisation pointed, obviously, to individual harmful episodes. As a student in Bergamo 
wondered, “I don’t know what goes off in that person’s head to push him to use violence. It must be 
something incredibly personal meant to be searched in that person’s past traumatic experiences.”719 Yet,                                                         
713 Interview no. 29, Q6, Appendix 5. 
714 Interview no. 53, Q6, Appendix 5. 
715 Respectively, Interview no. 56, Q6; Interview no. 64, Q8, Appendix 5. 
716 Interview no. 52, Q6, Appendix 5 
717 Interview no. 23, Q6, Appendix 5. 
718 Respectively, Interview no. 62, Q6; Interview no. 63, Q6, Appendix 5. 
719 Interview no. 23, Q6, Appendix 5. 
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unlike already mentioned studies, agonising experiences like death of relatives and time in prison were 
not as mentioned as drug abuse. 
Remarks from around Italy included phrases such as, “[…] In order to kill innocent people 
whom you have never even met before, you must be twisted, a mentally ill person. In fact, many have 
used drugs or had personal problems that brought them to violence”; “They are just crazy, sad people, 
who had bad experiences in the past, maybe even used drugs and stuff”; “Many of them had already 
had terrible experiences, were drugged up, were stupid, and didn’t even read the Quran.”720 To these 
respondents, not only do poor choices bring misery, but they also pave the way, at times, for the 
acquisition of radical ideas. As articulated by two Italian converts, those who fall prey to radicalisation:  
[…] Are crazy people whose lives are awful because they made bad choices or [because of] 
something not allowed in the Quran, which brought sadness upon them. They drink, smoke, 
have sex before marriage, and use drugs, then they get used by these criminals and do bad 
things.721 
 
In sum, respondents from the questionnaire and the interviews/focus groups principally blamed 
four main drivers for Islamist radicalisation. To both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, Islamist 
radicalisation would be the product of the exploitation of Islam for political purposes. But non-Muslim 
respondents majorly blamed economic hardship, then identity crisis, and lack of debate inside Islam. 
Muslim respondents focused more on the desire for money, women, fame, Heaven, and other material 
and spiritual benefits offered by Al Qaeda and ISIS. They too argued radicalisation is caused by the 
lack of internal, doctrinal debate within Muslim communities on the concept of religiously motivated 
violence. Finally, to Muslims, radicalisation happens due to traumatic past experiences that feature 
miseries such as drug abuse. All in all, were these assumptions by the study’s respondents accurate? 
Were these the reasons that ultimately enabled Roy’s argument over Croft’s? Were the respondents 
onto something? What really drove the rates of the “Islamist outlook”?    
 
The Testing of the Variables 
In an attempt to elucidate the previous queries, we tested a wide selection of models linking 
support for violence with predictors from the literature (please see Table 4 in the methodology). But as 
already specified in the methodological section, this was not to determine causal relations between 
variables, for statistics, as a matter of principle, are unable to establish causality. We could, however, 
determine quantitatively the degree of independence between the various variables. Secondly, we were                                                         
720 Respectively, Interview no. 37, Q6; Interview no. 32, Q6; Interview no. 57, Q5, Appendix 5. 
721 Interview no. 15, Q6, Appendix 5. 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able to conduct single parameter analyses that measured the odds that religiously framed violence could 
be justified based on the single predictor. Finally, we ran logistic regression models linking the 
responses indicative of “Islamist outlook” with the most statistically significant predictors.  
 
Insignificant Predictive Variables 
Our first main conclusion is that most predictors tested throughout the analysis are not 
supported by empirical, statistical evidence. Out of 28 assumed/proposed variables, 22 could not be 
statistically associated with the justification of violence in the name of God, the duty to punish 
offenders of Islam, and support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. Challenging Muslim respondents’ perception of 
what triggers Islamist radicalisation, the idea of benefiting from material and spiritual incentives 
(“rational choice theory”) was not a notable driver. Similarly, suffering from traumatic experiences 
could not be considered a key factor in shaping one’s take on the justification of violence either. 
Besides, except for one case, none of the standard sociological variables were statistically significant. 
Being younger or older, holding a particular citizenship, being born in Italy or not, having spent less or 
more than five years in the country, and being single or married were not important predictors, in the 
end. Being less or more educated, less or more well-off, leftist or more to the right, and more or less 
religious were irrelevant too. Even being male or female or having converted to Islam were not 
significant elements (Appendix 6). 
Another remarkable finding was that most accredited predictors, which we abstractedly labelled 
“The usual suspects”, were not significant either. We found no empirical evidence for theories 
proposing discrimination/racism, religious and social inequality, economic disparity, and perceived 
ignorance and prejudice towards Islam. Likewise, outrage at Western foreign policy and perceived 
oppression of Muslims were also insignificant. In truth, predictors like discrimination, outrage at 
Western foreign policy, or perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide initially seemed relevant, as 
they were significantly associated to the justification of religiously motivated violence. For instance, 
not only was discrimination originally associated with violence in the name of God; the odds that 
individuals from the study who felt discriminated against also supported violence in defence of faith 
ranged from a 28% to 35% chance (Appendix 6). Nevertheless, these variables still turned out 
statistically insignificant in the regression models when grouped with the actual influential predictors 
(Appendix 6). In light of such results, we argue the data drawn from a sample of 440 Muslims residing 
in today’s Italy seem to challenge the majority of assumed models of Islamist radicalisation from the 
literature.  
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The study’s Significant Variables 
The Duty to Punish Offenders of Islam 
The most significant variable was not initially envisioned or even considered as a potential 
predictor linked to Islamist framed violence. As a matter of fact, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” 
was solely originally selected as one of the four response variables. But after excluding potential issues 
of multicollinearity,722 both the tests of association and the regression models unequivocally showed 
this predictor to be the most meaningful one of the whole study. To begin with, duty to discipline 
mockers of Islam was the most associated predictor to violence in defence of faith. Considering we 
used the standard “0.05” significance threshold p-value, support for violence in defence of faith and 
duty to punish whoever insults Islam displayed a stunning p-value of 2.5E-59. In addition to being 
exponentially below the 0.05 threshold, this is by orders of magnitude the most significant association 
in the tests.  
This striking connection was also confirmed in the single parameter analysis, when we 
measured odds between two taken variables. As shown in Appendix 6, within the statistical contours of 
the study’s sample, those who strongly agreed with the duty to punish offenders of Islam had also a 
78% probability of supporting violence. Subjects who somewhat concurred with the previous 
assumption displayed a 49% chance of justifying violence in defence of faith. The odds that 
respondents from the survey sample who slightly disagreed with the duty to punish whoever insults 
Islam also justified violence amounted to 15%, which became 5% for those strongly disagreeing with 
the previous vision.  
Unsurprisingly, the impact “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” had in the regression models 
was critical. By using Wald z-tests, our objective was to determine which predictor had the strongest 
impact on the response variable when interacting with other significant predictors at the same time –
such variables were nothing but the most significant ones from the association tests. Hence, as for the 
justification of violence in the name of God, out of the 7 most significant predictors from the 
                                                        
722 Predictors that are used in the regression models must be independent from each other. If two predictors turn out to be 
already correlated to each other, this connection will be reproduced in the models, altering the final results (issue of 
multicollinearity). In light of this, one could argue “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” to be already linked to the violence 
framed in Islamist terms. However, the first predictor does not imply any use of actual force, as punishment could be carried 
out through legal means. Hence, we would not normally assume that proponents of punishing whoever insults Islam also 
justify violence, as the two variables are not necessarily correlated. As shown in the qualitative part of the analysis, half of 
the interviewees who agreed with such a stance strongly believed a person should be sued but not attacked or physically 
harmed in any way. Still, for the sake of analysis, we have decided to control for “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and 
carry out additional regression models void of the predictor in question to eliminate any potential issues of multicollinearity. 
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association tests, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was, by far, the most powerful. As Table 5 shows, 
it featured a p-value of 5.7E-11, which is tremendously significant. 
 
Table 5. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the 
justification of violence in defence of Islam.  
 Violence in defence of Islam can also be justified 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Duty to punish 
whoever offends Islam  
5.067466e+01 3.000000e+00 5.738565E-11* 
Ideology  11.996426725 3.000000000 0.007395411* 
Identity Crisis 2.1186979 3.0000000 0.5481393 
Social Difficulties  1.5209500 3.0000000 0.6774436 
Religious inequality 4.156896 3.000000 0.245013 
Geography (being from 
Rome or Lombardy) 
2.98479060 1.00000000 0.084050016 
Frustration 3.8139483 3.0000000 0.2822679 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
This result confirmed what transpired in the first part of the analysis. In relation to violence in defence 
of Islam, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was more important than anything else. That is, agreeing 
or disagreeing with the duty to punish mockers mattered more, comparatively, than one’s take on the 
Islamic government, potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at 
school, inability to find an appropriate worship place, one’s sense of frustration, and being from Rome 
or Lombardy. This outcome was possible because, when justifying or rejecting violence in the name of 
God, the personal impact that punishing or not punishing mockers had was considerably more 
meaningful than any other factor. In other words, one’s take on the duty to punish offenders was also 
the most important factor in shaping that person’s answer on violence in defence of faith.   
This trend was even more evident when we looked at subgroups. As Table 6 shows, if only 
definite answers are taken into account, out of 102 subjects who agreed with the right to punish 
offenders of Islam, 82 (80%) also supported violence in defence of faith while 20 objected it.  
 
Table 6. Contingency Table for Duty to Punish Whoever Insults Islam vs. Violence in Defence of Islam 
 Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished 
 
Violence in 
defence of Islam 
can be justified 
 
 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 82 46 128 
Disagree 20 237 257 
Total 102 283 385 
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Out of 283 people who rejected the duty to punish offenders of Islam, 46 supported violence and 237 
(92%) did not. Among those who supported the duty to punish offenders of the faith, supporters of 
violence outnumbered non-supporters by a factor of more than 4 (82/20). Instead, for those who 
opposed the duty to punish offenders the ratio was about 1/5 (46/237).  
In light of this, we assessed the difference between subgroups to be significant. Furthermore, 
through Wald z-tests with weights, we were also able to determine whether shifting from one answer to 
the other had a significant impact in shaping the respondents’ attitude towards violence. As illustrated 
in Table 7, as for violence in defence of Islam, the odds of supporting force diminished as respondents 
 
Table 7. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Violence in Defence of 
Islam featuring the four possible answers.  
















Agree 52 30 10 10 102 
Disagree 15 31 56 181 283 
Total 67 61 66 191 385 
 
increasingly disagreed with the assumption of punishing offenders of Islam. Counting only definite 
answers, out of 102 subjects who agreed with violence in the name of God, 52 also strongly agreed 
with right to punish offenders of Islam, 30 slightly agreed with such an assumption, 10 slightly 
disagreed, and 10 strongly disagreed. As shown in Appendix 6, the odds of supporting violence were 
reduced, in fact, by a factor of 2.36 (1/0.42304236) shifting from “strongly agree” to “slightly agree”, 
15.07 (1/0.06637462) from “slightly agree” to “slightly disagree”, and 48.35 (1/0.02068083) from 
“slightly disagree” to “strongly disagree”. Featuring a p-value of 0.00093, the most significant shift 
was between the odds coefficients of “slightly agree” and “slightly disagree” (3/1 ratio). This 
confirmed that the odds of supporting violence for a person who saw no duty to punish whoever insults 
Islam are significantly lower. In this subgroup, what mattered more, though, was not increasingly 
disagreeing with the duty to punish offenders, but choosing to disagree with the previous assumption 
instead of agreeing with it. 
In addition to violence in defence of Islam, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was strongly 
linked to support for ISIS. To start with, endorsement of ISIS and punishment of offenders of Islam 
were highly associated, for they scored a p-value of 7.2E-32 (Appendix 6). Exponentially below the 
0.05 significance threshold, this value was the second greatest number in regard to support for ISIS in 
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all of the association tests. Such a strong connection was also visible in the single parameter analysis 
(Appendix 6). Indeed, subjects strongly agreeing with punishing those who insult Islam displayed a 
51% probability of supporting the terrorist group, dropping to a 10% chance for individuals slightly 
agreeing with punishing mockers – with a 8% chance for subjects slightly disagreeing with the 
previous assumption, and 3% chance for those strongly disagreeing with it.    
In the regression models testing each predictor’s impact on support for ISIS, “Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam” was the second most powerful. Table 8 indicates that, of the 6 most significant 
predictors, “Duty to punish offenders of Islam was only second to “Ideology”, scoring a p-value of  
 
Table 8. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to 
support for ISIS. 
 ISIS’s struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Duty to punish 
whoever offends Islam  
2.079509e+01 3.000000e+00 1.161117E-04* 
Ideology  21.780619748 3.000000000 0.000072459* 
Identity Crisis 8.92923738 3.00000000 0.03024666* 
Social Difficulties  1.9542320 3.0000000 0.5819602 
Gender 0.3153972 1.0000000 0.5743870 
Frustration 8.85197143 3.00000000 0.03132515* 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
1.2E-04. This result confirmed what emerged in the first part of the analysis. In relation to support for 
ISIS, aside from “Ideology”, the right to punish mockers of Islam was more important than the other 
predictors. That is, agreeing or disagreeing with the duty to punish offenders mattered more, 
comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, 
one’s sense of frustration, and being male or female. This outcome was possible because, when 
justifying or rejecting ISIS’s struggle, the personal impact of punishing disrespectful individuals was a 
considerably meaningful factor.  
This trend was even more perceptible when we examined subgroups. Table 9 shows that, out of 
124 people who agreed with the duty to punish whoever insults Islam, 44 (35%) also supported ISIS, 
while 80 opposed it. Out of 250 individuals who did not agree with punishing offenders of Islam, only 




Table 9. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and Support for ISIS 
 Whoever insults Islam and its tenets deserves to be punished 
ISIS’s struggle against 
dictatorships and Western 
influence is legitimate 
 
 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 44 10 54 
Disagree 80 240 320 
Total 124 250 374 
 
offenders of Islam, supporters of ISIS were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of almost 2 
(44/80), while the ratio for those who disagreed with punishing mockers of their faith was about 1/24 
(10/242). That is, within the subgroup of those agreeing with punishing disrespectful individuals, pro-
violence subjects were about half the people who rejected force.  
Once again, the difference between the two subgroups was considerably significant. Further, as 
illustrated in Table 10, when we used Wald z-tests with weights, the odds of supporting ISIS  
 
Table 10. Contingency Table for Right to Punish Whoever Insults Islam and support for ISIS featuring 
the four possible answers  


















Agree 36 8 5 5 54 
Disagree 27 53 59 181 320 
Total 63 61 64 186 374 
 
diminished as respondents increasingly disagreed with the assumption of punishing offenders of Islam. 
Counting only definite answers, more than half (36/63) of those who felt strongly about the duty to 
punish offenders of Islam agree that ISIS are legitimate. Further, out of 54 proponents of ISIS, 8 
slightly agreed with duty to punish mockers, 5 slightly disagreed with this stance, and 5 strongly 
disagreed. As shown in Appendix 6, the odds of supporting violence were reduced, in fact, by a factor 
of 4.72 (1/0.21179781) shifting from “strongly agree” to “slightly agree”, 11.93 (1/0.08383149) from 
“slightly agree” to “slightly disagree”, and 16.19 (1/0.06176335) from “slightly disagree” to “strongly 
disagree”. Unlike the case for the justification of violence in defence of Islam, this time the shifts from 
“slightly agree” to “slightly disagree” and from “slightly disagree” to “strongly disagree” were not 
significant.  
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Overall, the fact that “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” turned out to be significantly related 
to support for violence in the name of God and support for ISIS is emblematic. As already mentioned, 
we included the variable in question for its charged nature, cognizant of its unnecessary connection to 
violence. Nonetheless, its statistically significant impact suggests respondents may have approached 
questionnaires and interviews differently when they were asked about their thoughts on punishing 
mockers of their faith. Interviewees tended to be more prudent in voicing their support for violence 
against offenders of Islam. More than that, half of those who indeed endorsed some sort of punishment 
for whoever insults their religion meant through legal means. Similarly, support for ISIS was almost 
null, and rare instances of sympathy seemed to stem from the (debated) religious duty to fight 
oppression. 
However, the quantitative analysis shows how a significant amount of the surveyed respondents 
who agreed with punishing offenders of Islam also justified violence in defence of faith. This means 
that those who agreed with some sort of punishment against disrespectful individuals most likely did 
not envision legal means but actual physical force. Along the same lines, statistics indicate that 
individuals who agreed with the right to punish offenders of their faith were substantially more prone to 
support ISIS than those who did not agree with the previous stance. Perhaps, this conveys how 
respondents in anonymous questionnaires, devoid of personal interaction, felt more at ease expressing 
their views. Regardless, such findings seem to confirm that religious tenets and icons are indeed 




The other enormously significant predictor was “Ideology”, here intended as the respondents’ 
take on a theocratic, Islamic government. Similarly to the previous case, we noticed that since the 
beginning of the statistical analysis our “Response variables” (i.e. support for violence in the name of 
God, punishment for offenders of Islam, Al Qaeda, and ISIS) were never independent from the 
respondents’ opinion on an Islamic, theocratic government. Considering the standard p-value 
significant threshold of 0.05, “Ideology” was always strongly associated to religiously framed violence. 
In particular, “Ideology” and violence in defence of Islam featured a p-value of 2E-18. “Ideology” and 
duty to punish whoever insults Islam displayed a p-value of 3.6E-17. “Ideology” and support for Al 
Qaeda scored a p-value of 1.6E-28, while “Ideology” and support for ISIS a p-value of 1.2E-34 
(Appendix 6). Not only were such results greatly below 0.05, but they were also the second most 
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relevant ones in all of the tests of associations, except for the value on ISIS, which ranked the most 
significant. 
This strong connection was also confirmed in the single parameter analysis, when we measured 
odds between two taken variables. Within the statistical contours of the study’s sample, those who 
strongly agreed with the statement that an Islamic government in the Middle East is better than a 
democracy had a 57% probability of supporting violence in the name of God. Subjects who somewhat 
concurred with the previous assumption displayed a 39% chance of justifying violence to justify in 
defence of faith. Conversely, the odds that respondents from the questionnaire who slightly disagreed 
with a theocratic rule being better than a democracy also justified violence amounted to 27%, which 
became 9% for those strongly disagreeing with the previous vision (Appendix 6). 
Such a trend was persistent in the other single parameter analyses too. Respondents who 
strongly endorsed theocratic rule had a 61% chance of agreeing with the duty to punish offenders of 
Islam, which became 57% for those slightly agreeing with the mentioned stance –with a 33% and 16% 
chance for those who slightly and strongly disagreed. Participants who strongly supported an Islamic 
government featured a 43% to support Al Qaeda, descending to 22% for those who slightly favoured 
theocratic rule –with a 6% and 1% chance for respondents who slightly and strongly disagreed with the 
previous assumption. Subjects who strongly preferred Islamic rule to democracy displayed a 44% 
probability of justifying ISIS’s struggle, descending to 36% for those who slightly favoured theocratic 
rule, and dropping to 7% and 2% for individuals who slightly and strongly rejected an Islamic 
government.  
With no surprise, the impact “Ideology” had in the regression models was crucial. Unlike “Duty 
to punish offenders of Islam”, “Ideology” turned out to be a significant predictor for all the four 
response variables. In truth, in relation to the justification of violence in defence of Islam, “Ideology” 
was the second most significant predictor. More so, “Ideology” ranked the most significant predictor as 
for duty to punish whoever insults Islam, support Al Qaeda, and support for ISIS. And when we 
controlled for “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and withdrew it from the models –in an attempt to 
diminish possible chances of multicollinearity723- “Ideology” became the most significant predictor in 
all of regression tests. 
That asserted, as shown in Table 5 on page 161, as for the justification of violence in the name 
of God, out of the 6 most significant predictors, “Ideology” ranked second with a p-value of 0.0074, 
which is still significant. Hence, agreeing or disagreeing with the Islamic government being better than                                                         
723 Please see footnote 722 on page 161.  
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a democracy mattered more, comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties 
at the workplace or at school, inability to find an appropriate worship place, one’s sense of frustration, 
and being from Rome or Lombardy. 
  As shown in Table 11, in relation to the duty to punish offenders of Islam, “Ideology” was, by 
far, the strongest predictor (p-value of 1.2E-05). Thus, a person’s take on theocratic rule mattered more 
than anything else when deciding to agree or disagree with the idea of punishing whoever insults Islam 
and its prophet. In fact, in this case, “Ideology” was more important than experiencing social 
difficulties, identity crisis, religious inequality, frustration, or being from Rome or Lombardy.  
 
Table 11. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the 
duty to punish whoever offends Islam. 
 Whoever insults Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Ideology  2.552499e+01 3.000000e+00 1.199097E-05* 
Social difficulties  13.949620323 3.0000000 0.002974536* 
Identity crisis 1.5404591 3.000000000 0.6729644 
Religious inequality  3.7791667 3.0000000 0.2863187 
Geography (being from 
Rome or Lombardy) 
2.82585062 1.00000000 0.09275774 
Frustration 2.2303228 3.0000000 0.5260005 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
As for the justification of Al Qaeda’s struggle, Table 12 shows that, out of 7 most significant 
predictors, “Ideology” ranked first (p-value of 0.0066). Thus, agreeing or not agreeing with a theocratic 
rule was more influential than any other predictor linked to support for Al Qaeda in this study. 
Precisely, one’s take on an Islamic state mattered more, comparatively, than the person’s opinion on 
the duty to punish whoever insults Islam, having a good house (social inequality), having a good job 
(economic inequality), “networks”, one’s sense of frustration, and one’s sense of perceived prejudice 











Table 12. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to 
support for Al Qaeda. 




Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Duty to punish 
whoever offends Islam  
6.1502896 3.0000000 0.1045229 
Ideology  12.240579831 3.000000000 0.006602872* 
Social inequality  2.5888980 3.0000000 0.4594392 
Networks 8.34093554 3.00000000 0.03946684* 
Frustration 5.4367490 3.0000000 0.1424711 
Ignorance/prejudice  1.0724270 3.0000000 0.7837341 
Economic disparity 0.3782795 1.0000000 0.53855255 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
Finally, in relation to support for ISIS, out of the 5 most significant predictors, “Ideology” was, 
once again, the strongest one with a p-value of 0.000072459, which is greatly significant. As illustrated 
in Table 8 on page 163, agreeing or disagreeing with an Islamic government counted more, 
comparatively, than potential instances of identity crisis, social difficulties at the workplace or at school, 
inability to find an appropriate worship place (religious inequality), one’s sense of frustration, and 
gender. This outcome was possible because, when respondents taking the questionnaire chose to 
endorse or reject ISIS’s struggle, agreeing or disagreeing on theocratic rule was, most likely, the most 
meaningful factor for their decision.  
The importance of supporting or opposing theocratic rule when addressing violence framed in 
religious terms was even clearer when we scrutinised subgroups. Table 13 shows that, out of 109 
subjects who preferred theocratic rule, 54 also supported violence and 55 opposed it, i.e., the sub-
sample was split evenly with respect to justification of violence. 
 
Table 13. Contingency Table for Ideology (Theocratic Government) and Violence in Defence of Islam  
 In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better than a democratic one 
 
Violence in 
defence of Islam 
can be justified 
 
 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 54 37 91 
Disagree 55 211 266 
Total 109 248 357 
 
In contrast, out of 248 subjects who opposed Islamic government, 37 justified violence, while 211 
rejected it. That is, this subsample was split roughly 6 to 1 (211/37) against violence. Similarly, as 
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shown in Appendix 6, in comparison to respondents who did not support an Islamic government, those 
who did were also considerably more likely to endorse punishment of offenders of Islam (67/44 vs. 
50/190 ratio), al-Qaeda (35/67 vs. 5/234), and ISIS (44/64 vs. 8/236). The contrast between all of the 
response variables’ subgroups was highly significant. 
Furthermore, through Wald z-tests with weights we assessed that the odds of supporting 
religiously framed violence decreased as respondents progressively disagreed with the idea of a 
theocratic rule being better than a democracy (Appendix 6). Aside from support for ISIS, where the 
most significant shift was registered between those who somewhat agreed and those who somewhat 
disagreed, for the other response variables what mattered the most was the change from “slightly 
disagree” to “strongly disagree”. 
Overall, our findings seem to suggest that, to a significant part of our respondents, the desire for 
an Islamic order based on a theocratic government is indeed an important subject. And within this 
context, to those placing Islam at the centre of the public, societal, and legal sphere, violence is 
considerably more accepted when compared to individuals who do not advocate for the same societal 
order. Such results might be twofold. On one hand, they might signal an alleged tension between 
Muslims centring Islam mostly within their private sphere and those wishing for their religion to 
increasingly pervade the public domain. On the other hand, our findings might also suggest the Italian 
Muslim community to be witnessing an inner confrontation on the role of violence in Islam and in the 
Islamic order.    
 
Social difficulties 
Here intended as the difficulty to mingle in at school or at the workplace being Muslim, “Social 
difficulties” ultimately resulted being quite significant, but only in regard to “Duty to punish offenders 
of Islam”. In the beginning, “Social difficulties” was considerably associated with the right to punish 
mockers of Islam. Considering the standard p-value threshold of 0.05, “Social difficulties” and duty to 
punish whoever insults Islam scored a p-value of 6.4E-09, which is greatly significant (Appendix 6). 
Moreover, in the single parameter analysis, we calculated that subjects who strongly felt they 
experienced difficulties at blending in at school or at work also had a 60% probability of supporting the 
duty to punish offenders of their faith. As for respondents who admitted to somewhat struggling at 
mingling in at school or work because they are Muslim featured a 47% chance of supporting the right 
to punish offenders. Conversely, the odds that those who slightly and strongly disagreed with their 
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inability to socialise at school or at the workplace also justified the punishment of mockers of Islam 
were, respectively, 29% and 16% (Appendix 6). 
 Though not as powerful as expected, the regression models showed “Social difficulties” to still 
be quite a relatively significant predictor. As shown in Table 14, out of 6 significant predictors, “Social 
difficulties” ranked second, scoring a p-value of 0.003, which is moderately significant. Hence, the fact 
that a person experienced or did not experience any sort of arduousness socialising at school or at the 
workplace mattered more, comparatively, than potential issues of identity crisis, struggling at finding 
an appropriate place of worship (religious inequality), one’s sense of frustration, and being from Rome 
or Lombardy.    
 
Table 14. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the 
duty to punish whoever offends Islam. 
 Whoever insults Islam and its prophet deserves to be punished 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Ideology  2.552499e+01 3.000000e+00 1.199097E-05* 
Social difficulties  13.949620323 3.0000000 0.002974536* 
Identity crisis 1.5404591 3.000000000 0.6729644 
Religious inequality  3.7791667 3.0000000 0.2863187 
Geography (being from 
Rome or Lombardy) 
2.82585062 1.00000000 0.09275774 
Frustration 2.2303228 3.0000000 0.5260005 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
In relation to support for punishing offenders of Islam, the impact of experiencing or not experiencing 
these social difficulties was also fairly patent when we analysed subgroups. Table 15 indicates that, 
counting only definite answers, out of 127 individuals who admitted to having a hard time blending in 
at school or at work being Muslim, 68 (54%) also agreed with the duty to punish whoever insults their 
faith, while 59 (46%) opposed the idea. Hence, among respondents who suffered from such social 
difficulties, supporters of the right to punish offenders of Islam slightly outnumbered non-supporters by 
a factor of roughly 1.6 (68/59). Out of 254 people who did not experience hardship at school or at work, 
57 (22.4%) endorsed the right to punish offenders of Islam and 197 did not. That is, among those who 
did not struggle at blending in at school or work, supporters of the duty to punish mockers of Islam 
were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of 3.5 (197/57). 
 
  172 
Table 15. Contingency Table for social difficulties (school and workplace) and duty to punish whoever 
insults Islam.  
 As a Muslim, I have a difficult time blending in at school or at work 
Whoever insults 




 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 68 57 125 
Disagree 59 197 256 
Total 127 254 381 
    
The difference between the two subsets was moderately significant. To such regard, when we 
used Wald z-tests with weights, we verified that odds of supporting the punishment of those who insult 
Islam diminished as respondents progressively denied having experienced social difficulties (Appendix 
6). All in all, the results seem to partly confirm the intuitive expectation that instability and lack of 
belonging to a certain environment (in this case a person’s school and workplace) may reinforce 
religious identity as a response to one’s perceived sense of alienation. This could, at times, steer 
individuals towards a more purist interpretation of their faith, which, if not shared or respected, could 
entice resentment and radical views.       
 
The study’s Marginally Significant Variables 
Geography 
In addition to “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”, “Ideology”, and “Social difficulties”, the 
statistical analysis indicates other predictors to be marginally significant in relation to religiously 
framed violence. “Geography”, or the respondents’ place of residence, was marginally significant, but 
only in relation to support for violence in defence of Islam. Initially, we created several predictors 
linked to geographical residence (city vs. city, region vs. region, larger areas vs. larger areas) to assess 
any potential association to the study’s response variables. When we combined the answers of 
participants from Rome and Lombardy (including the cities of Milan, Brescia, Bergamo, and Varese) 
and compared them to answers from other geographical areas, we found the data to be slightly 
associated to violence in defence of faith. The two variables scored a p-value of 0.008, which is 
somewhat significant (Appendix 6). Likewise, in the single parameter analysis, we calculated that 
individuals from Rome or Lombardy had a 34% chance of supporting violence in defence of Islam, 
while people not from Rome or Lombardy a 20% probability (Appendix 6). 
 In the regression models, once we controlled for “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” and 
withdrew it from the test, we assessed “Geography” to be, ultimately, a marginally significant predictor 
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for violence in defence of Islam. Table 16 indicates that, aside from “Ideology”, being from Rome or 
from one of the four Lombard cities was slightly more important than issues of identity crisis, social 
difficulties, religious inequality, and one’s sense of frustration when a person decided to justify or 
condemn violence in the name of God. 
  
Table 16. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to the 
justification of violence in defence of Islam.  
 Violence in defence of Islam can be justified 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Ideology  3.31209e+01 3.000000e+00 3.036898E-07* 
Identity Crisis 2.0314478 3.0000000 0.5659053 
Social Difficulties  6.25468488 3.00000000 0.09985574 
Religious inequality 2.3567300 3.0000000 0.5017401 
Geography (being from 
Rome or Lombardy) 
4.56344733 1.00000000 0.03266127* 
Frustration 7.04461371 3.00000000 0.07048929 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
  
Such a trend was also visible when we examined subgroups. As shown in Table 17, out of 169 
subjects from Rome or Lombardy, 57 (34%) justified violence in defence of Islam, while 112 opposed 
it. Conversely, out of 239 individuals from the rest of the country, 48 (20%) endorsed violence in 
defence of faith, whereas 191 condemned it. In both groups those who agreed with violence in the 
name of God were largely outnumbered. Yet, in the Rome/Lombardy subset, supporters were 
outnumbered by a factor of roughly 2 (112/57), while the other group including answers from all over 
Italy, the ratio was 1/4 against violence (191/48). The contrast between the two groups was minimally 
significant.  
 
Table 17. Contingency Table for geography (being from Rome or Lombardy) and the justification of 
violence in defence of Islam.  
 Geography 
Violence in 
defence of Islam 
can be justified 
 
 Rome/Lombardy Rest of Italy Total 
Agree 57 48 105 
Disagree 112 191 303 
Total 169 239 408 
 
Although the results provide weak support for “Geography” to be deemed a meaningful 
predictor, the fact that this variable turned out at least marginal is not surprising. Supporters of violent 
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Islamist views may be slightly more likely to be found in cities counting enormous Muslim 
communities, like Rome and Milan, or in the region, namely Lombardy, which is home to almost 30% 
of all Muslims residing in Italy. In other words, encountering supporters of violence in Rome and 
Lombardy may not be excessively astonishing, for it may be a matter of demographics. Second, 
especially in Lombardy, years of ideological and terrorist infiltrations by extremist preachers and Al 
Qaeda’s operatives have allowed for the establishment of Islamist mosques and centres. Hence, having 
in Lombardy a rich record of Jihadist activity, these results, though marginal, may be nothing more 
than the residuum of Al Qaeda’s presence in the area. Or these findings might be signs that the region 
is still a potential fertile ground for Islamist views.  
 
Identity Crisis 
 “Identity crisis” turned out a marginally significant predictor in relation to support for 
religiously motivated violence. Here intended as the respondent’s struggle in balancing feelings of 
welcoming or rejection of Italian culture, “Identity crisis” was minimally relevant, and only in regard to 
support for ISIS. In reality, we initially pictured the predictor in question to have a greater impact on 
the response variable, for the two were significantly associated (p-value of 3.1E-05, Appendix 6). Yet, 
our expectations were not met, since, already from the single parameter analysis, those who suffered 
considerably from instances of identity crisis had only a 23% chance of also supporting ISIS. This 
value became 10% for those who suffered relatively from identity crisis, rising back to 12% for 
subjects slightly disagreeing with the previous assumption, and descending to 8% for those totally 
denying issues related to identity crisis (Appendix 6). 
 Predictably, the regression models showed that “Identity crisis” was still a significant, but 
minimal predictor as for support for ISIS. As illustrated in Table 18, out of the 6 most significant 
predictors, “Identity crisis” ranked third. Its p-value amounted to 0.03, which is marginally significant. 
Nevertheless, that fact that participants to the questionnaire experienced some sort of identity crisis 
related to their role in Italian society and culture was more relevant than one’s sense of frustration, 








Table 18. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to 
support for ISIS. 
 ISIS’s struggle against dictatorships and Western influence is legitimate 
Most significant 
predictors 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Duty to punish 
whoever offends Islam  
2.079509e+01 3.000000e+00 1.161117E-04* 
Ideology  21.780619748 3.000000000 0.000072459* 
Identity Crisis 8.92923738 3.00000000 0.03024666* 
Social Difficulties  1.9542320 3.0000000 0.5819602 
Gender 0.3153972 1.0000000 0.5743870 
Frustration 8.85197143 3.00000000 0.03132515* 
* Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
 
Though minimal, the impact “Identity crisis” had in shaping respondents’ attitudes on ISIS was 
still visible when we looked at subgroups. As Table 19 indicates, out of 181 people who asked 
themselves whether or not they wanted to be part of Italy’s culture, 32 (21.5%) supported ISIS’s 
actions, while 149 condemned them. Considering only definite answers, in this subset, supporters of 
ISIS were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of almost 5 (149/32). By contrast, out of 179 
participants who did not ask themselves if they wanted to be part of Italy’s culture or not, only 17 
(9.5%) justified ISIS’s struggle, while 162 opposed it. Here, non-supporters were almost 10 times more 
numerous than ISIS’s supporters (162/17). Though supporters were largely outnumbered in both 
groups, the contrast was still marginally significant. 
 
Table 19. Contingency Table for identity crisis and support for ISIS.  
 In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace Italian culture or if I 







 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 32 17 49 
Disagree 149 162 311 
Total 181 179 360 
 
Furthermore, through Wald z-tests with weights, we were still able to assess that, though not in 
a persistent trend, the odds of supporting ISIS diminished as the respondents increasingly denied 
having issues related to identity crisis (Appendix 6). Although such results provide feeble support for 
theories linking identity crisis and radicalisation, the fact that ISIS is still appealing to a number of 
individuals stuck between cultures is worrisome. For these subjects, Islamist visions and ISIS’s rhetoric 
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might provide them with the meaning, sense of belonging, and social redemption they seek and lack in 
Italian society.  
 
Networks 
 Another marginal predictor was what we called, with a degree of vagueness, “Networks”. As 
already discussed in the methodology, we were unable to assess if participants had actual contacts with 
radicals and terrorists. We were thus incapable of creating a predictor that could truly be used to test if 
real, physical and emotional connections could be linked to our response variables. Ergo, “Networks” 
is here intended as the respondents’ belief or disbelief that connections and personal bonds (members 
of a group and friends) are the elements that really make a cause worthy. That specified, “Networks” 
eventuated in a marginal predictor, and only in relation to support for Al Qaeda. 
Originally, “Networks” and support for Al Qaeda were significantly associated. In the 
association tests, they scored a p-value of 1.6E-05, which is appreciably significant. However, this 
strong connection was not corroborated in the single parameter analysis (Appendix 6). Within the 
contours of this research, respondents who strongly agreed that friends and members of a group are the 
ones who really make a cause worthy had only a 25% chance of supporting Al Qaeda, dropping to 6% 
for those slightly agreeing with the previous stance. Conversely, subjects who slightly disagreed with 
contacts being most important for a cause still had a 6% probability of endorsing Al Qaeda, which 
increased to 9% for those strongly opposing the idea of “Networks” (Appendix 6). 
 In the regression models “Networks” had a marginal but still significant impact on respondents’  
   
 Table 20. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to 
support for Al Qaeda. 




Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam  
6.1502896 3.0000000 0.1045229 
Ideology  12.240579831 3.000000000 0.006602872* 
Social inequality 2.5888980 3.0000000 0.4594392 
Networks 8.34093554 3.00000000 0.03946684* 
Frustration 5.4367490 3.0000000 0.1424711 
Ignorance/prejudice  1.0724270 3.0000000 0.7837341 
Economic disparity 0.3782795 1.0000000 0.53855255 
*Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
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support for Al Qaeda (p-value of 0.04). Given Table 20, we claim one’s belief or disbelief that friends 
or members of a group are the ones who really make a cause worthy was slightly more important than 
that person’s sense of frustration, take on duty to punish offenders of Islam, perception of ignorance 
and prejudice towards Islam, and feelings of economic disparity and social inequality when choosing to 
endorse or condemn Al Qaeda’s actions.  
 The partial impact “Networks” had on support for Al Qaeda was also noticeable in the subgroup 
analysis. As exemplified in Table 21, out of 285 respondents who agreed that friends are members of a 
group are the ones who really make a cause worthy, 37 (13%) also justified Al Qaeda’s struggle, while 
248 opposed it. Instead, out of 67 subjects who did not think friends and group members are the ones 
who really make a cause virtuous, only 5 (7.5%) supported Al Qaeda, while 62 rejected it.   
  
Table 21. Contingency Table for Networks and support for Al Qaeda featuring the four possible 
answers  
 Members of a group and friends are the ones who can really 
make a cause worthy 
Al Qaeda and other groups are the 
ones who can fight American and 
Zionist imperialism 
 
 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 37 5 42 
Disagree 248 62 310 
Total 285 67 352 
 
Although most respondents within both groups condemned Al Qaeda’s actions, proponents of the 
group were outnumbered by non-supporters by a factor of 6.7 (248/37) among those who agreed with 
“Networks”, and by a factor of 12.4 (62/5) among individuals who did not agree with the idea in 
question. The difference between these two subsets was marginally significant -even if the shift 
between answers calculated through Wald z-tests with weights was not when not ultimately significant 
(Appendix 6). 
Although we were not able to actually analyse real personal connections to radicals or terrorists, 
these data offer frail evidence that “Networks” can be ultimately deemed relevant. Yet, the fact 
“Networks” was marginally significant in relation to support for Al Qaeda might partially confirm the 
impact the terrorist group had in Italy. Given Al Qaeda’s extended range of action in Italy before and 
after 9/11, it may be possible some respondents might have witnessed (or even experienced) instances 





 The last predictor that was marginally connected to violence framed in Islamist terms was one’s 
sense of frustration. In truth, we originally thought “Frustration” linked to one’s personal situation in 
Italy to be a powerful predictor, especially in relation to support for Al Qaeda and ISIS. In the 
association tests “Frustration” and Al Qaeda scored a p-value of 3.1E-12, while “Frustration” and 
support for ISIS a p-value of 6.3E-09 (Appendix 6). Though greatly significant, such values were not 
fully reflected in the single parameter analysis. The odds that people who strongly felt frustrated also 
supported Al Qaeda equalled to 27.5%, descending to 14% for those feeling slightly frustrated. 
Conversely, the probability that subjects somewhat disagreeing with a sense of personal frustration also 
endorsed Al Qaeda equalled to 6% and 3% for those totally disagreeing with the previous stance. As 
for ISIS, strongly frustrated individuals had a 29% chance of supporting ISIS, while individuals who 
felt somewhat frustrated a 19% probability. By contrast, subjects slightly denying being frustrated had 
an 8% possibility of justifying ISIS’s struggle, descending to 6% for those totally denying feeling 
frustration (Appendix 6). 
Unsurprisingly, the regression models showed one’s sense of frustration was a significant, but a 
marginal predictor in relation to support for Al Qaeda (p-value of 0.026). As shown in Table 22,  
once we withdrew “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” from the model, one’s sense of frustration was 
slightly more relevant than perceived social inequality, economic disparity, ignorance/prejudice, and 
networks for that person’s attitude to Al Qaeda. Similarly, Table 18 (page 175) illustrates how 
“Frustration” was marginally more important for respondents’ attitudes on ISIS than social difficulties 
and gender.   
  
Table 22. Logistic regression featuring Wald z-tests for the most significant predictors in relation to 
support for Al Qaeda. 




Chi2 Degrees of freedom P-value 
Ideology  2.048220e+01 3.000000e+00 1.348362e-04* 
Social inequality 2.2883063 3.0000000 0.5147648 
Networks 2.7797250 3.0000000 0.4268484 
Frustration 9.2214317 3.0000000 0. 0264872* 
Ignorance/prejudice  0.1829387 3.0000000 0. 9802954 
Economic disparity 4.0371747 1.0000000 0.53855255 
*Significant predictors below the 0.05 significance threshold. 
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 This minimal impact was also perceptible when examining subgroups. Table 23 shows that out 
of 165 subjects who felt frustrated, 34 (20%) also supported Al Qaeda, while 131 oppose it. Instead, 
out of 203 individuals who did not feel frustrated, 8 (4%) justified Al Qaeda and 189 condemned it. 
Although supporters of Al Qaeda were few in both subsets, among those who did feel frustration the 
proponents of the group were outnumbered by a factor of roughly 4 (131/34). In the group who did not 
feel frustration, proponents of Al Qaeda were almost 24 times inferior in size compared to its critics 
(189/14). 
 
Table 23. Contingency Table for frustration and support for Al Qaeda. 
 In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal situation 
Al Qaeda and 
other groups are 





 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 34 8 42 
Disagree 132 194 326 
Total 166 202 368 
 
Analogously, as illustrated in Table 24, out of 172 subjects who felt frustrated, 41 (24%) also 
justified ISIS’s struggle and 131 condemned it. Contrarily, out of the 203 individuals not feeling 
frustration, 14 (7%) supported ISIS, while 189 opposed it. In the first subset, ISIS’s proponents were 
outnumbered by a factor of approximately 3 (131/41), while in the second subgroup by a factor of 
almost 14 (189/14).   
 
Table 24. Contingency Table for frustration and support for ISIS. 
 In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal situation 
ISIS’s struggle against 
dictatorships and 
Western influence is 
legitimate 
 
 Agree Disagree Total 
Agree 41 14 55 
Disagree 131 189 320 
Total 172 203 375 
 
In both instances, the difference between the two subgroups is not enormous but remains 
marginally significant. Besides, when we used Wald z-tests with weights, we noticed the odds of 
supporting Al Qaeda and ISIS decreased (though not always in a continuous way) as respondents 
progressively disagreed with the claim they are frustrated. Yet, there were no significant shifts in the 
answers in any of the two cases (Appendix 6). 
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 Although the reasons behind the respondents’ sense of frustration remain unclear –are they 
driven by discrimination, economic disparity, identity crisis, or by other totally unrelated events such as 
family issues or widespread occupational instability?- these results provide weak evidence for theories 
linking frustration and radicalisation. Nevertheless, the implications of the fact that “Frustration” turned 
out to be marginally significant in relation to support for Al Qaeda and ISIS may be twofold. First, it 
shows that a few frustrated individuals may have recurred indeed to Islamist views as a response to 
their sense of anger and resentment. Second, though minimal, these findings might be a sign that, even 
in Italy, Al Qaeda and ISIS are increasingly attempting to appeal to and capitalise off the sense of 
frustration many Muslims unfortunately experience.  
 
Assessment  
All in all, out of 28 tested predictors, only 6 from the literature were eventually statistically 
significant. Among these, as illustrated in Table 25 summarising the results of the regression models, 
the most significant predictor was “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”. It registered the highest p-value  
 
Table 25. Summary of the regression tests featuring significant predictors for each response variable.  
Response variables Significant predictors Significant p-values 
 
1) Justification of violence in 
defence of Islam 
1. Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
5.738565E-11 
2. Ideology 0.007395411 
(3.036898E-07)* 




2) Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
 
1. Ideology 1.199097E-05 
2. Social difficulties 0.002974536 
 
3) Support for Al Qaeda 
 
1. Ideology 0.006602872  
(1.348362e-04)* 
2. Frustration 0. 0264872 
3. Networks 0.03946684* 
 
 
4) Support for ISIS 
 
1. Ideology 0.000072459 
(2.65949490E-07)* 
2. Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
1.161117E-04 
3. Identity crisis 0.03024666 
4. Frustration 0.03132515 
(0.0208782)* 
*Significance levels when “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” was withdrawn from the regression 
models. 
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of all the models (5.7E-11), and ranked the first and the second most significant predictor as for the 
justification of violence in defence of Islam and support for ISIS. “Ideology” was the other enormously 
relevant predictor. It was significant for all four response variables, ranking first in relation to the duty 
to punish offenders of Islam and support for Al Qaeda and ISIS, and second as for the justification of 
violence in defence of faith. Perhaps, this is the variable that reflects Muslim respondents’ perception 
of drivers of Islamist radicalisation the most, for it was their third most mentioned factor. That said, 
“Social difficulties” was relatively significant in relation to the duty to punish offenders of Islam. Every 
other predictor had a marginal, minimal impact on the response variables. “Geography” was marginally 
significant in shaping the respondents’ take on the justification of violence in defence of faith. 
“Networks” was partially relevant regarding support for Al Qaeda. Finally, “Frustration” was 
marginally significant for endorsement of Al Qaeda and ISIS. 
In light of this, we contend the following. Solely within the contours of this study, we hold that 
for those who supported violence in defence of Islam and ISIS, being a person who agreed with the 
right to punish those who insult their creed mattered immensely. For respondents who supported 
religious violence, punishment for Islam’s offenders, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, being someone who 
championed an Islamic theocratic government counted considerably. For participants accepting the 
punishment of offenders of their faith, being a person experiencing social difficulties at school or at 
work somewhat mattered. Moreover, participants who felt frustrated or believed that personal 
connections are the ones that can really make a cause worthy were barely more likely to support Al 
Qaeda than those who did not share the same ideas. Lastly, respondents suffering from frustration and 
identity crisis were also slightly more likely to support ISIS than those who were not.  
Yet again, two major clarifications are due. First, although “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” 
and “Ideology” dominated the regression tests, we mean no generalisations. As James Forest observes, 
an individual’s behaviour is subject to his/her interpretation of a specific ideology.724 Thus, these 
results are not to argue all Islamist purists who support an Islamic government or the punishment of 
Islam’s offenders ultimately endorse violence.725 Nor it is maintained that Islam is connected to 
violence or that Islamist views necessarily cause support for violence. Likewise, the results do not 
demonstrate that, in Italy, social difficulties, identity crisis, frustration, belief in personal connection, 
                                                        
724 Forest, James. (2009). “Terrorism as a Product of Choices and Perceptions”. In Howard, Russell, Hoffman, Bruce (Eds.). 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 110-139. 
725 Moreover, it is theoretically possible that inherently violent people tend to embrace purist Islamic opinions/ideology, i.e., 
the causality works in the opposite direction. There would still be a question why the ideology is so attractive to individuals 
who are prone to violence. 
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and being from Rome or Milan automatically trigger support for religiously framed violence. As a 
matter of fact, most respondents from the questionnaire who did share the same views or status did not 
support force framed in religious terms. More generally, every claim made pertains exclusively to the 
study’s sample, which, though fairly representative of the Italian Muslim community, has been 
scrutinised in spite of multiple methodological and logistical restrictions and challenges. 
Second, in addition to the kinds of restrictions illustrated in the methodology, it is important to 
recognise that our initial choices could have impacted the results and their interpretations. For instance, 
when we crafted and identified our predictive variables, we made a sharp distinction between 
“Discrimination”, (i.e. question # 15, “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against”), and “Duty 
to punish offenders”. As we know, the latter turned out to be the strongest driver in all of the study, 
whereas “Discrimination” was ultimately insignificant. Still, one could argue that mockery is by 
definition an act of discrimination and thus, had we counted “Duty to punish offenders” within the 
“Discrimination umbrella”, our findings might have been rather different. 
Such a consideration deserves further explanation. In order to evaluate the possibility that 
“Discrimination” and “Duty to punish offenders” could be related to one another, we have calculated 
the correlation between the two variables. The latter amounted to 0.15, which is really low considering 
that the maximum correlation between two given variables is 1. This low number makes sense, 
however. In truth, there is a marked conceptual difference between “Discrimination” and “Duty to 
punish offenders”. The first one is factual, for it does measure the respondents’ perception about 
discrimination –that is, if they feel that they are experiencing discrimination on account on being 
Muslim. The second, instead, is merely a hypothetical stance, for it does not measure how many times 
respondents say Islam is insulted, but explores their reaction should their religion be offended. 
Unsurprisingly, within our sample, most of the subjects who felt discriminated against did not 
accept the punishment of offenders, while a few cases showed that there were participants who did not 
feel discriminated against who did want to punish offenders. Hence, within the contours of this study, 
we can state that there was a clear statistical difference between “Discrimination” and “Duty to punish 
offenders”. Nonetheless, future investigations could solve such a potential issue by introducing an 
additional question that actually tests the real entity/degree of iconic disrespect and only then should 
studies assess if this variable is significantly associated to “Duty to punish offenders” – a possible 
example could be something like “In Italy, people often offend Islam and Islamic tenets” or “Italians 
make fun and insult Islam and its tenets”. 
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CHAPTER VIII: DISCUSSION  
Although it cannot be deemed as the country’s worst nightmare, this study has proven Islamist 
radicalisation affects Italy. We can affirm this because we did not encounter mere “spurs” of 
radicalisation. Rather, we quantitatively determined the presence of what we called an “Islamist 
outlook”. We observed that a significant minority of the country’s Muslim community did express 
support for Islamist framed violence. Duty to punish offenders of Islam and support for an Islamic, 
theocratic government were the two factors that drove the study’s results, outshining every other 
assumed theory of radicalisation. 
In light of such findings, how do Italian non-Muslims see their Muslim counterparts? Aside 
from violence, how do these two groups see matters of integration, security, and coexistence? What 
were the Muslim leaders’ opinions and recommendations? In an effort to answer these queries, the 
following section compares Muslim and non-Muslim respondents’ views and features comments by the 
three prominent Muslim leaders.  
 
Muslims’ and Non-Muslims’ Attitudes: Differing Perceptions 
As already illustrated, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents expressed diverging views on the 
matter of religiously framed violence. Non-Muslims were more likely to consider Islamist 
radicalisation an issue both within Islam and the Italian Muslim communities than their Muslim 
counterparts. The latter, though, registered higher rates of support for religiously motivated violence. 
Also different were the two samples’ selection of the drivers of Islamist radicalisation. While both 
groups mentioned “Exploitation of Islam for political purposes” as one of the main causes of 
radicalisation, non-Muslims emphasised the impact of “Economic hardship” and “Identity Crisis”. 
Conversely, Muslim participants pointed more to “The material/spiritual benefits offered by AQ, ISIS” 
and “Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam” as the main drivers.  
  
Non-Muslims’ Views on Muslims’ Situation in Italy  
In addition to the mentioned issues, Muslim and non-Muslim respondents had the chance to 
compare thoughts and attitudes about other topics intrinsic to their mutual relation. For instance, in 
regard to the perception of Muslims’ status in their country, 39% of Italian non-Muslims (172/440) 
agreed Muslims are discriminated against. 32.7% (144/440) stated Muslims have no voice. 33.6% 
(148/440) claimed Muslims have a hard time blending in at school. 43% (189/440) agreed that there is 
a media war to discredit Islam. 35.8% (157/440) maintained Muslims are often oppressed. 
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But once again, such results significantly differed from answers by Muslim respondents. As 
shown in Graph 16, in comparison to non-Muslims, 222 Muslims said they felt discriminated against  
 
Graph 16. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent’s views on Muslims’ situation in Italy. 
 
 
(1.3 times as many). 299 stated that they have no voice (more than twice as many). 150 claimed to have 
a hard time blending in at school (sample almost split equally). 358 felt there is a media war to discredit 
Islam (almost twice as many). 285 argued Muslims are often oppressed (circa twice as many). 
Therefore, except for the belief Muslims have a hard time blending in at school that virtually matched 
answers by Muslims participants, in all of the other cases non-Muslim respondents were markedly less 
likely to perceive the kind of unease felt by their Muslim counterparts.     
 
Non-Muslims’ Views on Muslims’ Attitudes Towards Violence 
As for non-Muslims’ perception of Muslims’ take on religiously motivated violence, 39% of 
non-Muslim participants (172/440) claimed that, in the end, many Muslims justify violence in defence 
of faith. 42.7% (188/440) held that, in the end, many Muslims would punish whoever offends their 
religion. 27.3% (120/440) believed that, in the end, many Muslims actually support terrorism. These 
beliefs did not match the actual attitudes by Muslim respondents, whose rates of support for violence 




















In reality, Graph 17 shows that 105 Muslims accepted violence in defence of faith (1.6 ratio). 
131 would punish offenders of their religion (1.4 ratio). 44 supported Al Qaeda (2.7 ratio) and 57 ISIS 
(2.1 ratio). In contrast with the actual Muslims’ rates of support for violence, non-Muslim respondents 
were still considerably more likely to assume most Muslims would accept religiously motivated force. 
This attitude by non-Muslim respondents may be consistent with the fact 57% of them (252/440) 
claimed that fear over Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is not exaggerated and that almost 80% of 
them (349/440) worry over ISIS. 
 
Graph 17. Comparison of non-Muslim and Muslim respondent’s views on Muslims’ attitude towards 
violence. 
 
   
Non-Muslims’ Views on Muslims in Italy  
As to how Italian non-Muslims perceive their fellow Muslim citizens, 47.7% of non-Muslim 
respondents (211/440) declared Islam and Italian values are definitely incompatible. 41% (181/440) 
would never live in a predominantly Islamic neighbourhood. 50.7% (223/440) did not believe that 
Muslims love Italy and its culture and want to be part of it. 47% (208/440) contended Muslims want to 
impose their beliefs and Islamise Italy. 40.4% (178/440) agreed Islam is a threat for Italy and its culture. 
By contrast, 81% of the surveyed Muslims (357/440) stated they love Italy and its culture in 
spite of every issue. 69% (305/440) strongly opposed the abolition of Christmas plays in schools and 
the removal of the cross from classrooms as a sign of respect towards Muslims. 53% (233/440) assured 

















keen effort to balance integration and security. Nevertheless, non-Muslims’ displayed mostly negative 
views of their fellow Muslim citizens.   
 
Non-Muslims’ and Muslims’ Views on Future Issues of Security and Coexistence  
In relation to future projections, non-Muslims and Muslims seem to differ in their perception on 
security but move closer in regard to future prospects of coexistence. For instance, 73% of non-Muslim 
respondents (320/440) said Italy could suffer from terrorist attacks similar to those that took place in 
Paris and Brussels. 55% (241/440) agreed tension between Italian Muslims and non-Muslims will 
increase. But the same amount (241/440) also disagreed with the statement that interreligious dialogue 
will be futile. In truth, 48% of non-Muslim respondents (212/440) were convinced Italy and its Muslim 
community will eventually live in peace and harmony. 61% (268/440) agreed the key to a better future 
is a greater integration of Islamic communities. And 73% (320/440) also claimed the key to a better 
future is education and teaching of multiculturalism and pluralism.  
Unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, when asked about the likelihood of Jihadist terrorist 
attacks occurring in Italy, only 28% of Muslim respondents (119/440) agreed with the previous stance. 
As illustrated in Graph 18, only 32% (143/440) believed tension between Italian Muslims and non-
Muslims is destined to increase. When it came to future issues of coexistence, 66% (289/440) disagreed 
with the idea interreligious dialogue will be useless. 77% (336/440) were convinced Italy and its 
Muslim community will live in peace and harmony. 80% (350/440) believed the key for a better future 
is a greater integration of Islamic communities and 77% (339/440) shared similar thoughts about 




















 What has patently emerged is that non-Muslim and Muslim respondents perceptions differ 
nearly in every case. Overall, non-Muslims showed to be appreciably more likely to reject violence in 
defence of faith, the duty to punish offenders of sacred tenets, and groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. 
Yet, they were more significantly inclined to perceive radicalisation in Islam and Italy as an issue, 
believe many Muslims in the end actually support violence, display unfavourable views of Muslims, 
and worry over future issues of security. On their side, Islamic respondents were more likely to 
minimise or reject allegations of radicalisation in Islam and within their communities, but featured 
higher rates of support for religiously motivated violence. They mostly displayed favourable views 
regarding Italy and integration and were considerably less preoccupied with prospects of security. 
 Mismatched perceptions and differing attitudes may be linked to the lack of mutual knowledge. 
As for non-Muslims, 53.6% of the respondents (236/440) affirmed they rarely interact with Muslims. 
13% (57/440) said they never socialise with them and 61% (269/440) stated they do not have any good 
Muslim friends. On their part, as emerged in interviews and focus groups, Muslim subjects have often 
showed an ignorance about Italian beliefs, culture, and religious traditions. In other instances, Muslims 
have even shown little respect for Italian society, for 44% of them (192/440) have claimed Islamic 























convert one day. In fact, in 50 years you will be working for us, and all women in the street will wear 
the veil or the burka”, predicted an Egyptian employer in Milan.726  
Hopes rest on the assumptions regarding future issues of coexistence, though. Even if non-
Muslims were more pessimistic about the future, both groups overwhelmingly approved of more 
constructive and conciliatory measures as key to a better tomorrow. Muslim and non-Muslim 
respondents indeed agreed that crucial steps towards a stronger future included increased integration of 
the Muslim community and education and teaching of multiculturalism and pluralism. As it will be 
shortly discussed, these are the essential premises needed to construct cultural bridges that could 
progressively diminish the gap between Italy and its Muslim citizens.     
 
Muslim Leaders’ Reception of the Study  
As already specified at the end of Chapter V, the three Muslim leaders who granted the project 
assistance and credibility were all unanimous in their disappointment and worry over the quantity of 
Muslim subjects endorsing violence framed in Islamist terms. In addition to their reaction to the 
“Islamist outlook”, the three public figures also worried over Italian non-Muslims’ perception of their 
fellow Islamic citizens. To them, misconceived views on Muslims and Islam would be the product of 
Islamophobia spread by the media and certain politicians. Elzir explained that, “Italians are not bad 
people, they are our brothers, for many of us are Italian citizens. But it’s natural when you read or hear 
about Muslims only after terrorist attacks that you become afraid of them.”727 Returning from a short-
term period in the United States to study de-radicalisation programmes, Cozzolino elucidated that: 
Both radicals and people who don’t want Muslims exploit the Islamophobic media propaganda 
for their needs. In more serious societies, such as America, Denmark, England, the Netherlands 
[…], governmental and non-governmental actors try to limit the usage of technical, poorly 
understood terms linked to Islamism and shift focus to more sociological aspects devoid of 
charged terminology. The idea is to promote a more conciliating tone, for we must not provide 
ground for bitterness.728  
 
As Pallavicini put it, “I understand and feel many Europeans’ timorousness in relation to Islam and its 
establishment in mainstream society. That can be a challenging process. But demonising all Muslims 
through the media only because a few of them misbehave enlarges the gap between them and their 
society.”729                                                           
726 Interview no. 43, Q5, Appendix 5. 
727 Ibid. 
728 Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
729 Pallavicini, Yaha, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
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All in all, when asked about the most important measures against Islamist radicalisation, the 
three leaders made one last unanimous call for dialogue as a tool for security and coexistence. 
Reiterating the contents of a former interview, Imam Pallavicini stressed the importance of 
multifaceted dialogue both within the contours of the Muslim community and between Italian Muslims 
and their government. In particular, the Imam urged the various segments of civil society to “work all 
together” to counter prospects of Islamist radicalisation: 
Politicians, experts of the matter in question, academics, clerics –and not just Muslim ones, but 
also other ones from Europe’s main religious creeds- must create a task force in coordination 
with each other. Only through this rhetoric based on secularism and religious pluralism will we 
be able to achieve concrete results.730  
 
Similarly, to Elzir, “dialogue and reciprocal knowledge is the ultimate key against terrorism, 
Islamophobia, and extremism.”731 As a matter of fact, “without dialogue with the Italian State and the 
















730 Pallavicini, Yaha. In Ciavardini, Tiziana. (2016). “Terrorists attacks in Brussels, Imam Pallavicini: ‘Let’s condemn Isis. 
Let’s forget about the Middle Ages. But Italy shall acknowledge Islam” [Italian]. Il Fatto Quotidiano. 
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/03/24/attentati-bruxelles-imam-pallavicini-condanniamo-isis-dimentichiamo-il-
medioevo-ma-litalia-riconosca-lislam/2578141/ accessed on 30 June 2017. 
731 Elzir, Ezzedin, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
732 Cozzolino, Massimo, interviewed by Michele Groppi, March 2017. Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 
Islamist radicalisation is an indubitably controversial matter in today’s Europe. In the course of 
this project, we have attempted to explore the phenomenon in question by proposing a new case study, 
that is, Italy. Unlike other European nations, Italy has yet to experience one single major Jihadist attack 
and Islamist views seem to gain little traction within the Italian Muslim community. Yet, the country’s 
arguably significant role in the 2016 Berlin attack and the London Bridge attacks perhaps suggest that 
“something” might be changing in Italy. Ergo, no matter how one looks at it, Italy is actually a case 
worth examining. If one considers the country as an exceptional case in comparison to other European 
realities truly affected by ISIS-related terrorism and Islamist radicalisation, one should ponder over the 
reasons why Rome is still a relatively safe environment. On the contrary, if one considers Italy not to 
differ substantially from other European countries -or if one agrees with the idea that its alleged 
“exceptionalism” is changing- then it is worth analysing if and how Islamist views espousing violence 
have penetrated the Italian Muslim community. In other words, is Islamist radicalisation Italy’s worst 
nightmare or is the latter just a myth? 
In order to answer the above question, we decided to explore the diverging positions on Islamist 
radicalisation featured by Olivier Roy and Stuart Croft. Based on his sociological observations, Roy 
contends Islamist radicalisation is a worrisome issue and should be treated accordingly. Conversely, 
Croft argues that fear over Islamist radicalisation is socially and culturally constructed to securitise 
Muslims and advance specific agendas. Hence, after presenting the academic discussion on definitions 
and theories of radicalisation, we completed one of the largest quantitative and qualitative analyses in 
the field exploring Italian Muslims’ views on religiously framed violence. Our aim was to search for 
what we labelled an “Islamist outlook”, that is, the respondents’ attitudes that justified violence framed 
in Islamist terms. In doing so, we surveyed 440 Italian Muslims from 15 cities, comparing their views 
with those from 440 Italian non-Muslims; in the course of the analysis, we also examined the opinions 
of 200 Muslim subjects from interviews and focus groups. 
Considering the arguments against and in favour of chances of Islamist radicalisation in Italy, 
our initial hypothesis was that neither Roy nor Croft was ultimately right. In truth, although we 
hypothesised Islamist radicalisation not to be a pressing issue in Italy, we still predicted to encounter 
“spurs” of radicalisation. That is, we expected our “Islamist outlook” to be marginal and, thus 
disproving both Roy and Croft - for the latter would not be neither relevant nor null/almost null. In 
simpler terms, we thought that our data would locate Italy somewhere in the middle Roy’s and Croft’s 
positions. 
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However, after providing our definition of “Islamist radicalisation”, our initial hypothesis was 
challenged, for we did not encounter mere “spurs” of radicalisation. In detail, within the Muslim 
sample, 24% of respondents (105/440) agreed with violence in defence of faith, 30% (131/440) 
accepted the punishment of offenders of Islam, 10% (44/440) supported Al Qaeda’s struggle, and 13% 
(57/440) viewed ISIS’s struggle as legitimate. Not only were such results significantly higher compared 
to the ones from the Italian non-Muslim counterparts; they also confirmed the presence of a minor but 
yet significant “Islamist outlook”. In line with data from the Italian Postal Police, the study’s results 
were considered matter of concern even by the three Muslim leaders who assisted the project, for they 
too expected the observed “Islamist outlook” to be marginal. In the end, although Islamist 
radicalisation in Italy still cannot be considered as the country’s worst nightmare, our findings confirm 
that Roy’s position fits the Italian scenario better than Croft’s.  
Subsequently, we tested a large number of models linking support for violence with various 
predictor parameters stemming from the most accredited theories on the drivers of radicalisation. No 
statistically significant support was found for theories proposing discrimination, economic disparity, 
outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression of Muslim, or any standard sociological variable, 
including gender and being a convert to Islam, as predictors. Similarly, neither “traumatic experiences” 
nor rational choice theory was supported by the data. By contrast, the most significant predictor 
variables relating to support for violence were taking offense against offenders of Islam and the 
endorsement of an Islamic, theocratic form of government (ideology). Social difficulties were fairly 
significant. Geography, “networks”, frustration, and uncertainty as for the wish to belong to Italian 
culture (identity crisis) were marginally significant.  
All in all, we believe that this study has proven that Italy does not differ substantially from the 
broader Western European experience of radicalisation. Italy’s lack of major Jihadist attacks does not 
mean that the country is impervious to Islamist views that endorse violence within its borders. On the 
contrary, our data shows that a minor but significant amount of Italian Muslims did support such 
visions. Perhaps, what is keeping Italy relatively safe from ISIS-related attacks is a combination of 
operational, strategic, and temporal circumstances intrinsic to the relation between Italy and Jihadist 
groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.733 What we are sure of, though, is that Italy needs to address 
prospects of Islamist radicalisation and, without any type of alarmism and unfair generalisation against 
Islam and Muslims, we feel a number of policies at the social and institutional level are necessary to 
foster dialogue, communal feelings, and social justice for all citizens of Italy. And most importantly, as                                                         
733 Please see comments by experts on page 15 and 16.  
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shown below, we stress the need for further research meant to contribute to the existing discussion on 
radicalisation.    
 
Future research: Is Italy the Next France?  
In spite of the study’s provided evidence, Italy still cannot be compared to realities such as 
Belgium or France. The Italian government’s counter-terrorist efforts have, so far, successfully 
thwarted plots and disrupted networks. Italian Muslims have considerably denounced acts of violence 
perpetrated in the name of Islam. ISIS seems to have exerted a minor lure inside the nation’s Muslim 
community. Perhaps along with Italy’s limited presence and action in the Middle East, a series of 
logistical/operational conditions might have protected the country from acts of terrorism. 
But there is reasonable doubt that this apparent absence of violence between Muslims and non-
Muslims in Italy may not last. Although racism and perceived inequality have not been significant 
factors in relation to support for Islamist violence, 51% of surveyed Muslims still did feel discriminated 
against. Likewise, 64% stated they have no voice and 82% believed there is a media war to discredit 
Islam. From its part, Italy, whose economy has still not recovered from the 2008 economic crisis, finds 
itself overwhelmed with managing the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding as a result of war and 
instability in Syria and Libya – which in 2016 brought to its shores more than 200,000 migrants.734 
Coupled with fear of Jihadist terrorism, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments are on the sharp 
rise. Cities hosting large Muslim communities have been experiencing a sort of ghettoization of certain 
neighborhoods mostly inhabited by Muslim immigrants. Regrettably, Via Padova in Milan, 
Torpignattara in Rome, and Falchera in Turin are inevitably progressively becoming synonymous with 
degradation. 
A more unstable future is not inconceivable, thus.735 Incapable or unwilling to successfully 
integrate and assimilate migration flows, Italy might turn into the object of resentment for hordes of 
disenchanted individuals. Demoralized and unoccupied, Muslim immigrants might flood suburban 
neighborhoods around Milan, Rome, and Turin, creating predominantly Islamic enclaves. Torn by 
unemployment, crime, and poverty, the formation of something comparable to the French banlieues 
might not be exceedingly farfetched. 
Besides, were Italy unable to meet expectations of social inclusion and recognition, second-                                                        
734 (2017). “Migrants, record arrivals in 2016”. Il Sole 24 Ore. http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-01-05/migranti-
2016-record-sbarchi-e-accoglienza-162035.shtml?uuid=ADdVMwQC accessed on 30 June 2017. 
735 Groppi, Michele. (2016). “No Molenbeeks here, but the future is not guaranteed” [Italian]. In Limes: Indagine sulle 
periferie. pp. 37-45. 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generation Italian Muslims might fall prey to issues of identity crisis and reject their country. In an 
increasingly polarized society, Islamist visions might offer that sense of meaning and nobility so 
desperately sought by a myriad of victimized, frustrated individuals. Though chances that Italy might 
eventually become the next France remain blurry, present signs blatantly indicate Rome to be slowly 
trending in that direction. Only through interdisciplinary efforts by all segments of the government and 
the civil society could the country impede these odds.    
Unwilling to turn into the next France, Italy cannot afford to disregard the study of Islamist 
radicalisation. As such, a fairly similar analysis should be repeated at a wider level devoid of the 
various logistical and practical restrictions faced by this investigation. It would be interesting to 
examine at least 100 Muslim and non-Muslim subjects per city, including other peripheral, but major 
centres such as Aosta, Bari, Belluno, Bolzano, Cagliari, Catania, Pordenone, Reggio Calabria, Trento, 
Treviso, and Trieste. Inmates arrested on charges of terrorism should too be examined in order to 
compare public perception of radicalisation and actual paths towards religiously framed violence. 
Searching for the “Islamist outlook” among immigrants and refugees would also make a 
significant contribution to the discussion surrounding matters of integration and security. Having 
conducted this type of investigations, the formulation of a rigorous, exhaustive counter-radicalisation 
policy should be the fulcrum of future Italian research. 
More generally, larger quantitative and qualitative analyses studying prospects of Islamist 
radicalisation should be carried out in other European countries as well. In addition to comparing 
findings, trends, and narratives, results could be, perhaps, utilised to form more exhaustive EU policies 
against radicalisation, discrimination, and Islamophobia. Last but not least, empirical studies on 
Islamophobia should be continued in every European nation, examining statistical trends and 
developing causal models of what could be labelled “Western radicalisation”. 
All in all, future research is of vital importance to understand the extremely complex 
phenomenon that is radicalisation. And further study is warranted to make sure Roy’s assertion of 
urgency does not turn into our worst nightmare. But Italy must not do so at the expense of its Muslim 
community, validating claims of securitisation of European Muslims. And as we embark on the quest 








Appendix 1: Interviews with Professional/Public Figures  
 
1) 18/06/2015, Olivier Roy 
 
Groppi: Thank you for receiving me professor Roy. We talked on the phone and I explained to you my 
research. What do you think about my project?   
 
Roy: I would say it’s really interesting, but you have to be very careful about how you frame the 
concept of radicalisation and political violence. You said that you want to find out how much Italian 
Muslims are radicalised, right? But I don’t think this is the right way to go. Radicalisation is often 
associated to violence. Hence, if you were doing something like Farhad did in the French prisons, 
interviewing former Al Qaeda members arrested on charges of terrorism, then that would be really 
good. Because that would really be a research analysing causes and mechanisms or radicalisation. If 
you do something like this, if you do surveys, I would suggest that you look for “Visions of 
Radicalisation”, meaning what people think of radicalisation and how much radicalised they might be. 
Then, once the project is done, we can compare the results with the ones from Farhad. 
 
Groppi: How do you think I should frame the concept of radicalisation? 
 
Roy: Make a clear distinction between radicalisation leading to violence and what you are searching, 
meaning views completely detached from violence. 
 
Groppi: For the rest, do you think there is a need of more quantitative studies in our field? 
 
Roy: For sure, it would be nice to see what your results are, but to be quite frank with you, it really 
depends on the findings. 
 
Groppi: Stuart Croft says Islamist radicalisation is socially constructed to securitise Muslims. What are 
your thoughts on that? 
 
Roy: There is certainly a point in his theory, but at the same time I still think we have to keen an eye on 
this phenomenon. 
 
Groppi: Is Islamist Radicalisation an urgent matter? 
 
Roy: Certainly and without being alarmist or anything, we have to admit is an urgent matter. And it 
should be treated as such. Again, we don’t have to be alarmist. Yes, there is an issue with radicalisation, 
but there is no need for panic. If we do, then we do what the terrorists want. We have to keep an eye on 
the banlieues, we have to watch all of the people who are leaving France, Britain, Germany, and 
Belgium to join the Islamic State. We have to be very careful about converts as well, who are becoming 
more and more involved in every type of Jihadist activity.  
 
Groppi: Why do people leave and become radicalised? 
 
Roy: Well, Islamism works as a function of globalisation and the de-territorialisation of Islam and 
Muslims in the Diaspora. They are stuck between two worlds, suffer from identity crisis, and cannot 
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deal with the fact that globalisation has left them out. And in a country like France, they mostly live in 
the banlieues torn by poverty and crime. So, Islamist views are their salvation. They allow them to 
escape their harsh reality and form a virtual, but global community, which can resist to the West, 
counter the West in its own yard. With these views, they feel powerful again.  
 
Groppi: As I am embarking on this project, what is your main advice? 
 
Roy: Make sure to define the theoretical contours of your research. That’s the most important aspect 
for me. 
 
Groppi: Merci beacoup. 
 
2) March 2017, Domenico Messina, Italian Postal Police 
 
Groppi: Dr. Messina, thank you for your time. What do you think of the study results? 
 
Messina: They are certainly interesting and similar to the ones we find monitoring online the people we 
deemed as potentially dangerous. In fact, I would dare to say that your results are consistent with our 
findings. As we monitor the Web on a daily basis, we can say that about 30% of the online community 
supports violent interpretations of Islam. And those who argue for such Islamist views use religious 
reasons to try to convince others they are right. In other words, their ideology is a tremendously 
important factor. 
 
Groppi: Who are these people and why do you think they support violent interpretations of Islam? 
 
Messina: Generally speaking they are consistent with the Muslim population’s demographic 
composition, so, Muslim males from North Africa who came here searching for better living conditions. 
Still, especially in these last years, we are noticing converts really pushing for more hard-core visions 
of Islam and women too whom we consider border line subjects. 
 
Groppi: What do you do with these subjects? 
 
Messina: We monitor them online on a daily base. In certain cases we execute environmental 
interceptions, including wiretapping.  
 
Groppi: How dangerous are these subjects? 
 
Messina: Potentially dangerous 
 
Groppi: Are we prepared to counter them? What should Italy do? 
 
Messina: It’s not so easy. We at the Postal Police engage in wiretapping and online surveillance. We 
keep under tight control dozens of subjects we have reasons to believe are being radicalised online. 
Among these are a number of female converts who are really active on disseminating propagandistic 
material. Yet, identities are not always clear and we are not able to decipher many messages on 
Facebook and Google, because these companies won’t provide us with the codes we need to decrypt 
confidential conversations. We believe that Italy will have do deal more and more with lone-wolves 
radicalised online who are really hard to identify and stop. If our country, the political domain, and the 
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international institutions do not come together and give us a hand, it’s always going to be harder and 
harder for use to counter such an increasing level of threat. In truth, if an international step is not taken 
in this direction, we are destined to witnessed the emergence of more lone-wolves. 
 
Groppi: Thank you Dr. Messina. 
 
 
3) March 2017, Pallavicini, Yaha, Vice President of COREIS 
 
Groppi: Dear Imam, thank you for coming here. So, what do you think of the results? 
 
Pallavicini: It’s just bone-chilling. When I completed the questionnaire myself, when it came to the 
statements about violence in Islam, the answer was quite simple and unquestionable. But, apparently, I 
was wrong. I didn’t think you could find what you’ve found. 
 
Groppi: Why do you think is that? 
 
Pallavicini: Ignorance and misinterpretation of Islamic tenets. But the thing that worries me the most is 
that there are going to be people who will not accept these results. Instead of looking at them critically, 
they will contest them and not recognise the problem and the need of reform. We’re fighting an battle 
first and foremost inside Islam, inside the European Muslim community, and inside the Italian 
community. But we have to be ready to stare at the evidence and take action. 
 
Groppi: What do you think of the Italian non-Muslim results? 
 
Pallavicini: They are hard to look at too. But I think they have to be analysed deeper. There is much 
potential for improvement. But we all have to do our part. In reality, I understand and feel many 
Europeans’ timorousness in relation to Islam and its establishment in mainstream society. That can be a 
challenging process. But demonising all Muslims through the media only because a few of them 
misbehave enlarges the gap between them and their society. It’s like saying that all Italians are Mafiosi. 
The community must take action, but the Italian institutions, the political world, and the civil society 
must all cooperate for the construction of more conciliatory tones that bring unity instead of division. 
 
Groppi: What should be the steps towards this? 
 
Pallavicini: On our part we must do anything we can to contrast these so-called Muslims. We must 
expose their ignorance, their unholy goals, and their way of being criminals. Because that’s what they 
are, criminals and nothing more. On its end, the Italian government should make an epochal move and 
recognise Islam as a religion. By granting us the status of official religion can we built a more 
progressive version of European Islam, where people feel proud to be Muslim and European at the 
same time. Who says that the two identities have to conflict? If the State does its part, we can succeed 
in creating a form of Islam, which remains Islam, but is also inserted into the European context because, 
being Muslims in Europe is not the same that being Muslim in Saudi Arabia. This is what we have to 
do, to allow second and third generations to feel pride in their double identity.   
 
Groppi: What are the main challenges? 
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Pallavicini: What aren’t the main challenges, you mean. We stand before really hard times, filled with 
extreme visions that feed on ignorance and rage. We must come all together and fight it together. It’s 
the only way, and if we embark on this journey together, we can succeed in creating a society in which 
everyone feels proud to belong to. 
 
Groppi: Thank you dear Imam. 
 
 
4) March 2017, Cozzolino Massimo, Secretary general of CII 
 
Groppi: Dr. Cozzolino, thank you for making time for me. What do you think about the study’s results? 
 
Cozzolino: Dear Michele, these results are really, really worrying, for they should not be diminished. 
It’s incredible how much ignorance and exploitation of the good nature of Islam there is around. More 
than we expected, to be honest. But again, if I think again, perhaps it’s not too surprising. 
 
Groppi: How so? 
 
Cozzolino: You see, both radicals and people who don’t want Muslims exploit the Islamophobic media 
propaganda for their needs. In more serious societies, such as America, Denmark, England, the 
Netherlands and so on, governmental and non-governmental actors try to limit the usage of technical, 
poorly understood terms linked to Islamism and shift focus to more sociological aspects devoid of 
charged terminology. The idea is to promote a more conciliating tone, for we must not provide ground 
for bitterness 
 
Groppi: Do you think the government is doing a better job lately? 
 
Cozzolino: Not at all! I mean, okay, there has been some partial improvement now and then, but that’s 
only because we had to do something about it. I don’t know if you know, but the government is 
currently discussing this legal proposition which is referred to as “Anti-Jihad Law”. How can you call a 
law “Anti-Jihad Law”? Even inadvertently, the State is promoting stereotypes against Muslims and this 
is really grave. You see how this name can be really problematic right? Because then there are people 
from certain political parties that can exploit this for the electoral campaigns and gain votes.   
 
Groppi: What should we do then? 
 
Cozzolino: We should educate the media and the political word about terms and difficult concepts that 
need clarification. But without dialogue with the Italian State and the Italian people, we are not going 
anywhere 
 
 Groppi: What should the government do? 
 
Cozzolino: If the government can give Islam its rightful place in society, we will be able to train Imams, 
register and regulate the funding of mosques. 
 




Cozzolino: We cannot pretend everything is alright. And it’s now that we must take action, by getting 
the second and third generations involved. As a matter of fact, that’s where we have to start, from 
women, active second-generations, and converts who love Italy and are our winning key against all 
sorts of extremisms 
 
Groppi: Hence, moderation when using certain terms and getting young and female Muslims involved, 
right? 
 
Cozzolino: Right, the quest for excessive, sensational news filled with inflammatory remarks enlarge 
the gap between Muslims and the Italian society. We might counter this, because this type of behaviour 
provides ground for feelings of Islamophobia and victimisation which extremists can exploit to 
radicalise, recruit, and turn people to violence.  
 
Groppi: Thank you Dr. Cozzolino. 
 
 
5) March 2017, Ezzedin Elzir, President of UCOII 
Groppi: Dear Imam, thank you for your help. What do you think of the results? 
 
Elzir: This research is very important to us to see how we are doing inside our communities. And when 
you say that almost 30% of the people would punish whoever offends Islam or would justify violence 
in the name of Allah, while between 10% and 15% support Al Qaeda and ISIS, it’s way too many 
people. I thought we would find like a 5% rate or so, but even 5% would still be too much. The fact 
there are these people who espouse violence in the name of Islam is unacceptable. It goes against 
everything we teach everyday. 
 
Groppi: What do you think drives the result? 
 
Elzir: Misguided religious interpretations and all the malaise that people who do not know nothing of 
Islam and want to use it for their political needs exploit to brainwash. 
 
Groppi: What should we do? Especially given that the non-Muslim results don’t look so good… 
 
Elzir: Italians are not bad people, they are our brothers, for many of us are Italian citizens. But it’s 
natural when you read or hear about Muslims only after terrorist attacks that you become afraid of them. 
But what it takes is courage, courage to come together, put our differences aside and grow together, 
because in the end, if you look closer, we share many things. And if you look at what we as UCOII did 
in Florence, well, this is a story of success. We signed that pact with the mayor, granting us certain 
rights, but, most importantly certain responsibilities. And with certain responsibilities comes the sense 
of integration and belonging to the city and the country. I myself consider myself a proud Italian, a 
proud Muslim, and a proud citizen of Florence. 
 
Groppi: Hence what would you tell people who don’t want anything to do with Muslims? 
 
Elzir: Come and meet us. You’ll see we’re good people and, in fact, people, just like you, with the 
same dreams, aspirations, and fears. But we really need dialogue. Dialogue and reciprocal knowledge is 
the ultimate key against terrorism, Islamophobia, and extremism. 
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Groppi: Thank you dear Imam. 
 
6) March 2017, Claudio Galzerano, Director of the International Anti-Terrorism Department of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 
Groppi: Director, thank you for this brief interview. What do you think of the study’s results? Do you 
think they are fairly reflective of the situation? 
 
Galzerano: I think so, even though prisons and the virtual space are the real main battlefields.  
 
Groppi: How would you describe the Italian situation? 
 
Galzerano: We are witnessing the re-emergence of the Balkan route. We are monitoring converts, 
among whom are a number of women who are really active in the promotion of such Islamist visions. 
We think lone-wolves are really what we have to worry about.   
 
Groppi: Why hasn’t our country been hit yet? 
 
Galzerano: It’s a combination of operational considerations. They have a hierarchy of who they want to 
strike. They need us for several reasons, but this does not mean that they won’t do it one day or sooner 
than we think. 
  
Groppi: How do you see the role that Islamist ideology played in the study? 
 
Galzerano: Certainly Islamist ideology is the core of the question. Yet, this proves once again that as a 
society, we must foster dialogue with those who want it for real, for dialogue is truly the only way. 
 






















Appendix 2: Theoretical Models of Radicalisation  
 
General models of terrorism and radicalisation 
Although the proposed models shortly described are mostly borrowed from terrorism studies, 
they still are, nonetheless, useful in understanding how, in general terms, individual radicalise and, at 
times, embrace terrorism. Aside from three “classical” psychological progressions to violence 
presented by Ehud Sprinzak, Roy Baumeister, and Albert Bandura respectively dealing with how 
individuals engage in de-legitimisation processes,736 conceive and process hatred,737 and gradually 
morally disengage to justify violence,738 six models of pathways to terrorism are hereby explored, three 
linear and three non-linear. 
 
Linear Models 
In a FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Randy Borum proposes a conceptual model to explain an 
individual’s pathway to terrorism.739 Through the analysis of multiple violent extremist groups 
featuring diverse ideologies with the intent to verify the existence of common factors in the process of 
radicalisation, Borum points to four main phases. At the initial stage, named “it’s not right”, the 
individuals judge their condition as undesirable and unbearable. At the second stage, called “it’s not 
fair”, people realise not only is their situation undesirable, but also unjust. At the third stage, baptised 
“it’s your fault”, such injustice is blamed on the juxtaposing out-group, such as a target policy, person, 
or nation. Finally, the fourth stage termed “you’re evil”, the believed responsible party is vilified and 
demonised, justifying impetus for aggression. 
Fathali Moghaddam’s famous model is the so-called “staircase to terrorism”, in which he uses 
the metaphor to describe the process of violent radicalisation.740 The staircase narrows as it ascends 
from the ground floor and through five successive levels. Like most theories, feelings of discontent and 
perceived suffering and deprivation are a platform for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism –
even though fewer people ascend to each successive level and, eventually, very few become terrorists. 
In the beginning, at the ground level individuals’ attempts to alleviate adversity and improve their 
status have been unsuccessful, leading to frustration. At the second level, frustrated individuals mature 
feelings of aggression that are then displaced onto some perceived causal agent, who becomes an 
enemy. As anger toward this enemy increases ascending to the third level, some become increasingly 
sympathetic towards justifications for violence and toward those terrorist groups taking action against 
the enemy. Some of those sympathizers eventually ascend to the fourth level, where they join an 
extremist group, organization or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist 
violence. At the top, final level are those who have joined, overcome barriers to violent action, and 
actually commit a terrorist act. 
Another way of conceiving the radicalisation process is illustrated in the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) pyramidal-type model.741 The pyramid is divided into four tiers. At tier 1 are 
all the members of the community. At tier 2 are those members considered as vulnerable to radical 
messages, such as young people within the criminal justice system, for instance. At tier 3, called 
“moving towards extremism”, are those individuals who, while not committing any violent acts                                                         
736 Sprinzak, Ehud. (1991). “The process of delegitimation”. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 3, no.1. pp. 50-68.  
737 Baumeister, Roy. (1997). Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty. New York: Freeman. 
738 Bandura, Albert. (1998). “Mechanisms of moral disengagement”. In Reich, Walter. (Ed.). Origins of Terrorism. 
Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
739 Borum, Randy. (2004). Psychology of Terrorism. Tampa: University of Florida. pp. 28-9. 
740 Moghaddam, Fathali. (2005). “The Staircase to Terrorism”. American Psychologist. Vo. 60, no. 2. pp. 161-169. 
741 Audit Commission. (2008). Preventing Violent Extremism: Learning and Development Exercise. Report to the Home 
Office and Communities and Local Government. p. 12.  
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themselves, may provide tacit support to terrorists and act to inspire others from below. Finally, at tier 
4 are the terrorists, who are the most radicalised but remain relatively few in number when considered 
in relation to all those who may sympathise with their beliefs and feelings.    
 
Non-linear Models 
Max Taylor and John Horgan propose a conceptual framework for addressing the psychological 
process in the development of the terrorist.742 Such framework is composed of three main categories: 
setting factors, personal factors, social/political/organisational contexts. Setting factors are those 
elements such as one’s family, peers, economic conditions, and past experiences that facilitate the 
decision for opt for involvement. Personal factors are linked to one’s psychological status, immediate 
negative experiences with the surrounding environment (arrests or clashes with police) or peer pressure 
with lead or reinforce disaffection. Finally, social/political/organisational contexts refer to the impact of 
group politics, identity, and ideology on the individual. In their observation of such factors, Taylor and 
Horgan note that terrorism works both at an individual and political level and the significant element in 
reinforcing involvement is the increased role of the social/political/organisational contexts in exerting 
control over behaviour.    
In a keen attempt to conceptualise some form of risk assessment for prediction of involvement 
in terrorism, John Horgan proposes six main risk factors he encountered in studying British 
terrorists.743 These six elements include any emotional vulnerability linked to anger or alienation that 
leads to search for guidance and clarity; dissatisfaction with one’s current activity, which leads to the 
conclusion that conventional politics does not work and that terrorism is the only necessary alternative; 
identification with oppressed Muslims around the world; acquisition of the belief violence directed 
against the state is not immoral; gaining of a sense of reward in terms of status, respect, and authority 
for participation in terrorist organisation; finally, kinship and social ties of those already involve as 
means of encouragement. Horgan’s factors provide a valuable framework for an individual’s 
predisposition to radicalise and, eventually, join terrorist organisations. Yet, as Horgan warns, the 
factors in question are not to be taken in isolation, but as a combination of factors that can ignite the 
radicalisation process towards terrorism.  
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko identify twelve mechanisms of political radicalisation 
that operate across three main levels: the individual, the group, and the mass level.744 The individual 
level includes personal victimisation (personal grievances at the base for action); political grievance 
(oppression of Muslims); joining a radical group –the slippery slope (gradual involvement in the group 
with final greater tasks); joining a radical group –the power of love (personal ties increasing 
commitment to the group); extremity shift in like-minded groups (increase in polarised ideas of the 
group). The group level, instead, includes extreme cohesion under isolation and threat (as threat 
increases cohesion augments too); competition for the same base of support (competition with other 
groups to gain support causing increase in radicalisation); competition with state power (struggle and 
increase in violent response to state counter actions); within group competition –fissioning (increase of 
radicalisation due to in-group competition). Finally, the mass level includes Jujitsu politics (threats 
increasing respect for leaders and punishment for dissenters); hate (dehumanisation for the enemy); 
martyrdom (glorification of martyrdom of group members). 
                                                         
742 Taylor, Max. Horgan, John. (2012). “A conceptual framework addressing psychological process in the development of 
the terrorist”. In Horgan, John. Terrorism Studies. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 130-144. 
743 Horgan, John. (2008). “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes”. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. Vo. 618, no. 1. pp. 82-83. 
744 McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2008). “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Towards Terrorism”. 
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 20, no. 3. pp. 415-433. 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Models of Islamist Radicalisation  
In addition to general linear and non-linear models of terrorism and radicalisation, the literature also 
offers models dealing specifically with Islamic radicalisation processes.   
 
Linear Models 
One of the most famous phase models is the so-called top-down model by the Danish 
intelligence services (PET).745 PET phase model distinguishes different degrees or stages of the 
radicalisation process, where the person becomes more and more radicalised the more phases he or she 
goes through. The process starts by being “susceptible” to radical ideas and meeting a “radicaliser”, 
and advances on to new religious practices and changed behaviour. Subsequently, the process involves 
a narrowing of the person’s circle of friends and family and results in the so-called “hardening phase”, 
which includes “reviewing of and interest in very violent videos” displaying terrorists in battle and the 
killing of hostages. 
Another widely used linear model is the one developed by the NYPD, which distinguishes four 
distinct phases forming the radicalisation process of radical Muslims in the West.746 According to the 
model, radicalisation is a bottom-up, linear process that functions as follows. Phase 1, the “Pre-
Radicalisation” phase, describes the individual’s world in terms of lifestyle, socio-economic status, and 
religion at the starting point towards radicalisation. Generally speaking, Muslims tend to be male, 
second or third-generation immigrants, stemming from middle-class backgrounds, having ‘ordinary’ 
lives and jobs, and with little, if any, criminal history. Phase 2, the “Self-Identification” phase, 
describes how the individual gradually opens up to a new interpretation of the world and starts to 
explore radical Islam. From this moment onward, the individual begins to gravitate away from his or 
her former identity and to associate with like-minded individuals. Phase 3, the “Indoctrination” phase, 
relates to the full adoption of the “Jihadi-Salafi ideology”, leading the individual to conclude militant 
Jihad is the only possible tool to achieve the “grater good.” Phase 4, lastly, the “Jihadization” phase, 
entails self-designation as holy warriors and actual engagement in violence, in which individuals plan 
and execute terrorist attacks.  
 Similarly to the NYPD model, Tomas Precth model of a “Typical” radicalisation pattern also 
features four main phases.747 The first one, “Pre-Radicalisation”, relates to individuals who are 
frustrated with their lives, society, or foreign policy of their governments. The second phase, 
“Conversion and Identification with Radical Islam” entails identification with extremist ideologies. The 
third phase, “Indoctrination and increased group bonding” is where adoption of extreme beliefs takes 
place, among which justification for violence. Finally, “Actual acts of terrorism or planned plots”, 
relates to the last phase only a few individual who become terrorists embark on.  
Wiktorowicz puts greater stress on the role that social influence plays in leading a person to join 
a radicalised Islamic group.748 The author conducted extensive fieldwork observing al-Muhajiroun and 
identifies four key processes that enhance the likelihood of an individual being drawn to a radical 
Islamic group and being persuaded to become actively involved. According to Wiktorowicz, these four 
factors include a cognitive opening, where a person becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas 
and world views; a phase of religious seeking, where a person seeks meaning through a religious 
framework; frame alignment, when the public representation of reality offered by the radical group 
“makes sense” and is internalised by each member; socialisation, where a person experiences religious                                                         
745 Danish Intelligence Services. PET. (2009). Radicalisation and Terrorism. [Danish]. Center for Terrorism Analysis.  
746 Silber, Mitchell. Bhatt, Arvin. (2007). “Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat”. New York City Police 
Department 
747 Precht, Tomas. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. The Danish Ministry of Justice. pp. 
32-37. 
748 Wiktorowicz, Quintain. Radical Islam Rising. Ch. 3, 4, 5, pp. 206-208. 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instruction that facilitates indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes  
Non-Linear Models 
One of the most famous models of the process of radicalisation is indubitably the one by Marc 
Sageman.749 His bottom-up, non-linear process entails four main factors. First, a sense of “moral 
outrage”, like reaction to perceived “major moral violations” such as the killings of Muslims in Bosnia 
and Chechnya, or the perceived humiliation of Muslims as in the abuse at Abu Grade prison in Iraq – 
which bridge the local and global in the world view of the recipient; second, a specific interpretation of 
the world, for instance, where moral violations are seen as representing a war against Islam; third, 
resonance with personal experiences, given by interpretations of a Western war against Islam that 
meshes with one’s history of discrimination; finally, mobilisation through networks that work as “echo 
chambers”, where group dynamics and peer pressure encourage and reinforce one’s acquisition of 
radical views. 
Similarly, Paul Gill offers a pathway model that charts the trajectory of individuals who become 
suicide bombers. The model proposes four key stages on their path to a suicide bombing.750 First, a 
broad socialisation process and exposure to propaganda which tends to predispose individuals towards 
violence; second, the experience of a “catalyst event”, which can motivate the decision to join a 
terrorist organisation; a number of pre-existing familial or friendship ties, which facilitate the 
recruitment process; finally, in-group radicalisation through processes of internalisation and 
polarisation of the group’s sets of norms and values. Although Gil concedes these stages can vary from 
bomber to bomber, they nonetheless mutually reinforce one another.  
Analogously, drawing on his analysis of the Hamburg Cell before 9/11, Michael Taarnby 
proposes eight factors that characterise Islamic radicalisation process.751 These factors feature 
individual alienation and marginalisation; a spiritual quest; a process of radicalisation, intended as the 
acquisition of radical interpretations of Islam; meeting and association with like-minded people; 
gradual seclusion, polarisation, and cell formation; acceptance of violence as a legitimate political 
means; connection with gatekeepers and operational experts; going operational by plotting terrorist 
attacks. 
The last two empirical studies by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman and Goli and 
Rezaei also find interesting characteristics of Islamic radicalisation processes.752 As for the previous 
ones, a study of radicalisation processes in the US and the UK displays six common manifestations: 
adopting a legalist interpretation of Islam; trusting only select religious authorities; perceived schism 
between Islam and the West; low tolerance for perceived theological deviance; attempts to impose 
religious beliefs on others; political radicalisation often featuring Western-based conspiracies to 
subjugate Islam. As for Goli’s and Rezaei’s works, instead, common elements of Islamic radicalisation 
processes are advocating for Islam as a religious ideology; acquisition of a holistic interpretation of 
Islam, distinguishing between true and false visions of Islam; submission to the idea that Islam final 
goal is the conquest of the world; agreement on the justification of violence.                                                         
749 Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad. Ch. 4, 5.  
750 Gill, P. (2008). “Suicide Bombers Pathways Among Islamic Militants”. Policing. Vo. 4, no. 2. pp. 412-422. 
751 Taarnby, Michael. (2005). Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Danish Ministry of Justice. p. 22.  
752 Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. Grossman, Laura. (2009). Homegrown terrorists in the U.S. and U.K. Foundation for Defense 
and Democracy. Washington DC: Foundation for Defense and Democracy Press. pp. 12-13; Goli, Mardo. Shahamak 
Rezaei. (2010). House of War: Islamic Radicalisation in Denmark. Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR) 
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. p. 48. 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Summary of Proposed Models 
All of the models examined have little specific information on how long the radicalisation 
process takes from inception to action. The NYPD study indicates radicalisation takes place gradually 
over two to three years, similar to Andrew Silke’s contention that for most, radicalisation takes months 
or years.753 However, Fernando Reinares’ sociological profile of arrested Jihadist terrorists in Spain 
estimated a longer process of radicalisation, starting up to ten years before their arrest.754 Yet, the case 
of Roshanara Choudhry shows radicalisation (in this case, self-radicalisation) leading to acts of 
violence can take place in less than 6 months.755 Similarly, the final “Jihadisation” stage identified in 
the NYPD study, that is, when attacks are planned, can occur very quickly, namely a couple of weeks, 
provided the members accept the group decision to undertake an attack.756  
Despite many differences, all studies agree on the fact radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism 
is a gradual process. In addition, many studies also agree there are common stages in most 
radicalisation processes.757 That is, there is always a stage of individual change, like an increase in 
religiosity or a search for identity, which is enhanced through external aspects linked to or 
discrimination or perceived sense of war against Muslims. Then, there is a move to violent 
radicalisation, usually taking place when the individual socialises with like-minded people who come 
to morally justify violence. These stages are not necessarily sequential and they can also overlap, 
meaning that a person may skip a stage in reaching militant action or alternatively may become 
disillusioned and, at any given point, abandon the process altogether. In fact, although this section has 
presented models of radicalisation that lead to violence, this is not to argue that whoever embarks on 
such journeys eventually embrace violence. Once again, radicalisation and terrorism or political 
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Appendix 3: Written Questionnaires Aimed at Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents 
 
Written Questionnaires for Muslim Participants  















• Other= _____Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Senegal, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, other. 
• Decline to state 
 
4) Were you born in Italy? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Decline to state 
 
5) If you were not born in Italy, for how many years have you been living in this country? 
• _____ 
• Decline to state 
 
6) In which city/province do you live? 
• _____ Bologna, Bergamo, Brescia, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Modena, Naples, Padua, Palermo, 
Reggio Emilia, Rome, Turin, Varese, Venice 
• Decline to state 
 




• Decline to state 
 
8) Do you have any children? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Decline to state 
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9) Economic status 
• I earn less than 1,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• I earn between 1,000 and 2,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• I earn more than 2,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• Decline to state 
 
10) Educational attainment 
• Elementary school 
• Middle school 
• High school 
• University (including BA, MA, PhD) 








• Decline to state 
 
12) If you have ever voted in Italy, you have voted for parties considered to be more from the: 
• Left (Partito Democratico, Sinistra Ecologia Libertà) 
• Right (Nuovo Centro Destra, Fratelli Italia, Lega, Forza Italia) 
• Centre (Scelta civica per l’Italia, Democrazia solidale) 
• Other (Movimento 5 Stelle, altre liste civiche) 
• I have never voted 
• Decline to state 
 
13) Religious participation 
• I always/often go to mosque and take part to all the Islamic holidays   
• I only take part to the Islamic holidays 
• I am not very observant 
• Decline to state 
 
14) Religion 
• Sunni Muslim since birth 
• Shia Muslim since birth 
• Sunni convert 
• Shia convert 








Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15) In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against 
 
      
16) In Italy I feel we Muslims have no voice and would like 
we could be listened to more 
 
      
17) As a Muslim, I have a difficult time in blending in at 
school 
 
      
18) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding a good occupation       
19) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding good housing 
 
      
20) As a Muslim, I struggle at finding an appropriate place 
for worship 
 
      
21) As a Muslim, I feel people look at me with greater 
diffidence 
 
      
22) In Italy I feel there is much ignorance and prejudice 
towards Islam and Muslims 
 
      
23) Particularly in recent times, I feel there is a sort of 
media war to discredit Islam 
 
      
24) I feel Italian institutions do little to facilitate my 
integration 
      
25) Italy should enforce laws that respect Muslim identity       
26) I feel fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is 
exaggerated 
 
      
27) In countering Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, I feel 
the involvement of Islamic communities is of crucial 
importance 
 
      
28) Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and 
has been unjust and frustrating 
 
      
29) Muslims in the world are often oppressed 
 
      
30) In Italy I often feel frustrated due to my personal 
situation 
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31) In Italy I have often asked myself if I wanted to embrace 
Italian culture or if I wanted to be out of it 
 
      
32) In the past, there have been hard experiences that 
brought me closer to God 
 
      
33) In spite of everything, I love Italy and its culture and I 
want to be part of it 
 
      
 
34) Please rank the following ones from most important (1) to least important (5) according to your life. 
If you wish not to answer, please select the last voice “decline to state”. 
• ____ Work 
• ____ Faith 
• ____ Family 
• ____ Health 
• ____ Security 
• Decline to state 
 
35) Please, rank the first three most important problems Italy faces from most important (1) to least 
important (3). If you wish not to answer, please select the last voice “decline to state”. 
• ____ Economy 
• ____ Corruption 
• ____ Health system 
• ____ Immigration 
• ____ National security 
• ____ Education system 
• ____ Crime 
• ____ Social inequality 




















36) In your opinion, is there an issue of radicalisation in Islam?  
• Yes 
• Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions  
• No 
• I do not know 
• Decline to state 
 
If your previous answer has been “No”, please go to question number 39. 
 
37) In your opinion, is there an issue of radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities?  
• Yes 
• Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions  
• No 
• I do not know 
• Decline to state 
 
38) Please rank the first three causes of Islamist radicalisation leading to terrorism (from 1 to 3). If you, 
instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”. 
• ____ Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam  
• ____ Traumatic personal experiences  
• ____ Exploitation of Islam for political purposes 
• ____ The Israeli-Palestinian question 
• ____ The material and mental/spiritual benefits offered by Al Qaeda, Isis, etc.  
• ____ The importance of personal bonds with radicals and the role of the group  
• ____ The call to armed struggle for every true Muslim against those who attack Islam 
• ____ Search for adventure and sense of nobility 
• ____ Personal identity crisis 
• ____ Denied rights and frustration 
• ____ Western racism 
• ____ Economic and social harshness 
• ____ Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world 
• ____ Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the crusades 
• Decline to state 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
39) Members of a group and friends are the ones who 
really make a cause worthy 
  
      
40) A person decides to get physically involved in a cause 
due to personal interests, which can be both material and 
mental/spiritual 
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41) It is a duty of every true Muslim to defend Islam 
 
      
42) Violence in defence of Islam can be justified 
 
      
43) Whoever offends Islam and its prophet deserves to be 
punished 
 
      
44) Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight 
American and Zionist imperialism 
 
      
45) Isis’ struggle against dictatorships and Western 
influence is legitimate 
 
      
46) In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better 
than a democratic one 
 
      
47) Jews control the world and are responsible for much 
evil 
 
      
48) 9/11 is an American and Jewish conspiracy       
49) In America and the West not only are many at war 
with certain Muslim countries, but also with Islam 
 
      
50) The State of Israel has no right to exist 
 
      
51) Hamas and Hezbollah are not terrorist organisations 
 
      
52) The solution to the loss of values in the Western world 
is the Islamic morale 
 
      
53) I feel that, as a sign of respect to us Muslims, it is fair 
to abolish Christmas plays at school and remove the cross 
from classrooms 
 
      
54) I think my son/daughter’s adopting of Western ways 
of life is fair 
 
      
55) I am opposed to my son/daughter marrying an Italian 
non-Muslim person 
 
      
56) Lying for the sake of faith, if faith is in danger, is 
acceptable 
 
      
57) The Quran is the unquestionable, absolute truth 
 
      
58) I would sign a law that is similar to the Austrian one,       
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featuring the training of Imams and the imposition of 
sermons in the local language (not in Arabic) 
 
59) In the future, I would like Muslims’ needs to be dealt 
by a Mufti or an Islamic court 
 




Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
60) In Italy, tension between non-Muslim Italians and 
Muslims will increase 
 
      
61) Italy will experience acts of Jihadist terrorism 
 
      
62) In case of a Jihadist attack, life for Italian Muslims 
will become much harder 
      
63) Interreligious dialogue will be useless        
64) I am confident Islam and Italian culture will live in 
peace and harmony 
 
      
65) The key to a better future for the country is a greater 
integration of our Muslim communities 
 
      
66) The key to a better future for the country is education 
and pluralism 
 
      
67) The key to a better future for the country is a greater 
economic and social conditions for foreigners, including 
us Muslim 
      
68) Islam in Italy is destined to remain a foreign reality, in 
the sense there will never be an Italian version of Islam 









Written Questionnaire for Non-Muslim Participants 
Written Questionnaire for Non-Muslim Participants and Summary of its Sample’s Composition 











• Decline to state 
 
3) Where do you live? 
• _____ 
• Decline to state 
 
4) Economic status 
• I earn less than 1,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• I earn between 1,000 and 2,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• I earn more than 2,000 euros on a monthly basis 
• Decline to state 
 
5) Educational attainment 
• Elementary school 
• Middle school 
• High school 
• University (including BA, MA, PhD) 








• Decline to state 
 
7) I consider myself to be more from the: 
• Left 
• Right  
• Centre 
• Other (Movimento 5 Stelle, altre liste civiche) 
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• Other (Jewish, Buddhist…) 
• Not applicable (atheist, agnostic) 
• Decline to state 
 
9) Religious participation 
• I always/often go to church/place of worship 
• I only take part in holidays 
• I am not very observant 
• Decline to state 
 





• Decline to state 
 
11) Do you have any Muslim good friends? 
• Yes 
• No 




Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12) In Italy, I feel Muslims are discriminated against 
 
      
13) In Italy, I feel Muslims have no voice and should be 
listened to more 
 
      
14) In Italy, I feel Muslims have a difficult time in blending 
in at school  
 
      
15) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding a good 
occupation 
      
16) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding good housing 
 
      
17) In Italy, I feel Muslims struggle at finding an       
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appropriate place for worship 
 
18) In Italy, I feel people look at Muslims with greater 
diffidence 
 
      
19) In general, I feel Islam and Italian values are utterly 
incompatible 
 
      
20) Particularly in recent times, I feel there is a sort of 
media war to discredit Islam 
 
      
21) I feel fear of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism is 
exaggerated 
 
      
22) In countering Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, I feel 
the involvement of Islamic communities is of crucial 
importance 
 
      
23) Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries is and 
has been unjust and frustrating 
 
      
24) In the world, Muslims are often oppressed 
 
      
25) In Italy, I feel there is much ignorance and prejudice 
towards Islam and Muslims 
 
      
26) I feel Italian institutions do little to facilitate Muslims’ 
integration  
 
      
27) Italy should enforce laws that respect Muslim identity 
 
      
28) In the end, I feel Muslims do not feel much different 
from Italian non-Muslims 
 
      
29) In general, I feel most Muslims do not love Italy and its 
culture and do not want to be part of it 
 
      
30) I would never live in a mostly Muslim neighbourhood 
 
      
 
31) Please rank the following ones from most important (1) to least important (5) according to your life. 
If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”.  
• ____ Work 
• ____ Faith 
• ____ Family 
• ____ Health 
• ____ Security 
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• Decline to state 
 
32) Please, rank the first three problems Italy faces from most important (1) to least important (3). If 
you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”. 
• ____ Economy 
• ____ Corruption 
• ____ Health system 
• ____ Immigration 
• ____ National security 
• ____ Education system 
• ____ Crime 
• ____ Social inequality 




33) In your opinion, is radicalisation happening inside Islam and is it a problem?  
• Yes 
• Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions  
• No 
• I do not know 
• Decline to state 
 
If your previous answer has been “No”, please go to question number 36. 
 
34) In your opinion, is radicalisation inside the Italian Muslim communities happening and is it a 
problem?  
• Yes 
• Yes, but it is minimal and exaggerated by certain governments and institutions  
• No 
• I do not know 
• Decline to state 
 
35) Please rank the first three causes of Islamist radicalisation (at times) leading to terrorism (from 1 to 
3). If you, instead, do not wish to answer the question, please select the last voice “decline to state”. 
• ____ Personal identity crisis 
• ____ Traumatic negative experiences 
• ____ Search for adventure and sense of nobility 
• ____ Economic and social harshness 
• ____ Denied rights and frustration 
• ____ Western racism 
• ____ The importance of personal bonds with radicals and the role of the group 
• ____ Oppression by authoritative governments in the Arab world 
• ____ Past and present Western foreign policy and the history of the crusades 
• ____ The Israeli-Palestinian question 
• ____ Exploitation of Islam for political purposes 
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• ____ Lack of a strong internal debate inside Islam 
• ____ Economic possibilities offered by Al Qaeda, Isis, etc.  
• ____ The call to armed struggle for every true Muslim against those who attack Islam 
• Decline to state 
 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
36) Members of a group and friends are the ones who 
really make a cause worthy 
  
      
37) A person decides to get physically involved in a cause 
due to personal interests, which can be both material and 
mental/spiritual 
 
      
38) It is a duty of every true Muslim to defend Islam 
 
      
39) Violence in defence of Islam can be justified 
 
      
40) Whoever offends Islam and its prophet deserves to be 
punished 
 
      
41) Al Qaeda and other groups are the ones that can fight 
American and Zionist imperialism 
 
      
42) Isis’ struggle against dictatorships and Western 
influence is legitimate 
 
      
43) In the Middle East, an Islamic government is better 
than a democratic one 
 
      
44) Jews control the world and are responsible for much 
evil 
 
      
45) 9/11 is an American and Jewish conspiracy       
46) In America and the West not only are many at war 
with certain Muslim countries, but also with Islam 
 
      
47) The State of Israel has no right to exist 
 
      
48) Hamas and Hezbollah are not terrorist organisations 
 
      
49) Many Muslims want to impose their beliefs and 
Islamise Italy 
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50) I feel that, as a sign of respect to Muslims, it is fair to 
abolish Christmas plays at school and remove the cross 
from classrooms 
 
      
51) In the end, many Muslims would lie for the sake of 
faith, if faith is in danger  
 
      
52) In the end, for many Muslims, questioning certain 
tenets is unacceptable 
 
      
53) In the end, many Muslims justify violence in the name 
of their faith 
 
      
54) In the end, many Muslims believe that whoever 
offends Islam and its Prophet deserves to be punished 
      
55) In the end, many Muslims support terrorism 
 
      
56) I believe many Muslims would sign a law that is 
similar to the Austrian one, featuring the training of 
Imams and the imposition of sermons in the local 
language (not in Arabic) 
 
      
57) In the future, I believe more Muslims would like their 
needs to be dealt by a Mufti or an Islamic court 
 





Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement in relation to the following statements by 
choosing from the following: Strongly agree (1), slightly agree (2), slightly disagree (3), strongly 
disagree (4), I do not know (5), or decline to state (6). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
58) ISIS and the Jihadist threat worry me       
59) Italy will experience acts of Jihadist terrorism like in 
Paris and Brussels 
 
      
60) In Italy, tension between non-Muslim Italians and 
Muslims will increase 
 
      
61) In case of a Jihadist attack, life for Muslims will 
become harder 
      
62) In case of a Jihadist attack, I would be in favour of 
measures limiting my personal freedom for the sake of 
national security 
      
  218 
63) In case of a Jihadist attack, I would support the 
government’s harsh terrorist countermeasures, even 
military retaliation, against terrorists 
      
64) Interreligious dialogue will be useless       
65) Islam is a threat to Italy and its culture 
 
 
      
66) I am confident Islam and Italian culture will live in 
peace and harmony 
 
      
67) The key to a better future for the country is greater 
integration of Italian Muslim communities 
      
68) The key to a better future for the country is education 
and pluralism 
 
      
69) The key to a better future for the country is greater 
economic and social conditions for foreigners, including 
Muslims 
 
      
70) The key to a better future for the country is patrolled 
immigration and preservation of regional and national 
identities 
      
71) Islam in Italy is destined to remain a foreign reality, in 
the sense there will never be an Italian version of Islam 
       
 
The non-Muslim sample featured the same amount of respondents of the Muslim sample (440). It also 
featured the same gender and occupational composition, and number of cities (290 males, 147 females, 
and 3 “decline to state”; 187 employees, 59 employers, 119 students, 22 unemployed, 49 “other”, and 4 
“decline to state”; 15 cities). The sampling also displayed roughly the same residence and age cross 
sections –with non-Muslims counting 10 extra people over age 60. That stated, the majority of non-
Muslim respondents (42%) stated to earn between 1.000 and 2.000 euros per month; almost 50% had a 
high school degree (and 47% a university degree); 41% voted left (24.5% were from the right); 70% 
defined themselves as Christian, but only 24.1% affirmed to often/always go to church. Lastly, more 










Appendix 4: Statistical Methods 
 
This Appendix provides an informal introduction to the statistical methods used in this work.  
 
1. Categorical Variables. 
Most of this study’s data subject to statistical analysis are categorical, i.e., the instances are 
divided into discrete categories or “bins”. The categories may correspond to expressed opinions on 
various issues or reactions to offered statements, such as “agree”/“disagree” or “strongly agree”, 
“somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “strongly disagree”, etc. In other cases, they may correspond 
to basic demographic or social variables, such as gender, age, nationality, political affiliation, place of 
birth or residence, education, marital or family status, etc. In some cases the underlying variable may 
be numerical, such as age or monthly income, but rather than dealing with a wide range of continuous 
or discrete numerical values the parameters are categorised, e.g., with monthly incomes of less than 
Euros 1000, between Euros 1,000 and Euros 2000, and above Euros 2,000 considered separate 
categories. 
The technical notions in the rest of the Appendix will be mostly stated in application to such 
categorical variables. It should be noted that in some cases there might be a natural “order” between the 
categories, even though the relative scaling may or may not exist. Such order exists, for instance, 
between the “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, and “strongly disagree” 
reactions to various statements: clearly “somewhat agree” lies between “strongly agree" and 
“somewhat disagree”, while “strongly disagree lies further away from any agreement. This intuitively 
means that a categorical analysis that distinguishes between all the 4 responses may be more detailed, 
and yield more insight, than a similar analysis of the same data that only distinguishes between “agree” 
and “disagree”. At the same time, there is no definition of a quantitative scale, so the additional insight 
is limited and may be uncertain. One may wonder, for instance, how various respondents whose 
reaction to a particular statement is uncertain decide between “somewhat agree” and “somewhat 
disagree”, or whether a thoughtful or cautious person may choose “somewhat agree” over “strongly 
agree” if there is the tiniest doubt or hesitation in his or her mind. 
The above considerations are an important part of the decision to eliminate the “I do not know” 
and “Decline to state” responses from the analysis. Clearly, these are not subjects to the same 
qualitative order as the “definite” reactions. In cases where the real underlying variables are numeric 
(age, income, etc.) the scale may not be intuitively clear, either. There is no a priori information that 
would guide one to the “correct” – or “interesting”- categorisation. Should “low income” be defined as 
Euros 1,000/month? Does “young” correspond to “under 30 years of age”? Without extensive 
additional research such categorisation is necessarily arbitrary, at least to some extent.  In some cases, 
of course, no natural order exists even in a qualitative sense. Consider gender, nationality, place of 
residence, etc. 
A final note is that any statistical analysis assumes that the experimental sample is vary large 
and very random (the analytic results are “asymptotic” in this respect). This assumption may or may 
not be correct. The sample in this study may be regarded as moderately sized at best, there may be 
selection or self-selection biases (for instance, this study necessarily covers only individuals who 
agreed to respond to a survey or be interviewed), distortions (there is no proof that the answers were 
truthful), etc. This assumption will be explicitly referred in the rest of the appendix only if it is essential, 






2. Contingency Tables 
We used contingency tables because it is usual way to present the (multivariate) frequency 
distribution of sampled variables. For 2 variables, such as perceived discrimination (statement #15 in 
the Questionnaire: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against") and support for ISIS (statement 
#45 in the Questionnaire, “ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western Influence is legitimate”), 
where the responses to the “Discrimination” question are divided into 4 categories (“strongly agree”, 
“somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree", and “strongly disagree”), while “support for ISIS” has 2 
categories (“agree” and “disagree”) may look as follows (NB: this contingency table represents the 
















Agree 19 13 7 8 47 
Disagree 51 92 81 73 297 
Total 70 105 88 81 344 
 
Note that only the “definite” responses (cf. Section 1 above) are included. 
 
3. Chi-Squared Test of Association/Independence. 
As discussed in Section 1, we assume categorical variables. In particular, the categories are not 
necessarily ordered. Suppose that Variable A has m categories, and Variable B has k categories. The 
null hypothesis states that knowing the category of Variable A does not help you predict the category 
of Variable B. That is, the variables are independent. 
The alternative hypothesis is that knowing the category of Variable A can help you predict the 
category of Variable B, that is the variables are related and not independent. To summarise, the null 
hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (Ha) are: 
 
H0: Variable A and Variable B are independent. 
Ha: Variable A and Variable B are not independent. 
 
As an example, suppose A corresponds to perceived discrimination (statement #15 in the 
Questionnaire: “In Italy, as a Muslim, I feel discriminated against”) and B corresponds to expressed 
support for ISIS (statement #45 in the Questionnaire, “ISIS's struggle against dictatorships and Western 
Influence is legitimate”). Is there a relationship between these variables? Support for the alternative 
hypothesis suggests that the variables are related, but the relationship is not necessarily causal, in the 
sense that one variable “causes” the other. As an example, if we find that the perceived level of 
discrimination against Muslims is related to stated support for ISIS, this does not mean that 
respondents who feel discriminated against tend to support ISIS. It may mean, for instance, that ISIS 
supporters tend to feel (or at least report to feel) discriminated against in Italy. This is a crucial point 
when one interprets the data. 
The null hypothesis H0 in this example is that perceived discrimination and expressed support 
for ISIS are independent. The experimental data can be presented in the form of a “contingency table”, 
cf. Section 2 above (only the “definite” responses are included). The table shows that 47 out of 344 
respondents expressed support for ISIS activities (in the form of agreeing that those activities were 
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“legitimate”). Consider the 70 respondents out of 344 that strongly agree that Muslims in Italy are 
discriminated against. One would expect that the number of respondents who feel discrimination 
among ISIS supporters will be: 
 
      47*(70/344) = 9.56 
 
Instead, the actual observed number is 19. The residual difference between the observed and the 
expected results for this particular cell of the table is 
 
  (observed-expected)/sqrt(expected) = (19-9.56)/3.09 = 3.05 
 
The expected values corresponding to the observed values in Table 1 are shown in Table 2, and Table 3 
shows the residuals. The sum of squares of the residuals over all the cells in the table is the so-called 
“test statistics” usually dubbed “chi-squared”, and in our example it is 14.345. 
Under the null hypothesis the test statistics are distributed as the sum of squares of k 
independent normal variables (this incorporates the assumption that our sampling is completely random, 
cf. Section 1 above, and also assumes that the deviations are normally distributed). Such a distribution 
is usually called "chi-squared" (hence the name of the statistics and of the test itself, called “Pearson's 
chi-squared test”), and the number of variables is referred to as the number of “degrees of freedom”, 
equal to: 
 
    k = (#rows-1)*(#columns-1) = (4-1)*(2-1) = 3. 
 
Larger deviations are not likely under the null hypothesis. Therefore, if the test statistics value is 
improbably large, then one is compelled to reject the null hypothesis. The quantitative measure of the 
likelihood that the null hypothesis (H0) is correct is the so-called “p-value”, the probability that the chi-
squared statistics will be as large as it is under the null hypothesis. The smaller the p-value the more 
likely it is that the alternative hypothesis (Ha) is correct. 
The p-value corresponding to the observed chi-squared of 14.345 with 3 degrees of freedom is 
approximately 0.0025. Is this “small”? On the face of it, 0.25% is small indeed. In fact, for a normal 
distribution it roughly corresponds to 3 standard deviations, or “3 Sigmas”. However, one should 
remember the various assumptions that went into the analysis. The “large random sample” assumption 
is certainly not completely true and the sample size and biases lead to underestimation of the p-value. 
The assumption regarding the normal distribution of residuals is probably not true, either. Note that the 
latter leads to an underestimation of the p-value, since the normal distribution implies very low 
(exponentially low) probabilities of high residuals. This may be a good approximation for natural 
phenomena in thermal equilibrium. Social variables related to human behaviour tend to have much 
“fatter tails” and therefore the normal distribution assumption leads to unrealistically small p-values. 
These and other reasons mean that the "2 sigma" level of significance (corresponding to p-value 
of approximately 0.05) often adopted as a rule of thumb is probably inappropriate. The p-value of 
0.0025 in this example may be regarded as "moderately significant" at best, and to be reasonably 
certain that the null hypothesis can be rejected one would set the cut-off level quite a bit lower. It is 
well known that events whose probability according to normal models are at the level of dozens of 
standard deviations are observed with surprising frequency. A daily event will deviated by 3 standard 
deviations from the expected value (as in this illustrative example) approximately once a year, and by 2 
standard deviations every 3 weeks, which should look surprising enough to anyone who is used to 
considering 2 standard deviations significant. 
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All of the above considerations should lead a conscientious scholar to adopting a much smaller 
p-value as a significant result. The 5 sigma level (p-value of 5.7e-7) seems reasonable enough and is 
often a criterion of significance in natural sciences, and 4 sigma level (p-value of 6.3e-5) may be 
adopted if one is inclined to a compromise. The latter corresponds to observing a daily event with 4 
Sigma deviation twice in a lifetime. And all those, as mentioned, are significantly underestimated 
values in the context. 
 
4. Probabilities, Odds, and Logs 
 
Consider an event or an experiment with a binary categorical outcome. It may be a result of a coin or 
dice toss, Chelsea winning the Premier League, Tories winning the next general election, or an 
individual randomly chosen from some well defined population supporting ISIS. Let's call the two 
possible outcomes “success” and “failure”. 
Let us say that the probability of “success” is P, assume P=0.8 for a specific numerical example. 
The probability of “failure” is then 1-P=1-0.8=0.2. The odds of success -the number normally quoted 
by bookies- is the probability of success divided by the probability of failure (or sometimes the reverse 
– “odds against”). 
In our example the odds of success are P/(1-P)=0.8/0.2=4/1, normally quoted as "4 to 1". For a 
fair coin toss, of course, the probabilities of heads and tails are equal, P=1-P=0.5, and the odds of heads 
(or tails) are 1 to 1. To summarise the relationship between probability P and odds O of success may be 
expressed as: 
 
        O = P/(1-P), 
 
        P = O/(1+O). 
 
Odds are a monotonically increasing function of the probability of success, i.e., when the probability of 
success increases, the odds of success rise also. While the probability ranges between 0 an 1 odds range 
from 0 to positive infinity. 
Often one prefers to deal with logarithms of odds. Note that log() is also a monotonically 
increasing function that ranges from negative infinity to positive infinity. Dealing with logarithms of 
odds circumvents many difficulties intrinsic in modelling variable that vary within a restricted range, 
such as probability. The transformation from probability to logarithm of odds (the so-called 
“logit” transformation) allows one to deal with a variable defined as a real number without restrictions. 
We will adopt the notation: 
 
        logit(P) = log(O) = log(P/(1-P)) 
 
in what follows. 
 
5. Logistic Regression 
A logistic regression model considers a relationship between a binary categorical variable and a 
group of predictor variables.  It models the logit-transformed probability (cd Section 4 above) as a 
linear combination of the predictor variables.  We will note in passing that the model does not have to 
be linear in predictor variables. It may also include “interaction” terms (products of predictors) of the 
second, third, and higher orders. One should note that when categorical predictors (cf. Section 1) are 
considered the model will include a coefficient for each category of each predictor.  
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Application of a logistic regression model means determination of the coefficients for each term. 
Each coefficient is the expected change in the logarithm of odds as the corresponding predictor's value 
is switched from one category to the next (here is where the “ordering” between non-binary categories 
becomes meaningful, cf. Section 1), with the rest of the predictors in the model kept constant. The 
exponent of each coefficient is the ratio of two odds corresponding to the two values of the 
corresponding predictor. 
One can also consider the goodness of fit by computing the model’s residuals (differences 
between the predicted and observed values) and the chi-squared statistics (cf. Section 3). The p-value – 
the probability of having the chi-squared statistics, i.e., the sum of squares of the residuals, at least as 
large as observed - will 
 indicate the goodness of the fit: the smaller the p-value the better. Obviously, this provides a 
quantitative means to compare competing models. One can add the model's terms one by one to analyse 
how the residuals diminish and determine which of the parameters are the most significant in the model. 
 
6. Wald z-test 
One can estimate the probability that a coefficient in the logistic regression model is 0, i.e., that 
the corresponding predictor is not significant in the model. More specifically, the difference between 
the maximum likelihood estimate of the coefficient (cf. Section 5 above) and the proposed value (0), 
normalised on the estimate of the variance, is compared to the chi-squared distribution (cf. Section 3 
above). The lower the corresponding p-value is the more readily the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
is 0 and the corresponding category of the predictor is not significant in the model can be rejected. 
The Wald z-test may be performed on a group of coefficients. The most obviously useful case is to 
estimate the collective significance of the coefficients corresponding to all the categories of a particular 
predictor. This gives an overall estimate of how significant that predictor variable is in the model. 
Another potentially interesting analysis consists of looking at the difference between the model 
coefficients of different categories of the same categorical predictor. Essentially, it is a test whether the 
coefficients, say, of the “somewhat agree” and “somewhat disagree” responses to a statement in a 
questionnaire are the same. If they are then there is no significant differences between the subsamples 
that gave the two responses. Such an analysis can be performed by running a Wald test with opposite 
weights (+1 and -1) assigned to the two terms in question, and zero weights assigned to all the other 
terms (this is called "weighted Wald test" in the main body of this study). The difference is compared 
to the chi-squared distribution and the resulting p-value indicates whether the difference between the 

















Appendix 5: Excerpts from the Transcripts of Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
The full transcript of the interviews and focus groups is attached to the thesis. Every voice reports, in 
this order, the city, the date (month and year), the number of people taking part to the interview/focus 
group, their nationality, gender, religion (Sunni or Shia), employment status (employed, employer, 
student, unemployed), age range (16-30, 30-60, >60), and the time they have spent in Italy (<1, <5, >5 
years). 
 
#1) Rome, 03/16, #3 Bangladeshi, male, Sunni, employed, 16-30, 1 year in Italy 
6. What about if someone insults Islam and its prophet? 
a. Not even in this case is violence justified, because the teaching of Mohammad and even 
his very own life prohibit us from responding violently to any kind of provocation. 
b. You cannot kill innocent people, even if they wronged you. 
c. The only case in which violence is justifiable is in face of oppression, in self defence. 
Let’s say someone kills or attacks your family or your Muslim brethren, you then can 
kill or attack your enemy’s family, for the Quran allows you to do so. 
 
#2) Rome, 03/16, #2, Bangladeshi, male, Sunni, 1 employed, 1 employer, 16-30 & 30-60, > 5 
7. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. Radicalisation exists and is a big problem because people who don’t know Islam read 
the Quran, take some parts out of context, and use them for their own needs 
b. Yes and it’s huge 
 
#3) Rome, 03/16, #2, Moroccan, male, Sunni, 30-60, 1 unemployed, 1 employed, >5 
7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. If there is oppression or if you offend our prophet, it’s somewhat justifiable. 
b. It’s definitely right to punish someone who offends the prophet, maybe even physically 
especially if this person keeps doing that, but he/she should not be killed. 
 
 
#4) Rome, 03/16, #3, Egyptian/Italian, male, Sunni, 20-30, all born in Italy, employed, >5 
6. What causes that [Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. Definitely identity crisis 
b. I think it’s the people you know because you must know someone who can point you 
and guide you if you want to do those types of things. 
c. I think it’s actually more about the money, those people don’t care about Islam or the 
state of the Islamic world, they have nothing to do and what they truly care about is the 
money, that’s it. 
 
5) Rome, 03/16, #2, Somali, Palestinian, male, Sunni, 20-30, employed, >5 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
a. Look what happen is Paris was tragic, but if you touch our prophet, you know, there are 
some crazy people out there and it can be dangerous. 
b. Killing is bad, but you should not do it, if you do, you should be sued immediately. 
 
#7) Naples, 05/16, #8, Senegalese, male, 16-30, Sunni, employed, 2 <1 & 6 <5 years 
6. What causes that [Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. (8) Money, business, and various opportunities 
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i. They just want money and to become famous, they were poor, had nothing 
before and when groups like Isis offers them something to improve their 
everyday situation, they take it with no regard to God or any other religion for 
that matter. 
ii. They think they can have women because they feel cool 
iii. If they say they are the bad guys the get women…lucky them! 
iv.  They are poor people who can have some money and food, so they go 
v. Also, they are thieves who rob people and can get rich that way 
vi. Money I tell you! 
vii. I think they are all Jews wanting money and control over the world 
viii. Or maybe because these people think they can cleanse past sins by joining this 
cause. 
 
9. What are your views regarding Isis and al-Qaeda? 
b. (8) They got it all wrong. How can a person say he’s Muslim and do such a thing. 
Shame on them, they are godless people, that’s what they are. 
i. We hate them because they are the worst thing happened to Islam 
ii. They are not Muslim and they will go to Hell.  
iii. They don’t know what Islam, they only do what they do for the money, to get 
women, steal, and do things that are utterly forbidden in Islam. 
iv. We despise them, they are a disgrace, are made of infidels! 
 
#8) Naples, 05/16, #1 Senegal, male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5  
8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda 
a. They are the only defenders of oppressed people in Syria and the Middle East 
 
#10) Naples, 05/16, #3 Pakistani, male, Sunni, 30-16, 2 employed, 1 employer <5  
6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. It’s only possible if one brother is attacked and cries for help, then I have to help him, 
because I have to be a good Muslim 
b. (2) It’s natural when a person is oppressed to rebel and do whatever he can to end the 
suffering, even by fighting. 
i. What would you do? 
 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
c. (3) If you decide to insult Mohammad it’s your risk, you should not do that. 
i. There are a lot of crazy people out there 
 
#12) Naples, 05/16, #2 Algeria, male, Sunni, 30-60, employers, >5  
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. No, Islam has no issues, extremists do not exist in Islam, and those who say they are, 
they are not real Muslims. 
b. I don’t agree. Radicalisation has become a problem because people who know nothing 
of Islam, who have not studied it, take some figurative notions and take them too far, but 





6. What do you think are the causes for such radicalisation? 
c. They don’t understand anything about Islam, they only use it for political purposes. In 
the end, it’s all a game of politics, international politics, featuring global interests. All 
the players in the game have political purposes and, some of them, Muslims and non-
Muslims too, use Islam and wrongfully self-proclaimed Islamic groups to obtain precise 
political goals in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
d. Wow, what an answer, yes I agree with him all along!  
 
#15) Naples, 05/16, #2 Italian, male, Sunni converts, 30-16, unemployed.   
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?  
a. Money and lack of knowledge of Islam 
b. They are crazy people whose lives are awful because they made bad choices or 
something not allowed in the Quran, which brought sadness upon them.  They drink, 
smoke, have sex before marriage, and use drugs, then they get used by these criminals 
and do bad things. 
 
# 16) Naples, 05/16, #1 Italian, male, Sunni since birth, 30-16, student   
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. Yes. There are people who definitely take parts of the Quran out of context and use 
them to pursue their political, unholy interests. But I also must say that they are really a 
minority and fear towards them is exaggerated, even created by the media to securitise 
our community and keep us under control. 
 
#19) Naples, 05/16, #2 Morocco, male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5  
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?  
a. (2) The only two things people like that are motivated by: money and women. 
 
#20) Genoa, 05/16, #10 (4 Tunisian, 2 Palestinian, 2 Italian, 1 Albanian, 1 Algerian), male, Sunni, 5 
30-16, 5 30-60, 3 students, 7 employed, >5  
7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. (7) You can never kill innocent people, people deserve to live, even if they are bad 
people 
i. Islam is all about mercy and making it up to your neighbour. 
ii. If you kill without a good reason Allah will never forgive you 
iii. Since we are little they teach us to forgive, to never raise our voice, you have to 
show everyone the right path, which is Allah’s. But if you kill or punch someone, 
that is not what Allah has taught you 
iv. Killing people, even if they have wronged you, goes against the real peaceful 
essence of Islam 
b. (3) The only case in which violence can be justified is if there is oppression. If a brother 
is in danger or under the yoke of the oppressor, it is a religious duty to go and help him 
i. Yet, you can never kill civilians 







#21) Reggio Emilia, 04/16, #30 ( 8 Tunisian, 3 Turkish, 6 Morocco, 5 Egyptian, 1 Lebanese, 3 
Albanian, 1 Saudi, 1 Libya, 2 Algerian), male, Sunni, 18= 30-16, 12= 30-60, all employed, all >5  
 
6. Then, in addition to this, for those who say radicalisation exists, what do you think can be other 
causes? (Only for the 15 who agreed radicalisation exists) 
a. (4) Definitely money and power 
b. I say Western racism and oppression 
c. You know, the West has always done some really bad things, especially towards the 
Arab. And if you look at the last ten years, I think it’s pretty clear some people in the 
West are at war with us and with Islam. I don’t justify terrorism, but you also have to 
understand that it may be caused by injustice perpetrated by the West 
d. Especially if you look at the Syrian case, or other dictatorship that were put there by the 
West. First you put there people who massacre their own people, but then, when it’s 
time to intervene to save lives, if there is no direct interest for the West, you look the 
other way. This is why people then go fight for Isis. 
e. I also think people here in Europe are so frustrated by their inability to find their spot in 
society that just become radicalised 
f. Finally, in addition to all of this, I think sometimes we don’t really know who we are, 
we’re not sure if Italy or the West are good for us, I mean, we love it here, but when you 
take a look at the values this society is fostering, like nudity, same-sex marriage and 
such, where do we stand? Do we want to be part of it? And where there is confusion as 
to who we are and where we’d like to live, that’s when vulnerable people can fall prey 
to such nonsense 
g. (2) Money and prostitutes 
h.  These people are just so bored. Come work with me, then you’ll see you don’t want to 
believe that crap 
i. They are screwed in the head, they are mentally ill 
j. (2) Again, it’s because people don’t know Islam 
i. That is the core question here, trust me 
 
7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
k. (2) I think these topics are way too complicated for people like us, and even you, to 
understand. The only way we can answer this, is that if we go to the real source, which 
is the Quran, and to the people who have dedicated their whole lives to understand 
what’s written in it, that is, the teachers. 
l. (23) Well, in spite of all of this, of all of the things we have just said, I think I can speak 
for all of us when I say it’s super wrong  
i. It’s against the message and even the life of the prophet 
ii. A true Muslim can never harm a person, because, if he does, the first person he 
kills is himself, his soul, and then not just the other person, but all of humanity 
iii. A true Muslim cannot even hurt a tree 
iv. There was a time in which, if you were a Muslim, you had to brace arms to 
guarantee your survival and the survival of Islam, but that time has been over for 
many centuries. Now there can never be a justification for that, because Islam is 
here, even in Italy, we can pray and be Muslim. 
v. A true Muslim cannot yell “Allah Ahkbar” and kill someone. This person is not 
a Muslim and when he will be before Allah, he will be sent straight to Hell for 
killing innocent people and harming Islam 
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vi. I think by now you know the answer, that every true Muslim condemns violence 
in the name of Islam, because Islam is simply not about violence, but it tells you 
how to live in peace in every circumstance 
vii. You are free not to follow the tenets and still Allah can forgive you, but if you 
kill someone, it is going to be really difficult, unless you truly repent, for Allah 
to forgive you 
viii. For these people, the terrorists, there is just no place in our society. We hate 
them as much as you and everybody else do. And do you know why? Because 
their actions reflect on us and affect us first than everybody else. Remember, we 
are the first victims. 
m. (5) Yes, but, although this type of violence cannot be justified, you still can understand 
it 
i. Think you are a Syrian citizen. Who is going to protect you? Assad? Putin? The 
West? No, only other true Muslims who are obliged to come protect you if you 
are in danger 
ii. If there is violence, if people are dying and the West does nothing, what is left 
for the Syrians? If other people do not take action, there’s only death 
iii. And at this point, it’s really a religious duty for every true Muslim to defend 
oppressed and persecuted brothers. Besides, as a man, you must defend your 
own home and your own brothers. If you cannot, other men will come protect 
you. That’s what they do, it’s their job as good Muslim men. 
 
9. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda? 
n. (3) What type of question is that? It’s even offensive for us to talk about it 
o. (2) We don’t know anything about them, and don’t want to know anything about them 
p. (25) They are not real Muslims, they do not represent us  
i. They do not represent any kind of Islam or Muslims by any means 
ii. They were created by the CIA and Israel 
iii. Have you ever wondered how a group of young guys with no real military 
experience has managed to hold a city like Paris hostage for hours, almost killing 
the French Prime Minister at the stadium? Isn’t it clear that it’s an inside job or, 
worse, Israel did that? 
iv. And, I’m sorry, how come Isis has yet to attack Israel? It’s all part of a big plan 
against us and Islam 
v. Have you ever asked yourself, if Isis were actually real, how come it’s still 
there? I mean, after all, you have the US, Russia, and a huge coalition against, 
what, some thousands fighters and former soldiers from Saddam Hussein’s army. 
How is it possible they are still there, killing, burning, and pillaging? Perhaps 
someone needs them? 
vi. Who sells them weapons, who runs them? It’s the Jews and Israel. 
vii. Same thing as for 9/11. Israel knew about it. That day 3000 people perished, but, 
among them, not even one Israeli in the largest financial district in the world. 
Israel called every person who was there warning them not to go to work. But 
that’s no surprise, because they run everything, the Zionists, the media, 
information, and the economy. 
viii. I am sorry Michele, my brothers at the beginning did not mean to be rude with 
you. It’s just Isis is so bad and hurts us so much to see other people who call 
themselves Muslims do the opposite of what a true Muslim would do, this is why 
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we get frustrated and even offended at times, but we are here to tell you we are 
not all like them, in fact, they are a very small part of the big family Islam really 
is. 
 
#22) Rome, 04/16, #4  (3 Egypt, 1 Morocco) male, Sunni, 30-16, employed, >5  
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. (4) Absolutely not. 
i. Islam is the true, perfect path towards salvation, whoever kills innocent people, 
other Muslims, and women and children is not Muslims, even if they say they 
are 
ii. They are mercenaries only driven by money who are controlled by the 
Americans and the Jews. Think about 9/11, is it possible that people from all 
over the world, including Christians and Muslims, died that day, but not even 
one Israeli died? They are behind them 
 
6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
b. (2) A true Muslim cannot hurt anyone. Even if a Muslim is forced into war, there are 
many rule one has to follow, because life and its sanctity come first 
c. (2) Violence cannot be justified unless there is a good cause, like defending oppressed 
brothers 
 
#23) Bergamo, 05/16, #12, 5 Italian, 7 Morocco, male, Sunni, 8 students, 4 employed, all 16-30, >5 
3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media? 
a. (11) For us, the media is our enemy number 1, the worst thing for us Muslims living 
here 
i. The media is writing false things about Islam because the political world does 
not want Italy to get to know us and Islam 
ii. There is a clear media war meant to discredit Islam. If a white, Christian, Italian 
or European citizen commits a heinous crime, as it happened in Norway, we 
always find out the person had some personal issues or that he mentally ill, while 
if a Muslim does the same thing he’s automatically labelled as a terrorist.  
iii. This type of double standard helps some politicians get votes, it’s all calculated 
iv. I think you remember a major headline following the Paris attack entitled 
“Islamic bastards”. I think that explains itself as a mixture of ignorance, fear, and 
political goals hidden in the media war against Islam. If someone bad happens, 
all of us become affected, an entire religion is judged, and our credibility ends up 
on the line. 
b. (1) Though I totally agree with everything said, I think the responsibility lies on our end 
too because we complain but rarely take action in a constructive way, because we in the 
first place don’t know much about Islam in order to explain what it really is and that’s 
where it gets really hard to fight ignorance and prejudice. 
 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
c. (1) I honestly would not know man 
d. (2) There is not because Islam is perfect and people are just bad people regardless of 
their religion 
e. (9) There is, although it’s not as bad as they tell us 
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i. You probably know that Muslims are killed by these terrorists for the most part 
and, on top of it, if you look at who commits the most acts of terrorism, Muslim 
perpetrators are the great minority. This problem exists but it’s minimal. 
ii. In fact, if you think that we are more than a billion and a half in world and there 
are only a few thousands who are now in Syria, you do the math, but it’s a very 
small percentage of the whole Muslim population in the world. 
iii. It’s just a bunch of guys who say they are Muslims, but they are wrong and do 
wrong 
iv. You don’t have to believe anything. Those people, in my opinion, are not even 
Muslims in the real sense of the term, they are from some place else in the world, 
I feel that. 
 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]?  
f. (2) Honestly, I don’t know because, if you are a real Muslim, anything can happen to 
you, but you are called to accept it because it’s Allah that allows it.  
i. I don’t know what goes off in that person’s head to push him to use violence. It 
must be something incredibly personal meant to be searched in that person’s past 
traumatic experiences  
g. (10) It’s a combination of many factors, like money and ignorance in the first place 
i. The fact they don’t know Islam is crucial, because a person who studies, goes to 
the mosque and such cannot be brainwashed. The fact is that we don’t talk as 
much as we should about these things. 
ii. But this tells us that knowing the wrong people is also instrumental because 
without those individuals there would be less people diverting from the real path 
of Islam 
iii. I think poverty and ignorance are key elements 
iv. I think Western racism and discrimination also play a role because if you are 
happy here and have your place in society, why on Earth should you lose it all to 
go die for something that we all know is fake? 
v. I think those people must be crazy, drugged up too, because otherwise they 
would not be able to kill innocent people just like that, with no remorse 
 
#25) Rome, 04/16, # 1 Italian convert, male, Sunni convert, 30-60, employed 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. Yes, and I think it’s because of people who take tenets of Islam too far, or just don’t 
understand them. In other cases, these people just use such tenets to obtain power or 
other political purposes  
 
#26) Florence 04/16, #1 Algerian, male, Sunni, >60, employed, >5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. Yes, radicalisation is huge and our communities have to do something. 
 
#28) Milan 04/16, #2, 1 Italian convert, 1 Pakistani, male, Sunni, employed, 30-60, >5 
3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media? 
a. (1) The media are engaging in a real crusade against Islam. You must not believe 
anything you read or watch on TV because it’s false. A true Muslim is peaceful, 
violence has no place in God’s kingdom. A true Muslim is calm, honest, and tries to 
resolve problems with words, not swords. A true Muslim would never kill innocent 
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people, would never burn, rape, pillage, and do things like that. Even if you insult the 
prophet, I cannot kill you, I will sue you, but God forbid I use violence in his name, and 
whoever does so, he’s not a Muslim 
b. (1) Al-Qaeda and Isis are not made of Muslims. They are made of CIA men and are 
orchestrated by the secret services from Israel. They exist just to serve their political 
purposes and create fear towards Islam and justify war, confiscation, and robbery 
against Muslims around the world. In spite of what you’ve read and seen, what 
happened in Paris didn’t really happen at all. The people at the Bataclan theatre didn’t 
really die, because if you look at blood traces on the wall, they are all in the wrong 
position, they cannot coincide with bullet wounds. The people you see laying on the 
ground are actually actors who were put there and if you look closely at the image of 
those “dead” bodies, you can see the symbol of the Jews Freemasons. But this makes 
sense, how could a bunch of guys with criminal background engineer something like 
this? How could they even get close to Hollande? That’s preposterous, but, again, it 
makes sense because the Jews and the Freemasons control the world and, with Israel, 
use everything they create ad hoc to enslave Muslims, just like in Palestine. But no 
worries, they are destined to fall, Allah will bring upon them great punishment and 
Israel will not exist anymore 
 
#29) Varese, 03/16, #1 Morocco, female, Sunni, 30-60, unemployed, <5 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. They see some advantages in choosing this path. The first one is money, in the first 
place. Also, if you don’t know anything about Islam and you meet with people who are 
bad, tell you if you kill yourself you’re going to Heaven, you can, at times, be 
brainwashed, and then you think God will reward you 
 
8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
                 a. This person has to be punished harshly. 
 
#32) Brescia, 03/16, #10 Tunisian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, >5 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. (2) Money and lust for power 
b. (2) They are just crazy, sad people, who had bad experiences in the past, maybe even 
used drugs and stuff 
c. (1) Their lives are bad, I mean, look at where those people live in France, something like 
this gives them purpose and a sense of nobility 
d. (5) In our case, we have to mention the role dictatorships play in this. A dictatorship is 
the worst thing that can happen to you. If you dare to have a different opinion, they put 
you in jail, they torture you, they bring your wife and rape her in front of you, and then 
they even hurt your kids. Which kind of person can you turn into then? Plus, a person 
who can be easily influenced can be persuaded to go fight for Isis through false 
promises of greatness 
i. Can you imagine growing up in that? What kind of person do you become? 
ii. They don’t care and they will hurt everyone you love just because they feel like 
it 




8. What about if someone offends Islam and its Prophet? 
e. (3) Nothing happens 
i. We just have to tell you it’s wrong, but the prophet never reacted violently when 
someone insulted him, so who are we to do otherwise? 
f. (4) We can take legal action because Mohammed cannot be touch, as he’s sacred for us. 
i. We are for freedom of speech, but your freedom ends when someone’s starts. 
We respect all of the prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and even the 
Virgin Mary, because, if you do not, you cannot be a real Muslim. So, given that 
we respect this, why shouldn’t people respect our prophet and our sacred truth? 
ii. In fact, you can insult me, my wife, my children, and all of the people who are 
here. It would hurt, but it wouldn’t hurt as much as if you offended our prophet, 
because all of our lives, compared to him, are worth nothing, and so, when 
someone insults Mohammed it hurts us real bad inside of our souls, because he’s 
more sacred than our lives. 
g. (3) It’s wrong to kill people, but I understand that if you insult Mohammed and there are 
some crazy people out there, it’s your risk 
i. If there are some hotheads and you insult the prophet, it’s your fault  
 
# 37) Modena, 06/16, #6, Turkish, male, Sunni, 1 16-30, 5 30-60, 5 employed, 1 other, >5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. (2) Yes, but it’s because people don’t know Islam and take some rules too far 
i. They misinterpret what is written in the Quran and use it for political purposes 
b. (4) No, in the sense that Islam is perfect, while men are imperfect 
 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
c. (1) In the first place, ignorance and misinterpretation about Islam, which, by definition, 
teaches to be respectful of everything and everyone on Earth, since a young age. 
d. (1) I say people who go fight for Isis are mere mercenaries who have nothing going on 
in their own lives and are just lured by the money 
e. (3) Well, we also have to take into account the horrible situation the French and the 
English created in our region after WWI. They divided the land that the Ottomans had 
ruled for centuries without caring of cultural and societal differences. Now everything is 
falling apart and I think much of the mess that came out of it can be attributed to 
Western intervention and imperialism 
i. Look at Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine...all lands where the Europeans had 
conquered and look at them today  
f. (1) I also think that, In order to kill innocent people whom you have never even met 
before, you must be twisted, a mentally ill person. In fact, many have used drugs or had 
personal problems that brought them to violence. 
 
8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
g. (1) Killing someone is out of the question. But at the same time, just like in your family 
you have to discipline your children and punish them if they persevere in their mistakes, 
you have to do the same here. If you decide to write offensive caricatures and I tell you 
that insults me once, twice, three times, four times, etc., then maybe, if I slap you, you 
stop.  
h. (5) Nobody should afford to insult the prophet, but nobody should be killed if that 
happens. 
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i. If you do it, I am compelled, as a Muslim, to tell you that you are making a big 
mistake, but that’s it.  
ii. I would invite you to our mosque so that you can learn what Mohammad means 
to us and why it’s really hurtful to us when someone insults him 
iii. But at the same time, given that we have laws here in Italy to protect religious 
minorities, those who insult Islam should be prosecuted  
iv. No one should be punished physically, but legally   
 
#39) Verona, 06/16, #2, Gambian, male, Sunni, 16-30, unemployed, <1 
6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. (1) Only if there is a good reason God can allow it, like say if you have to defend 
yourself 
b. (1) I don’t want to answer 
 
#41) Milan, 06/16, #1, Kurdish, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, > 5 
6. What do you think its causes are [Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. They want money and want to feel great and important people 
 
#42) Milan, 06/16, #1, Egyptian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. No, at least not here. Here in Italy, Imams teach us to love the country and its 
inhabitants. We have to earn our spot in society, and maybe one day Milan could have 
too, like London, a Muslim mayor who serves all citizens. So, you see, there is just no 
room for radicalism and extremism here; we would be the first victims 
 
#43) Milan, 06/16, #1, Egyptian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. No, Islam is the true religion for all people and Italy will all convert one day. In fact, in 
50 years you will be working for us and all women in the street will wear the veil or the 
burka.  
 
6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
b. Islam and violence cannot go in the same sentence unless you are talking about non-
Muslims oppressing Muslims 
 
#47) Milan, 06/16, #4, 3 Egyptian, 1 Algerian, 3 male, 1 female, Sunni, 2 16-30, 2 30-60, 3 employed, 1 
employed, > 5 
7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. (1) If there is oppression you are compelled to take action to defend your Muslim 
brothers 
b. (3) I don’t agree, violence in the name of God is not right 
i. I don’t agree either because you cannot kill in the name of God 
ii. I see your point, which is about self-defence. Yet, although self-defence can be 
justified, you cannot justify it as ‘God told me to do so’, because if God allows 
you to go fight, then it’s his will, but if you sense it’s not the right thing, like Isis 




#48) Milan, 06/16, #2, Bangladesh, male, Sunni, 30-60, employer, > 5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. Yes 
b. I don’t think there is. Islam is perfect, it teaches you how to love, how to behave, how to 
be peaceful at all times, then, if you hurt someone in the name of God, I am not sure if 
He will ever forgive you. 
 
#52) Milan, 06/16, #1, Albanian, male, Sunni, 30-60, employed, > 5 
6. What do you think its causes are [Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. Lack of heated debate on the interpretation of Islam and the role of violence plays in it 
 
#53) Milan, 06/16, #1, Italian-Egyptian, female, Sunni, 16-30, student, > 5 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. They just don’t know what the real Islam is all about. If they knew, they would never 
become radical 
 
#54) Reggio Calabria, 06/16, #1, Moroccan, female, Sunni, 16-30, student, > 5 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. It’s very simple, for it is the oldest reason in the world: money 
 
#55) Carpi, 06/16, #1, Pakistani, male, Shia, 16-30, student, > 5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. There are people who use their credo as a means of destruction. Islam means peace and 
has nothing to do with being radical. 
 
#56) Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #1, Pakistani, male, Shia, 16-30, student, > 5 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. Lack of religious knowledge, along with bad leaders  
 
#57) Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #6, 2 Moroccan, 1 Egyptian, 1 Tunisian, 1 Syrian , 1 Italian convert, male, 
employed, Sunni, 2 16-30, 4 30-60, >5 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
a. (1) Look, you are Italian just like me. If you want to ask me why I converted, why Allah 
is the true and only God, I am here for you, but otherwise, this doesn’t concern me, 
because Islam is perfect, there is no violence, no radicalisation 
b. (4) All of those who are radical are not real Muslims, they don’t know what Islam 
actually is 
i. It’s just people who want money 
ii. Many of them had already had terrible experiences, were drugged up, were 
stupid, and didn’t even read the Quran. But they are not Muslims.  
iii. What does “Allah Akhbar mean”? Everyone can say it, even you could and are 
you a Muslim? It’s not enough to cry that aloud in a public place, you don’t 
become Muslim, you’re not a Muslim just for that. You have to live Islam, 
follow the teachings of the prophet, which are all about peace. So, ask yourself: 
can those people be Muslims? No, they cannot. 
1. They are Jews from the Mossad 
2. They are mercenaries that someone, you know who, has paid to obscure 
and discredit Islam 
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c. (1) Brothers, please, enough. They are our brothers, we have to stop going around the 
problem. There is a problem not with Islam but in Islam, we have a problem of 
radicalisation and those, even if they follow or don’t, are Muslims, they are our brothers 
who are wrong and need to be corrected, but it’s not gonna do us any good if we just 
refrain from addressing the problem, a problem which is given by ignorance, 
misinterpretation, and exploitation of unsettled youths by some radical preachers 
 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
d. (5) The very prophet has suffered insults and many pieces of injustice in his life, but 
never reacted with violence 
i. I can talk to you, tell you that what you are doing is wrong, but that’s it 
ii. The only thing I can do is to take legal action and demonstrate, but I certainly 
cannot kill you 
iii. I would just ignore you, because you have no idea what you could be facing once 
you’re in front of God in the day of judgement  
e. (1) Yes, but there are lots of crazy people out there, if you decide to provoke them, it’s 
your own risk, because you know by now how bad insulting the Prophet is 
 
#58) Bologna, 06/16, #1, Tunisian, male, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
a. It is a huge provocation, which should not be done and you should be sued. Yet, even if 
I think killing or hurting someone is wrong, I think we are doomed to wars of religion, 
because people don’t understand how hurtful insulting Mohammed is 
 
 
#60) Bologna 07/16, #3, 2 Egyptian, 1 Tunisian, male, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5 
7. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. (3) The only thing that Islam allows is self-defence, that is if you are attacked, then you 
can react, but that’s it. Violence, offensive violence can never be justified 
 
#61) Padua, 07/16, #1, Jordanian, male, Sunni, employed,16-30, >5  
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. Complete lack of religious knowledge, because if you are a radical, you are not a 
Muslim because the Quran and the Prophet teach us to respect everyone 
 
#62) Modena, 06/16, #1, Italian, female, student, Sunni since birth, 16-30 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. Lack of religious knowledge, because people read just a few lines, know nothing of the 
complexity of the Quran, and use only parts of it for political purposes. Yet, I think that, 
especially in the case of Europe, including Italy too, it’s because of failed processes of 
integration and identity crises. These people don’t know who they are, don’t feel 








#63) Reggio Emilia, 06/16, #1, Italian, female, student, Sunni since birth, 16-30 
6. What do you think its causes are [of Islamist radicalisation]? 
a. I don’t think it’s because of money, poverty, and denied rights as many Muslims are 
saying. It’s because people don’t know their own religion, hence, it’s an internal 
problem that we have to face and come to terms with. 
 
#64) Padua, 07/16, #1, Moroccan, female, student, Sunni, 16-30, >5, living in Venice also 
3. What are your views regarding how Islam is portrayed in Italy, especially in the media? 
a. Things are improving, but there is a long way to go. Now you see Muslims on TV when 
there is terrorism. But that’s the point, only when terrorism happens. They never call an 
expert on any issue, let’s say medicine, to discuss something related to his/her field. 
They want Muslims, instead, only when it’s about terrorism, but this, you see, creates an 
immediate correlation between Islam and terrorism, between Italy and its Muslim 
citizens who have to defend themselves, and the tones are never that constructive. I 
guess it’s a start because, some time ago, many TV shows didn’t even invite Muslims; 
yet, Muslims now are always on the other side, they always have to defend themselves 
for something 99% of them already condemns…in short, Muslims are like defendants.  
 
5. Do you think there is an issue of radicalisation in Islam? 
b. Yes of course, there are people who use the name of God to hurt other people, but I 
think the causes of this phenomenon are not to be researched in who knows what field. I 
think terrorism is nothing but military tactics that misuses or twists a certain ideology 
for political purposes, in the end. 
 
8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda 
c. They got it all wrong because they go against the pure Islam. Of course there are some 
dirty games underneath it, but those organisations are made by Muslims for Muslims. 
Let’s not forget that they are waging war on Muslims and Islam in the first place, not on 
the West. They break families, make false promises, twist the religion, and kill 
exponentially more Muslims than non-Muslims. First and foremost, they are at war with 
Islam 
 
#65) Modena, 06/16, #1, Moroccan, male, employer, Sunni, 16-30 >5 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
a. I cannot kill you, but I do understand if someone punches you because you cannot touch 
the Prophet  
 
#67) Catania, 06/16, #1, Algerian, male, employed, Sunni, 30-60 
8. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
a. The peaceful nature of Islam leaves no room for violence, at any time, especially in the 
name of God 
 
#68) Palermo, 06/16, #1, Tunisian, male, other, Sunni, 30-60 
6. What are your views regarding violence in the name of God? 
a. Allah is merciful and teaches us to love. But self-defence is allowed in Islam. If they 




#71) Florence, 05/16, #1, Somali, male, employed, Sunni, 30-60 
7. What about if someone offends Islam and its prophet? 
a. That person should be definitely punished, even physically if he doesn’t stop and repent 
 
8. What are your views about Isis and al-Qaeda 
b. They are the ones who defend the people that the Syrian and the Western regimes 











































Appendix 6: Association Tests, Single Parameter Analyses, Regressions, and Wald Z-Tests with 
Weights 
 
1) Association Tests  
 
The following Table summarises the scores of the p-value resulting from the association tests of the 25 
models that were tested (+ “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” that was inserted throughout the course 
of the analysis). Most of the assumed variables were not significant from the start, for they scored p-
values greater than 0.05, which is the threshold we used. For those variables that were indeed 
significant in the first part of the analysis, that is, displaying significant p-values in the association tests, 
we then present their single parameter analysis results and then regression models to show their final 
insignificance.  
 
A. Table of all the association tests of the 25 tested models (+ “Duty to punish offenders of Islam”) in 






p-values of the Chi-square tests, threshold 0.05 
 
Violence in 
defence of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of 
Islam 
Support for Al 
Qaeda 
Support for ISIS 
1) Age 0.78 0.49 0.62 0.47 
2) Gender 0.005* 0.04* 0.32 0.04* 




0.25 0.85 0.051 0.047* 
3.2) Nationality 
(African/Rest) 
0.22 0.79 0.02* 0.08 
3.3) Nationality 
(Italian/Rest) 
0.17 0.56 0.08 0.02 
4) Born in Italy 0.31 0.32 0.007* 0.06 
5) Years lived in Italy 
(<1, <5, >5) 
0.10 0.54 0.34 0.65 
6) Geography**  
(Rome+Lombardy/Rest) 
0.008* 9.E-5* 0.02* 0.29 
7) Social status 0.68 0.42 0.15 0.09 
8) # of children 0.86 0.41 0.99 0.80 
9) Monthly pay 0.31 0.60 0.11 0.01* 
10) Educational 
attainment 
0.57 0.40 0.0004* 0.0008* 
11) Occupation 0.14 0.32 0.03* 0.26 
12) Political party 0.59 0.17 8.E-7* 0.009* 
13) Religious 
participation 
0.77 0.72 0.22 0.006*  
14) Religion 0.56 0.01* 0.35 0.69 
15) Discrimination 0.0003* 5.E-6* 3.E-5* 0.0003* 
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16) Social difficulties 1.E-5* 6.E-9* 3.E-10* 1.E-5* 
17) Finding good job 0.03* 0.001* 0.009* 0.03* 
18) Western FP 0.004* 1.E-6* 1.E-5* 0.0006* 
19) Oppression of 
Muslims 
 
1.E-8* 1.E-11* 1.E-6* 0.0002* 
20) Frustration 3.E-5* 2.E-7* 3.E-12* 6.E-9* 
21) Traumatic 
experiences 
0.29 0.09 0.0003* 0.03* 
22) Identity crisis 3.E-5* 3.E-6* 1.E-5* 3.E-5* 
23) Rational factors 0.0004* 0.15 3.E-5* 0.005* 
24) Networks 0.005* 0.02* 1.E-5* 0.006* 
25) Ideology 2.E-18* 3.E-17* 1.E-28* 1.E-34* 
26) Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
2.E-59* - 1.E-34* 7.E-32* 
* Significant values being inferior to the “0.05” significance level. 
** We ran many tests for this variable. We tested every single city (15 in total), and we combined 
regions and areas of Italy. For the sake of analysis, though, we are only presenting the variable, which 
is the combination of “Rome” and the “Lombardy” region juxtaposed to the rest of the country, which 
eventually resulted partially significant in the regression models. 
 
2) Single Parameters of Significant Variables After the Association Tests 
The following section presents the single parameter analyses of the most significant predictive 
variables from the association tests. For each variable, we have included the odds that, within the 
contours of this study, respondents in that variable supported religiously framed violence. 
 
A. Table for the odds of “Gender” 
Gender Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence of faith Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
Support for ISIS 
Male 27% 35% 18% 
Female 22% 28% 7% 
 
B. Table for the odds of “Nationality” (Italian/African/Rest) 
Nationality Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 




B1. Table for the odds of “Nationality” (African/Rest) 
Nationality Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 








C. Table for the odds of “Born in Italy” 
Born in Italy  Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for AQ 
Born  13% 
Not born 6% 
 
D. Table for the odds of “Geography” 
Geography Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence of faith Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
Support for AQ 
Rome + Lombardy 27% 35% 18% 
Rest 22% 28% 7% 
 
E. Table for the odds of “Educational Attainment” 
Education Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Elementary school 16% 29% 
Middle school 13% 14% 
High school 11% 14% 
University 11% 13% 
 
F. Table for the odds of “Occupation” 
Occupation Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 






G. Table for the odds of “Political Party” 
Political party Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Left 10% 10% 
Right 13% 13% 
Centre 29% 29% 
Other lists 8% 8% 
Never voted 10% 15% 
 
H. Table for the odds of “Religious Participation” 
Religious participation Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for ISIS 
Always go to mosque 14% 
Only holydays 14% 








I. Table for the odds of “Religion” 
Religion Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Duty to punish offenders of Islam 
Sunni 34% 
Shia 35% 
Sunni convert 25% 
 
L. Table for the odds of “Discrimination” 
Discrimination Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 36% 56% 24% 26% 
Slightly agree  28% 31% 9% 13% 
Slightly disagree 21% 23% 5% 7% 
Strongly disagree 15% 21% 4% 10% 
 
M. Table for the odds of “Social difficulties” 
Social difficulties Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 44% 60% 29% 29% 
Slightly agree  31% 47% 19% 19% 
Slightly disagree 25% 29% 8% 12% 
Strongly disagree 13% 16% 3% 7% 
 
N. Table for the odds of “Economic Disparity” 
Economic disparity Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 35% 52% 24% 23% 
Slightly agree  27% 38% 9% 14% 
Slightly disagree 24% 27% 9% 12% 
Strongly disagree 20% 22% 7% 11% 
 
O. Table for the odds of “Western FP” 
Western FP unjust Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 33% 44% 17% 21% 
Slightly agree  22% 22% 2% 4% 
Slightly disagree 21% 20% 6% 7% 











P. Table for the odds of “Oppression of Muslims” 
Oppression of 
Muslims 
Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 38% 47% 19% 23% 
Slightly agree  22% 30% 5% 7% 
Slightly disagree 12% 19% 5% 7% 
Strongly disagree 5% 2% 5% 10% 
 
Q. Table for the odds of “Frustration” 
Frustration Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 44% 51% 28% 29% 
Slightly agree  33% 44% 14% 19% 
Slightly disagree 22% 27% 6% 8% 
Strongly disagree 12% 15% 3% 6% 
 
R. Table for the odds of “Traumatic experiences” 
Traumatic experiences Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 15% 18% 
Slightly agree  15% 16% 
Slightly disagree 11% 12% 
Strongly disagree 4% 10% 
 
S. Table for the odds of “Identity crisis” 
Identity crisis Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 33% 40% 19% 23% 
Slightly agree  38% 45% 10% 10% 
Slightly disagree 18% 29% 10% 12% 
Strongly disagree 13% 16% 4% 8% 
 
T. Table for the odds of “Rational Factors” 
Rational factors Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence of faith Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam 
Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 32% 36% 18% 
Slightly agree   22% 31% 11% 
Slightly disagree  33% 33% 10% 










U. Table for the odds of “Networks” 
Networks  Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 38% 45% 25% 25% 
Slightly agree  22% 30% 6% 11% 
Slightly disagree 21% 33% 6% 10% 
Strongly disagree 15% 18% 9% 12% 
 
V. Table for the odds of “Ideology” 
Ideology  Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 57% 62% 43% 44% 
Slightly agree  39% 59% 22% 36% 
Slightly disagree 27% 33% 6% 7% 
Strongly disagree 9% 16% 1% 2% 
 
Z. Table for the odds of “Duty to punish offenders of Islam” 
Duty to punish offenders of 
Islam  
Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Violence in defence of faith Support for AQ Support for ISIS 
Strongly agree 78% 51% 57% 
Slightly agree   49% 10% 13% 
Slightly disagree  15% 6% 8% 
Strongly disagree 5% 1% 3% 
 
X. Table for the odds of “Monthly pay” 
Monthly pay Probability (in percentage) of support for violence 
 
 Support for ISIS 
Less than Euros 1,000 12% 
Between Euros 1,000 and Euros 2,000 15% 


























p-values of the Wald-Z tests in the regression models**, threshold 0.05 
 
Violence in defence 
of faith 
Duty to punish 
offenders of Islam 
Support for Al 
Qaeda 
Support for ISIS 
2) Gender 0.23 0.1  0.4 
3) Nationality (all)  0.3   
3.1) Nationality 
(Italian/North African/Rest) 
   0.1 
3.2) Nationality 
(African/Rest) 
  0.7  
4) Born in Italy   0.2  
6) Geography 
(Rome+Lombardy/Rest) 
0.03*** 0.09 0.6  
10) Educational attainment   0.9 0.3 
11) Occupation   0.09  
12) Political party   03 0.2 
13) Religious participation    0.7  
14) Religion  0.8   
15) Discrimination 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 
16) Social difficulties 0.6 0.002* 0.2 0.6 
17) Finding good job 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 
18) Western FP 0.5 0.5 0.16 0.2 
19) Oppression of Muslims 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 
20) Frustration 0.28 0.5 0. 03* 0.03* & 0.02** 
21) Traumatic experiences   0.6 0.5 
22) Identity crisis 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.03* 
23) Rational factors 0.8  0.6 0.3 
24) Networks 0.8 0.1 0.04* 0.1 
25) Ideology 0.007* & 3.E-7*** 1.E-5* 0.006* &1.E-04* 0.00007*& 
2.E-07** 
26) Duty to punish offenders 
of Islam 
5.E-11* - 0.10 1.161117E-04* 
* Significant values being inferior to the “0.05” significance level. 
** The p-values come from multiple Wald Z-tests in various regression models. And not all of them are 
part of the last regression model that ultimately determined which variable, among the strongest 
predictors, was ultimately significant –for they scored low p-values in the pre-tests to assess which 
predictors should form the last regression model. 













4) Regression Models of the Significant Variables Featuring Wald z-tests and Wald z-tests With 
Weights 
 
A. X42.Violence in defence of Islam (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X43.OffendereIslam (duty to punish offenders) 
   X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology) 
   X31.CulturaItaliana (Identity crisis) 
   X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties) 
   X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place) 
   X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography) 
   X30.Frustraz (Frustration) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                              OR      2.5 %      97.5 % 
(Intercept)          11.36851287 3.65252949 41.68889468 
X43.OffendereIslam2   0.42304236 0.14296063  1.21052642 
X43.OffendereIslam3   0.06637462 0.01993415  0.19665357 
X43.OffendereIslam4   0.02068083 0.00588270  0.06247186 
X46.GovIslamico2      0.45959016 0.13462361  1.54126384 
X46.GovIslamico3      0.37103392 0.11547517  1.14870010 
X46.GovIslamico4      0.14316060 0.04535940  0.42926210 
X31.CulturaItaliana2  1.53162307 0.53919669  4.42817604 
X31.CulturaItaliana3  0.69989741 0.21567650  2.24314014 
X31.CulturaItaliana4  1.40178766 0.43567852  4.61084304 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2    0.50617065 0.14172372  1.74252794 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3    0.86395245 0.26571761  2.82815504 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4    0.60373189 0.13576554  2.68437139 
X20.LuogoCulto2       0.73118275 0.23076337  2.25798616 
X20.LuogoCulto3       2.15770780 0.72844810  6.61391016 
X20.LuogoCulto4       0.62011352 0.14169287  2.57456559 
X6.RomaLombardia1     2.04692988 0.91557460  4.69819753 
X30.Frustraz2         0.39759690 0.13543302  1.13469225 
X30.Frustraz3         0.51319326 0.15174045  1.67117989 




Wald z-test for X43.Offend Islam: 
        chi2           df            P  
5.067466e+01 3.000000e+00 5.738565e-11  
 
Wald z-test for X46.IslamicGov: 
        chi2           df            P  
11.996426725  3.000000000  0.007395411  
 
Wald z-test for X31.Identitycrisis: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.1186979 3.0000000 0.5481393  
 
Wald z-test for X17.SocialDiff: 
     chi2        df         P  
1.5209500 3.0000000 0.6774436  
 
Wald z-test for X20.Worshipplace: 
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    chi2       df        P  
4.156896 3.000000 0.245013  
 
Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia: 
      chi2         df          P  
2.98479060 1.00000000 0.08405016  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustration: 
     chi2        df         P  
3.8139483 3.0000000 0.2822679  
 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 11.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.00093 (significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.13, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.71 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.068 (not significant) 
 
X42.Violence in defence of Islam (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology) 
   X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis) 
   X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties) 
   X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place) 
   X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography) 
   X30.Frustraz (Frustration) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                             OR      2.5 %    97.5 % 
(Intercept)          3.32703959 1.41051732 8.3773834 
X46.GovIslamico2     0.67895197 0.25301523 1.8072842 
X46.GovIslamico3     0.36165284 0.14534932 0.8760035 
X46.GovIslamico4     0.08488132 0.03387033 0.2009565 
X31.CulturaItaliana2 1.18852552 0.50955444 2.7948664 
X31.CulturaItaliana3 0.58960303 0.21831509 1.5496369 
X31.CulturaItaliana4 0.96907850 0.36851195 2.5433411 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2   0.53775163 0.19526118 1.4507841 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3   0.53551676 0.20579935 1.3818902 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4   0.23385275 0.07223001 0.7283094 
X20.LuogoCulto2      1.08851423 0.42721051 2.7239976 
X20.LuogoCulto3      1.61329201 0.65430360 4.0329975 
X20.LuogoCulto4      0.69297583 0.21739785 2.0646259 
X6.RomaLombardia1    2.02185218 1.06556659 3.8971823 
X30.Frustraz2        0.40231872 0.17194763 0.9191628 
X30.Frustraz3        0.40018718 0.14723029 1.0493058 
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Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
3.312096e+01 3.000000e+00 3.036898e-07  
 
Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.0314478 3.0000000 0.5659053  
 
Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro: 
      chi2         df          P  
6.25468488 3.00000000 0.09985574  
 
Wald z-test for X20.LuogoCulto: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.3567300 3.0000000 0.5017401  
 
Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia: 
      chi2         df          P  
4.56344733 1.00000000 0.03266127  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
      chi2         df          P  
7.04461371 3.00000000 0.07048929  
 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 1.7, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.2 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




















B. X43.Duty to punish offenders (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X46.GovIslamico (Ideology) 
   X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity Crisis) 
   X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties) 
   X20.LuogoCulto, (Worship place) 
   X6.RomaLombardia, (Geography) 
   X30.Frustraz (Frustration) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                            OR      2.5 %    97.5 % 
(Intercept)          3.1246520 1.37184620 7.5244809 
X46.GovIslamico2     1.5486411 0.58731811 4.1701231 
X46.GovIslamico3     0.5192094 0.21309798 1.2471215 
X46.GovIslamico4     0.2001622 0.08934701 0.4373848 
X31.CulturaItaliana2 0.8519254 0.37901897 1.9088805 
X31.CulturaItaliana3 0.9855822 0.42244943 2.3119307 
X31.CulturaItaliana4 0.5955441 0.24080513 1.4455770 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2   0.7955563 0.30256801 2.0718971 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3   0.3507480 0.13725023 0.8704324 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4   0.1610160 0.05205609 0.4722150 
X20.LuogoCulto2      1.8390299 0.80163920 4.2799606 
X20.LuogoCulto3      0.7634586 0.31328372 1.8413061 
X20.LuogoCulto4      0.9597614 0.35838382 2.5490288 
X6.RomaLombardia1    1.6795257 0.91868246 3.0895186 
X30.Frustraz2        0.6575902 0.28939406 1.4834819 
X30.Frustraz3        0.5758888 0.23234483 1.4087797 




Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
2.552499e+01 3.000000e+00 1.199097e-05  
 
Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana: 
     chi2        df         P  
1.5404591 3.0000000 0.6729644  
 
Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro: 
        chi2           df            P  
13.949620323  3.000000000  0.002974536  
 
Wald z-test for X20.LuogoCulto: 
     chi2        df         P  
3.7791667 3.0000000 0.2863187  
 
Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia: 
      chi2         df          P  
2.82585062 1.00000000 0.09275774  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
     chi2        df         P  








"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 5.1, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.024 (marginal to somewhat significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 5.9, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.015 (rather significant) 
 
For scuola lavoro 
"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.068 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.66 (not significant) 
 
C. X44.AlQaeda (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X43.OffendereIslam (Duty to punish offenders) 
   X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology) 
   X19.BuonaCasa, (Finding a good house) 
   X39.Contatti, (Networks) 
   X30.Frustraz, (Frustration) 
   X22.IgnoranzaPreg, (Ignorance and prejudice) 
   X18.BuonLavoro, (Economic disparity) 
   X6.RomaLombardia (Geography) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                              OR         2.5 %        97.5 % 
(Intercept)         8.555109e+00  1.849821e+00  6.531640e+01 
X43.OffendereIslam2 1.850340e-01  2.799883e-02  9.968500e-01 
X43.OffendereIslam3 1.284143e-01  1.699501e-02  6.726612e-01 
X43.OffendereIslam4 4.135029e-10 1.635385e-215  1.385156e+31 
X46.GovIslamico2    2.322670e-01  4.122272e-02  1.120732e+00 
X46.GovIslamico3    2.046602e-01  2.893558e-02  1.143135e+00 
X46.GovIslamico4    1.242936e-02  4.945570e-04  1.116328e-01 
X19.BuonaCasa2      2.887125e+00  4.964415e-01  2.146503e+01 
X19.BuonaCasa3      9.392138e-01  1.031606e-01  8.406191e+00 
X19.BuonaCasa4      4.601987e-01  2.445511e-02  5.643919e+00 
X39.Contatti2       1.016530e-01  1.628767e-02  4.963481e-01 
X39.Contatti3       1.107974e-01  8.640228e-03  1.021675e+00 
X39.Contatti4       9.281520e-01  9.353578e-02  8.506972e+00 
X30.Frustraz2       2.006826e-01  3.345993e-02  9.576375e-01 
X30.Frustraz3       1.544205e-01  5.754089e-03  1.548943e+00 
X30.Frustraz4       8.285111e-02  4.950913e-03  8.787066e-01 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg2  4.400670e-01  8.166636e-02  2.143356e+00 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg3  4.557348e-01  4.056189e-02  4.228453e+00 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg4  4.152113e-08            NA 2.740015e+111 
X18.BuonLavoro2     5.243761e-01  5.793911e-02  3.819335e+00 
X18.BuonLavoro3     3.403053e+00  5.020383e-01  2.479059e+01 
X18.BuonLavoro4     4.672583e+00  4.083925e-01  7.310323e+01 





Wald z-test for X43.OffendereIslam: 
     chi2        df         P  
6.1502896 3.0000000 0.1045229  
 
Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
12.240579831  3.000000000  0.006602872  
 
Wald z-test for X19.BuonaCasa: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.5888980 3.0000000 0.4594392  
 
Wald z-test for X39.Contatti: 
      chi2         df          P  
8.34093554 3.00000000 0.03946684  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
     chi2        df         P  
5.4367490 3.0000000 0.1424711  
 
Wald z-test for X22.IgnoranzaPreg: 
     chi2        df         P  
1.0724270 3.0000000 0.7837341  
 
Wald z-test for X18.BuonLavoro: 
     chi2        df         P  
0.3782795 1.0000000 0.5385255  
 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.017, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.9 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 1.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.31 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.37, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.54 (not significant) 
 
X44.AlQaeda (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X46.GovIslamico (Ideology) 
   X19.BuonaCasa, (Finding a good house) 
   X39.Contatti, (Networks) 
   X30.Frustraz, (Frustration) 
   X22.IgnoranzaPreg, (Ignorance and prejudice) 
   X18.BuonLavoro, (Economic disparity)  
   X6.RomaLombardia (Geography) 
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Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                             OR         2.5 %       97.5 % 
(Intercept)        2.656021e+00  8.798580e-01 8.946803e+00 
X46.GovIslamico2   2.640945e-01  6.683745e-02 9.221160e-01 
X46.GovIslamico3   1.406594e-01  2.835250e-02 5.603626e-01 
X46.GovIslamico4   1.003481e-02  5.103011e-04 5.996886e-02 
X19.BuonaCasa2     1.024624e+00  2.457611e-01 4.534599e+00 
X19.BuonaCasa3     4.516833e-01  6.350310e-02 2.891592e+00 
X19.BuonaCasa4     1.731739e-01  1.123145e-02 1.799339e+00 
X39.Contatti2      3.548811e-01  9.729511e-02 1.266115e+00 
X39.Contatti3      4.634595e-01  5.265688e-02 2.891990e+00 
X39.Contatti4      7.718010e-01  1.061390e-01 5.156222e+00 
X30.Frustraz2      2.701950e-01  7.360420e-02 9.166534e-01 
X30.Frustraz3      5.755205e-02  2.341848e-03 4.604385e-01 
X30.Frustraz4      8.723572e-02  8.512973e-03 5.328003e-01 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg2 7.827006e-01  1.947220e-01 2.980689e+00 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg3 7.172705e-01  9.654279e-02 4.696710e+00 
X22.IgnoranzaPreg4 2.021463e-06 2.133281e-190 2.615707e+25 
X18.BuonLavoro2    5.204428e-01  7.874645e-02 2.902252e+00 
X18.BuonLavoro3    1.582626e+00  3.112651e-01 8.548956e+00 
X18.BuonLavoro4    6.113664e+00  6.347655e-01 7.582651e+01 




Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
2.048220e+01 3.000000e+00 1.348362e-04  
 
Wald z-test for X19.BuonaCasa: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.2883063 3.0000000 0.5147648  
 
Wald z-test for X39.Contatti: 
     chi2        df         P  
2.7797250 3.0000000 0.4268484  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
     chi2        df         P  
9.2214317 3.0000000 0.0264872  
 
Wald z-test for X22.IgnoranzaPreg: 
     chi2        df         P  
0.1829387 3.0000000 0.9802954  
 
Wald z-test for X18.BuonLavoro: 
     chi2        df         P  
4.0371747 3.0000000 0.2574778  
 
Wald z-test for X6.RomaLombardia: 
      chi2         df          P  










"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.6, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.44 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 1.6, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.21 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 0.09, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.76 (not significant)  
 
D. X45.ISIS (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X43.OffendereIslam, (Duty to punish offenders) 
   X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology) 
   X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis) 
   X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties) 
   X2.Sesso, (Gender) 
   X30.Frustraz (Frustration) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                             OR       2.5 %     97.5 % 
(Intercept)          4.92292438 1.633141718 16.9701643 
X43.OffendereIslam2  0.21179781 0.052117813  0.7620656 
X43.OffendereIslam3  0.08383149 0.017430626  0.3255673 
X43.OffendereIslam4  0.06176335 0.014293902  0.2217906 
X46.GovIslamico2     1.17663427 0.359544736  3.9855788 
X46.GovIslamico3     0.20400371 0.048045042  0.7521102 
X46.GovIslamico4     0.05201329 0.009961005  0.2068575 
X31.CulturaItaliana2 0.13644954 0.028836418  0.5366416 
X31.CulturaItaliana3 1.28645613 0.316704603  5.1798712 
X31.CulturaItaliana4 0.89212650 0.203657423  3.8292386 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2   2.74233136 0.648224901 12.3679438 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3   2.01261592 0.489262870  8.6997461 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4   1.69029318 0.332191274  8.7900065 
X2.Sesso2            0.71362358 0.206578869  2.2457306 
X30.Frustraz2        0.32684591 0.098478805  1.0209224 
X30.Frustraz3        0.03975475 0.001872772  0.2862332 




Wald z-test for X43.OffendereIslam: 
        chi2           df            P  
2.079509e+01 3.000000e+00 1.161117e-04  
 
Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
21.780619748  3.000000000  0.000072459  
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Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana: 
      chi2         df          P  
8.92923738 3.00000000 0.03024666  
 
Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro: 
     chi2        df         P  
1.9542320 3.0000000 0.5819602  
 
Wald z-test for X2.Sesso: 
     chi2        df         P  
0.3153972 1.0000000 0.5743870  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
      chi2         df          P  
8.85197143 3.00000000 0.03132515  
 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 1.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.27 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 6.4, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.012 (somewhat significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 6.8, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.0089 (significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 3.3, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.069 (marginal at best) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 









X45.ISIS (1=agree, 0=disagree) vs. 
 
   X46.GovIslamico, (Ideology) 
   X31.CulturaItaliana, (Identity crisis) 
   X17.ScuolaOLavoro, (Social difficulties) 
   X2.Sesso, (Gender) 
   X30.Frustraz (Frustration) 
 
Odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals: 
 
                             OR       2.5 %    97.5 % 
(Intercept)          2.16813444 0.864193621 5.6932281 
X46.GovIslamico2     1.18467724 0.425705346 3.3420890 
X46.GovIslamico3     0.17616975 0.049626229 0.5411438 
X46.GovIslamico4     0.03292801 0.007085331 0.1108375 
X31.CulturaItaliana2 0.22500147 0.065285175 0.6859077 
X31.CulturaItaliana3 0.65829485 0.190459656 2.1483344 
X31.CulturaItaliana4 0.73579816 0.210585689 2.4895041 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro2   1.81254669 0.527538981 6.4664483 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro3   1.13800320 0.343235814 3.8484990 
X17.ScuolaOLavoro4   0.84415780 0.218221546 3.2351674 
X2.Sesso2            0.61137670 0.196286417 1.7049168 
X30.Frustraz2        0.37258889 0.128162622 1.0273117 
X30.Frustraz3        0.08144493 0.011023686 0.3763936 




Wald z-test for X46.GovIslamico: 
        chi2           df            P  
3.339413e+01 3.000000e+00 2.659490e-07  
 
Wald z-test for X31.CulturaItaliana: 
      chi2         df          P  
6.43000166 3.00000000 0.09246432  
 
Wald z-test for X17.ScuolaOLavoro: 
     chi2        df         P  
1.5686096 3.0000000 0.6665281  
 
Wald z-test for X2.Sesso: 
     chi2        df         P  
0.8137632 1.0000000 0.3670100  
 
Wald z-test for X30.Frustraz: 
     chi2        df         P  
9.7433919 3.0000000 0.0208782  
 




"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 9.0, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.0027 (significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 





"somewhat agree" vs. "somewhat disagree" chi-squared test: 
X2 = 3.2, df = 1, P(> X2) = 0.073 (not significant) 
 
"somewhat disagree" vs. "strongly disagree" chi-squared test: 





















































Books, academic journals, think tanks, and institutions 
 
(2006). Muslims in Europe. Pew Research Center, Washington DC.  
 
(2006). Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization. The George Washington 
University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis 
Group. 
 
(2011). “G2: A Proud Generation”. [Italian]. Genemaghrebina Association 
 
(2011). The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Pew Research Center. Washington DC.  
 
(2014). IS Spokesman Rallies Fighters Against U.S.-Led Coalition, Threatens Enemy and Calls 
Individual Muslims to Launch Attacks. SITE Intelligence Group. 
 
(2017). Relazione sulla politica dell’informazione della sicurezza. Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri. Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica. Rome, Italy.  
 
Abbas, Tahir. (2011). Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience. London: 
Routledge.   
 
Abbas, Tahir. (2011). Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics. Oxon: Routledge.  
 
Abbas, Tahir. (2012). “The symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalisation”. Critical 
Studies on Terrorism. 5:3. pp. 345-358.  
 
Al-Lami, M. (2009). Studies of Radicalisation. Department of politics and International Relations. 
University of London. ESRC. 
 
Al-Turabi, Hasan. (1932). Al-Islam wal-Hukm. London: Al-Saqi, 2003 ed. 
 
Ali, Shaheen, Rehman, Javaid. (2005). “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law”. Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law. Vo. 10, issue 3. pp. 321-343. 
 
Allen, Christopher. (2010). Islamophobia. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Allievi, Stefano. (2008). “Islamophobia in Italy”. [Italian]. Interviewed by IRIB, Iran, Radio Islam. 29 
September.  
 
Allievi, Stefano. (2012). “No” to the Mosque. [Italian]. Padova: Le Gru. 
 
Allievi, Stefano. (2015). The Strength of inclusion. [Italian]. Nigrizia, Dossier Islam. pp. 46-49. 
 
Alonso, Rogelio. (2010). “Radicalization and Recruitment Among Jihadist Terrorists in Spain”. In 
Understanding Violent Radicalisation. pp. 207-230. 
 
  257 
Archer, Louise. (2001). ‘Muslim brothers, black lads, traditional ‘Asians’: British Muslim young men’s 
constructions of race, religion and masculinity”. Feminism and psychology. Vo. 11, no.1. pp. 79-105. 
 
Ariel Merari. (2010). Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Arun Kundnani, (2012). “Radicalisation: the journey of a concept”. Race & Class, Vol. 54, No. 2. pp. 
3-25.   
 
Asik, Ozan, Mehmet. Erdemir, Ayakan. (2010). “Westernization as Cultural Trauma”. Journal for the 
Study of Religions and Ideologies. Vo. 9, no. 25. pp. 111-132. 
 
Aslam, Maleeha. (2012). Gender-based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist 
Islamism and Terrorism. New York: United Nations University Press. 
 
Baker, Sarah, Edwards Rosalind (Eds.). (2012). How many qualitative interviews is enough? National 
Centre for Research Methods Review Paper. Southampton: ESRC National Centre for Research 
Methods. 
 
Bakker, Edwin, De Leede, Seran. (2016). European Female Jihadists in Syria: Exploring an Under-
Researched Topic. ICCT, The Hague.  
 
Bakker, Edwin. (2006). Jihadi terrorists in Europe. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
Clingendael;  
 
Bandura. Albert. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. New York: Prentice Hall. 
 
Barber, Benjamin. (1996). Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books. 
 
Barnard, Paolo. (2006). Why They Hate Us. [Italian]. Milan: RCS Libri. 
 
Bartlett, Jamie, Miller, Carl. (2012). “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between 
Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization”. Terrorism and Political Violence. 24:1. pp. 1-21.  
 
Bartoszewicz, Monika. (2012). “Controversies and Conversions: The Potential Terrorist Threat of 
European Converts to Islam”. Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 7, no. 3. pp. 17-29. 
 
Bashir, Abdul-Raheem. (2015). “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic Philosophy”. American International 
Journal of Social Science. Vo. 4, no.1. pp. 141-148.  
 
Baumol, Willaim. (1952). Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Benjamin, Daniel & Simon, Steven. (2002). The Age of Sacred Terror. New York: Randon House. 
 
Benjamin, Daniel. (2007). The Converts’ Zeal: Why Are So Many Jihadists Converts to Islam? 
Brookings Institute, Washington DC.   
 
  258 
Benjamin, David. (2005). The Next Attack. New York: Henry Holt. 
 
Bergen, Peter, Hoffman, Bruce. (2010). Assessing the Terrorist Threat. Bipartisan Policy Center. 
 
Bin Laden, Osama. (1998). “A Muslim Bomb”. In Bin Laden, Messages to the World. 
 
Bingham, Clara. (2016). Witness to the Revolution: Radicals, Resisters, Vets, Hippies, and the Year 
America Lost Its Mind and Found Its Soul. New York: Random House. 
 
Bjorkman, Carl. (2011). “Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism in Italy”. In Magnus Ranstorp, Understanding Violent 
Radicalisation. Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
Mia Bloom (2005). Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Bloom, Mia. (2016). “The changing nature of women in extremism and political violence”. Freedom 
from Fear. Issue 11. pp. 1-15.  
 
Bötticher, Astrid, Mare, Miroslav. (2012). Extremism: Theories, Concepts, Forms. Munich: 
Oldenbourg Verlag. 
 
Brighton, Shane. (2007). “British Muslims, multiculturalism, and UK foreign policy: ‘integration’ and 
‘cohesion’ in and beyond the state”. International Affairs. 83:1. pp. 1-17.  
 
Brooks, Risa. (2011). “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the 
Threat?” International Security. Vol. 36, n. 2. pp. 4-47. 
 
Brown, Katherine, Saeed, Tania. (2015). “Radicalization and counter-radicalization at British 
universities: Muslim encounters and alternatives”. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vo. 38, no.11. pp. 1952-
1968. 
 
Brown, Katherine. (2008). “The Promise and Perils of Women’s Participation in UK Mosques: The 
Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community”. Journal of Politics and 
International Relations. Vo. 10, no. 3. pp. 472-491. 
 
Brown, Katherine. (2010). “Contesting the securitization of British Muslims”. Interventions. Vo. 12, 
no.2. pp. 171-182. 
 
Bukay, David. (2009). “The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings”. The Middle East Quarterly. 
Vo. 13, no.4. pp. 27-36. 
 
Bux, Shahid. (2007). ”Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalisation: Addressing some Myths”. 
The Police Journal. Vol. 80. pp. 267-278. 
 
Cammett, Melani. (2014). Compassionate Communalism. Cornell University: Cornell University Press. 
 
Canu, Isabelle (1997). The protection of democracy in Germany and France. [German]. Opladen: 
Leske und Budrich.  
 
  259 
Carolyn, Hoyle et al. (2015). Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS. Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue, London. pp. 20-27. 
 
Carpenter, Scott et al. (2009). “Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism”. Journal of National 
Security Law and Policy. Vo. 3, no 303. pp. 303-329. 
 
Ceseari, Jocelyne.(2009). The Securitization of Islam in Europe. CEPS Challenge. Research Paper. 
 
Ceseri, Jocelyne. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of European Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Choudhury, Tufyal. (2007). The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in 
progress). London: Department for Communities and Local Government London. 
 
Choudhury, Tufyal. (2017). “The radicalisation of citizenship deprivation”. Critical Social Policy. Vo. 
37, Issue 2. pp. 225-244.  
 
Christmann, Kris. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. (2012). Preventing Religious 
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. 
 
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. (2011). Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and 
Us. Oxford: University Press. 
 
Coolsaet, Rik. (2011). (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and 
American Experiences, 2nd edition. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Corbucci, Carlo. (2011). Islamic Terrorism: Falsity and Mystification. [Italian]. Rome: Agorà. 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. (1981). “The Causes of Terrorism”. Comparative Politics. Vo. 13(4). pp. 379-399. 
 
Croft, Stuart. (2012). “Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of British Muslims”. 
Contemporary Security Policy. Issue 32, Vol. 2. pp. 219-235. 
 
Croft, Stuart. (2012). Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Cronin, Audrey. (2015). “Isis Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest 
Jihadist Threat”. Foreign Affairs. Vo. 94, no. 2. (March/April Issue), pp. 97-98.    
 
Csiernik, Rick, Birnbaum, Rachel. (2017). Practising Social Work Research: Case Studies for 
Learning. Toronto: Toronto University Press. 
 
Daalgard-Nielsen, Anja. (2010). “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do 
Not Know”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vo. 33, Issue 9. pp. 797-814. 
 
Davies, John. (1973). “Aggression, violence, revolution, and war”. In Knutsen, N. Handbook of 
Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. pp. 234-260. 
 
  260 
De Roy van Zuijdewijn, Bakker, Edwin. (2014). “Returning Western foreign fighters”. International 
Centre for Counter-terrorism, The Hague. 
 
 
Della Porta, Donatella. (1996). Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Desai, Meghnad. (2007). Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror. London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co. 
 
Dollard, John. (1939). Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Donatella Della Porta & Gary LaFree. (2012). “Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation”. 
IJCV, Vol. 6, No. 1. p. 4. 
 
El Ayoubi, Mostafa. (2015). “No entrenching”. [Italian]. Nigrizia, Dossier Islam.   
 
Emerson, Michael, Kaush, Kristina, Youngs, Richard (Eds). (2009). Islamist Radicalisation: The 
Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.  
 
Esposito, John. Mogahed, Dalia. (2007). Who Speaks for Islam. New York: Gallup Press. 
 
European Commission. (2010). The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future 
challenges. COM 386.  
 
Council of the European Union. (2011). EU Action Plan on combating terrorism. 15893/1/10. 
 
European Commission. (2011). Internal Security. Special Eurobarometer 371. 
 
European Commission. (2011). Special Eurobarometer 371. Internal Security.  
 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2006). “Muslims in the European Union: 
Discrimination and Islamophobia”. 
 
European Parliament. (2014). Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU. PE 509.977. 
 
European Union Council Decision. (2007). Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management 
of Terrorism and other Security related risks. 124/EC, Euratom. 
 
European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. (2013). Fundamental Rights: Challenges and 
Achievements in 2012. Luxemburg: Publication Office of the European Union. pp. 145-182;  
 
Europol. (2013). EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. TE-SAT Report. 
 
Europol. (2016). European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. TE-SAT Report. 
 
Fenstermacher, L. et al (Eds.). (2010). Protecting the homeland from international and domestic 




Ferrero, Marco. (2002). Radicalization as a reaction to failure. University of Eastern Piedmont. 
Alessandria. 
 
Fink, Naureen, Chowdhury, El-Said, Hamed. (2011). Transforming Terrorists: Examining 
International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism. New York: International Peace Institute, IPI. 
 
Flower, Scott. (2013). “Muslim Converts and Terrorism”. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis”. Vo. 
5, no. 11. pp. 6-9. 
 
Furnham, Adrian. (1990). “Faking personality questionnaires: Fabricating different profiles for 
different purposes”. Current Psychology. Vo. 9, issue 1. pp. 46-55. 
 
Ganor, Boaz. (2007). The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon. ICT, 
Interdisciplinary Center. Herzliya. 
 
Ganor, Boaz. (2015). Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism. New York: 
Columbia University Press.   
 
Gaskin, John Charles. (1998). (ed.). Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
 
Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, Lambert, Robert. (2010). “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: 
the persistence of a failed discourse”. International Affairs. 86:4. pp. 889-901.   
 
Goerzig, Carolin, Al-Hashimi, Khaled (2015). Radicalization in Western Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
Groppi, Michele. (2015). “Portrait of the Lombard Jihadist”. [Italian]. In “Who Fears the Caliph?”. 
Limes, Italian Magazine of Geopolitics. No. 3 (March issue). pp. 191-200. 
 
Groppi, Michele. (2015). Dossier on the Italian Muslim Community: Index of Radicalisation. [Italian]. 
CEMISS. 
 
Groppi, Michele. (2016). “No Molenbeeks here, but the future is not guaranteed” [Italian]. In Limes: 
Indagine sulle periferie. pp. 37-45. 
 
Groppi, Michele. (2017). “The Growing Jihadi Terror Threat to Italy: How Italian Exceptionalism is 
Rapidly Diminishing”. CTC Sentinel West Point 10:5.  
 
Gurr, Ted. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Hamed, Gahad. (2012). “Friends, Relationships, and Family in the Arab Society”. Institute for Middle 
East Studies Canada. Working paper no.7.  
 




Hamm, Mark. (2008). “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.” National Institute of 
Justice, Journal no. 261. 
 
Harbeson, John. (2008). Africa in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 276-302. 
 
Hegghammer, Thomas. (2006). “Militant Islamism in Saudi Arabia: Patters of Recruitment to ‘Al-
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’”. Paths to Global Jihad: Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorist 
Networks. Proceedings from a FFI (Norwegian Defense Research Establishment) Seminar. Oslo, 15 
March. 
 
Heil, Georg. (2017). “The Berlin Attack and the Abu Walaa Islamic State Recruitment Network”. CTC 
Sentinel 10:2  
 
Heinke, Daniel. (2017). “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq; The Updated Data and Its 
Implications”. CTC Sentinel 10: 3. 
 
Hemmingsen, Sophie-Anne. Andreasen, S. J. (2007). Radicalization in Europe. DIIS. 
 
Hermann, M. G. (1986). Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
HM Government [CM 8092]. (2011). Prevent Strategy. 
 
HM Government. (2013). Tackling extremism in the UK.   
 
Hoffman, Bruce (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Holtz, Peter et al. (2013). “German Muslims and the ‘Integration Debate’”. Integrative Psychological 
& Behavioural Science. Vo. 47(2). pp. 231-248.  
 
Horgan, John. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge. 
 
Horgan, John. (2008). “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes”. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science. Vo. 618, no. 1. pp. 80-94. 
 
Hoskins Andrew, O’Loughlin, Ben. (2009). “Pre-mediating guilt: radicalisation and mediality in 
British news”. Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2:1. pp. 81-93.  
 
Hoskins, Andrew. O’Loughlin, Ben (2009). “Media and the myth of radicalization.” Media, War, and 
Conflict. 2:2. pp. 107-110. 
 
House of Commons [1087]. (2006). Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th 
July 2005. London: The Stationary Office. 
 
House of Commons [HC 1446]. (2012). Roots of violent radicalisation. London: The Stationary Office. 
 
Howard, L. (1992). Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses. New York: Praeger. 
  263 
Hoyle, Carolyn et al. (2015). “Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to Isis”. Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue. 
 
Human Rights Watch. (2017). World Report 2017: European Union. New York, NY. 
 
Husain, Ed. (2007). The Islamist. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald, Pippa, Norris. (2009). “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins 
and Destination.” Harvard Kennedy School. 
 
Irwin, Joyce. (1979). Womenhood in Radical Protenstantism. New York: E. Mellen. 
 
Jeffrey, Alexander et al. (2004). Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Jenkins, Brian. (2010). Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United 
States Since September 11, 2001. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation. 
 
Jenkins, Brian. (2011). Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies. RAND. Santa Monica, CA. 
 
Joberg, Laura, Gentry, Caron (Eds.) (2011). Women, gender and terrorism. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press. 
 
Joffe, George. (2013). Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East. New York: Palgrave 
Mcmillan. 
 
Jones, Stephen. (2013). “New Labour and the Re-making of British Islam”. Religions. Vol. 4, pp. 550-
566.  
 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2000). Terror in the mind of God. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Karagiannis, Emmanuel. (2012). “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization”. 
Politics, Religion, and Ideology. Issue 13, no. 1. pp. 99-113. 
 
Karsh, Efraim. (2006). Islamic Imperialism: A History. Filey: L&L Composition. 
 
Kepel, Gilles. (2004). The War for Muslim Minds. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Kern, Soeren. (2011). Europe: ‘You Are Entering A Sharia Controlled Zone’. Gatestone Institute. 
International Policy Council, NY. 
 
Kern, Soeren. (2014). Germany Aiming to Become More Muslim Friendly. The Gatestone Institute. 
International Policy Council.  
 
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2013). “Radicalization through religion”. University of Michigan. pp. 1-8. 
 
  264 
Kilcullen, David. (2016). Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failure of the War on Terror. London: 
Hurst & Co. (Publishers).  
 
Kimmel, Michael. (2002). “Gender, Class, and Terrorism”. The Chronicle Review. The Chronicle of 
Higher Education. 
 
Kishi, Katayoun. (2016). Anti-Muslim assaults reach 9/11 era levels, FBI data show. Pew Research 
Center, Washington DC. 
 
Klandermans, Bert et al (Eds.). (2003). From Structure to Action. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press. 
 
Kolig, Erich. (2014). Freedom of Speech and Islam. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. 
 
Koopmans, Ruud (2015). “Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups”. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 33-57. 
 
Korteweg, Rem et al. (2010). “Background contributing factors to terrorism” In Ranstorp, Magnus (ed). 
Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. London/New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Kramer, Martin. (2003). “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?”. The Middle East 
Quarterly. Vo. 10, No. 2. pp. 65-77. 
 
Krueger, Alan. (2007). What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kushner, Harvey. (2004). Holy War on the Home Front. New York: Sentinel. 
 
Leiken, Robert. (2005). "Europe's Angry Muslims," Foreign Affairs. 84:4. (July/August). 
 
Levitt, Matthew. (2007). Teaching Terror. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington 
DC. 
 
Lifton, Robert. (2000). Destroying the World to Save It. New York: Holt. 
 
Lipka, Michael (2017). Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world. Pew 
Research Center, Washington DC. 
 
Lofland, John, Stark, Rodney. (1965). “Becoming a World Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant 
Perspective”. American Sociological Review. Vo. 30, no. 6. pp. 862-875. 
 
Lynch, Orla. (2013). “British Muslim youth: radicalisation, terrorism, and the construction of the 
“Other”. Critical Studies on Terrorism. 6:2. pp. 241-261. 
 
Magnus Ranstorp. (2010). “Understanding Violent Radicalisation”, In Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.), 
Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge. 
 
  265 
Malmstrom, Cecilia. (2011). In European Commission. Europe needs to step-up its efforts to fight 
violent extremism. Speech/11/586. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. (2002). “Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: A Political Perspective on Culture and 
Terrorism”. American Anthropologist. 104:3. pp. 766-775. 
 
Mandaville, Peter. (2001). Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Mandaville, Peter (2007). Global Political Islam. London: Routledge. 
Marone, Francesco. (2016). “Italian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq”. Journal of Terrorism Research. 7(1), 
pp.20–35. 
 
Marranci, Gabriele. (2009). Faith, Ideology, and Fear. London: Continuum. 
 
Martin, Richard et al. (2009). Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam. Stanford 
University: Stanford University Press. 
 
Massari, Monica. (2006). Islamophobia: Fear and Islam. [Italian]. Rome: Laterza; 
 
Mavelli, Luca. (2013). “Between Normalisation and Exception: The Securitization of Islam and the 
Construction of the Secular Subject”. Millennium – Journal of International Studies. 41:2. pp. 159-181. 
 
McCauley, Clark. Moskalenko, Sophia. (2011). Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and 
Us. Oxford: University Press, p.5. 
 
Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011). Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review. 
Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence. 
 
Moghadam, Assaf. (2011). The Globalization of Martyrdom. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.  
 
Moghaddam, Fathali. (2006). From the terrorists’ point of view: what they experienced and why they 
come to destroy. Westport, CT: Preager Security International.  
 
Moran, M. (2013). “Psychiatrists Have a Role in Assessing Candidates for Asylum”. Psychiatric News. 
Vo. 48, no. 13, pp.1-1.  
 
Moskalenko, Sophia, McCauley, Clark. (2009). “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction 
Between Activism and Radicalism”. Terrorism and Political Violence. 21. pp. 40. 
 
Moskalenko, Sophia. McCauley, Clark. (2010). “Measuring Political Mobilisation: The Distinction 
Between Activism and Radicalism” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 21. p. 240. 
 
Mozaffari, Mehdi. (2007). “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”. Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions. Vo. 8, No. 1. pp. 17-33. 
 
  266 
Mullins, Sam (2012). “Iraq Versus Lack of Integration.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and 
Political Aggression 4, pp. 110–113. 
 
Mullins, Sam. (2015). “Re-examining the involvement of Converts in Islamist Terrorism: A 
Comparison of the U.S. and the U.K.”. Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 9, no 6. pp. 72-84.  
 
Muslim Women’s Network UK (MWNUK). (2010) “Memorandum: Written Evidence Submitted to the 
House of Commons, Select Committee Report 2010 on Preventing Violent Extremism PVE20”. 
 
Nesser, Petter. (2005). Profiles of Jihadist Terrorists in Europe. Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment. 
 
Nesser, Petter. (2012). Jihad in Europe. Oslo: University of Oslo. PhD Thesis. 
 
Neumann, Peter. (2008). “Introduction” In Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: 
Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence. London: 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.  
 
Neumann, Peter. (2009). Joining Al Qaeda: Islamist Militant Recruitment in Europe. Adelphi Paper 
339. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
  
Neumann, Peter (2012). Prisons and Terrorism. London: ICSR, King’s College London. 
 
Neumann, Peter. (2013). “The trouble with radicalization”. International Affairs. 89:4. pp. 873-893.  
 
Neumann, Peter. (2015). Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000. London: ICSR, 
King’s College London.  
 
Niedersachsisches Ministerium fur Inneres und Sport. State of Lower of Saxony. (2012). 
Radicalisation Processes in the Context of Islamic Extremism and Terrorism.  
 
Nielsen, Jorgen. (2012). Islam in Denmark. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. 
 
O’Loughlin, Ben, Boudeau, Carole, Hoskins, Andrew, Holloway, Royal. (2011). “Distancing the 
extraordinary: Audience understandings of discourses of ‘radicalization’”. Continuum: Journal of 
Media and Cultural Studies. 25:2. pp. 153-164. 
 
Olesen, Thomas. (2009). Social Movement Theory and Radical Islamic Activism. Centre for the Study 
in Islamism and Radicalisation, Aarhus. 
 
Olsson, Peter. (2013). “Homegrown Terrorists: Rebels in Search of a Cause”. The Middle East 
Quarterly. Vo. 20, no.3. pp. 3-10. 
 
Ongering, Lidewidje (2007). Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands. 
Experiences, expectations, and approaches. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee. Washington DC. 
 
  267 
Pape, Robert. (2005). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random 
House. 
 
Patel, Faiza. (2011). “Rethinking Radicalization”. Brennan Center for Justice. New York University 
School of Law. 
 
Pearson, Elizabeth. (2016). “The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theories on Online 
Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad”. Policy & Internet. Vo. 8, Issue 1. pp. 5-33.  
 
Pedahzur, Ami et al. (2003). “Altruism and fatalism: the characteristics of Palestinian suicide 
terrorists”. Deviant Behavior. Vo. 24, no. 4. pp. 405-423.    
 
Piazza, James. (2012). “Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism”. Conflict Management and 
Peace Science. Vo. 29(5). pp. 521-546. 
 
Pisoiu, Daniela. (2012). Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. An occupational change process. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Pisoiu, Daniela. (2015). “Subcultural Theory Applied to Jihadi and Right-Wing Radicalization in 
Germany”. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 27, no. 1. pp. 9-28.  
 
Pittel, Karen. Rubbelke, Dirk. (2009). Decision Processes of a Suicide Bomber. Center of Economic 
Research at ETH, Zurich. 
 
Polchi, Vladimiro. (2015). “The Caliphate and jihadists are just terrorism”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 29 
June, p. 14.  
 
Post, Jerald. (2003). “The Terrorist in their own words”. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 15, pp. 
171-184.  
 
Post, Jerrold. (2004). Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world: The psychology of political 
behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Post, Jerrold. Sprinzak Ehud. Denny, Laurita. (2003). “The Terrorists in their own words”. Terrorism 
and Political Violence. Vo. 15, no.1. pp.171-184. 
 
Precht, Tomas. (2007). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. Danish Ministry 
of Justice.   
 
RAN. (2014) Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s 
Response. 
 
RAN. (2016). The Root Causes of Violent Extremism. 
 
Raymond, Catherine. (2010). Al-Muhaj+iroun and Sharia4UK: The group behind the ban. ICSR, 
London.   
 
Reich, Walter. (1998). (Ed.). Origins of Terrorism. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
  268 
Rhodes, Jacqueline. (2005). Radical Feminism Writing and Critical Agency: from manifesto to modem. 
Albany: State University of New York Press.  
 
Rosenfeld, Richard et al. (2010). Contemporary Issues in Criminological Theory and Research. 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
 
Rosenthal, John. (2006). The French Path to Jihad. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
 
Rousseau, C. et al. (2011). Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: Evidence Review from Newly Arriving 
Immigrants and Refugees. Canadian Collaboration for Immigrant and Refugee Help. 
 
Roy, Olivier. (1994). The Failure of Political Islam. London: IBI Tauris. 
 
Roy, Olivier. (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Safran, William. (1991). “Diasporas in Modern Societies”. Diaspora. Vo. 1, no.1. pp. 83-99. 
 
Sageman, Marc. (2008). “The Next Generation of Terror”. Foreign Policy. Issue 165. March/April 
Issue. p. 37. 
 
Sageman, Marc. (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Said, Edward. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage. 
 
Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds). (2007). European Islam: Challenges for 
Society and Public Policy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Satterthwaite, Margaret, Huckerby, Jayne (Eds.). (2012). Gender, National Security and Counter-
terrorism: a human rights perspective. London: Routledge. 
 
Sayyid, Salman. (1997). A Fundamental Fear. London: Zed Books. 
 
Schimd, Alex. (2013). “The End of Radicalisation?”. ICCT, The Hague. 
 
Schmid, Alex. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual 
Discussion and Literature Review. ICCT, The Hague. 
 
Schönpflug, Daniel. (2002). Der Weg in Die Terreur. Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag. 
 
Schuurman, Bart et al. (2016). Converts and Islamist Terrorism. ICCT, The Hague.  
 
Sedgwick, Marc. (2010). “The Concept of Radicalisation as a Source of Confusion”. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. Vol. 22, Issue 4. pp. 479-494. 
 
Sheri, Berman. (2003). “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society. Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 1, 
No. 2. pp. 257-272. 
  269 
Silber, Mitchell. Bhatt, Arvin. (2007). Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New York 
City Police Department, NY. 
 
Silke, Andrew. (2011). “Disengagement or Deradicalization.” CTC Sentinel 4, pp. 18–21. 
 
Silke, Andrew. (2014). (Ed.), Prisons, Terrorism, and Extremism. New York: Routledge. 
 
Simon, Herbert. (1995). “Rationality in Political Behavior”. Political Psychology. Vo. 16, no. 1. pp. 45-
61. 
 
Smith, Thomas, Egan, Dave. (2014). EU Gangs Programme. Summative Research Report of 
Transnational Partner Research Responses. Life Long Learning Programme, European Commission.   
 
Stevens, Tim. Neumann, Peter. (2009). Countering Online Radicalisation. London: ICSR, King’s 
College London. 
 
Taarnby Jensen, Michael. (2006). Jihad in Denmark: an overview and analysis of Jihadi activity in 
Denmark 1990-2006. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. 
 
Taylor, Max. (1994). Terrorist lives. London: Brassey’s.   
 
Taylor, Maxwell. Horgan, John. (2002). “The psychological and behavioural bases on Islamic 
fundamentalism”. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 13, no. 4. pp. 37-71. 
 
Tinka Velhius, Jorgen Staun. (2009). Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model. Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations Clingendael. 
 
Tourangeau, Roger. (2007). “Sensitive Questions in Surveys”. Psychological Bulletin. Vo. 133, no. 5. 
pp. 859-883. 
 
Trujillo, Humberto et al. (2009). “Radicalization in Prison? Field Research in 25 Spanish Prisons”. 
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vo. 21, no.4. pp. 558-579. 
 
Uhlmann, Milena. (2007). “European Converts to Terrorism”. Middle East Quarterly. Vo. 15, no. 3. 
pp. 31-37. 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2002). Resettlement Handbook. 
 
United Nations, co-Chairs of the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism. (2008). 
First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism the Lead to Terrorism: Inventory 
of State Programmes. 
 
United States Bipartisan Policy Center. National Security Preparedness Group. (2011). Preventing 
Violent Radicalisation in America. Washington DC: Bipartisan Policy Center. 
 
Vaisse, Justin. (2010). “Eurabian Follies”. Foreign Policy. January/February Issue.  
 
  270 
Van Ostayen, Pieter. (2016). “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks”. CTC 
Sentinel 9:6. 
 
Van San, Marion. “Lost Souls Searching For Answers? Belgian and Dutch Converts Joining the 
Islamic State”. Perspectives on Terrorism. Vo. 9, no. 5. pp. 47-56. 
 
Varvelli, Arturo. (2016). Jihadist Hotbeds. Understanding Local Radicalization Processes. ISPI, Milan. 
 
Veldhuis, Tinka. and Bakker, Edwin. (2007). “Causal factors of radicalisation and their mutual 
consistency” [Dutch]. Vrede &Veiligheid. Vo. 36, no. 4. pp. 447-470. 
 
Veldhuis, Tinka. and Bakker, Edwin. (2009). Muslims in the Netherlands: Tensions and Violent 
Conflict. MICROCON Policy Working Paper 6. Brighton: MICROCON. 
 
Victoroff. Jeff. (2005). “ The mind of the terrorist”. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vo. 49, no. 1. 
pp. 3-42. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. (2006). Al Qaeda in Europe. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. (2009). “Europe’s New Security Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly. 32: pp. 61–
75. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. (2011). “The Buccinasco Pentiti: A Unique Case Study of Radicalization”. Terrorism 
and Political Violence. Vo. 23, no.3. pp. 398-418. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. Brandon, James. (2012). Countering Radicalization in Europe. London: ICSR, 
King’s College London. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. Home-grown Jihadism in Italy; Italian Ministry of Justice. (2012). The radicalization 
of Islamic Terrorism. Elements for a study of the proselytism phenomenon in jail. [Italian]. Quaderni 
ISSP. Number 9.  
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. (2013). “The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise and Homegrown Radicals”. CTC 
Sentinel, 6:11.   
 
Vidino, Lorenzo. (2014). Home-grown Jihadism in Italy: birth, development, and dynamics of 
radicalization [Italian]. ISPI, Milan. 
 
Vidino, Lorenzo et al. (2017). Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West. 
ISPI, Milan; ICCT, The Hague; The George Washington University Program on Extremism, 
Washington. Forward.  
 
Voll, John, Esposito, John. (1993). “”Islam’s Democratic Essence”. Middle East Quarterly. Vo. 1, 
no.3. pp. 3-11. 
 
Volpi, Frédéric. (2010). Political Islam Observed. London: Hurst & Co. (Publishers).  
 
Von Behr, Ines et al. (2013). “Radicalisation in the digital era”. RAND Europe. 
  271 
Vopel, Stefan. (2015). Religion Monitor. Understanding common ground. Special study of Islam. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung Foundation. 
 
Waldman, Peter. (2010). Radicalisation in the Diaspora: Why Muslims in the West attack their host 
countries. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. 
 
Waldmann, Peter. (2010). Radicalisation in the Diaspora. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. 
 
Wanger, Andreas. Mauer, Victor. (2009). The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism. Center for 
Security Study, ETH, Zurich.  
 
Weinberg, Leonard. (1994). “Cultural differences in the behaviour of terrorists”. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. Vo. 9, pp. 241-262. 
 
Weisberg, Herbert, Bowen, Bruce. (1977). An Introduction to Survey Research and Data Analysis. San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman. 
 
Westrop, Samuel. (2015). UK: Some Faiths are More Equal than Others. Gatestone Institute. 
International Policy Council, NY.   
 
Whitehead, John. (1991). “Environmental Interest Group Behavior and Self-Selection Bias In 
Contingent Valuation Mail Surveys”. Growth and Change. Vo. 22, issue 1. pp. 10-20.  
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. (2004). Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. (2005). Radical Islam Rising. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Wilner, Alex, Dubouloz, Claire (2011). “Transformative Radicalization.” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 34: pp. 418–38. 
 
Yemelianova, Galina. (2010). Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Yousufzai, Khouwaga, Emmerling, Franziska. (2017). “Explaining violent radicalization in Western 
Muslims: a four factor model”. Journal of Terrorism Research. Vo. 8, Issue 1. pp. 68-80. 
 
Zedalis, Debra. (2004). Female Suicide Bombers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. War College. 
 
Zeyno, Baran. (2004). (Ed.), The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical 










Newspapers articles, blogs, and online material. 
 
(2003). “Five Moroccans released”. [Italian]. Il Tirreno. 
http://ricerca.gelocal.it/iltirreno/archivio/iltirreno/2003/04/02/LA7PO_LA706.html accessed on 28 
June 2017. 
 
(2003). “Minister Pisanu expels Carmagnola’s Imam”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/2003/j/sezioni/cronaca/imanarresti/espulso/espulso.html accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
 
(2003). “Naples, Pakistanis accused of terrorism released”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/allarmepisanodue/scarcerazioni/scarcerazioni.html accessed on 
28 June 2017. 
 
(2005). “French Muslims face job discrimination”. BBC. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4399748.stm accessed on 16 July 2017. 
 
(2005). “Is Islam compatible with the West?”. BBC. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4204820.stm accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2005). “Turin, Imam Bouchta expelled”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/2005/h/sezioni/cronaca/allertaitalia2/imamtorino/imamtorino.html accessed 
on 28 June 2017 
 
(2006). “Assault on the Italian consulate in Libya”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della Sera. 
http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/02_Febbraio/17/islam.shtml?refresh_ce-cp accessed on 
28 June 2017. 
 
(2006). “Police: Plot to blow up aircraft foiled”. CNN. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/10/uk.terror/ accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
(2006). “The Pope is sorry, but Islam’s anger continues” [Italian]. La Stampa. 
http://www.lastampa.it/2006/09/17/esteri/il-papa-dispiaciuto-ma-non-si-placa-la-rabbia-dellislam-
9UtfJngoPgygLlZvVX6MKM/pagina.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2007). “Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan”. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762209.stm 
accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
(2007). “Race hate cleric Faisal deported”. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6691701.stm 
accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
(2009). “Poachers mistaken for terrorists and arrested”. [Italian]. Il Messaggero. 
http://www.ilmessaggero.it/ROMA/CRONACA/pescatori_di_frodo_scambiati_per_terroristi_e_arresta
ti_risarciti_con_280mila_euro/notizie/61916.shtml accessed on 28 June 2017.  
 
(2010). “Asharq al-Awsat talks to the Quilliam’s Foundation Ed Husain”. Asharq al-Awsat. 
http://english.aawsat.com/2010/10/article55249028/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-the-quilliam-foundations-
ed-husain accessed on 28 June 2017. 
  273 
(2011). “100 protesters burn American flag outside U.S. embassy in London during minute’s silence 
for 9/11”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2036172/9-11-memorial-events-
London-protesters-burn-American-flag-outside-US-embassy.html accessed on 17 May 2017. 
 
(2011). “David Cameron: Speech on radicalisation and Islamic extremism”. New Statesman. 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology, accessed on 24 
June 2017. 
 
(2011). “Islamic terrorism, sentences and releases confirmed”. [Italian] Il Resto del Carlino, 
http://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/reggio_emilia/cronaca/2011/07/15/544393-
terrorismo_islamico_confermate_condanne.shtml accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2011). “Islamist hatemongers funded by the taxpayer with money earmarked for schools”. The Daily 
Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2000492/Theresa-May-admits-63m-terror-fighting-
fund-GIVEN-extremist-groups.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
 
(2011). “This just in from Londonistan: Violent clashes outside U.S. Embassy after hundreds of UK 
Muslims stage mock funeral for ‘murdered’ Bin Laden”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1384344/Osama-Bin-Laden-death-UK-Muslims-stage-mock-
funeral-outside-US-Embassy.html accessed on 17 May 2017. 
 
(2011). “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s statement on guilty plea”. Detroit Free Press. 
http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-
statement-guilty-plea accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
(2012). “Many German Muslims ‘refuse to integrate’”. The Local. 
http://www.thelocal.de/20120301/41079 accessed on 21 June 2017.  
 
(2012). “Protesters burn flags outside US embassy in London”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9544579/Protesters-burn-flags-outside-US-embassy-in-
London.html accessed on 16 May 2017. 
 
(2012). “The online ummah”. The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/21560541 accessed on 
27 June 2017. 
 
(2013). “Netherlands, Germany alarmed over Islamist extremist”. The Yurriyet Daily News.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/netherlands-germany-alarmed-over-islamist-extremists-
.aspx?pageID=238&nid=42916, accessed on 24 June 2017.  
 
(2013). “Non-Muslims Carried Out More Than 90% of All Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil”. 
Washington’s Blog. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/05/muslims-only-carried-out-2-5-percent-
of-terrorist-attacks-on-u-s-soil-between-1970-and-2012.html, accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
(2013). “Preacher refuses to ‘abhor’ attack”. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-22650053/anjem-
choudary-refuses-to-abhor-woolwich-attack accessed on 22 June 2017. 
 
(2013). “Woolwich murder probe: ‘Thousands’ at risk of radicalisation, says Theresa May”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22671619, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
  274 
(2014). “#NotInMyName: Young British Muslims stand up to Isis in online campaign”. Mirror. 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/notinmyname-young-british-muslims-stand-4274392 accessed 
on 15 July 2017. 
 
(2014). “After the arrest of Mehdi Nemmouche, the debate over French jihadists’ surveillance 
revamps” [French]. Le Monde. http://www.lemonde.fr/europeennes-2014/article/2014/06/01/la-tuerie-
de-bruxelles-montre-la-realite-de-la-menace-djihadiste_4429880_4350146.html, accessed on 24 June 
2017. 
 
(2014). “Brussels Jewish Museum killing: Suspect ‘admitted attack’”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27654505 accessed on 13 July 2017. 
 
(2014). “Locals concerned as ‘Sharia police’ patrol streets of German city”. Deutsche Welle. 
http://www.dw.com/en/locals-concerned-as-sharia-police-patrol-streets-of-german-city/a-17904887 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2014). “RAI, Muslim associations to Fico: ‘Stop Islamophobia in the public service’”. [Italian]. Il 
Fatto Quotidiano. http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/09/12/rai-le-associazioni-musulmane-a-fico-
basta-islamofobia-nel-servizio-pubblico/1119448/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2014). “Recruiting for Jihad”. Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.com/en/recruiting-for-jihad/a-
17483704 accessed on 16 June 2017.  
 
(2014). “UK Imams Against Isis”. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Bd0Y6qWmlA 
accessed on 15 July 2017.  
 
(2014). “UK will count cost of Islamic extremism for ‘many years’, says Cressida Dick”. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-
for-many-years-says-cressida-dick, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
(2014)“Locals concerned as ‘Sharia police’ patrol streets of German city”. Deutsche Welle. 
http://www.dw.com/en/locals-concerned-as-sharia-police-patrol-streets-of-german-city/a-17904887 
accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
(2015). “Isis, Alfano: ‘Increased security just like after 9/11’”. [Italian]. RAI News. 
http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/alfano-terrorismo-sicurezza-italia-allarme-ded02842-9897-
4e2e-87df-33e093b8b241.html accessed on 11 June 2017.  
 
(2015). “Isis, warning from the Libyan Minister: Terrorists arrive to Italy on migrants’ boats”. [Italian]. 
Il Messaggero. 
http://www.ilmessaggero.it/PRIMOPIANO/ESTERI/isis_terroristi_arrivano_barconi_migranti_ministr
o_libico_allarme/notizie/1349387.shtml accessed on 10 June 2017.  
 
(2015). “Islamist recruiters target asylum seekers, German intelligence says”. RT News. 
https://www.rt.com/news/316233-islamist-recruiters-target-refugees/ accessed on 23 June 2017.  
 
  275 
(2015). “Libya, 4 Italians kidnapped in Mellitah”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della Sera. 
http://www.corriere.it/esteri/15_luglio_20/libia-farnesina-quattro-italiani-rapiti-mellitah-101937da-
2eaa-11e5-820a-d82a668b1363.shtml accessed on 12 June 2017.    
 
(2015). “Maria Giulia, the Jihadist that recruited in Italy”. [Italian]. L’Espresso. 
http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2015/07/01/news/maria-giulia-sergio-la-jihadista-che-reclutava-
in-italia-ecco-cosa-diceva-ai-genitori-e-alla-sorella-in-partenza-1.219478 accessed on 28 June 2017.  
 
(2015). “Millions across France join ‘unprecedented’ rallies against terrorism”. France 24. 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150111-france-demonstration-paris-attack-rally-unprecedented-turnout 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2015). “Skyping with the enemy: I went undercover as a Jihadi girlfriend”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/26/french-journalist-poses-muslim-convert-isis-anna-
erelle accessed on 25 June 2017. 
 
(2015). “Terrorism, 2 arrested in Brescia”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/22/news/terrorismo_due_arresti_a_brescia_promuovevano
_l_is_sul_web-119568984/ accessed on 28 June 2017.  
 
(2015). “The Islamic communities: ‘We demonstrate for peace’”. [Italian] La Stampa. 
http://www.lastampa.it/2015/01/09/edizioni/vercelli/le-comunit-islamiche-manifestiamo-per-la-pace-
f4QLGHB6kFNIuy1ar3xXSN/pagina.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
(2015). “Wiretapping, Maria Giulia Sergio”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://video.repubblica.it/edizione/milano/le-intercettazioni-maria-giulia-sergio--papa-prendi-mamma-
per-i-capelli-e-vieni-in-siria/206021/205126 accessed on 10 June 2017 
 
(2016). “Anis Amri killed in Milan” [Italian]. Il Sole 24 Ore. 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2016-12-23/spara-ad-agente-milanese-e-grida-allah-akbar-
ucciso-polizia-102426.shtml?uuid=ADHVlRJC accessed on 25 April 2017.  
 
(2016). “Committee for the Study of the Phenomenon of Radicalization and Jihadist Extremism 
Established” [Italian]. Italian Government. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. 
http://www.governo.it/articolo/insediata-commissione-di-studio-su-fenomeno-radicalizzazione-ed-
estremismo-jihadista/5640 accessed on 30 June 2017. 
 
(2016). “Florence, ‘Citizenship Act’ between mayor and Imam: sermons in Italian during worship 
sessions” [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://firenze.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/02/08/news/firenze_il_patto_di_cittadinanza_tra_sindaco_e_i
mam_sermoni_in_italiano_durante_le_cerimonie-132960172/ accessed on 30 June 2017. 
 
(2016). “The journey of the Jihadists from Veneto to ISIS’s training camps”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della 
Sera http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/notizie/cronaca/2016/28-marzo-2016/viaggio-jihadisti-




(2017). “London attack: what we know so far”. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39355108 
accessed on 24 June 2017.  
 
(2017). “Migrants, record arrivals in 2016”. Il Sole 24 Ore. 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-01-05/migranti-2016-record-sbarchi-e-accoglienza-
162035.shtml?uuid=ADdVMwQC accessed on 30 June 2017. 
 
(2017). “Terrorism: Iraqi citizen arrested in Crotone: he propagandized for ISIS” [Italian]. Il Corriere 
della Sera. http://www.corriere.it/cronache/17_giugno_19/terrorismo-arrestato-iracheno-crotone-
faceva-propaganda-isis-a0f92742-54b4-11e7-8fb7-7977c09f9d70.shtml accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
(2017). “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985 accessed on 25 
April 2017.    
 
(2017). “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985 accessed on 25 
April 2017.    
 
Abbas, Tahir. (2009). “Muslim radicalisation’s socio-economic roots”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/apr/29/islam-terrorism-radicalisation-
recession accessed on 16 June 2017.  
 
Alderman, Liz. (2015). “After Terrorist Attacks, Many French Muslims Wonder: And What Now?”. 
The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/french-muslims-worry-about-
backlash-after-charlie-hebdo-attack.html?_r=0 accessed on 16 July 2017. 
 
Alexander, Harriet. (2015). “France is still ignoring radicalisation threat”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11553307/France-is-still-ignoring-
radicalisation-threat-warns-Europes-anti-extremism-tsar.html accessed on 16 June 2017. 
 
Almelling, A. et al. (2015). “An overview of Germany’s Islamist scene”. Deutsche Welle.  
http://www.dw.com/en/an-overview-of-germanys-islamist-scene/a-18860746 accessed on 24 June 
2017. 
 
Amoruso, Pasquale. (2013). “Bari, violence against Islamic community” [Italian]. Il Quotidiano 
Italiano. http://bari.ilquotidianoitaliano.it/cronaca/2013/05/news/bari-violenze-contro-la-comunita-
islamica-vice-presidente-cii-si-rivolge-a-napolitano-23455.html/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Anderson, Christina. (2017). “Stockholm Suspect Was Denied Asylum and Told to Leave in ‘16”. The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/world/europe/sweden-truck-attack.html?_r=0 
accessed on 15 June 2017. 
 
Annunziata, Lucia. (2016). “5 doubts as to why Italy is safe (but maybe not by much)” [Italian]. 
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.it/lucia-annunziata/sicurezza-italia-
terrorismo_b_11072118.html accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Anthony, Andrew. (2015). “Losing their religion: The hidden crisis of faith among Britain’s young 
Muslims”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/17/losing-their-religion-
british-ex-muslims-non-believers-hidden-crisis-faith accessed on 21 June 2017. 
  277 
 
Balestrazzi, Gabriele. (2015). “Islam and us”. [Italian]. Gazzetta di Parma. 
http://www.gazzettadiparma.it/news/stranieri/247181/L-Islam-e-noi--tre.html accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
 
Barrett, Richard. (2014). In “UK will count cost of Islamic extremism for ‘many years’, says Cressida 
Dick”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-
extremism-for-many-years-says-cressida-dick, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Bartolini, Alessandro. (2017). “Isis’s Recruiters, Combatants, and Wannabe Kamikazes: The Great 
Black Story of Jihad Is In Lombardy”. [Italian]. Il Fatto Quotidiano.  
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/01/04/reclutatori-isis-combattenti-e-aspiranti-kamikaze-il-grande-
romanzo-nero-del-jihad-e-in-lombardia-le-storie/3282044/2/ accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Bartsch, Matthias et al. (2012). “The Dangerous Success of Radical Young Clerics”. Der Spiegel. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-growing-following-in-germany-the-dangerous-success-
of-radical-young-clerics-a-816642-2.html accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Bell, Stewart. (2014). “Mohammed Hersi wanted to move to Muslim country to escape Canada’s 
‘Islamophobia’, terror trial hears”. National Post. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/mohamed-
hassan-hersi-wanted-to-move-to-muslim-country-to-escape-islamophobia-terror-trial-hears accessed on 
23 June 2017. 
 
Bilefsky, Dan. (2015). “French Premier Declares ‘War’ On Radical Islam”. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html?_r=0 accessed on 13 
July 2017. 
 
Bond, Anthony. (2013). “Lee Rigby murder trial”. Mirror. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/lee-
rigby-murder-trial-michael-2943185 accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Bonessa, Michelangelo. (2015). “Those Italian Muslims between cheering and ambiguity”. [Italian] Il 
Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/quei-musulmani-italiani-esultanza-e-ambiguit-
1081156.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Borghetti, Giorgio. (2016). “If there is not even one Muslim in the Anti-Jihad Committee” [Italian]. Il 
Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/nella-commissione-anti-radicalizzazione-non-c-
neanche-1301792.html accessed on 30 June 2017.   
 
Bowcott, Owen. (2006). “Arrest extremist marchers, police told”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/feb/06/raceandreligion.muhammadcartoons accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
 
Boyle, Danny et al. (2016). “Nice terror attack: Police vans blocking promenade withdrawn hours 
before”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-
blocking-promenade-withdrawn-hour/ accessed on 23 June 2017.  
 
  278 
Bracchi, Paul. (2015). “The campus of hate”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2972909/The-campus-hate-terrorist-butcher-Emwazi-s-murderous-alter-ego-created-heart-Britain-s-
capital-city.html accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Brewer, Julia. (2015). “For British Muslim women, Isis may offer freedom”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/for-british-muslim-women-isis-may-offer-freedom-
10329930.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Brown, Katherine. (2013). “Gender, Prevent, and British Muslism”. Public Spirit. 
http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/gender-prevent-and-british-muslims-2/ accessed on 26 June 2017. 
 
Brown, Katherine. (2017). “This is how Islamist radicalisation actually happens”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-isis-al-qaeda-radicalisation-risk-factors-
a7753451.html accessed on 25 June 2017. 
 
Bruno, Greg. (2008). “Religion and Politics in Iran”. Council on Foreign Relations. 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/religion-and-politics-iran accessed on 17 July 2017. 
 
Buccini, Goffredo. (2017). “The Florence Imam: ‘Terrorists in Islam’s family book” [Italian]. Il 
Corriere della Sera. http://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_gennaio_12/imam-firenze-anche-
terroristi-nell-album-famiglia-dell-islam-27072fe8-d916-11e6-97e6-e1e054cdfc34.shtml accessed on 
30 June 2017.  
 
Burke, Jason, Traynor, Ian. (2009). “Fears of an Islamic revolt in Europe begin to fade”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/26/radicalisation-european-muslims, accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
 
Burke, Jason. (2013). “Fighting terrorism: Do ‘deradicalisation’ camps really work?”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-deradicalisation-camps-work accessed 
on 30 June 2017. 
 
Burrows, Thomas. (2015). “Up 100 Islamist teachers could be banned from schools after 
investigations”. Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3026230/Up-100-Islamist-
teachers-banned-schools-investigation-links-Trojan-Horse-scandal-dozens-claiming-Lee-Rigby-s-
murder-hoax.html accessed on 23 July 2017. 
 
Calderwood, Imogen. (2015). “French women furious after ‘Muslim girl-gang’ attacks ‘immoral’ 
sunbather”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3175959/Girl-gang-attacks-
immoral-sunbather-wearing-bikini-French-park-sparking-JeSuisCharlie-style-social-media-
campaign.html accessed on 12 June 2017.  
 
Cartaldo, Claudio. (2017). “Dossier on arrivals by boat: in 2017 more than 250 thousand migrants”. 
[Italian] ll Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/dossier-riservato-sugli-sbarchi-nel-2017-
oltre-250mila-1375348.html accessed on 25 April 2017.   
 
Carter, Claire. (2013). “M&S apology over Muslim staff policy”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/10534294/MandS-apology-over-
Muslim-staff-policy.html accessed on 25 April 2017. 
  279 
 
Castellani, Daniele et al. (2015). “At the mosque people don’t cry for Charlie Hebdo”. [Italian]. 
L’Espresso. http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2015/01/15/news/in-moschea-non-si-piange-per-
charlie-hebdo-1.195285 accessed on 28 June 2017. 
Cavallaro, Felice. (2016). “Berlin attack, Amri radicalised in Sicily”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della Sera  
http://www.corriere.it/esteri/16_dicembre_22/anis-amri-berlino-radicalizzazione-sicilia-carcere-
6fd8abea-c88e-11e6-b72f-beb391d55ecd.shtml  accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Chrisafi, Angelique. (2016). “Cell of French women guided by ISIS behind failed Notre Dame attack”. 
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/09/cell-of-french-women-radicalised-by-
isis-behind-failed-notre-dame-attack accessed on 15 June 2017. 
 
Ciavardini, Tiziana. (2016). “Terrorists attacks in Brussels, Imam Pallavicini: ‘Let’s condemn Isis. 
Let’s forget about the Middle Ages. But Italy shall acknowledge Islam” [Italian]. Il Fatto Quotidiano. 
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/03/24/attentati-bruxelles-imam-pallavicini-condanniamo-isis-
dimentichiamo-il-medioevo-ma-litalia-riconosca-lislam/2578141/ accessed on 30 June 2017. 
 
Cline, Seth. (2013). “The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: A New Threat Emerges”. U.S. News. 
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-past/2013/02/26/the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing-a-
new-threat-emerges, accessed on 03 July 2014. 
 
Collony, Kate, Stephen, Chris. (2016). “Berlin attack suspect Anis Amri had been on watchlist since 
January”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/21/berlin-attack-suspect-anis-
amri-under-monitoring-since-january accessed on 23 June 2017.   
 
Conger, George. (2006). “Most Dutch say Islam incompatible with West”. The Jerusalem Post. 
http://www.jpost.com/International/Most-Dutch-say-Islam-incompatible-with-West accessed on 12 
July 2017. 
 
Coughlan, Sean. (2014). “‘Disturbing’ findings from Trojan horse inquiry”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/education-28419901 accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Council on American-Islamic Relations. (2015). “CAIR Welcomes AP Stylebook Revision of 
‘Islamist’”. CAIR Official Website. https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/11808-cair-
welcomes-ap-stylebook-revision-of-islamist.html accessed on 17 June 2017.  
 
Couvillon, Dillon. (2014). “Gays Are Not Terrorists –A Response to Pat Roberts”. Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dillon-couvillon/half-the-battle-of-being-_b_6031328.html accessed on 
19 June 2017. 
 
Cowell, Alan. (2006). “Blair Says Homegrown Terrorism Is Generation-Long Struggle”. The New York 
Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/world/europe/11britain.html?_r=0, accessed on 24 June 
2017. 
 
Crosetti, Maurizio. (2001). “Bouchta: ‘You must not fear Islam’”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2001/09/19/bouchta-non-dovete-avere-paura-
dellislam.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
  280 
Culzac, Natasha. (2014). “Israel-Gaza conflict: Rise of anti-Semitic attacks in UK”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/israelgaza-conflict-rise-of-antisemitic-attacks-in-
uk-as-crisis-rages-in-the-middle-east-9631174.html accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Custodero, Alberto. (2015). “Blitz against al-Qaeda in Italy”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/04/24/news/maxi_operazione_contro_al_qaeda_in_italia_arrest
ati_autori_della_strage_del_mercato_a_peshawar-112701307/ accessed on 28 June 2017 
 
Custodero, Alberto. (2016). “Alfano: ‘Prevention steady, Italy is a safe country’” [Italian]. La 
Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/08/15/news/terrorismo_alfano_prevenzione_ok_paese_sicuro-
146021579/ accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Dearden, Lizzie. (2015). “‘Isis’ French factory attack”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/grenoble-isis-beheading-live-updates-french-
factory-attack-10347351.html accessed on 13 July 2017. 
 
Di Landro, Armando. (2015). “The Italian-Australian Jihadist Imam. Sermons in Bergamo and Brescia 
too”. [Italian]. Il Corriere della Sera http://bergamo.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_gennaio_20/musa-
cerantonio-bergamo-brescia-moschee-1f9d5874-a090-11e4-b571-55218c79aee3.shtml accessed on 25 
April 2017. 
 
Dodd, Vikram et al. (2017). “Police unravel multiple aliases of Westminster terrorist Khalid Masood”. 
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/23/westminster-attack-police-arrest-
seven-people-in-raids-at-six-addresses accessed on 29 August 2017. 
 
Dodd, Vikram, Addley, Esther. (2016). “Leytonstone knife attack: man convicted of attempted 
murder”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/08/leytonstone-knife-attack-
man-convicted-of-attempted accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Doward, Jamie. (2007). “The network”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/06/terrorism.jamiedoward accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Dugan, Emily. (2014). “Radicalised Muslims in UK more likely to be born in Britain, rich, and 
depressed”. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/radicalised-muslims-in-
uk-more-likely-to-be-wellheeled-9754062.html accessed on 26 June 2017. 
 
Emad El-Din Shahin. (2015). The Oxford Enciclopedia of Islam and Politics. Oxford Islamic Studies 
Online. https://0-www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.mylibrary.qu.edu.qa/article/opr/t342/e0252 accessed 
on 17 June 2017. 
 
Esposito, John. Mogahed, Galia. (2008). In “Press Release for Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion 
Muslims Really Think”. Gallup Center. http://www.gallup.com/press/104206/who-speaks-islam.aspx#1, 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Esposito, John. (2014). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford, Islamic Studies Online. 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/print/opr/t236/e0888 accessed on 17 June 2017.   
 
  281 
Evans, Martin et al. (2017). “Everything we know about Manchester suicide bomber Salman Abedi”. 
The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/26/everything-know-manchester-suicide-
bomber-salman-abedi/ accessed on 29 August 2017. 
Foschini, Giuliano. (2014). “Bilal Bosnic: ‘There are Italians in ISIS. We will conquer the 
Vatican’”[Italian]. La Repubblica, 
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2014/08/28/news/bilal_bosnic_ci_sono_italiani_nell_is_conquisteremo_
il_vaticano-94559220/ accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Foschini, Giuliano. (2015). “Hunting for fighters” [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/01/15/news/a_caccia_di_combattenti_ecco_gli_imam_erranti_c
he_reclutano_in_italia-104970531/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Freeman, Colin. (2015). “Ladbroke Grove connection- the wealthy West London district that bred 
Jihadi John”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-
state/11438534/Ladbroke-Grove-connection-the-wealthy-west-London-district-that-bred-Jihadi-
John.html accessed on 29 August 2017. 
 
Gardham, Duncan. (2008). “Glasgow bomb plot: Wills to families left by airport terrorists”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3689301/Glasgow-bomb-plot-Wills-to-families-
left-by-airport-terrorists.html accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Gatehouse, Gabriel. (2016). “Germany ‘was warned about Ansbach suicide bomber’”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37059100 accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Gilligan, Andrew. (2009). “Islamists who want to destroy the state get £100,000 funding”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/6427369/Islamists-who-want-to-destroy-the-
state-get-100000-funding.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
 
Gillum, Rachel. (2013). “There is no difference in religious fundamentalism between American 
Muslims and Christians”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2013/12/16/no-difference-in-religious-fundamentalism-between-american-muslims-and-
christians/ accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Giudici, Cristina. (2016). “Why is Italy still immune to terrorism?” [Italian]. Il Foglio. 
http://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2016/07/15/news/perche-litalia-e-ancora-immune-dal-terrore-98420/ 
accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Gover, Dominic. (2015). “‘Jihadi John’: Westminster University bans Muslim hate cleric”. 
International Business Times. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/jihadi-john-westminster-university-bans-
muslim-hate-cleric-after-mohammed-emwazi-revealed-1489651 accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Graham-Harrison, Emma. (2015). “Paris policeman’s brother: ‘Islam is a religion of love’”. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/charlie-hebdo-policeman-murder-ahmed-
merabet accessed on 15 July 2017. 
 
Grant, Madeline. (2014). “16% of French Citizens Support Isis, Poll Finds”. News Week. 




Greenwood, Chris. (2014). “Rising tide of anti-semitism in Britain as Jewish people face backlash over 
bloodshed in Gaza”. Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2707421/Rising-tide-anti-
semitism-Britain-Jewish-people-face-backlash-bloodshed-Gaza.html accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Grignetti, Francesco. (2016). “U.S. Raid in Libya, Italy offers support but won’t send its army”. 
[Italian]. Il Secolo XIX, http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/mondo/2016/08/02/ASVoHCkD-
italia_sostegno_militari.shtml  accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Grilli, Franco. (2015). “Mossad: ‘Jihadists are planning 10 attacks in Europe’”. [Italian]. Il Giornale. 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/mossad-i-jihadisti-preparano-10-attacchi-europa-1089983.html 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Grotti, Leone. (2016). “‘We’ll soon get to Rome.’ ISIS’s list of threats to Italy”. [Italian]. Tempi. 
http://www.tempi.it/roma-isis-ha-minacciato-italia-e-perche#.WQNXnBzUDEc accessed on 25 April 
2017. 
 
Groves, Jason. (2011). “‘We need to be a lot less tolerant towards Islamic extremists’”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353902/David-Cameron-Stop-tolerating-Islamic-extremists-
respect-British-core-values.html accessed on 15 July 2017. 
 
Hadith: https://sunnah.com/muslim/54/50 accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Hafiz, Yasemine. (2014). “‘Jews And Arabs Refuse To Be Enemies’ Movement Demands Peace”. 
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/15/jews-and-arabs-refuse-to-be-
enemies_n_5587742.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Hakim, Yalda. (2016). “How Sweden became an exporter of Jihad”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37578919 accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Hall, John. (2014). “‘British banker’ reveals he has quit to join ISIS in Iraq”. Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2759535/British-banker-reveals-quit-join-ISIS-Iraq-hated-
ruled-laws-Allah-s-self-indulgence-rich.html accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Hall, John. (2014). “Revealed: How ‘up to 60’ women who rule Isis’s capital by fear”. Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2858819/Up-60-British-Jihadette-women-rule-ISIS-s-capital-
fear.html accessed on 21 July 2017. 
 




Hargei, Taj. (2014). “Why aren’t British Muslims condemning the maniacs killing in the name of 
Islam?”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2725475/Why-aren-t-British-
Muslims-condemning-maniacs-killing-Islam-From-leading-Muslim-voice-troubling-question.html 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
  283 
Hasan, Mehdi. (2013). “Extremists point to Western foreign policy to explain their acts. Why do we 
ignore them?” Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/woolwich-attack-
western-foreign-policy_b_3357794.html accessed on 22 June 2017. 
 
Hasan, Mehdi. (2013). “Woolwich Attack: Overreacting to Extremism ‘Could Bring Back Al Qaeda’ 
Ex CIA Officer Warns”. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/27/sageman-
interview_n_3342206.html, accessed on 01 August 2017. 
 
Hassan, Hassan. (2015). “Three sisters, nine children, one dangerous journey to the heart of Isis. What 
is the lure of the caliphate?”. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/21/three-
sisters-nine-children-what-is-the-lure-of-the-isis-caliphate accessed on 21 July 2017. 
 
Heyer, Julia. (2014). “The Spoils of War: Violence in Gaza Leads to Youth Radicalization”. Der 
Spiegel. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-in-gaza-strip-leads-to-radicalization-of-
palestinian-youth-a-985510.html accessed on 23 June 2017.   
 
Holden, Michael. (2015). “Pakistani cleric launches anti-ISIS curriculum in Britain”. Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/britain-security-curriculum-idUSL8N0Z92Y720150623 
accessed on 15 July 2017. 
 
Huggler, Justin. (2015). “Islamic extremists ‘trying to recruit Syrian refugees in Germany”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11856326/Islamic-
extremists-trying-to-recruit-Syrian-refugees-in-Germany.html accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Hughes, Chris. (2014). “British jihadi Isis fighters post chilling Youtube video urging Muslims to 
‘sacrifice your family for Allah’”. Mirror. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/british-jihadi-
isis-fighters-post-3734364 accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Hule, Dale. (2012). CBN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GjNIaIoZKAE accessed on 24 June 
2017.  
 
Husain, Ed. (2007). “Interview: Ed Husain, author of the Islamist”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/may/12/religion.news accessed on 21 July 2017. 
 
Husain, Ed. (2007). “With God on their side?”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jun/27/withgodontheirside accessed on 21 July 2017. 
 
Husain, Ed. (2007). Interviewed by Amanpour, Christiane. “Radical Islam: Britain’s huge problem”. 
CNN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_WKFpak9Mc accessed on 21 June 2017. 
Hussam Abdu, Mohammed Bouyeri, Riadh Jelassi, Adam Gadahn, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: 
Reynolds, James. (2004). “‘Nobody is going to live forever’”. BBC. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3899015.stm accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Hussey, Andrew. (2014). “The French Intifada: how the Arab banlieues are fighting the French state”. 
The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/french-intifada-arab-banlieues-
fighting-french-state-extract accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
  284 
Italian State Police. (2013). “Discriminated for being Muslim, becomes terrorist”. [Italian]. 
http://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/29347/ accessed on 16 May 2017. 
 
Jaffer, Nabeelah. (2015). “The secret world of Isis brides”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/isis-brides-secret-world-jihad-western-women-syria 
accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Jenkins, Simon. (2013). “The real threat to our way of life? Not terrorists or faraway dictators, but our 
own politicians and securocrats”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/real-threat-terrorist-politicians-national-
security, accessed on 03 July 2017.  
 
Kepel, Gilles. (2004). In “The War for Muslim minds: an interview with Gilles Kepel”. Open 
Democracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-5-57-2216.jsp, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Khan, Sara. (2015). “My journey into the complex lives of British Muslim women and girls”. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/british-muslim-communities-
women-face-challenge-extremism accessed on 26 June 2017. 
 
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. (2015). “The Mill of Muslim Radicalism in France”. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/the-mill-of-muslim-radicalism-in-france.html?_r=0 
accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
Kingsley, Patrick. (2016). “2016 Sets New Record For Asylum Seeker Reaching Italy By Boat,” The 
Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/2016-sets-new-record-for-asylum-seekers-
reaching-italy-by-boat accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Knapton, Sarah et all. (2017). “Khruam Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba named: 
Everything we know about the London Bridge terrorists”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/05/ringleader-london-bridge-terror-attack-named-khuram-
butt/ accessed on 29 August 2017. 
 
Kotecha, Sima. (2015). “Warning over Islamic radicalisation in England’s prisons”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32194671 accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Kundnani, Arun. (2014). “Boris Jason’s Radicalization Myth-Making”. Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/arun-kundnani/boris-johnsons-radicalisation_b_4896120.html, 
accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
Lewis, Paul. (2006). “Banned group tried to rent hall near suspects’ home”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/16/topstories3.terrorism accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Lodoli, Marco. (2015). “Mosque, fear, and prayers”. [Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://roma.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/01/10/news/moschea_paura_e_preghiere_il_vero_islam_soltant
o_pace-104633668/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Lorenzetto, Stefano. (2008). “Piccardo: ‘There’s only a moderate Islam’”. [Italian]. Panorama. 
http://archivio.panorama.it/archivio/Piccardo-C-e-solo-un-islam-moderato accessed on 28 June 2017. 
  285 
Macintyre, Donal. (2014). “Exclusive: Al Qaeda plot to blow up 5 passengers planes in Christmas 
‘spectacular’”. Daily Express. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/541725/REVEALED-Al-Qaeda-plot-
to-blow-up-5-European-passenger-jets-in-Christmas-spectacular accessed on 12 July 2017. 
 
Malnick, Edward. (2014). “Islamic schools condemned by Cameron receive state funding”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10706398/Islamic-schools-condemned-by-David-
Cameron-receive-state-funding.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
 
Martin, Arthur. (2015). “Pictured: Father who blamed police for not stopping his daughter joining Isis 
screams ‘burn USA’”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3015311/Pictured-
Father-blamed-police-not-stopping-daughter-joining-ISIS-screams-burn-USA-stands-just-feet-Lee-
Rigby-s-killer-Muslim-demo.html accessed on 17 July 2017. 
 
Mason, Rowena, Stewart, Heather. (2017). “Jeremy Corbyn: the war on terror is simply not working.” 
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/26/jeremy-corbyn-the-war-on-terror-
is-simply-not-working accessed on 22 June 2017. 
 
McKay, Peter. (2014). “Jihad and why young men love going to war”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2665368/PETER-McKAY-Jihad-young-men-love-going-
war.html, accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
McNeil Nillson Richard. (2014). “More radical approaches are needed by European governments”. 
Your Middle East. http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/the-west-should-not-fear-syrias-foreign-
fighters_23696, accessed on 03 July 2017.  
 
McTague, Tom. (2014). “’Islamic militants in Iraq planning to attack us here in the United Kingdom’: 
Cameron warns MPs of terror threat from Middle East”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2661159/Former-spy-chief-warns-young-men-leave-UK-
jihadis-Europe-Iraqs-ambassador-U-S-claims-thousand-bin-Ladens-emerge-Isis.html, accessed on 24 
June 2017.  
 
McTague, Tom. (2014). “More Brits signing up to fight with Jihadist militants in Iraq and Syria than 
for the UK Army Reserve”. The Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2659237/More-
Brits-signing-fight-jihadist-militants-Iraq-Syria-UK-Army-Reserve.html accessed on 28 June 2017.  
 
Meichtry, Stacy. (2014). “France Fears Syria Is Becoming Terrorist Training Ground”. The Wall Street 
Journal. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304049904579517751693560582, 
accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Millet, Richard. (2012). “Hezbollah marches through London again on Al Quds Day”. Richard Millet’s 
Blog. https://richardmillett.wordpress.com/2012/08/17/hezbollah-marches-through-london-again-on-al-
quds-day/ accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
Millington, Karen. (2013). “What happens when Muslims and Christians tie the knot?” BBC. 




Millward, David. (2016). “Munich terror alert: Two railway stations ‘evacuated’ as German police 
warn of threat by Islamic State suicide bombers”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12077040/Munich-terror-alert-train-
stations-evacuated.html accessed on 15 June 2017. 
 
Molinari, Maurizo. (2015). “Isis claims car bombing in Cairo”. [Italian]. La Stampa. 
http://www.lastampa.it/2015/07/11/esteri/egitto-forte-esplosione-nel-centro-del-cairo-colpito-
consolato-italiano-xT8NiCsJlivT9Qi5do0gTK/pagina.html accessed on 11 June 2017.  
 
Moosavi, Leon. (2012). “Muslims are well-integrated in Britain- but no one seems to believe it”. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/jul/03/muslims-integrated-britain 
accessed on 15 July 2017.    
 
Muhammad, Hakeem. (2015). “Is France failing its Muslim youth?”. Aljazeera America. 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/14/france-islamophobiaimmigration.html accessed on 15 
July 2017.  
 
Mulholland, Rory. (2015). “Teacher quits French Muslim school accusing it of ‘promoting Islamism’”. 
The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11398672/Teacher-quits-
French-Muslim-school-accusing-it-of-promoting-Islamism.html accessed on 12 June 2017.  
 
Nadotti, Cristina. (2017). “Jihadists of Italy, here are the stats and the anti-terrorism operations”. 
[Italian]. La Repubblica. 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/03/30/news/tutte_le_operazioni_antiterrorismo_e_gli_arresti_in
_italia-161777930/ accessed on 25 April 2017.   
 
Norton-Taylor, Richard. (2010). “‘Mumbai-style’ terror attack on UK, France, Germany foiled”. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/29/terror-attack-plot-europe-foiled accessed on 
12 June 2017. 
 
Nugent, Elisabeth. (2014). “What do you mean by ‘Islamist’”?. The Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/what-do-we-mean-by-islamist/ 
accessed on 17 June 2017. 
 
Oltermann, Philip. (2016). “Germany’s first attack by radicalised asylum seeker alarms officials”. The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/germany-train-attack-could-prompt-
rethink-of-counter-terrorism-policy accessed on 15 June 2017. 
 
Orsini, Alessandro. (2016). “Orsini: Possible attacks in Italy in 2018” [Italian]. Onmibus, La7 TV, 6 
January. http://www.la7.it/omnibus/video/orsini-possibili-attentati-in-italia-nel-2018-07-01-2016-
171296 accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Payne, Ed. Carroll, Jason. (2015). “The terrorist recruiting crossroads: Where Jihad meets rap”. CNN. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/13/us/jihadi-rap/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Pelliccetti, Riccardo. (2015). “Here’s what is preached at the mosque: ‘Allah, count them and 
exterminate them all’”. [Italian]. Il Giornale. http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/i-leader-dialoganti-
condannano-terrorismo-nei-luoghi-culto-1082268.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
  287 
 
Perring, Rebecca. (2015). “British Muslims blame police and MI5 for radicalising teens who want to 
join Islamic State”. Daily Express. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/569536/British-Muslims-blame-
MI5-police-radicalisation accessed on 16 June 2017. 
 
Pfeffer, Anshel. (2012). “Iran’s specter looms large over London’s annual ‘Quds Day’ march”. 
Haaretz. http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/2.431/iran-s-specter-looms-large-over-london-s-annual-quds-
day-march-1.459264 accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Radio Radicale. (2015). “Islam in Italy: challenges and opportunities” [Italian]. Rome, 5 March. 
http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/435415/lislam-in-italia-sfide-e-opportunita accessed on 28 June 
2017. 
 
Rame, Sergio. (2015). “Mossad and the CIA warn Pope Francis”. [Italian]. Il Giornale. 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/mossad-e-cia-avvertono-papa-francesco-vaticano-prossimo-
1081884.html accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Randacio, Emilio. (2017). “Terrorism, ISIS’s boxer sentenced to 6 years”. [Italian]. La Repubblica, 
http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/02/14/news/terrorismo_isis_pugile_condannato_milano-
158273826/ accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Ranieri, Daniele. (2014). “Here’s how the Islamic State recruits in Italy”. [Italian]. Il Foglio. 
http://www.ilfoglio.it/video/2014/08/28/video-esclusivo-cosi-lo-stato-islamico-fa-reclutamento-in-
italia___7-120359-2014-8_c245.htm accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Reid, Sue. (2015). “From joker to jihadi bride”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2978248/From-joker-jihadi-bride-exclusive-pictures-goofs-
like-typical-London-schoolgirl-reveal-poisoned-mind-15-year-old-s-run-join-ISIS.html accessed on 28 
June 2017. 
 
Reuter, Christoph. (2013). “Jihad Tourists: How Dangerous Are Syria’s Foreign Fighters?” Der 
Spiegel. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/syrian-jihadist-problem-is-real-but-reports-often-
exaggerated-a-924900.html, accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
Riegert, Bernd. (2014). “De Kerchove: ‘Terror threat still present in Europe’”. Deutsche Welle. 
http://www.dw.de/de-kerchove-terror-threat-still-present-in-europe/a-17486669, accessed on 24 June 
2017. 
 
Robinson, Martin. (2014). “The Final Insult”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2568317/Justice-Lee-Rigby-Soldiers-family-arrive-court-
wearing-matching-t-shirts-act-solidarity-ahead-sentencing-two-Muslim-converts-murdered-him.html 
accessed on 22 June 2017. 
 
Robinson, Martin. (2015). “If he’s a ‘beautiful, kind man’, why is he killing innocent civilians?” The 
Daily Mail. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2970521/Outrage-group-blames-MI5-radicalising-
extremely-kind-Jihadi-John-fled-Syria-kill-people-ISIS.html accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
  288 
Rogers, Joel. (2015). “The majority of voters doubt that Islam is compatible with British values”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/politics-blog/11503493/The-
majority-of-voters-doubt-that-Islam-is-compatible-with-British-values.html accessed on 12 July 2017. 
 
Rogers, Tim. (2015). “Cardiff Jihadist ‘willing to die’ for Isis fight in Syria”. BBC. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-28116575 accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Romano, Luca. (2016). “ISIS’s face in Lombardy and Piemonte”. [Italian]. Il Giornale, 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/i-volti-dellisis-lombardia-e-piemonte-1252295.html accessed 
on 25 April 2017. 
 
Rosini, Gianni. (2017). “Terrorism, Vidino: Italy is not a logistical base: but Lombardy, Emilia-
Romagna, and Veneto are Jihadist centres”. [Italian] Il Fatto Quotidiano. 
https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/06/07/terrorismo-vidino-litalia-non-e-base-logistica-ma-
lombardia-emilia-romagna-e-veneto-centri-del-jihadismo/3640721/ accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Ross, Aaron. (2011). “Why Aren’t There More Muslim Terrorists?”. Princeton University’s 
Loonewatch. http://www.loonwatch.com/2011/08/book-review-the-missing-martyrs-by-charles-
kurzman-2/, accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
Ross, Tim. (2015). “Muslim charity stripped of state funding over extremism fears”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11337846/Muslim-charity-stripped-of-state-
funding-over-extremism-fears.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
 
Roy, Olivier. (2015). “There Are More French Muslims Working For French Security Than For Al 
Qaeda”. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olivier-roy/paris-attack-muslim-
cliches_b_6445582.html accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
Salahi, Reem. (2009). “Muslim Youth Radicalization or Politically Correct Islamophobia?”. Huffington 
Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reem-salahi/muslim-youth-radicalizati_b_405055.html, accessed 
on 03 July 2017. 
 
Samuel, Henry. (2014). “Islamist plot to blow up Eiffel Tower, Louvre, and nuclear power plant foiled, 
say French police”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10956636/Islamist-plot-to-blow-up-Eiffel-
Tower-Louvre-and-nuclear-power-plant-foiled-say-French-police.html accessed on 12 June 2017. 
 
Sanchez, Raf. (2016). “Israelis urge to boycott Ikea in diplomatic row with Sweden”. The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/12101735/Israelis-urged-to-boycott-
Ikea-in-diplomatic-row-with-Sweden.html accessed on 28 June 2017.  
 
Satloff, Robert. (2016). “Words Matter in the Fight Against Islamism”. The American Interest. 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/01/words-matter-in-the-fight-against-islamism/ 
accessed on 25 April 2017 
Scalea, Daniele. (2016). “In regard to terrorists on boats”. [Italian]. Huffington Post. 




Scarborough, Rowan. (2015). “France’s ethnic apartheid: ‘Separate Islamic societies’ breed 
malcontent, radicalism”. The Washington Times. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/25/frances-ethnic-apartheid-separate-islamic-
societie/?page=all accessed on 23 June 2017.   
 
Schianchi, Francesca. (2017). “110 fighters from Italy departed to fight with ISIS”. [Italian] Il Secolo 
XIX. http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2017/01/06/ASlOTlqF-combattere_fighter_foreign.shtml 
accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Schofield, Hugh. (2012). “Did France ignore the Islamic radical threat?” BBC News. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17476996, accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Sengupta, Kim. (2015). “Charlie Hebdo cover: We are not Charlie”. The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-cover-we-are-not-charlie-say-the-
dissenting-voices-angered-further-by-french-solidarity-9976166.html accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Serafini, Marta. (2017). “Isis, 17 are the foreign fighters already returned to Italy”. [Italian] Il Corriere 
della Sera. http://www.corriere.it/politica/17_gennaio_05/isis-sono-17-foreign-fighters-gia-rientrati-
italia-04d07d02-d390-11e6-a965-24e9ebbeaea2.shtml accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Sherwood, Harriet et al. (2015). “Schoolgirl jihadis”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirl-jihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-
isis-iraq-syria accessed on 24 June 2017. 
 
Slack, James. (2011). “40 UK universities are now breeding grounds for terror”. The Daily Mail. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1394625/40-UK-universities-breeding-grounds-terror.html 
accessed on 27 June 2017. 
 
Slawson, Nicola. (2017). “Finland knife attacker ‘targeted women’”. The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/19/finland-police-believe-turku-knife-attack-was-
terrorism accessed on 29 August 2017. 
 
Sparrow, Andrew. (2014). “Tony’s Blair speech calling for global drive to fight Islamist extremism”. 
The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2014/apr/23/tony-blairs-speech-calling-for-
west-to-fight-islamist-extremism-reaction-politics-live-blog, accessed on 24 June 2017.  
 
Stabile, Giordano. (2015). “New threats to Italy in a new ISIS’s video”. [Italian]. La Stampa, 
http://www.lastampa.it/2015/04/14/esteri/nuove-minacce-allitalia-in-un-video-dellisis-
s2c8mYqTa6OIVpEP4aLCdI/pagina.html accessed on 25 April 2017.  
 
Stakelbeck, Eric. (2010). “UK Muslim Leader: Islam Not A Religion of Peace”. CBN News. 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2010/March/UK-Muslim-Leader-Islam-Not-a-Religion-of-Peace/ 
accessed on 21 June 2017. 
 
Stavrou, David. (2010). “The debate over Swedish troops in Afghanistan”. The Local. 
http://www.thelocal.se/20101215/30858 accessed on 24 May 2017. 
 
  290 
Stevens, Claire. (2014). “I was a liberal atheist. And then my stepson found radical Islam”. The 
Spectator. http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9329742/my-boy-the-radical-muslim/ accessed on 21 
June 2017. 
 
Taylor, Adam (2015). “The Islamic State threatens to come to Rome; Italians respond with travel 
advice”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/02/20/the-
islamic-state-threatens-to-come-to-rome-italians-respond-with-travel-advice/  accessed on 25 April 
2017.   
 
Tonacci, Fabio. (2017). “London attack, third terrorist identified: Italian-Moroccan Youssef Zaghba” 
[Italian]. La Repubblica. http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/06/06/news/londra_attentato-167383564/ 
accessed on 10 June 2017. 
 
Travis, Alan. (2008). “MI5 challenges views on terrorism in Britain”. The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1 accessed on 25 May 2017. 
 
Turner, Camilla. (2014). “Government donation to Muslim Charity Forum denounced as ‘madness’”. 
The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11114599/Government-donation-to-Muslim-
Charities-Forum-denounced-as-madness.html accessed on 15 May 2017. 
 
Ulrich, Andreas. (2016). “Germany Attackers Had Contact with Suspected IS Members”. Der Spiegel. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/attackers-in-germany-had-contact-with-suspected-is-
members-a-1106271.html accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Vidal, Ava. (2014). “Islamophobia: ‘people call us terrorist, grab our veil, want us dead’”. The 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/10804880/Islamophobia-People-grab-
our-veils-call-us-terrorists-and-want-us-dead-What-its-really-like-to-be-a-Muslim-woman-in-
Britain.html accessed on 26 June 2017. 
 
Vinocur, Nicholas. (2014). “Anti-Israeli Protesters Rally Across France”. Haaretz. 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.606036 accessed on 16 June 2017. 
 
Viviano, Francesco. (2015). “Lampedusa, a returning terrorist on a boat”. [Italian]. La Repubblica, 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/11/08/news/lampedusa_su_un_barcone_terrorista_di_ritorno-
126872333/ Cristina accessed on 25 April 2017. 
 
Ward, Clarissa. (2014). “Campaigning for Isis in the West”. CBS News. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/recruiting-for-isis-60-minutes/ accessed on 28 June 2017. 
 
Weaver, Matthew, Farrer Martin. (2016). “Ansbach bombing: attacker pledged allegiance to Isis, says 
official”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/25/ansbach-explosion-
german-town-deliberate-blast-latest accessed on 23 June 2017. 
 
Younge, Gary. (2011). “Europe’s Homegrown Terrorists”. The Nation. 
http://www.thenation.com/article/162270/europes-homegrown-terrorists#, accessed on 03 July 2017. 
 
  291 
Zogby, James. (2011). “Peter King Note: Islamophobia Can Create Radicalization”. Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/peter-king-note-islamopho_b_831790.html, accessed on 
03 July 2017. 
